The phenomenology of mind

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EDITED BY J. H. MUIRHEAD, LL.D.

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HEGEL
THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIND

Digitized by the Internet Archive

in 2011 with funding from

University of Toronto

http://www.archive.org/details/phenomenologyof02hege

THE

PHENOMENOLOGY
OF MIND

G. W. F. HEGEL

TRANSLATED, WITH AN INTRODUCTION AND NOTES,

BY

J. B. BAILLIE

Kal TovTO kpyov iari, to voiTJarai ck tQv avTui -yvwpijxuTipuiv

TO. Tri \!/vaeL yvüpi/xa avTU) yvüpi/xa.

Kal lariv ij v6r]ai.s uorjcrecos vÖTiffis.

Aristotle, Metaphysics.

VOL. II

LONDON
SWAN SONNENSCHEIN & CO., Limited

NEW YORK: THE MACMILLAN COMPANY
1910

HE INSTITUTE OF ¥ED!AP/AL STUDIES

ID ELMSLEY PLACE
Tö«CiMTO 5, CAi^ADA.

FEB 2 7 1932

Volume II

CONTENTS

(BE). SPIRIT
VI. Spirit .......

A. Objective Spirit : the ethical order .

a. The ethical world : law divine and human :
man and woman ....

[1 Nation and family.
(«) Human law.
(6) Divine law.

(c) The claims of the individual.
2 The process involved in these two laws,
(o) Government as positive power, war as

negative.
(6) The ethical relation of man and woman

as brother and sister,
(c) The interfusion of the two laws.
3. The ethical world as infinitude or self-
complete totality.]

h. Ethical action : knowledge human and Divine :

guilt and Destiny ....

[1. Contradiction of individuality with its essence.

2. Opposite characteristics of ethical action.

3. Dissolution of the ethical being.]

c. Legal status .....
[1. Personality.

2. Contingency of the person.

3. The lord of the world ; the absolute person.]

PAOB

429-682
430-435
436-485

440-458

460-477

479-485

VI

Contents

B. Spirit in self-estrangement : The discipline

of culture and civilisation . . . 486-605

I. The world of spirit in self-estrangement . 493-545
a. Culture and its sphere of reality . 494-533

[(1) Culture as the estrangement of natural
existence,
(rt) Goodness and badness : state-power

and wealth.
(6) The cleavage of self-consciousness :

nobility [and baseness,
(c) Service and advice.
(2) Language as the actuality ^of culture.
(a) Flattery.

(&) The language of distraction,
(c) The vanity of culture.]
h. Belief and pure Insight . . . 534-545

[(1) The idea of belief.

(2) The object of belief.

(3) The rationality of pure insight.]

II. Enlightenment .... 546-591

a. The struggle of enlightenment with

superstition .... 549-581

[(1) The negative attitude of insight to-
wards belief.

(2) The doctrine of enlightenment.

(3) The rights of enlightenment.]

h. The truth of enlightenment . . 582-591

[(1) Pure thought and pure matter.

(2) The sphere of utility.

(3) Self -certainty.]

Ill, Absolute freedom and terror . . 592-605

[The awakening of free subjectivity.]

C. Spirit certain of itself : Morality . . 606-682

a The moral view of the world . . . 610-623

Contents vii

PAGE

[(1) The postulated harmony of duty and reality.

(2) The ;divine lawgiver and the imperfect

moral consciousness.

(3) The moral world as a presented idea.]

h. Dissemblance ..... 625-639
[(1) The contradictions in the moral view of the
world.

(2) The resolution of morality into its opposite.

(3) The truth of moral self-consciousness].

c. Conscience : the " beautiful soul " : Evil and

the forgiveness of it . . . . 642-682

[(1) Conscience as the freedom of the self within

itself. The reality of duty : conviction.
(2) The universality of conscience.
(.3) Evil and forgiveness.]

(CC). RELIGION . . 683-799

VII. Keligion in General . . . . 685-696

A. Natural Religion .... 698-711
a. God as Light.

h. Plants and Animals as religious objects.
c. The artificer.

B. Religion in the form of Art . . . 712-758
a. The abstract work of art.

[(1) The representation of the gods.

(2) The hymn.

(3) The cult.]

h. The living work of art : the human form

as an embodiment of beauty.
c. The spiritual work of art : art expressive of

social life.
[(1) Epic.

(2) Tragedy.

(3) Comedy.]

.eis

viii Contents

PAOE

C. Eevealed Eeligion .... 759-799

[1. The presuppositions requisite for the notion
of revealed religion.

2. The ultimate content of revealed religion :

the reality of the incarnation of God
(a) in an individual,
(6) in a religious communion.

3. Development of the notion of revealed

religion. The Absolute as a trinity :
the Absolute as externalised in the world :
the Absolute as fulfilled in a spiritual
kingdom.]
(DD). ABSOLUTE KNOWLEDGE . 800-823

VIII. Absolute Knowledge .... 800-823
[1. The ultimate content of the Self which
knows itself as all existence.

2. Systematic Science as the self-comprehen-

sion of Spirit.

3. The return of Spirit so comprehended to

immediate existence]

PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIND

(BB)
SPIRIT *

[In the preceding section there is analysed the attempt on the part of
individuality to operate as its own legislator and judge of laws holding
for individuals. Individuality may claim the privilege of enunciating
laws universal in character but having their source and inspiration solely in
the single individual. Such laws can at best only be regulative and
cannot be constitutive of the substance of individuality ; for the sub-
stance of individuality necessarily involves other individuals within it.
In short individuality is itself only realised as a part of a concrete whole
of individuals : its life is drawn from common life in and with others.
To attempt to enunciate laws from itself as if it could create the conditions
of its own inherent universality can only issue in one result : laws are
furnished without the content which gives those laws any meaning, or else
the laws and the content remain from first to last external to one another.
But if laws are purely formal, they cease to be " laws," i.e. constitutive
conditions of individuality. Hence the attempt above described is sure
to break down by its own futility. What is wanted to give the laws
meaning is the concrete substance of social life : and when this concrete
substance is provided ipso facto the attempt of individuality to create
laws disappears, for these laws are already found in operation in social life.
Only such laws have reality. But this involves the further step that in-
dividuality is only realised, only finds its true universal content, in and
with the order of a society. Here alone is individuality what it is in
truth, at once a particular focus of self-consciousness, and a realisation of
universal mind. This condition where individuality is conscious of itself
only in and with others, and conscious of the common life as its own, is
the stage of spiritual existence. Spiritual existence and social life thus go
together. The following section begins the analysis of this phase of
experience, which extends from the simplest form of sociality — the Family
— up to the highest experience of universal mind — Eeligiou.

The immediately succeeding section may be taken as tlie keystone of
the whole arch of experience traversed in the Phenomenology. Here it is
pointed out that all the preceding phases of experience have not merely
been preparing the way for what is to follow, but that the various aspects,
hitherto treated as separate moments of experience, are iu reality abstrac-
tions from the life of concrete spirit now to be discussed and analysed.

It is noteworthy that from this point onwards the argument is less
negative in its result either directly or indirectly, and is more systematic
and constructive. This is no doubt largely because hitherto individual
mind as such has been under review, and this is an abstraction from social
mind or spiritual existence.]

* The term "Spirit" seems better to render the word "Geist" used
here, than the word " mind '' would do. Up to this stage of experience
the word "mind" is sufficient to convey the meaning. But spirit is
mind at a much higher level of existence.

VOL. II.— B 429

VI

SPIRIT

REASON is spirit, when its certainty of being all reality
has been raised to the level of truth, and reason
is consciously aware of itself as its own world, and of the
world as itself. The development of spirit was indicated
in the immediately preceding movement of mind,
where the object of consciousness, the category pure
and simple, rose to be the notion of reason. When
reason " observes,'' this pure unity of ego and existence,
the unity of subjectivity and objectivity, of for-itself-ness
and in-itself-ness — this unity is immanent, has the
character of implicitness or of being ; and consciousness
of reason finds itself. But the true nature of " observa-
tion " is rather the transcendence of this instinct of
finding its object lying directly at hand, and passing
beyond this unconscious state of existence. The directly
perceived {angeschaut) category, the thing simply
"found," enters consciousness as the self-existence of the
ego, — ego, which now knows itself in the objective reality,
and knows itself there as the self. But this feature of
the category, viz. of being for-itself as opposed to
being immanent within itself, is equally one-sided,
and a moment that cancels itself. The category
therefore gets for consciousness the character which it
possesses in its universal truth — it is self-contained

430

Sfirit 431

essential reality {an und fürsichseyndes Wesen). This
character, still abstract, which constitutes the nature
of absolute fact, of "fact itself," is to begin with
" spiritual reahty " {das geistige Wesen) ; and its mode of
consciousness is here a formal knowledge of that reahty,
a knowledge which is occupied with the varied and
manifold content thereof. This consciousness is still,
in point of fact, a particular individual distinct from
the general substance, and either prescribes arbitrary
laws or pretends to possess within its own knowledge
as such the laws as they absolutely are {an und für sich),
and takes itself to be the power that passes judgment on
them. Or again, looked at from the side of the sub-
stance, this is seen to be the self-contained and self-
sufficient spiritual reahty, which is not yet a conscious-
ness of its own self. The self-contained and self-suffi-
cient reality, however, which is at once aware of being
actual in the form of consciousness and presents itself
to itself, is Spirit.

Its essential spirtual being {Wesen) has been above
designated as the ethical substance ; spirit, however,
is concrete ethical actuahty {Wirklichkeit). Spirit is the
self of the actual consciousness, to which spirit stands
opposed, or rather which appears over against itself, as
an objective actual world that has lost, however, all
sense of strangeness for the self, just as the self has lost
all sense of having a dependent or independent existence
by itself, cut off and separated from that world.
Being substance and universal self-identical permanent
essence {Wesen), spirit is the immovable irreducible
basis and the starting point for the action of all and
every one ; it is their purpose and their goal, because
the ideally imphcit nature {Ansich) of all self-conscious-

432 Phenomenology of Mind

nesses. This substance is likewise the universal product,
wrought and created by the action of each and all, and
giving them unity and Hkeness and identity of meaning ;
for it is self-existence (Fürsichseyn), the self, action.
Qita substance, spirit is unbending righteous self-same-
ness, self-identity; but qua for-itself, self-existent and
self-determined (Filrsichseyn), its continuity is resolved
into discrete elements, it is the self-sacrificing soul of
goodness, the benevolent essential nature, in which
each fulfils his own special work, rends the continuum
of the universal substance, and takes his own share
of it. This resolution of the essence into individual
forms is just the aspect of the separate action and the
separate self of all the several individuals ; it is the
moving soul of the ethical substance, the resultant
universal spiritual being. Just because this substance
is a being resolved in the self, it is not a lifeless
essence, but actual and alive.

Spirit is thus the self-supporting absolutely real
ultimate being (Wesen). All the previous modes of
consciousness are abstractions from it : they are
constituted by the fact that spirit analyses itself,
distinguishes its moments, and halts at each individual
mode in turn. The isolating of such moments pre-
supposes spirit itself and requires spirit for its subsist-
ence, in other words, this isolation of modes only exists
within spirit, which is existence. Taken in isolation
they appear as if they existed as they stand. But their
advance and return upon their real ground and essential
being showed that they are merely moments or vanishing
quantities; and this essential being is precisely this move-
ment and resolution of these moments. Here, where
spirit, the reflection of these moments into itself, has

Sfirit 433

become established, our reflection may briefly recall
them in this connexion : they were consciousness, self-
consciousness, and reason. Spirit is thus Consciousness
in general, which contains sense- experience, perception
and understanding, so far as in analysing its own self it
holds fast by the moment of being a reahty objective
to itself, and by abstraction eUminates the fact that this
reality is its own self objectified, its own self-existence.
When again it holds fast by the other abstract moment
produced by analysis, the fact that its object is its own
self become objective to itself, is its self-existence, then it
is Self -consciousness. But as immediate consciousness of
its inherent and its exphcit being, of its immanent self
and its objective self, as the unity of consciousness and
self-consciousness, it is that type of consciousness
which has Reason : it is the consciousness which, as
the word " have " indicates, has the object in a shape
which is implicitly and inherently rational, or is cate-
gorised, but in such a way that the object is not yet
taken by the consciousness in question to have the
value of a category. Spirit here is that consciousness
from the immediately preceding consideration of which
we have arrived at the present stage. Finally, when
this reason, which spirit '' has," is seen by spirit to be
reason which actually is, to be reason which is actual
in spirit, and is its world, then spirit has come to its
truth ; it is spirit, the essential nature of ethical life
actually existent.

Spirit, so far as it is the immediate truth, is the
ethical hfe of a nation : — the individual, which is a
world. It has to advance to the consciousness of
what it is immediately ; it has to abandon and transcend
the beautiful simpHcity of ethical Hfe, and get to a

VOL. II,— C

434 Phenomenology of Mind

knowledge of itself by passing through a series of stages
and forms. The distinction between these and those
that have gone before consists in their being real
spiritual individualities {Geister), actualities proper, and
instead of being forms of consciousness, they are forms
of a world.

The living ethical world is spirit in its truth. As it
first comes to an abstract knowledge of its essential
nature, ethical life {Sittlichkeit) is destroyed in the
formal universahty of right or legahty {Recht). Spirit,
being now sundered within itself, traces one of its worlds
in the element of its objectivity as in a crass solid
actuahty ; this is the realm of Culture and Civilisation ;
while over against this in the element of thought is
traced the world of BeHef or Faith, the realm of the
Inner Life and Truth {Wesen). Both worlds, however,
when in the grip of the notion — when grasped by
spirit which, after this loss of self through self-
diremption, penetrates itself, — are thrown into con-
fusion and revolutionised through individual Insight
{Einsicht), and the general diffusion of this attitude,
known as the " Enhghtenment " {Aufklärung). And the
realm which had thus been divided and expanded into
the "present " and the "remote beyond,'' into^the "here"
and the " yonder," turns back into self-consciousness.
This self-consciousness, again, taking now the form of
Morality (the inner moral Hfe) apprehends itself as the
essential truth, and the real essence as its actual self :
no longer puts its world and its ground and basis away
outside itself, but lets everything fade into itself, and
in the form of Conscience {Gewissen) is spirit sure and
certain {gewiss) of itself.

The ethical world, the world rent asunder into the

Spirit 435

" here " and the " yonder," and the moral point of view
(moralische Weltanschauung) are, then, individual forms
of spirit [Geister) whose process and whose return
into the self of spirit, a self simple and self-existent
(fürsichseynd), will be developed. When these attain
their goal and final result, the actual self-consciousness
of Absolute Spirit will make its appearance.

Objective Spirit,* — The Ethical Order!

Spirit, in its ultimate simple truth, is consciousness,
and breaks asunder its moments from one another.
An act divides spirit into spiritual substance on the
one side, and consciousness of the substance on the
other ; and divides the substance as well as conscious-
ness. The substance appears in the shape of a universal
inner nature and purpose standing in contrast to itself
qua particularised reality. The middle or mediating
term, infinite in character, is self-consciousness, which,
being imflicitly the unity of itself and that substance,
becomes so, now, exphcitly {für sich), unites the universal
inner nature and its particular realisation, raises the
latter to the former and becomes ethical action : and,
on the other hand, brings the former down to the latter
and carries out the purpose, the substance presented
merely in thought. In this way it brings to light the
unity of its self and the substance, and produces this
unity in the form of a "work" done, and thus as actual
concrete fact {Wirklichkeit).

When consciousness breaks up into these elements,
the simple substance has in part preserved the attitude
of opposition to self-consciousness ; in part it thereby
manifests in itself the very nature of consciousness,
which consists in distinguishing its own content within

* Der wahre Geist. t Sittlichkeit.

436

Objective Sfirit 437

itself, — manifests a world articulated into separate
areas. The substance is thus an ethical being
split up into distinct elemental forms, a human and
a divine law. In the same way, the self-conscious-
ness appearing over against the substance assigns itself,
in virtue of its inner nature, to one of these powers,
and, qua involving knowledge, gets broken up into
ignorance of what it is doing on the one hand,
and knowledge of this on the other, a knowledge which
for that reason proves a deception. It learns, therefore,
through its own act at once the contradictory nature of
those powers into which the imier substance divided it-
self, and their mutual overthrow, as well as the contra-
diction between its knowledge of the ethical character of
its act and what is truly and essentially ethical, and so
finds its own destruction. In point of fact, however,
the ethical substance has by this process become actual
concrete self-consciousness : in other words this parti-
cular self has become self-sufficient and self-dependent
(An und FürsicJiseyenden), but precisely thereby the
ethical order has been overthrown and destroyed.

The Ethical World: Law Human and
Divine: Man and Woman

[The first step in the analysis of spirit is to take spirit as a realised actual
social order, immediately given as a historical fact, and present directly to
the minds of the individuals composing it. This is social life as an estab-
lished routine of human adjustments, where the natural characteristics and
constitution of its moral individuals are absorbed and built into the single
substance of the living social whole. It is spirit as an objectively
embodied whole of essentially spiritual individuals, without any con-
sciousness of opposition to one another or to the whole, and with an
absolute unbroken sense of their own security and fulfilment within
the substance of social mind. It is spirit at the level of naive acqui-
escence in the law and order of conventional life.

But such a self-complete type of experience has various levels of
realisation. It cannot exist except through the union of opposing
elements ; and the central principle of all experience, self-consciousness,
which assumes here such a concrete form, has abundant material on which
to exercise its function of creating and uniting distinctions. The first
level is determined by the fact that the substance of social life is consti-
tuted out of the quasi-natural phenomena of human genus and species,
of race and nationality, on the one hand, and the purely natural element
of specialised individual sex on the other. These two aspects go together;
the sex-relations of individuals maintain race and nationality, the nation
lives in and through its sexually distinct individuals. The social order as
an order is realised and maintained in the medium of these elements.
The fact that this order is an order of universal mind gives it a perma-
nence, an inviolability, an absoluteness, which are inseparable from it,
so inseparable that the order is looked on as having its roots in the
Absolute Mind, and as deriving its authority from it. The social order on
this asj^ect consists of a divinely established and divinely sanctioned
regime ; the gods are the guardians of the city, of the hearth and the
home. On the other hand the expression of this order varies, and is
enunciated from time to time in the history of a community. The
order in this sense is made by man ; the law of the social order thus
becomes a human law, determined by human conditions and human ends ;
it is a round of conventions and customs. These two forms of order are
inseparable in the life of a community, and they subsist together and side

438

Objective Spirit 439

by side at this level of social consciousness. They may lead to conflict in
the life of the individual in the community, and have to be reconciled by
force or otherwise ; and they become associated and connected with the
fundamental diflferences of individuality above referred to.

The analysis of this level of social life constituted as above furnishes
the argument of the following section.]

The Ethical World : Law Human and
Divine : Man and Woman

The simple substance of spirit, being consciousness,
divides itself into parts. In other words, just as con-
sciousness of abstract sensuous existence passes over
into perception, so does immediate certainty of real
ethical existence ; and just as for sense perception
bare " being " becomes a " thing " with many proper-
ties, so for ethical perception a given act becomes
a reality involving many ethical relations. For the
former, again, the unnecessary plurahty of proper-
ties concentrates itself into the form of an essential
opposition between individual and universal ; and
still more for the latter, which is consciousness puri-
fied and substantial, the plurality of ethical moments
is reduced to and assumes a twofold form, that of a law
of individuality and a law of universality. Each of
these areas or " masses " of the substance remains, how-
ever, spirit in its entirety. If in sense-perception
" things " have no other substantial reahty than the
two determinations of individual and imiversal, these
determinations express, in the present instance, merely
the superficial opposition of both sides to one an-
other.

Individuahty, in the case of the subject {Wesen) we
are here considering, has the significance of self-con-
sciousness in general, not of any particular consciousness
we care to take. The ethical substance is, thus, in this

440

The Ethical World 441

determination actual concrete substance, Absolute Spirit
realised in the pluraKty of distinct consciousnesses
definitely existing. It [this spirit] is the community
{Gemeinwesen) which, as we entered the stage of the
practical embodiment of reason in general, came
before us as the absolute and ultimate reahty,
and which here comes objectively before itself in its
true nature as a conscious ethical reahty {Wesen) and
as the essential reahty, for that mode of conscious-
ness we are now dealing with. It is spirit which is
for itself, since it maintains itself by being reflected in
the minds of the component individuals ; and which
is in itself 01 substance, since it preserves them within
itself. Qua actual substance, that spirit is a Nation
( Volk) ; qua concrete consciousness, it is the Citizens of
a nation. This consciousness has its essential being in
simple spirit, and is certain of itself in the actual
reahsation of this spirit, in the entire nation ; it has
its truth there directly, not therefore in something
unreal, but in a spirit which exists and makes itself
felt.

This spirit can be named Human Law, because it "-^3
has its being essentially in the form of self-con-
scious actuahty. In the form of universahty, that
spirit is law known to everybody, famihar and recog-
nised, and is every-day present Customary Convention
{Sitte) ; in the form of particularity it is the concrete
certainty of itself in any and every individual ; and the
certainty of itself as a single individuahty is that spirit
in the form of Government. Its true and complete
nature is seen in its authoritative vahdity openly and
unmistakably manifested, an existence which takes
the form of unconstrained independent objective fact,

442 Phenomenology of Mind

and is immediately apprehended with conscious cer-
tainty in this form.

Over against this power and pubHcity of the ethical
secular human order there appears, however, another
power, the Divine Law. For the ethical power of the
state, being the movement of self-conscious action,
finds its opposition in the simple immediate essen-
tial being of the moral order ; qua actual concrete
universality, it is a force exerted against the indepen-

■^ dence of the individual ; and, qua actuality in general,
*^ it finds inherent in that essential being something other
than the power of the state.

We mentioned before that each of the opposite
ways in which the ethical substance exists, contains
that substance in its entirety, and contains all moments
of its contents. If, then, the community is that sub-
stance in the form of self-consciously reahsed action,
the other side has the form of immediate or directly
existent substance. The latter is thus, on the one
hand, the inner principle (Begriff) or universal possibility
of the ethical order in general, but, on the other hand,
contains within it also the moment of self-consciousness.
This moment which expresses the ethical order in this
element of immediacy or mere being, which, in other
words, is an immediate consciousness of self (both as
regards its essence and its particular thisness) in an
"other," — and hence, is a natural ethical community —
this is the Family. The family, as the inner indwelhng
principle of sociality operating in an unconscious way,
stands opposed to its own actuahty when exphcitly con-
scious ; as the basis of the actuahty of a nation, it stands
in contrast to the nation itself ; as the immediate ethical

1U existence, it stands over against the ethical order

The Ethical World 443

which shapes and preserves itself by work for universal
ends ; the Penates of the family stand in contrast to
the universal spirit.

Although the ethical existence of the family has the
character of immediacy, it is within itself an ethical
entity, but not so far as it is the natural relation of its
component members, or so far as their connexion is one
immediately holding between individual concrete beings.
For the ethical element is intrinsically universal, and
this relation estabhshed by nature is essentially just
as much a spiritual fact, and is only ethical by being
spiritual. Let us see wherein its peculiar ethical char-
acter consists.

In the first place, because the ethical element is
the intrinsically universal element, the ethical relation
between the members of the family is not that of senti-
ment or the relationship of love. The ethical element in
this case seems bound to be placed in the relation of the
individual member of the family to the entire family
as the real substance, so that the purpose of his action
and the content of his actuality are taken from this
substance, are derived solely from the family hfe.
But the conscious purpose which dominates the action
of this whole, so far as that purpose concerns that
whole, is itself the individual member. The procuring
and maintaining of power and wealth turn, in part,
merely on needs and wants, and are a matter that has
to do with desire ; in part, they become in their higher
aspect something which is merely of mediate significance.
This aspect does not fall within the family itself, but
concerns what is truly universal, the community ; it
acts rather in a negative way on the family, and consists
in setting the individual outside the family, in subduing

444 Phenomenology of Mind

his merely natural existence and his mere particularity
and so drawing him on towards virtue, towards living
in and for the whole. The positive purpose peculiar
to the family is the individual as such. Now in order
that this relationship may be ethical, neither the
individual who does an act nor he to whom the act
refers, must show any trace of contingency such as
obtains in rendering some particular help or service.
The content of the ethical act must be substantial in
character, or must be entire and universal ; hence it
can only stand in relation to the entire individual, to
the individual qua universal. And this, again, must not
be taken as if it were merely in idea that an act of
service furthered his entire happiness, whereas the
service, taken as an immediate or concrete act,
only does something particular in regard to him.
Nor must we think that the service really takes
him as its object, and deals with him as a whole,
in a series of efforts, as if it were a process of education,
and produces him as a kind of work, where apart from
the purpose, which operates in a negative way on the
family, the real act has merely a limited content.
Finally, just as little should we take it that the service
rendered is a help in time of need, by which in truth
the entire individual is saved ; for it is itself an entirely
casual act which can as well be as not be, the occasion
of which is an ordinary actuality. The act, then,
which embraces the entire existence of the blood rela-
tion, does not concern the citizen, for he does not belong
to the family, nor does it deal with one who is going
to be a citizen and so will cease to have the significance
of a mere particular individual : it has as its object and
content this specific individual belonging to the family,

The Ethical World 445

takes him as a universal being, divested of his sensuous,
or particular reality. The act no longer concerns the
living but the dead, one who has passed through the
long sequence of his broken and diversified existence
and gathered up his being into its one completed
embodiment, who has Hfted himself out of the unrest of
a life of chance and change into the peace of simple
universality. Because it is only as citizen that he is
real and substantial, the individual, when not a citizen,
and belonging to the family, is merely unreal insub-
stantial shadow.

This condition of universality, which the individual
as such reaches, is mere being, death ; it is the immediate
issue of a natural process, and is not the action of a
conscious mind. The duty of the member of a family
is on that account to attach this aspect too, in order
that this last phase of being also, (this universal being),
may not belong to nature alone, and remain something
irrational, but may be something actually done, and the
right of consciousness be asserted in it. Or rather the
significance of the act is that, because in truth the peace ^'^^
and universality of a self-conscious being does not belong
to nature, the apparent claim which natm^e has made to
act in this way, may be given up and the truth reinstated.

What nature did in the individuaFs case, concerns
the aspect in which his process of becoming universal
is manifested as the movement of an existent. It
takes effect no doubt within the ethical community,
and has this in view as its purpose : death is the fulfil-
ment and final task which the individual as such under-
takes on its behalf. But so far as he is essentially a
particular individual, it is an accident that his death
was connected directly with his labour for the universal

446 Phenomenology of Mind

whole, and was the outcome of his toil ; partly because
if it was so, it is the natural course of the negativity
of the individual qua existent, in which consciousness
does not return into itself and become self-conscious;
or, again, because, since the process of the existent con-
sists in becoming cancelled and transcended and attaining
the stage of independent self-existence, death is the
aspect of diremption, where the self-existence, which is
obtained, is something other than that being which
entered on the process.

Because the ethical order is spirit in its immediate
truth, those aspects into which its conscious life breaks
up, fall also into this form of immediacy ; and the
individual's particularity passes over into this abstract
negativity, which, being in itself without consolation or
reconcilement, must receive them essentially through
a concrete and external act.

Blood-relationship therefore supplements the abstract
natural process by adding to it the process of conscious-
ness, by interrupting the work of nature, and rescuing
the blood-relation from destruction ; or better, because
destruction, the passing into mere being, is necessary,
it takes upon itself the act of destruction.

Through this it comes about that the universal being,
the sphere of death, is also something which has returned
into itself, something self-existent ; the powerless bare
particular unity is raised to universal individuahty.
The dead individual, by his having detached and
liberated his being from his action or his negative unity,
is an empty particular, merely existing passively for
some other, at the mercy of every lower irrational
organic agency, and the [chemical, physical] forces
of abstract material elements, both of which are now

The Ethical World 447

stronger than himself, the former on account of the hfe
which they have, the latter on account of their negative
nature.* The family keeps away from the dead this
dishonouring of him by the desires of unconscious
organic agencies and by abstract elements, puts its
own action in place of theirs, and weds the relative
to the bosom of the earth, the elemental individu-
ahty that passes not away. Thereby the family makes
the dead a member of a community t which prevails over
and holds under control the powers of the particular
material elements and the lower hving creatures, which
sought to have their way with the dead and destroy him.
This last duty thus accomphshes the complete
divine law, or constitutes the positive ethical act
towards the given individual. Every other relation
towards him which does not remain at the level of love,
but is ethical, belongs to human law, and has the nega-
tive significance of hfting the individual above the con-
finement within the natural community to which he
belongs as a concrete individual. But, now, though
human right has for its content and power the actual
ethical substance consciously aware of itself, the entire
nation, while divine right and law derive theirs from
the particular individual who is beyond the actual, yet
he is still not without power. His power lies in the
abstract pure universal, the shadowy individual, which <^ft m.*Kt«uu^
seizes upon the individuahty that cuts itself loose from
the element and constitutes the self-conscious reahty of
the nation, and draws it back into the pure abstraction
which is the essential nature of the shadowy individual,
while at the same time the latter is its ultimate ground

* The description here refers to the process of bodily corruption.
t i.e. the earth ?

448 Phenomenology of Mind

as well. How this power is made explicit in the nation
itself will come out more fully as we proceed.

Now in the one law as in the other there are differences
and stages. For since these laws involve the element
of consciousness in both cases, distinction is developed

'i,Tit within themselves : and this is just what constitutes
the peculiar process of their life. The consideration of
these differences brings out the way they operate, and
the kind of self-consciousness at work in both the uni-
versal essential principles {Wesen) of the ethical world,
as also their connection and transition into one an-
other.

The community, the higher law whose validity is
open to the Hght of day, makes its concrete activity
felt in government; for in government it is an
individual whole. Government is concrete actual spirit
reflected into itself, the self pure and simple of the
entire ethical substance. This simple force allows,
indeed, the community to unfold and expand into
its component members, and to give each part
subsistence and self-existence of its own {Fiirsichseyn).
Spirit finds in this way its realisation or its objective
existence, and the family is the medium in which this

* "realisation takes effect. But spirit is at the same time
the force of the whole, combining these parts again
within the unity which negates them, giving them
the feehng of their want of independence, and keep-
ing them aware that their life only Hes in the whole.
The community may thus, on the one hand, organise
itself into the systems of property and of personal
independence, of personal right and right in things ;
and, on the other hand, articulate the various ways of
working for what in the first instance are particular

The Ethical World 449

ends — those of gain and enjojnuent — into their own
special guilds and associations, and may thus make
them independent. The spirit of universal assem-
blage and association is the single and simple prin-
ciple, and the negative essential factor at work in the
segregation and isolation of these systems. In order
not to let them get rooted and settled in this isolation
and thus break up the whole into fragments and let
the common spirit evaporate, government has from
time to time to shake them to the very centre by War.
By this means it confounds the order that has been
estabhshed and arranged, and violates that right to
independence, while the individuals, (who, being ab-
sorbed therein, get adrift from the whole, striving after
inviolable self-existence (Fürsichseyn) and personal
security), are made, by the task thus imposed on
them by government, to feel the power of their lord
and master, death. By thus breaking up the form
of fixed stability, spirit guards the ethical order from lif
sinking into merely natural existence, preserves
the self of which it is conscious, and raises that
self to the level of freedom and its own powers. The
negative essential being shows itself to be the might
proper of the community and the force it has for self-
maintenance. The community therefore finds the true
principle and corroboration of its power in the inner
nature of divine law, and in the kingdom of the nether
world.

The divine law which holds sway in the family has
also on its side distinctions within itself, the relations
among which make up the Hving process of its reahsation.
Amongst the three relationships, however, of husband
and wife, parents and children, brothers and sisters, the

VOL. II. D

450 Phenomenology of Mind

relationship of husband and wife is to begin with the
primary and immediate form in which one conscious-
ness recognises itself in another, and in which each
finds reciprocal recognition. Being natural self-know-
ledge, knowledge of self on the basis of nature, and
not on that of ethical life, it merely represents and
typifies in a figure the fife of spirit, and is not spirit
itself actually reahsed. This figurative representation,
however, gets its realisation in an other than it is.
This relationship, therefore, finds itself realised not in
itself as such, but in the child — an other, in whose
coming into being that relationship consists, and with
which it passes away. And this change from one
generation onwards to another is permanent in and as
the life of a nation.

The reverent devotion {Pietät) of husband and wife
towards one another is thus mixed up with a natural
relation and with feeling, and their relationship is not
inherently self- complete ; similarly, too, the second rela-
tionship, the reverent devotion of parents and children
to one another. The devotion of parents towards their
children is afiected and disturbed just by its being
consciously realised in what is external to themselves
(viz. the children), and by seeing them become some-
thing on their own account without this returning to
the parents : independent existence on the part of the
children remains a foreign reality, a reality all their
own. The devotion of children, again, towards their
parents is conversely affected by their coming into being
from, or having their essential nature in, what is external
to themselves (viz. the parents) and passes away ;
3^ (J and by their attaining independent existence and a
self-consciousness of their own solely through separation

The Ethical World 451

from the source whence they came — a separation in
which the spring gets exhausted.

Both these relationships are constituted by and hold
within the transience and the dissimilarity of the two
sides, which are assigned to them.

An unmixed intransitive form of relationship, how-
ever, holds between brother and sister. They are the
same blood, which, however, in them has entered into
a condition of stable equihbrium. They therefore
stand in no such natural relation as husband and wife,
they do not desire one another ; nor have they given
to one another, nor received from one another, this
independence of individual being ; they are free
individuahties with respect to each other. The feminine
element, therefore, in the form of the sister, premonises
and foreshadows most completely the nature of ethical
life {sittliches Wesen). She does not become conscious
of it, and does not actuaUse it, because the law of the
family is her inherent implicit inward nature, which
does not he open to the dayhght of consciousness, but
remains inner feeling and the divine element exempt
from actuality. The feminine hfe is attached to these
household divinities {Penates), and sees in them
both her universal substance, and her particular
individuahty, yet so views them that this relation of
her particular being to them is at the same time not
the natural one of pleasure.

As a daughter, the woman must now see her parents
pass away with natural emotion and yet with ethical
resignation, for it is only at the cost of this con-
dition that she can come to that individual existence
of which she is capable. She thus cannot see her
independent existence positively attained in her relation

452 Phenomenology of Mind

to her parents. The relationships of mother and wife,
however, are individuahsed partly in the form of some-
thing natm:al, which brings pleasm:e ; partly in the form
of something negative which finds simply its own
evanescence in those relationships; partly again the
individualisation is just on that account something
contingent, which can be replaced by an other par-
ticular individuahty. In a household of the ethical
kind, a woman's relationships are not based on a
reference to this particular husband, this particular child,
but to a husband, to children in general, — not to f eehng,
but to the universal. The distinction between her
ethical life {Sittlichkeit), (while it determines her particu-
lar existence and brings her pleasure), and that of her
husband consists just in this, that it has always a
directly imiversal significance for her, and is quite alien
to the impulsive condition of mere particular desire.
On the other hand, in the husband these two aspects
get separated ; and since he possesses, as a citizen,
the self-conscious power belonging to the universal
life, the life of the social whole, he acquires thereby
the rights of desire, and keeps himself at the same time
in detachment from it. So far, then, as particularity is
implicated in this relationship in the case of the wife,
her ethical life is not purely ethical ; so far, however,
as it is ethical, the particularity is a matter of
indifference, and the wife is without the moment
of knowing herself as this particular self in and through
an other.

The brother, however, is in the eyes of the sister a
being whose nature is unperturbed by desire and is
ethically like her own ; her recognition in him is pure
and unmixed with any sexual relation. The indifference

The Ethical World 453

characteristic of particular existence, and the ethical
contingency thence arising, are, therefore, not present
in this relationship ; instead, the moment of individual
selfhood, recognising and being recognised, can here
assert its right, because it is bound up with the balance
and equihbrium resulting from their being of the same
blood, and from their being related in a way that
involves no mutual desire. The loss of a brother is
thus irreparable to the sister, and her duty towards
him is the highest.*

This relationship at the same time is the limit, at
which the circumscribed life of the family is broken up,
and passes beyond itself. The brother is the member
of the family in whom its spirit becomes individuahsed,
and enabled thereby to turn towards another sphere,
towards what is other than and external to itself,
and pass over into consciousness of universahty. The
brother leaves this immediate, rudimentary, and, there-
fore, strictly speaking, negative ethical life of the family,
in order to acquire and produce the concrete ethical
order which is conscious of itself.

He passes from the divine law, within whose realm
he Hved, over to the human law. The sister, however,
becomes, or the wife remains, director of the home
and the preserver of the divine law. In this way both
the sexes overcome their merely natural being, and
become ethically significant, as diverse forms dividing
between them the different aspects which the ethical
substance possesses. Both these universal factors of --^
the ethical world have their specific individuahty in
naturally distinct self-consciousnesses, for the reason
that the spirit at work in the ethical order is the im-

* Cp. Antigone, 1. 910.

454 Phenomenology of Mind

mediate unity of the substance [of ethical Hfe] with
self-consciousness — an immediacy which thus appears
as the existence of a natural difference, at once as
regards its aspect of reahty and of difference.
It is that aspect which, in the notion of spiritual
reahty, came to light as " original determinate nature,"
when we were dealing with the stage of " Individuahty
which is real to itself." This moment loses the in-
determinateness which it still has there, and the contin-
gent diversity of " constitution " and " capacities." It
is now the specific opposition of the two sexes, whose
natural character acquires at the same time the signifi-
cance of their respective ethical determinations.

The distinction of the sexes and of their ethical
content remains all the same within the unity of the
ethical substance, and its operation is just the constant
process of that substance. The husband is sent forth
by the spirit of the family into the life of the community,
and finds there his self-conscious reality. Just as the
family thereby finds in the community its universal
substance and subsistence, conversely the community
finds in the family the formal element of its own reaHsa-
tion, and in the divine law its power and confirmation.
Neither of the two is alone self-complete. Human law
as a Hving and active principle proceeds from the divine,
the law holding on earth from that of the nether world,
the conscious from the unconscious, mediation from
immediacy ; and returns too whence it came. The
power of the nether world, on the other hand, finds its
reahsation upon earth ; it comes through consciousness
to have existence and efficacy.

The universal elements of the ethical hfe are thus
the (ethical) substance qua universal, and that sub-

The Ethical World 455

stance qua particular consciousness. Their universal
actuality is the nation and the family ; while they get
their natural self, and their operative individuaHty, in
man and woman. Here in this content of the ethical 333
world, we see attained those purposes which the previous
insubstantial modes of conscious hfe set before them.
What Reason apprehended only as an object, has
become Self-consciousness, and what self-consciousness
merely contained within it is here expHcit true reahty.
What Observation knew, — an object given externally and
picked up, and one in the constitution of which the sub-
ject knowing had no share, — is here a given ethical con-
dition, a custom f oirnd lying ready at hand, but a reality
which is at the same time the deed and the product of
the subject finding it. The individual who seeks the
*' pleasure " of enjoying his particular individuaUty,
finds it in the family hfe, and the " necessity "* in which
that pleasure passes away is his own self-consciousness
as a citizen of his nation. Or, again, it is knowing the
** law of his own heart "f as the law of all hearts, know-
ing the consciousness of self to be the recognised and
universal ordinance of society: it is "virtue," J which
enjoys the fruits of its own sacrifice, which brings about
what it sets out to do, viz. to bring the essential nature
into the light of the actual present, — and its enjoyment
lies in this universal hfe. Finally, consciousness of
" fact as such " {der Sache selbst)^ gets satisfaction in the
real substance, which contains and maintains in positive
form the abstract aspects of that empty category.
That substance finds a genuine content in the powers
of the ethical order, a content that takes the place of
those insubstantial commands which the " healthy

* Cp. p. 350 ff. + Cp. p. 357 ff. X Cp. p. 369 £f. § Cp. p. 387 ff.

456 Phenomenology of Mind

human reason "* wanted to give and to know : and in
consequence thus gets a concrete inherently determinate
standard for " testing/' not the laws, but what is done.
The whole is a stable equihbrium of all the parts,
and each part a spirit in its native element, a spirit
which does not seek its satisfaction beyond itself, but
has the satisfaction within itself for the reason that
itself is in this balanced equipoise with the whole. This
condition of stable equihbrium can, of course, only be
Hving by inequahty arising within it, and being brought
back again to equipoise by Righteousness and Justice.
Justice, however, is neither an ahen principle {Wesen)
holding somewhere remote from the present, nor the
reahsation (unworthy of the name of justice) of mutual
malice, treachery, ingratitude, etc., which, in the un-
intelligent way of chance and accident, would fulfil
the law by a kind of irrational connection with-
out any controlhng idea, action by commission and
omission, without any consciousness of what was
involved. On the contrary, being justice in human law,
it brings back to the whole, to the universal hfe of
society, what has broken away separately from the
harmony and equilibrium of the whole : — the indepen-
dent classes and individuals. In this way justice is the
government of the nation, and is its all-pervading essen-
tial hfe in a consciously present individual form, and
is the personal self-conscious will of all.
, That justice, however, which restores to equihbrium
the universal when getting the mastery over the par-
ticular individual, is similarly the simple single spirit
of the individual who has suffered wrong ; it is not
broken up into the two elements, one who has suffered

* Cp. p. 412 tf.

The Ethical World 457

wrong and a far away remote reality (Wesen). The
individual himself is the power of the " nether " world,
and that reahty is his " fury/' wreaking vengeance
upon him.^ For his individuahty, his blood, still Hves
in the house, his substance has a lasting actuahty.
The wrong, which can be brought upon the individual
in the realm of the ethical world, consists merely in this,
that a bare something by chance happens to him. The
power which perpetrates on the conscious individual
this wrong of making him into a mere thing, is " nature " ;
it is the universality not of the commimity, but the
abstract universahty of mere existence. And the
particular individual, in wiping out the wrong suffered,
turns not against the community — for he has not
suffered at its hands — but against the latter. As we
saw, those who consciously share the blood of the in-
dividual remove this wrong in such a way, that what
has happened becomes rather a work of their own
doing, and hence bare existence, the last state, gets
also to be something willed, and thus an object of
gratification.

The ethical realm remains in this way permanently
a world without blot or stain, a world untainted by any
internal dissension. So, too, its process is an untroubled
transition from one of its powers to the other, in such a
way that each preserves and produces the other. We
see it no doubt divided into two ultimate elements and
their reahsation : but their opposition is rather the
confirming and substantiation of one through the other ; ^3 /
and where they directly come in contact and afiect each
other as actual factors, their mediating common element
straightway permeates and suffuses the one with the

* 'ITie reference here is to Orestes.

458 Phenomenology of Mind

other. The one extreme, universal spirit conscious
of itself, becomes, through the individuaHty of man,
linked together with its other extreme, its force and
its element, with unconscious spirit. On the other
hand, divine law is individuahsed, the unconscious
spirit of the particular individual finds its existence, in
woman, through the mediation of whom the spirit of
the individual comes out of its unrealisedness into
actuahty, out of the state of unknowing and un-
known, and rises into the conscious realm of universal
spirit. The union of man with woman constitutes the
operative mediating agency for the whole, and con-
stitutes the element which, while separated into the
extremes of divine and human law, is, at the same time,
their immediate union. This union, again, turns both
those first mediate connections (Schlüsse) into one and
the same synthesis, and unites into one process the
twofold movement in opposite directions, — one from
reality to unreahty, the downward movement of
human law, organised into independent members, to
the danger and trial of death, — the other, from un-
reahty to reahty, the upward movement of the law of
the nether world to the daylight of conscious existence.
Of these movements the former falls to man, the latter
to woman.

Ethical Action. Knowledge, Human and Divine.
Guilt and Destiny.

[A fundamental condition of social order is that it is maintained by-
action on the part of the individual members of a society ; action is a
fundamental principle of distinction between individuals, is the way they
make their contribution to social life, and is also the way by which the
continuance of social life is ceaselessly broken and reconstituted. In a
comprehensive sense therefore action is the principle by which distinction
in unity is carried out in social life. The consideration of its significance
is thus an essential problem for the analysis of social mind. Action must
be considered at once with reference to individuality and also with refer-
ence to those conceptions of social order as containing both " divine " and
"human" law. In the following section, this analysis is undertaken.

The specific historical background of Hegel's thought in this section,
and to some extent in the preceding section, is supplied by the social life
of the Greek city state. The Greek city state has been taken as the type,
so to say, of spiritual existence realised as a self-complete ethical order.
But the social life of Greece is here in large measure read and interpreted
in the light of the dramatisation of Greek ethical conceptions by the
great Greek tragedians, especially Sophocles. This accounts for the re-
peated reference to the purely dramatic conception of the " destiny" or
the "pathic" element in the life of the individual whose spiritual
existence is completely bound up with the established social order. It is
in Greece that we find most fully realised the all-sulficiency of the state
for the individual, which Hegel has here in view, a sufficiency which
was at once the strength and beauty, as well as the pathos and weakness
of Greek social life.

With this and the preceding section should be read Hegel's Philosophy
of History, Part II, "The Greek World."]

459

Ethical Action. Knowledge, Human and Divine.
Guilt and Destiny.

In the form presented by the opposition of elements
in the realm just dealt with, self-consciousness has not
yet come to its rights as a particular individuality.
Individuality there has, on one side, the sense of merely
universal will, on the other, of consanguinity of the
family. This particular individual has merely the signifi-
cance of shadowy unreality. There is as yet no perform-
ance of an act. The act, however, is the realised self.
It breaks in upon the untroubled stable organisation
and movement of the ethical world. What there appears
as ordinance and harmony between both its constituent
elements, each of which confirms and complements the
other, becomes through the performing of an act a
transition of opposites into one another, by which each
proves to be the annihilation rather than the confirma-
tion of its self and its opposite. It becomes the process
of negation or destruction, the eternal necessity of awful
destiny, which engulfs in the abyss of its bare identity
divine and human law alike, as well as both the self-
conscious factors in which these powers subsist ;
and, to our view, passes over into the absolute self-
existence of mere particular self-consciousness.

The basis from which this movement proceeds, and
on which it takes effect, is the kingdom of the ethical
order. But the activity at work in this process is self-
consciousness. Being ethical consciousness, it is the

460

Ethical Action 461

pure and simple direction of activity towards the
essential principle of the ethical Hfe — it is Duty. There
is no caprice, and Hkewise no struggle, no indecision in
it, since it has given up legislating and testing laws :
the essential ethical principle is, for it, something
immediate, unwavering, without contradiction. There
is therefore neither the painful spectacle of find-
ing itself in a colhsion between passion and duty, nor
the comic spectacle of a collision between duty and
duty — a colhsion, which so far as content goes is the
same as that between passion and duty ; for passion
can also be presented as a duty, because duty, when
consciousness withdraws into itself and leaves its
immediate essential substance {Wesenheit), comes to be
the formal universal, into which one content fits equally
well with another, as we found before. The colhsion
of duties is, however, comical, because it brings out
the contradiction inherent in the idea of an absolute
standing opposed to another absolute, expresses some-
thing absolute and then directly the annihilation of
this so-called absolute or duty. The ethical conscious-
ness, however, knows what it has to do ; and is decided,
whether it is to belong to divine or human law. This
directness which characterises its decision is something
immanent and inherent (Ansichseyn), and hence has
at the same time the significance of a natural condition 33>'
of being, as we saw. Nature, not the accident of
circumstances or choice, assigns one sex to one law, the
other to the other law ; or conversely both the ethical
powers themselves estabhsh their individual existence
and actualisation in the two sexes.

Thus, then, because on the one side the ethical
order consists essentially in this immediate directness

462 PJienomenology of Mind

of decision, and therefore only the one law is for con-
sciousness the essential reality ; while, on the other side,
the powers of the ethical order are actual in the self of
conscious life, — in this way these forces acquire the
significance of excluding one another and of being
fU opposed to one another. They are explicit in self-

^j.^^, consciousness just as they were merely impHcit in the
realm of the ethical order. The ethical consciousness,
because it is decisively on the side of one of them, is
essentially Character. There is not for it equal
essentiality in both. The opposition therefore appears
as an unfortunate collision of duty merely with
reality, on which right has no hold. The ethical con-
sciousness is qua self-consciousness in this opposition,
and being so, it at once proceeds either to subdue by
force this reahty opposing it to the law which it
accepts, or to get round this reality by craft. Since
it sees right only on its own side, and wrong on the
other, so, of these two, that which belongs to divine
law detects, on the other side, mere arbitrary fortuitous
human violence, while what appertains to human law,
finds in the other the obstinacy and disobedience of
subjective self-sufficiency. For the commands of

teiA^ government have a universal sense and meaning
open to the light of day ; the will of the other law,
however, is the inner concealed meaning of the realm
of darkness {unterirdisch), a meaning which appears
expressed as the will of a particular being, and in
contradicting the first is malicious offence.

There arises in this way in consciousness the opposi-
tion between what is known and what is not known,
just as, in the case of substance, there was an opposition
between the conscious and the unconscious ; and the

Ethical Action 463

absolute right of ethical self-consciousness comes into 3$ 8
conflict with the divine right of the essential reahty.
Self -consciousness, qua consciousness, takes the objective
actuality, as such, to have essential being. Look-
ing at its substance, however, it is the unity of itself
and this opposite, and the ethical self-consciousness is
consciousness of that substance : the object, qua
opposed to self-consciousness, has, therefore, entirely
lost the characteristic of having essential being
by itself. Just as the spheres [of conscious life] where
the object is merely a "thing" are long past and
gone, so, too, are these spheres, where consciousness
sets up and estabhshes something from out itself, and
turns a particular moment into the essential reahty
(Wesen). Against such one-sidedness actual concrete
reahty has a power of its own ; it takes the side of
truth against consciousness and shows consciousness
itself what the truth is. The ethical consciousness,
however, has drunk from the cup of the absolute
substance, forgotten all the one-sidedness of isolating
self-existence, all its purposes and pecuUar notions,
and has, therefore, at the same time drowned in
this Stygian stream all essentiality of nature and all the
independence claimed by the objective reality. Its
absolute right, therefore, when it acts in accordance
with ethical law, is to find in this actuahsation nothing
else than the fulfilment and performance of this law
itself: and that the deed should manifest nothing but
ethical action.

The ethical, being absolute essence and absolute
power at once, cannot endure any perversion of its
content. If it were merely absolute essence without
power, it might undergo perversion at the hands of

464 Phenomenology of Mind

individuality. But this latter, being ethical conscious-
ness, has renounced all perverting when it gave up its
one-sided subjectivity (Fürsichseyn). Conversely, again,
mere power might be perverted by the essential reality,
if power were still a subjectivity of that kind. On
account of this unity, individuahty is a pure form of
the substance which is the content, and action consists
in transition from thought over into reahty, merely as
the process of an unreal opposition, whose moments
have no special and particular content distinct from
one another, and no essential nature of their own. The
absolute right of ethical consciousness is, therefore, that
the deed, the mode and form of its realisation, should
be nothing else than it knows it to be.

But the essential ethical reahty has spht asunder
into two laws, and consciousness, taking up an un-
divided single attitude towards law, is assigned only
to one. Just as this simple consciousness takes its
stand on the absolute right that the essential reahty has
appeared to it qua ethical as that reality inherently is, so,
too, this essence insists on the right belonging to its
reahty, i.e. the right of having a double form.* This
right of the essential reahty does not, however, at the
same time stand over against and opposed to self-
consciousness, as if it were to be found anywhere else ;
rather it is the essential nature of self-consciousness.
Only there has it its existence and its power ; and its
opposition is the act of self- consciousness itself. For
the latter, just because it is a self to itself, and proceeds
to act, lifts itself out of the state of simple immediacy,
and itself sets up the division into two. By the act it
gives up the specific character of the ethical hfe, that of

* viz. divine and human law.

Ethical Action 465

being pure and simple certainty of immediate truth,
and sets up the division of itself into self as active and
reahty over against it, and for it, therefore, negative.
By the act it thus becomes Guilt. For the deed is its
doing, and doing is its inmost nature. And the guilt
acquires also the meaning of Crime ; for as simple
ethical consciousness it has turned to and conformed
itself to the one law, but turned away from the other,
and thus has broken the latter by its deed.

Guilt is not an external indifferent entity {Wesen) with
the double meaning, that the deed, as actually manifested
to the light of day, may be an action of the guilty self, or
may not be so, as if with the doing of it there could be
connected something external and accidental that did not
belong to it, from which point of view, therefore, the
action would be innocent. Rather the act is itself this
diremption, this affirming itself for itself, and estabhshing
over against this an ahen external reahty. That such a
result takes place is due to the deed itself, and is the ■si^c
outcome of it. Hence, innocence is an attribute merely
of the want of action {NicJit-thun), a state like the mere
being of a stone, and one which is not even true of a
child.

Looking at the content, however, the ethical act con-
tains the element of wrongdoing, because it does not
cancel and transcend the natural allotment of the two
laws to the two sexes ; but rather, being an undivided
attitude towards the law, keeps within the sphere of
natural immediacy, and, qua acting, turns this one-sided-
ness into guilt, by merely laying hold of one side of the
essential reahty and taking up a negative relation
towards the other, i.e. violating it. Where, in the
general ethical life, guilt and crime, deeds and actions,

VOL. II.— E

466 Phenomenology of Mind

come in, will be more definitely brought out later.
Meantime, so much is at once clear, that it is not this
particular individual who acts and becomes guilty.
For he, qua this particular self, is merely a shadowy
reality ; he is merely qua universal self, and indi-
viduality is purely the formal aspect of doing anything
at all, while its content is the laws and customs which
are determined for the individual, the laws and customs
of his class or station. He is the substance qua genus,
which by its determinateness becomes, no doubt, a
species, but the specific form remains at the same time the
generic universal. Self-consciousness within the life of
a nation descends from the universal only down as far
as specific particularity, but not as far as the single indi-
viduality, which sets up an exclusive self, estabhshes in its
action a reality negative to itself. On the contrary, the
action of that self-consciousness rests on secure confidence
in the whole, into which there enters nothing alien or
foreign, neither fear nor hostility.

Ethical self-consciousness now comes to find in its
deed the full explicit meaning of concrete real action as
much when it followed divine law as when it followed
human. The law manifest to it is, in the essential
reality, bound up with its opposite ; the essential
reality is the unity of both ; but the deed has merely
carried out one as against the other. But being
bound up with this other in the inner reality, the fulfil-
3i I ment of the one calls forth the other, in the shape of
something which, having been violated and now become
hostile, demands revenge — an attitude which the deed
has made it take up. In the case of action, only one
phase of the decision is in general in evidence. The
decision, however, is inherently something negative,

Ethical Action 467

which plants an "other" in opposition to it, something
foreign to the decision, which is clear knowledge.
Actual reahty, therefore, keeps concealed within itself
this other aspect ahen to clear knowledge, and does
not show itself to consciousness as it fully and truly is
{an und für sich). In the story of OEdipus the son does
not see his own father in the person of the man who
has insulted him and whom he strikes to death, nor
his mother in the queen whom he makes his wife. In
this way a hidden power shunning the light of day,
waylays the ethical self-consciousness, a power which
bursts forth after the deed is done, and seizes the doer
in the act. For the completed deed is the removal of the
opposition between the knowing self and the reality over
against it. The ethical consciousness cannot disclaim the
crime and its guilt. The deed consists in setting in motion
what was unmoved, and in bringing out what in the
first instance lay shut up as a mere possibiUty, and
thereby finking on the unconscious to the conscious,
the non-existent to the existent. In this truth, there-
fore, the deed comes to the fight ; — it is something in
which a conscious element is bound up with what is
unconscious, what is pecufiarly one's own with what
is alien and external : — it is an essential reality divided
in sunder, whose other aspect consciousness discovers
and also finds to be its own aspect, but as a power
violated by its doing, and roused to hostifity against it.
It may well be that the right, which kept itself in
reserve, is not in its pecufiar form present to the con-
sciousness of the doer, but is merely impficit, present
in the subjective inward guilt of the decision and
the action. But the ethical consciousness is more
complete, its guilt purer, if it knows beforehand the

\.t fTAn*

468 Phenomenology of Mind

law and the power which it opposes, if it takes them
to be sheer violence and wrong, to be a contingency in
the ethical hfe, and wittingly, Hke Antigone, commits
the crime. The deed when accomplished transforms
its point of view : the very performance of it eo if so
expresses that what is ethical has to be actual ; for
the reahsation of the purpose is the very purpose of
acting. Acting expresses precisely the unity of reaHty
and the substance ; it expresses the fact that actuality
is not an accident for the essential element, but
that, in union with that element, is given to no right
which is not true right. On account of this actuahty
and on account of its deed ethical consciousness must
acknowledge its opposite as its own actuality; it must
acknowledge its guilt.

Because of our sufferings we acknowledge we have erred.*

To acknowledge this, is expressly to indicate that the
severance between ethical purpose and actuahty has
been done away ; it means the return to the ethical
frame of mind, which knows that nothing counts
but right. Thereby, however, the agent surrenders
his character and the reality of his self, and has
utterly collapsed. His being lies in belonging to
his ethical law, as his substance ; in acknowledging
an opposite, however, he has ceased to find his sub-
stance in this law; and instead of reaUty this has
become an unreality, a mere sentiment, a frame of
mind. The substance no doubt appears as the "pathic "
elementt in the individuahty, and the individuahty

* An adaptation from Antigone, 926.

t The element that so permeates his being as to constitute his con-
trolling necessity and destiny.

Guilt and Destiny 469

appears as the factor which animates the substance,
and hence stands above it. But the substance is a
" pathic '' element which is at the same time his char-
acter; the ethical individuahty is directly and in-
herently one with this its universal, exists in it alone,
and is incapable of surviving the destruction which this
ethical power suffers at the hands of its opposite.

This individuality, however, has all the same the cer-
tainty, that that individuahty, whose "pathic" ele-
ment is this opposite power [the substance], suffers no
more harm than it has inflicted. The opposition of the
ethical powers to one another, and the process of the
individuahties setting up these powers in life and
action, have reached their true end merely in the fact
that both sides undergo the same destruction. For
neither of the powers has any advantage over the
other that it should be a more essential moment of
the substance common to both. The fact of their being
equally and to the same degree essential, and subsisting 3z>.3
independently beside each other means their having no
separate self ; in the act they have a self-nature, but a
different self, — which contradicts the unity of the self
and cancels their claim to independent right, and thus
brings about their necessary destruction. Character,
too, in part, looking at its " pathic " element, the
substance, belongs to one alone ; in part, when we look
at the aspect of knowledge, the one character Hke the
other is divided into a conscious element and an un-
conscious : and since each itself calls forth this opposi-
tion, and the want of knowledge is by the act also
its doing, each falls into the guilt which consumes it.
The victory of one power and its character, and the
defeat of the other side, would thus be merely the

470 Phenomenology of Mind

part and the incomplete work, which steadily advances
till the equilibrium between the two is attained. It is
in the equal suppression of both sides that absolute
right is first accomphshed, and the ethical substance,
as the negative force devouring both sides, in other
words omnipotent and righteous Destiny, makes its
appearance.

If both powers are taken according to their specific
content and its individualisation, we have the scene
presented of a contest between them as individuated.
On its formal side, this is the struggle of the ethical
order and of self-consciousness with unconscious nature
and a contingency due to this nature. The latter has a
right as against the former, because this is only objec-
tive spirit, merely in immediate unity with its substance.
On the side of content, the struggle is the rupture of
divine and human law. The youth goes forth from the
unconscious life of the family and becomes the in-
dividuality of the community [i.e. Ruler]. But that he
still shares the natural Hfe from which he has torn
himself away, is seen in the fact that he emerges there-
from only to find his claim afiected by the contingency
that there are two brothers * who with equal right take
possession of the community ; t the inequality due to
the one having been born earlier and the other later,
an inequahty which is a natural difference, has no
importance for them when they enter the ethical life of
society. But government, as the single soul, the self of
the national spirit, does not admit of a duahty of in-
dividuality ; and in contrast to the ethical necessity of
this unity, nature appears as by accident providing

* Eteocles and Polynices : v. OMipus at Colonus.
t viz. the throne of their Father ffidipus.

Guilt and Destiny 471

more than one. These two [brothers], therefore, become
disunited ; and their equal right in regard to the
power of the state is destructive to both, for they
are equally wrong. Humanly considered, he has
committed the crime who, not being in actual possession,
seizes on the community, at the head of which the other
stood. While again he has right on his side who knew
how to seize the other merely qua particular individual,
detached from the community, and banish him, while
thus powerless, out of the community ; he has
merely laid hands on the individual as such, not the
community, not the essential nature of human right.
The community, attacked and defended from a point
of view which is merely particular, maintains itself ;
and both brothers find their destruction reciprocally
through one another. For individuality, which involves
peril to the whole in the maintenance of its own self-
existence (Fürsichseyn), has thrust its ovv^n self out of
the community, and is disintegrated in its own nature.
The community, however, will do honoiu: to the one
who is found on its side ; the government, the re-
established singleness of the self of the community,
will punish by depriving of the last honour him
who already proclaimed its devastation on the walls
of the city. He who came to affront the highest
spiritual form of conscious hfe, the spirit of the com-
munity, must be stripped of the honour of his entire
and complete nature, the honour due to the spirit of
the departed.*

But if the universal thus lightly knocks off the
highest point of its pyramid, and doubtless triumphs
victoriously over the family, the rebellious principle

* V, Antigone.

472 Phenomenology of Mind

of individuation, it has thereby merely put itself
into conflict with divine law, the self-conscious with
the unconscious spirit. For the latter, this unconscious
spirit, is the other essential power, and therefore the
power undestroyed, but only insulted by the former.
It finds, however, only a bloodless shade to lend it help
towards actually carrying itself out in the face of that
masterful and openly enunciated law. Being the law
of weakness and of darkness, it therefore gives way,
to begin with, before law which has force and pub-
licity ; for the strength of the former is effective
in the nether realm, not on earth and in the light
of day. But the actual and concrete, which has taken
away from what is inward its honour and its power, has
thereby consumed its own real nature. The spirit which
is manifest to the light of day has the roots of its power
in the lower world : the certainty felt by a nation, a
certainty of which it is sure and which makes itself
assured, finds the truth of its oath binding all its
members into one, solely in the mute unconscious
substance of all, in the waters of forgetfulness. In
consequence, the fulfilment of the pubhc spirit
turns round into its opposite, and learns that its
supreme right is supreme wrong, its victory rather
its own defeat. The slain, whose right is injured,
knows, therefore, how to find means of vengeance
which are of the same reahty and strength as the
power at whose hands it has suffered. These powers
are other communities,* whose altars the dogs or birds
defiled with the corpse of the dead, which is not raised
into unconscious universality by being restored, as is
its due, to the ultimate Individuum, the elemental

* Refers to the attack of Argos agaiust Thebes : v. Antigone.

Guilt and Destiny 473

earth, but instead has remained above ground in the
sphere of reahty, and has now received, as the force
of divine law, a self-conscious actual universaHty.
They rise up in hostihty, and destroy the community
which has dishonoured and destroyed its own power,
the sacred claims, the " piety " of the family.

Represented in this way, the movement of human and
divine law finds the expression of its necessity in indi-
viduals, in whom the universal appears as a " pathic "
element, and the activity of the movement as action of
individuals, which gives the appearance of contingency
to the necessity of the process. But individuality and
its action constitute the principle of individuation in
general, a principle which in its pure universality was
called inner divine law. As a moment of the visible
community it does not merely exhibit that unconscious
activity of the nether world, its operation is not simply
external in its existence ; it has an equally manifest
visible existence and process, actual in the actual nation.
Taken in this form, what was represented as a simple 3/, <^
process of the " pathic '' element as embodied in in-
dividuals, assumes another look, and crime and the
resulting ruin of the community assume the proper
form of their existence.

Human law, then, in its universal mode of existence
is the community, in its efficient operation in general
is the manhood of the community, in its actual
efficient operation is government. It has its being, its
process, and its subsistence by consuming and absorbing
into itself the separatist action of the household gods
{Penates), the individualisation into insular independent
families which are under the management of woman-
kind, and by keeping them dissolved in the fluent

474 Phenomenology of Mind

continuum of its own nature. The family at the same
time, however, is in general its element, the individual
consciousness its universal operative basis. Since the
community gets itself subsistence only by breaking in
upon family happiness, and dissolving [individual]
self-consciousness into the universal, it creates its
enemy for itself within its own gates, creates it in
what it suppresses, and what is at the same time essen-
tial to it — womankind in general. Womankind — the
everlasting irony in the life of the community — changes
by intrigue the universal purpose of government into
a private end, transforms its universal activity into
a work of this or that specific individual, and perverts
the universal property of the state into a possession
and ornament for the family. Woman in this way
turns to ridicule the grave wisdom of maturity, which,
being dead to all particular aims, to private pleasure,
personal satisfaction, and actual activity as well,
thinks of, and is concerned for, merely what is imiversal ;
she makes this wisdom the laughing-stock of raw and
wanton youth, an object of derision and scorn, un-
worthy of their enthusiasm. She asserts that it is
everywhere the force of youth that really counts ;
she upholds this as of primary significance ; extols a
son as one who is the lord and master of the mother
who has borne him ; a brother as one in whom the
sister finds man on a level with herself ; a youth as
one through whom the daughter, deprived of her
dependence (on the family unity), acquires the satis-
faction and the dignity of wifehood.

The community, however, can preserve itself only

by suppressing this spirit of individualism ; and because

-*^. . the latter is an essential element, the community like-

Guilt and Destiny 475

wise creates it as well, and creates it, too, by taking
up the attitude of seeking to suppress it as a hostile
principle. Nevertheless, since, by cutting itself off
from the universal purpose, this hostile element is
merely evil, and in itself of no account, it would be
quite ineffective if the community did not recognise
the force of youth, (manhood, which, while immature,
still remains in the condition of particularity), as the
force of the whole. For the community, the whole,
is a nation, it is itself individuality, and really only is
something for itself by other individualities being for
it, by its excluding these from itself and knowing itself
independent of them. The negative side of the com-
munity, suppressing the isolation of individuals within
its own bounds, but originating activity directed beyond
those bounds, finds the weapons of its warfare in individ-
uals. War is the spirit and form in which the essential
moment of ethical substance, the absolute freedom of
ethical self-consciousness from all and every kind of
existence, is manifestly confirmed and reahsed. While,
on the one hand, war makes the particular spheres of
property and. personal independence, as well as the
personality of the individual himself, feel the force of
negation and destruction, on the other hand this
engine of negation and destruction stands out as that
which preserves the whole in security. The individual
who provides pleasure to woman, the brave youth,
the suppressed principle of ruin and destruction,
comes now into prominence, and is the factor of primary
significance and worth. It is now physical strength
and what seems like the chance of fortune, that decide
as to the existence of ethical Ufe and spiritual necessity.
Because the existence of the ethical Hfe thus rests on

476 Phenomenology of Mind

physical strength and the chances of fortune, it is
eo ipso settled that its overthrow has come. While
only household gods, in the former case, gave way
before and were absorbed in the national spirit, here
the living individual embodiments of the national
spirit fall by their own individuality and disappear
in one universal community, whose bare universality
is soulless and dead, and whose living activity is
found in the particular individual qua particular. The
ethical form and embodiment of the life of spirit has
passed away, and another mode appears in its place.

This disappearance of the ethical substance and its
transition into another mode are thus determined by
the ethical consciousness being directed upon the law
essentially in an immediate way. It lies in this char-
acter of immediacy that nature at all enters into the
acts which constitute- the ethical life. Its realisation
simply reveals the contradiction and the germ of
destruction, which lie hid within that very peace and
beauty belonging to the gracious harmony and un-
broken equihbrium of the ethical spirit. For the
essence and meaning of this immediacy contains a
contradiction : it is at once the unconscious peace of
nature and the self-conscious unresting peace of spirit.
On account of this " naturalness," the ethical life of
a nation is, in general, a kind of individuality determined
by, and therefore limited by, nature, and thus finds
its dissolution in, and gives place to, another type of
individuahty. This characteristic being given a positive
existence, is a Hmitation, but at the same time is the
negative element in general and the self of individuality.
Since, however, this determinateness passes away,
the life of spirit and this substance, conscious of itself

Guilt and Destiny 477

in all its component individuals, are lost. The determin-
ate character comes forth and stands apart as a formal
universality in the case of all the component in-
dividuals, and no longer dwells within them as a living
spirit; instead, the uniform solidarity of its individuaHty
has burst into a plurahty of separate points.

The Condition of Right or Legal Status

[A further step in the realisation of the principle of coherent sociality
is reached when the individual is invested with the universality of the
social order by definite enactments of the controlling agency of the
social whole. His contingency as an individual is removed by his being
expressly treated as a focal unity of the whole order, whose very exist-
ence is staked on maintaining him as a unit with a universal significance,
and which stands or falls by maintaining him in this condition. The
universal order is in this case no longer merely implicit, merely a matter
of routine and custom ; it is openly and objectively expressed in and
through each individual component of society. The form this takes is
the diff"erentiation of the social substance into a totality of " persons," each
and all invested with express universal, or legally acknowledged, signifi-
cance. This is the sphere of legal personality, or of individuality consti-
tuted by a system of Eights. It is a supreme achievement of social
existence, and the highest attainment of coherent social experience. Hence
the present section.

This is a condition or stage in every developed community. But the
specific historical material for this section is derived from the law-consti-
tuted social order of the Roman Empire, especially the Empire under the
Antonines. Here, whether by coincidence or otherwise, the culmination of
imperial rule and the " golden age " of law synchronised. The triumph of
Roman imperial government and the perfecting of the system of Roman
jurisprudence were accomplished during the same period of time, about
A.D. 131-235. There is every reason to suppose that the two necessarily
arose and fell together, and that the decline and disappearance of the
Roman law-constituted state should thus prepare the way for a further
achievement of the social spirit of humanity. Hence the historical justifi-
cation for the transition to the next stage of social life, that of self-
discordant spiritual existence.

With this section should be read Hegel's Philosophy of History, Part
III, especially the introduction to this part, and Sect. Ill, c. 1., "Rome
under the Emperors."]

478

The Condition or Right or Legal Status

The general comprehensive unity, into which the
living immediate unity of individuality and the ethical
substance falls back, is the soulless (geistlos) community,
which has ceased to be the un-selfconscious * substance
of individuals, and in which they now, each in his
separate individual existence, count as selves and
substances with a being of their own. The universal
being thus spht up into the atomic units of a
sheer plurahty of individuals, this inoperative, hfeless
spirit is a principle of equahty in which all count
for as much as each, i.e. have the significance of
Persons. What in the realm of the ethical life was
called the hidden divine law has in fact come out of
concealment to the light of actuahty. In the former
the individual was, and was counted, actual merely
as a blood relation, merely as sharing in the general -^Hi
hfe of the family. Qua particular individual, he was
the selfless departed spirit ; now, however, he has
come out of his unreahty. Because tlie ethical sub-
stance is only objective, "true," spirit, only imphes spirit,
the individual on that account turns back to the im-
mediate certainty of his own self ; he is that substance
qua positive universal, but his actuality consists in being
a negative universal self.

We saw the powers and forms of the ethical world
sink in the bare necessity of mere Destiny. This

* Reading " selbstbewusstlose " (1st ed.).
479

480 Phenomenology of Mind

power of the ethical world is the substance turning
itself back into its ultimate and simple nature. But
that absolute being turning back into itself, that very-
necessity of characterless Destiny, is nothing else
than the Ego of self-consciousness.

This is taken henceforth as what is absolutely real,
as the ultimate self-contained reaUty. To be so ac-
knowledged is its substantiality ; but this is abstract
universahty, because its content is this rigid self, not
the self dissolved in the substance.

Personahty, then, has here risen out of the hfe
and activity of the ethical substance. It is the con-
dition in which the independence of consciousness
has actual concrete validity. The unrealised abstract
thought of such independence, which arises through
renouncing actuality, was at an earlier stage before
our notice in the form of " Stoical self-consciousness.'*
Just as the latter was the outcome of "Lordship and
Bondage,"* the mode in which self-consciousness exists
immediately, — so personality is the outgrowth of the
immediate life of spirit which is the universal controlHng
will of all, as well as their dutiful obedience and
submissive service. What in Stoicism was imphcit
merely in an abstract way, is now an explicit con-
crete world. Stoicism is nothing else than the mood
of consciousness which reduces to its abstract form
the principle of legal status, the principle of the sphere
of right, — an independence devoid of the quahties of
spirit {geistlos). By its flight from actuahty it attained
merely the idea of independence : it is absolutely sub-
jective, exists solely for itself, in that it does not hnk
its being to anything that exists, but rather wants to

* V. p. 175 ff.

Legal Status 481

give up every kind of existence, and places its essential
meaning in the unity of mere thinking. In the same
manner, the " right " of a " person " is not linked on to a
richer or more powerful existence of the individual qua -.^'i*
individual, nor again connected with a universal living
spirit, but, rather, is attached to the mere unit of its
abstract reahty, or to that unit qua self-consciousness
in general.

Now just as the abstract independence of Stoicism set
forth the stages of its actuahsation, so, too, this last form
of independence [Personahty] will recapitulate the pro-
cess of the former mode. The former [Stoicism] passes
over into the state of sceptical confusion, into a fickle
instabihty of negation, which without adopting any per-
manent form strays from one contingent mode of being
and thinking to another, dissipates them indeed in
absolute independence, but just as readily creates their
independence once more. In fact, it is simply the
contradiction of consciousness claiming to be at once
independent and yet devoid of independence. In hke
manner, the personal independence characteristic of
the sphere of right is really a similar universal confusion
and reciprocal dissolution of this kind. For what passes
for the absolute essential reahty is self-consciousness
in the sense of the bare empty unit of the person. As
against this empty universahty, the substance has the
form of what supphes the filhng and the content ; and
this content is now left completely detached and dis-
connected ; for the spirit, which kept it in subjection
and held it in its unity, is no longer present. The
empty unit of the person is, therefore, as regards its
reahty, an accidental existence, a contingent insub-
stantial process and activity that comes to no durable

VOL, II. — F

482 Phenomenology of Mind

subsistence. Just as was the case in Scepticism, the
formahsm of "right" is, thus, by its very conception,
without special content ; it finds at its hand the fact of
" possession," a fact subsisting in multiphcity, and im-
prints thereon the abstract universaHty, by which it is
called " property," — the same sort of abstraction as
Scepticism made use of. But while the reality so deter-
mined is in Scepticism called a mere appearance, a
mere semblance, and has merely a negative value, in
the case of right it has a positive significance. The
negative value in the former case consists in the real
having the meaning of self qua thought, qua inherent
universal; the positive significance in the latter case,
however, consists in its being mine in the sense of the
category, as something whose vahdity is admitted, re-
cognised, and actual. Both are the same abstract uni-
3 5 ' versal. The actual content, the proper value of what is
" mine " — whether it be an external possession, or again
inner riches or poverty of mind and character — is not
contained in this empty form and does not concern it.
The content belongs, therefore, to a peculiar specific
power, which is something different from the formal
universal, is chance and caprice. Consciousness of
right, therefore, in the course of the very process of
making its claim good, finds that it loses its own reahty,
discovers its complete lack of inherent substantiality,
and that to describe an individual as a " person " is to use
an expression of contempt.

The free and unchecked power possessed by the
content takes determinate shape in this way. The
absolute plurahty of dispersed atomic personahties is,
by the nature of this characteristic feature gathered
at the same time into a single centre, alien to

Legal Status 483

them and just as devoid of the hfe of spirit (geistlos).
That central point is, in one respect, Kke the atomic
rigidity of their personaHty, a merely particular
reahty ; but in contrast to their empty particularity,
it has the significance of the entire content, and hence
is taken to be the essential element; while again, in
contrast to their pretended absolute, but inherently
insubstantial, reahty, it is the universal power, and
absolute actuahty. This " lord and master of the world ''
takes himself in this way to be the absolute person,
comprising at the same time all existence within himself,
for whom there exists no higher type of spirit. He is a
person : but the sole and single person who has chal-
lenged, confronted, and conquered all. These all
constitute and establish the triumphant universality
of the one person ; for this particular, as such, is truly
what it is only qua universal plurality of particular
units : cut off from this plurality, the solitary and
single self is, in fact, a powerless and unreal self.
At the same time, it is the consciousness of the con-
tent which is antithetically opposed to that universal
personality. This content, however, when liberated
from its negative power, means chaos of spiritual
powers, which, when let loose as elemental independent
agencies, break out into wild extravagances and excesses,
and fall on one another in mad destruction. Their help-
less self- consciousness is the powerless inoperative en-
closure and the arena of their chaotic tumult. But this
master and lord of the world, aware of his being the ^e'Z
sum and substance of all actual powers, is the titanic
self-consciousness, which takes itself to be the living
God. Since, however, he exists merely qua formal self,
which is unable to tame and subdue those powers, his

484 Phenomenology of Mind

procedure and his self- enjoyment are equally gigantic
extravagance.*

The lord of the world becomes really conscious of
what he is, — viz. the universal might of actuaUty, — by
that power of destruction which he exercises against
the contrasted selfhood of his subjects. For his power
is not the spiritual union and concord in which the
various persons might get to know their own self-
consciousness. Eather they exist as persons separately
for themselves, and all continuity with others is ex-
cluded from the absolute punctual atomicity of their
nature. They are, therefore, in a merely negative
relation, a relation of exclusion both to one another
and to him, who is their principle of connection or
continuity. Qua this continuity, he is the essential
being and content of their formal nature, — a content,
however, foreign to them, and a being hostile in
character, which abolishes just what they take to be
their very essence, viz. bare subjectivity without any
content, mere empty independent existence each on its
own account. And, again, qua the continuity of their
personality, he destroys this very personahty itself.
Juridical personahty thus finds itself, rather, without
any substance of its own, since content ahen to it
is imposed on it and holds good within it, — and does
so there, because such content is the reahty of that
ty3)e of personality. On the other hand the passion for
destroying and turning over everything on this unreal
field gains for itself the consciousness of its complete
supremacy. But this self is barren desolation, and

* Cp. with the above Hobbes' Leviathan. The historical reference
liere is to the "apotheosis" of the Roman Emperors,

Legal Status 485

hence is merely beside itself, and is indeed the very
abandonment and rejection of its own self-consciousness.
Such, then, is the constitution of that aspect in
which self-consciousness qua absolute being is actual.
The consciousness, however, that is driven back
into itself out of this actuality, thinks this its insub-
stantiality, makes it an object of thought. Formerly
we saw the stoical independence of pure thought pass
through Scepticism and find its true issue in the
"unhappy consciousness,'' — the truth about what
constitutes its inherent and exphcit nature, its final
reahty. If this knowledge appeared at that stage ;;■;
merely as the one-sided view of a consciousness qua
consciousness, here the actual truth of that view has
made its appearance. The truth consists in the fact that
this universal accepted objectivity of self-consciousness
is reahty estranged from it. This objectivity is the ^ef:hn
universal actuahty of the self; but this actuality
is directly the perversion of the self as well — it is
the loss of its essential being. The reality of the self
that was not found in the ethical world, has been
gained by its reverting into the " person." What in the
case of the former was all harmony and union, comes
now on the scene, no doubt in developed form, but self-
estranged.

B

Spirit in Self-estrangement — The Discipline of

Culture

[The life of spirit as found in the social self-consciousneas has two
fundamental factors, the universal spirit or social whole as such, and the
individual member as such. The interrelation of these constitutes the
spiritual existence of society. Each by itself is abstract, but the realisa-
tion of complete spiritual life through and in each is absolutely essential for
spiritual fulfilment. In the preceding analysis of spirit, one form of this
process has been considered, the realisation of the objective social order
in and through individuals. In the succeeding section, with its various
subsections, the other process of securing the same general result is
analysed : we have the movement by which, starting from the in-
dividual spirit, the realisation of comj^lete spiritual existence is established.
The former starts from the compact solidarity of the social substance, and
results in the establishment of separate and individually complete legal
personalities. The latter process starts from the rigidly exclusive unity of
the individual self and issues in the establishment of a social order of
absolutely universal and therefore absolutely free wills. Both processes
are ^er se abstract, necessary though they are : hence, as we shall find,
a further stage in the evolution of spirit has still to appear.

The process of spirit in this second stage assumes from the start a
conscious contrast between the individual spirit and a universal spiritual
whole, a contrast, which, while profound, the individual seeks to remove,
because the universality of spiritual existence which he seeks to attain is
implicitly involved in his very being as a spiritual entity. His spiritual
life seems, to begin with, rent in twain, so complete is the sense of the
opposition of these factors constituting his life. His true life, his objective
embodiment, seems outside him altogether and yet is felt to be his own
self. He seems " estranged " from his complete self, and the estrangement
seems his own doing, becavise the substance from which he is cut oflf is
felt to be his own. The contrast is the deepest that spirit can possibly
experience, just because spirit is and knows itself to be self-contained and
self -complete, " the only reality." The contrast can only be removed by
effort and struggle, for the individual spirit has to create or recreate for
itself and by its own activity a universal objective spiritual realm, which

486

Spirit in Self-estrangement 487

It implies and in which alone it can be free and feel itself at home. The
struggle spirit goes through is thus the greatest in the whole range of its
experience, for the opposition to be overcome is the profoundest that
exists. Since its aim is to achieve the highest for itself, nothing sacred
can be allowed to stand in its way. It will make any sacrifice, and, if
necessary, produce the direst spiritual disaster, a spiritual "reign of
terror," to accomplish its result.

The movement of spirit here analysed covers every form of the in-
dividual's "struggle for a substantial spiritual life." It embraces the
" intellectual," " economic," " religious," and the " ethical " in the narrower
sense of these terms ; it embraces all that we mean by " culture " and
" civilisation." Hence the various parts of the argument : — spiritual " dis-
cipline," "enlightenment," the pursuit of "wealth," "belief" and "super-
stition," " absolute freedom."

The process of spiritual life passed under critical review here is familiar
to a greater or less extent in every age and every society. But the
actual historical material present to the mind of the writer is derived
from (1) the period of European history embracing the entrance of
Christianity and Christian philosophy into European civilisation after the
fall of the Roman Empire, and the intellectual, " humanistic," awakening
of the Renaissance which led on to the ecclesiastical revolution known as
the Reformation : (2) the rationalistic movement of the eighteenth century,
the so-called "Enlightenment" which preceded and culminated in the
French Revolution, the supreme outburst of spiritual emancipation known
in European history. These two periods, far removed as they are in time,
have much in common. They embody principles of spiritual develop-
ment fundamentally alike, and are therefore freely drawn upon in the
analysis, regardless of historicity.

Much of Hegel's analysis of the first stage of this spiritual move-
ment has also directly in view the character of Rameau in Diderot's
dialogue Le neveu de Rameau. This remarkable work was written in
1760, but was first brought to the notice of the literary public by Goethe,
who translated and published the work in 1805. It thus came into
Hegel's hands while he was writing the Phenomenology : and this perhaps
accounts for the repeated references to it in the argument. The term
" self -estranged spirit" with which he heads this section occurs in Goethe's
translation. Rameau is an extreme type of such a spirit.

With this section should be read Hegel's Philosophy of History, Pt. Ill,
§ 3, c. 2 ; Pt. IV, § 2, c. 1, § 3, c. 1, 3 : the History of Philosophy, Pt. 3,
Introduction, and c. 2, " The French Philosophy and the German En-
lightenment."]

Spirit in Self-estrangement — The Discipline of

Culture

The ethical substance preserved and kept opposition
enclosed within its simple conscious life ; and this con-
sciousness was in immediate unity with its own
essential nature. That nature has therefore the
simple characteristic of something merely existing
for the consciousness which is directed immediately
upon it, and whose "custom" {Sitte) it is. Con-
sciousness does not stand for a particular excluding
self, nor does the substance mean for it an existence
shut out from it, with which it would have to establish
its identity only through estranging itself, and yet at
the same time have to produce that estrangement. But
that mind, whose self is absolutely insular, absolutely
discrete, finds its content over against itself in the form
of a reahty that is just as impenetrable as itself, and
the world here gets the characteristic of being some-
thing external, negative to self-consciousness. Yet
this world is a spiritual reality, it is essentially the
fusion of individuahty with being. This its existence
is the work of self-consciousness, but Hkewise an
actuality immediately present and alien to it, which
has a peculiar being of its own, and in which it does
not know itself. This reality is the external element
and the free content * of the sphere of legal right. But
this external reality, which the master of the world

* V, p. 479 fr.

Spirit in Self-estrangement 489

of legal right takes control of, is not merely this ele-
mentary irreducible entity casually lying before the self ;
it is his work, but not in a positive sense, rather
negatively so. It preserves its existence by self-con-
sciousness of its own accord relinquishing itself and
giving up its essentiality, the condition which, in that
waste and ruin which prevail in the sphere of right, the
external force of the elements let loose seems to bring
upon self-consciousness. These elements by themselves
are sheer ruin and destruction, and cause their own over-
throw. This overthrow, however, this their negative
nature, is just the self ; it is their subject, their action,
and their process. Such process and activity again,
through which the substance becomes actual, are the
ahenation of personality, for the immediate self, i.e. the
self without estrangement and holding good as it stands,
is without substantial content, and the sport of these
raging elements. Its substance is thus just its re-
linquishment, and the relinquishment is the substance,
i.e. the spiritual powers forming themselves into a
coherent world, and thereby securing their subsistence.

The substance in this way is spirit, self-conscious
unity of the self and the essential nature ; but both also
take each other to mean and to imply ahenation. Spirit
is consciousness of an objective reahty which exists
independently on its own account. Over against
this consciousness stands, however, that unity of the
self with the essential nature, consciousness pure and
simple over against actual consciousness. On the one
side actual self-consciousness by its self-relinquishment
passes over into the real world, and the latter back again
into the former. On the other side, however, this
very actuality, both person and objectivity, is can-

4Ö0 Phenomenology of Mind

.celled and superseded ; they are purely universal. This
its alienation is pure consciousness, or the essential
nature. The present has at once its opposite in its
beyond, which consists in its thinking and its being
thought; just as this again has its opposite in what
is here in the present, which is its actuality alienated
from it.

Spirit in this case, therefore, constructs not merely one
world, but a twofold world, divided and self-opposed.
The world of the ethical spirit is its own proper present ;
and hence every power it possesses is found in this
unity of the present, and, so far as each separates itself
2>^ from the other, each is still in equilibrium with the
whole. Nothing has the significance of a negative of
self-consciousness ; even the spirit of the departed
is in the life-blood of his relative, is present in the self
of the family, and the universal power of government
is the will, the self of the nation. Here, however, what is
present means merely objective actuality, which has its
consciousness in the beyond ; each particular moment,
as an essential entity, receives this, and thereby actuality
from an other, and so far as it is actual, its essential
being is something other than its own actuality. No-
thing has a spirit self-established and indwelhng within
it ; rather each is outside itself in what is ahen to it.
The equihbrium of the whole is not the unity which
abides by itself, nor its inwardly secured tranquillity,
but rests on the alienation of its opposite. The whole
is, therefore, like each particular moment, a self-
estranged reality. It breaks up into two spheres :
in one kingdom self-consciousness is actually both the
self and its object, and in another we have the kingdom
of pure consciousness, which, being beyond the former,

Spirit in Self-estrangement ' 491

has no actual present, but exists for Faith, is matter
of BeHef. Now just as the ethical world passes from
the separation of divine and human law, with its various
forms, and its consciousness gets away from the division
into knowledge and the absence of knowledge, and re-
turns into the principle which is its destiny, into the self
which is the power to destroy and negate this oppo-
sition, so, too, both these kingdoms of self-alienated
spirit will return into the self. But while the former was
the first self, holding good directly, the particular person, ^tn^^ /r*^^
this second, which returns into itself from its self- ^*^^'^
relinquishment, will be the universal self, the conscious-
ness grasping the conception ; and these spiritual worlds,
all of whose moments insist on being a fixed reality and
an unspiritual subsistence, will be dissolved in the Hght
of pure Insight. This insight, being the self grasping
itself, completes the stage of culture. It takes up
nothing but the self, and everything as the self, i.e. it
comprehends everything, extinguishes all objectiveness, 35%
and converts everything implicit into something ex-
phcit, everything which has a being in itself into what
is for itself. When turned against behef, against faith,
as the far-away region of inner being lying in the distant
beyond, it is Enhghtenment {Aufklärung). This en-
lightenment also terminates self-estrangement in this
region whither spirit in self-alienation turns to seek its
safety as to a region where it becomes conscious of a
peace adequate to itself. Enlightenment upsets the
household arrangements, which spirit carries out in the
house of faith, by bringing in the goods and furnishings
belonging to the world of the Here and Now, a world
which that spirit cannot refuse to accept as its own
property, for its conscious Hfe likewise belongs to that

492 Phenomenology of Mind

world. In this negative task pure insight reaHses itself
at the same time, and brings to light its own proper
object, the " unknowable absolute Being" and utihty.*
Since in this way actuahty has lost all substantiahty,
and there is nothing more implicit in it, the kingdom
of faith, as also that of the real world, is overthrown ;
and this revolution brings about absolute freedom, the
stage at which the spirit formerly estranged has gone
back completely into itself, leaves behind this sphere
of culture, and passes over into another region, the land
of the inner or subjective moral consciousness {moral-
ischen BevMSstsein).

* Cp. Eighteenth century Deism and utilitarianism.

The World of Spirit in Self-estrangement

The sphere of spirit at this stage breaks up into two
regions. The one is its real world, its self-estrangement,
the other is constructed and set up in the ether of pure
consciousness, and is exalted above the first. This
second world, being constructed in opposition and
contrast to that estrangement, is just on that account
not free from it ; on the contrary, it is only another
form of that very estrangement, which consists precisely
in having a conscious existence in two sorts of worlds,
and embraces both. Hence it is not self-consciousness
of Absolute Being in and for itself, not Religion, which
is here dealt with : it is Behef, Faith, in so far as faith
is a flight from the actual world, and thus is not a self-
complete experience {an und für sich). Such flight
from the realm of the present is, therefore, directly in
its very nature a dual state of mind. Pure consciousness
is the sphere into which spirit rises : but it is not only
the element of faith, but of the notion as well. Con-
sequently both appear on the scene together at the
same time, and the latter comes before us only in anti-
thesis to the former.

493

a

Culture and its Sphere of Objective Eeality*

The spirit of this world is spiritual essence permeated
by a self-consciousness which knows itself to be directly-
present as a self- existent particular, and has that essence
as its objective actuality over against itself. But the
existence of this world, as also the actuality of self-
consciousness, depends on the process that self-con-
sciousness divests itself of its personahty, by so doing
creates its world, and treats it as something alien
and external, of which it must now take possession.
But the renunciation of its self-existence is itself the
production of objective actuality, and in doing so,
therefore, self-consciousness ipso facto makes itself
master of this world.

To put the matter otherwise, self-consciousness is
only something definite, it only has real existence, so
far as it alienates itself from itself. By doing so, it puts
itself in the position of something universal, and this
its universality actualises it, establishes it objectively,
makes it valid. This equahty of the self with all selves
is, therefore, not the equahty that was found in the case
of right ; self-consciousness does not here, as there,
get immediate recognition and acknowledgment merely
because it is ; on the contrary, its claim to be rests on

* It will be observed that " culture " embraces all means of self-
development, "ideas" as well as material factors sucb as *' wealth,"

494

Culture and its Sphere of Reality 495

its having made itself, by that mediating process of self-
alienation, conform to what is universal. The spiritless
formal universality which characterises the sphere of
right takes up every natural form of character as well
as of existence, and sanctions and establishes them.
The universality which holds good here, however, is
one that has undergone development, and for that
reason it is concrete and actual.

The means, then, whereby an individual gets objec-
tive vaUdity and concrete actuahty here is the forma-
tive process of Culture. The alienation on the part
of spirit from its natural existence is here the indi-
vidual's true and original nature, his very sub-
stance. The rehnquishment of this natural state is,
therefore, both his purpose and his mode of existence ;
it is at the same time the mediating process, the transi- jf^
tion of the thought-constituted substance to concrete
actuality, as well as, conversely, the transition of deter-
minate individuahty to its essential constitution. This
individuality moulds itself by culture to what it
inherently is, and only by so doing is it then something
fer se and possessed of concrete existence. The extent*
of its culture is the measure of its reahty and its power.
Although the self, qua this particular self, knows itself
here to be real, yet its concrete reahsation consists
solely in cancelhng and transcending the natural self.
The original determinateness of its nature is, therefore,
reduced to a matter of quantity, to a greater or less
energy of will, a non-essential principle of distinc-
tion. But purpose and content of the self belong
to the universal substance alone, and can only be
something universal. The specific particularity of

* Bacon's phrase, "Knowledge is power,"

496 Phenomenology of Mind

a given nature, which becomes purpose and content,
is something powerless and unreal: it is a "kind of
being " which exerts itself foolishly and in vain to
attain embodiment : it is the contradiction of giving
reality to the bare particular, while reality is, if so
facto, something universal. If, therefore, individuality
is falsely held to consist in particularity of nature and
character, then the real world contains no individualities
and characters ; individuals are all alike for one another ;
the pretence {vermeint) of individuality in that case
is precisely the mere presumptive {gemeint) existence
which has no permanent place in this world where only
renunciation of self and, therefore, only universality
get actual reality. What is presumed or conjectured to
be {Das Gemeinte) passes, therefore, simply for what
it is, for a hind of being. "Kind" is not quite the
same as Espece* " the most horrible of all nicknames,
for it signifies mediocrity, and denotes the highest
degree of contempt."! "A kind" and "to be good of
its kind " are German expressions, which add an air of
honesty to this meaning, as if it were not so badly
meant and intended after all ; or which, indeed, do not
yet involve a clear consciousness of what " kind " and
what culture and reality are.

That which, in reference to the particular individual,
59 appears as his culture, is the essential moment of
spiritual substance as such, viz. : the direct transition
of its ideal, thought-constituted, universality into
actual reality; or otherwise put, culture is the single
soul of this substance, in virtue of which the essen-

* " Espece se dit de personnes auxquelles on ne trouve ni qualite ni
merite. " — Littre.

t Diderot's Ramcaus Neffe.

Culture and its Sphere of Reality 497

tially inherent (AnsicJi) becomes something explicitly
acknowledged, and assumes definite objective exist-
ence. The process in which an individuahty cultivates
itself is, therefore, ipso facto, the development of
individuahty qua universal objective being; that
is to say, it is the development of the actual
world. This world, although it has come into being
by means of individuahty, is in the eyes of self-con-
sciousness something that is directly alienated and
estranged, and, for self-consciousness, takes on the form
of a fijxed, undisturbed reality. But at the same time
self-consciousness is sure this is its own substance, and
proceeds to take it under control. This power over its
substance it acquires by culture, which, looked at from
this aspect, appears as self-consciousness making itself
conform to reahty, and doing so to the extent permitted
by the energy of its original character and talents.
What seems here to be the individual's power and force,
bringing the substance under it, and thereby doing
away with that substance, is the same thing as the
actuahsation of the substance. For the power of the
individual consists in conforming itself to that substance,
i.e. in emptying itself of its own self, and thus estab-
lishing itself as the objectively existing substance. Its
culture and its own reality are, therefore, the process of
making the substance itself actual and concrete.

The self is conscious of being actual only as trans-
cended, as cancelled.* The self does not here constitute
the unity of consciousness of self and object ; rather
this object is negative as regards the self. By means
of the self qua inner soul of the process, the substance
is so moulded and worked up in its various moments,

* Cp. Hume's view of " personal identity," Treatise, pt. IV, c. 6.
VOL. II. — G

498 Phenomenology of Mind

that one opposite puts life into the other, each opposite,
by its aHenation from the other, gives the other stabiUty,
and similarly gets stabihty from the other. At the
same time, each moment has its own definite natm:e,
in the sense of having an insuperable worth and signifi-
cance ; and has a fixed reality as against the other.
The process of thought fixes this distinction in the
most general manner possible, by means of the absolute
opposition of " good " and " bad,'' which are poles
asunder, and can in no way become one and the same.
3£,^ But the very soul of what is thus fixed consists in its
immediate transition to its opposite ; its existence
lies really in transmuting each determinate element into
its opposite ; and it is only this alienation that consti-
tutes the essential nature and the preservation of the
whole. We must now consider this process by which
the moments are thus made actual and give each other
life ; the alienation will be found to alienate itself, and
the whole thereby will take all its contents back
into the ultimate principle it implies {seinen Begriff).

At the outset we must deal with the substance
pure and simple in its immediate aspect as an organisa-
tion of its moments ; they exist there, but are inactive,
their soul is wanting. We have here something like
what we find in nature. Nature, we find, is resolved
and spread out into separate and separable elements —
air, water, fire, earth. Of these air is the unchanging
factor, purely universal and transparent ; water, the
reaUty that is for ever being dissolved and given up ;
fire, its pervading active unity which is ever dissolving
opposition into unity, as well as breaking up simple
unity into opposite constituents: earth is the tightly
compact knot of these separated factors, the subject

Culture and its Sphere of Reality 499

in which these reahties are, where their processes take
effect, that which they start from and to which they
return. In the same way the inner essential nature,
the simple life of spirit that pervades self-conscious
reality, is resolved, spread out into similar general areas
or masses, spiritual masses in this case, and appears as
a whole organised world. In the first area or mass it is
the inherently universal spiritual being, self-identical ;
in the second it is self-existent being, it has become
inherently self-discordant, sacrificing itself, abandon-
ing itself ; the third which takes the form of self-
consciousness is subject, and possesses in its very
nature the fiery force of dissolution. In the first
case it is conscious of itself, as immanent and implicit,
as existing per se ; in the second it finds independence,
self-existence {Fürsichseyn) developed and carried out
by means of the sacrifice of what is universal. But
spirit itself is the self - containedness and self -com-
pleteness of the whole, which splits up into substance
qua constantly enduring and substance engaged in self-
sacrifice, and which at the same time resumes substance
again into its own unity ; a whole which is at once a
flame of fire bursting out and consuming the substance,
as well as the abiding form of the substance consumed.
We can see that the areas of spiritual reahty here
referred to correspond to the Community and the
Family in the ethical world, without, however, possess-
ing the native familiarity of spirit which the latter
have. On the other hand, if destiny is ahen to this spirit,
self-consciousness is and knows itself here to be the
real power underlying them.
We have now to consider these separate members

500 Phenomenology of Mind

of the whole, in the first instance as regards the way
they are presented qua thoughts, qua essential inherent
entities falling within pure consciousness, and also
secondly as regards the way they appear as objective
reahties in concrete conscious life.

In the prst form, the simplicity of content found in
pure consciousness, the real is the Good, the self-identical,
immediate, unchanging, and primal nature of every con-
sciousness, the independent spiritual power inherent in
its essence, alongside which the activity of the mere
self-existent consciousness is only by-play. Its other
is the passive spiritual being, the universal so far
as it parts with its own claims, and lets individuals
get in it the consciousness of their particular existence ;
it is a state of nothingness, a being that is null and
void, the Bad. This absolute break-up of the real into
these disjecta membra is itself a permanent condition;
while the first member is the foundation, starting-
point, and result of individuals, which are there purely
universal, the second member, on the other hand, is
a being partly sacrificing itself for another, and, on
that very account, is partly their incessant return to
self qua individual, and their constant development of
a separate being of their own.

But, secondly, these bare ideas of Good and Bad are
similarly and immediately alienated from one another ;
they are actual, and in actual consciousness appear as
moments that are objective. In this sense the first
state of being is the Power of the State, the second its
Resources or Wealth. The state-power is the simple
spiritual substance, as well as the achievement of all,
the absolutely accomplished fact, wherein individuals
find their essential nature expressed, and where their

Culture and its S flier e of Reality 501

particular existence is simply and solely a consciousness
of their own universality. It is likewise the achieve-
ment and simple result from which the sense of its
having been their doing has vanished : it stands as
the absolute basis of all their action, where all their
action securely subsists. This simple pervading sub-
stance of their life, owing to its thus determining their
unalterable self -identity, has the nature of objective ''^a
being, and hence only stands in relation to and exists
for '' another." It is thus, if so facto, inherently the
opposite of itself — Wealth or Resources. Although
wealth is something passive, is nothingness, it is
likewise a universal spiritual entity, the continu-
ously created result of the labour and action of all,
just as it is again dissipated into the enjoyment of
all. In enjoyment each individuality no doubt becomes
aware of self-existence, aware of itself as particular;
but this enjoyment is itself the result of universal action,
just as, reciprocally, wealth calls forth universal labour,
and produces enjoyment for all. The actual has
through and through the spiritual significance of being
directly universal. Each individual doubtless thinks he
is acting in his own interests when getting this enjoy-
ment ; for this is the aspect in which he gets the sense
of being something on his own account, and for that
reason he does not take it to be something spiritual.
Yet looked at even in external fashion, it becomes
manifest that in his own enjoyment each gives enjoy-
ment to all, in his own labour each works for all as
well as for himself, and all for him. His self-existence
is, therefore, inherently universal, and self-interest is
merely a supposition that cannot get the length of
making concrete and actual what it means or sup-

502 Phenomenology of Mind

poses, viz. to do something that is not to further the
good of all.

Thus, then, in these two spiritual potencies self-
consciousness finds its own substance, content, and
purpose ; it has there a direct intuitive consciousness
of its twofold nature ; in one it sees what it is inherently
in itself, in the other what it is exphcitly for it-
self. At the same time qua spirit, it is the negative
unity, uniting the subsistence of these potencies with the
separation of individuahty from the universal, or that
of reality from the self. Dominion and wealth are,
therefore, before the individual as objects he is aware
of, i.e. as objects from which he knows himself to be
detached and between which he thinks he can choose,
or even decUne to choose altogether. In the form of this
detached bare consciousness he stands over against the
essential reality as one which is merely there for him.
He then has the reality qua essential reahty within
3i3 itself. In this bare consciousness the moments of the
substance are taken to be not state-power and wealth, but
thoughts, the thoughts of Good and Bad. But further,
self-consciousness is a relation of his pure consciousness
to his actual consciousness, of what is thought to the
objective being; it is essentially Judgment. What is
Good and what is Bad has aheady been brought out in
the case of the two aspects of actual reahty by determin-
ing what the aspects primarily are; the one is state-
power, the other wealth. But this first judgment, this
first distinction of content, cannot be looked at as a
"spiritual" judgment; for in that first judgment the
one side has been characterised as only the inherently
existing or positive, and the other side as only
the explicit self- existent and negative. But qua

Culture and its S'phere of Reality 503

spiritual realities, each permeates both moments, per-
vades both aspects; and thus their nature is not ex-
hausted in those specific characteristics [positive and
negative]. The self-consciousness that has to do with
them is self-complete, is in itself and for itself. It must,
therefore, relate itself to each in that twofold form in
which they appear; and by so doing, this nature of
theirs, which consists in being self-estranged determin-
ations, will come to light.

Now self-consciousness takes that object to be good,
and to exist per se, in which it finds itself ; and that
to be bad when it finds the opposite of itself there.
Goodness means its identity with objective reality,
badness their disparity. At the same time what is for
it good and bad, is per se good and bad ; because
it is just that in which these two aspects — of being per
se, and of being for it — are the same : it is the real
indwelhng soul of the objective facts, and the judgment
is the evidence of its power within them, a power which
makes them into what they are in themselves. What
they are when spirit is actively related to them, their
identity or non-identity with spirit, — that is their real
nature and the test of their true meaning, and not how
they are identical or diverse taken immediately in them-
selves apart from spirit, i.e. not their inherent being
and self-existence in abstracto. The active relation of
spirit to these moments, — which are first put forward
as objects to it and thereafter pass by its action into
what is essential and inherent — becomes at the same ^(,,
time their reflection into themselves, in virtue of
which they obtain actual spiritual existence, and their
spiritual meaning comes to light. But as their first
immediate characteristic is distinct from the relation of

504 Phenomenology of Mind

spirit to them, the third determinate moment — their
own proper spirit — is also distinguished from the
second moment. Their second inherent natm:e {Das
zweite Ansich derselben) — their essentiahty which comes
to Kght through the relation of spirit to them —
must in the first instance turn out different from the
immediate inherent nature ; for indeed this mediating
process of spiritual activity puts in motion the im-
mediate characteristic, and turns it into something
else.

As a result of this process, the self-contained con-
scious mind doubtless finds now in the Power of the
State its reality pure and simple, and its subsistence ;
but it does not find its individuality as such ; it finds its
inherent and essential being, but not what it is for
itself. Rather, it finds there its action qua individual
action rejected and denied, and subdued into obedience.
The individual thus recoils before this power and tiirns
back into himself ; it is the reahty that suppresses
him, and is the bad. For instead of being identical
with him, that with which he is at one, it is something
utterly in discordance with individuality. In contrast
with this. Wealth and Riches are the good ; they tend
to the general enjoyment, they are there simply to be
disposed of, and they ensure for every one the conscious-
ness of his particular self. Riches means in its very
nature universal beneficence : if it refuses any benefit
in a given case, and does not gratify every need, this
is merely an accident which does not detract from its
universal and necessary nature of imparting to every
individual his share and being a thousand-handed
benefactor.

These two judgments provide the ideas of goodness

Culture and its S'phere of Reality 505

and badness with a content which is the reverse of what
they had for us. Self-consciousness has up till now,
however, been related to its objects only incompletely,
viz. only according to the criterion of the self-existent.
But consciousness is also real in its inherent nature, and
has Hkewise to take this aspect for its point of view and
criterion, and by so doing round ofi completely the
judgment of self-conscious spirit. According to this
aspect state-power expresses its essential nature : the
power of the state is in part the quiet insistence of law,
in part government and prescription, which appoints
and regulates the particular processes of universal
action. The one is the substance pure and simple, the
other its action which animates and sustains itself and
all individuals. The individual thus finds therein his
ground and nature expressed, organised, and exercised.
As against this, the individual, by the enjoyment of
riches, does not get to know his own imiversal nature :
he only gets a transitory consciousness and enjoyment
of himself qua particular and self- existing, and discovers
his discordance, his want of harmony with his own
essential nature. The conceptions good and bad thus
receive here a content the opposite of which they had
before.

These two ways of judging find each of them an
identity and a disagreement. In the first case conscious-
ness finds the power of the state out of agreement with it,
and the enjoyment that came from wealth in accord
with it ; while in the second case the reverse holds
good. There is a twofold attainment of identity
and a twofold form of disagreement : there is an
opposite relation established towards both the essential
reahties. We must pass judgment on these different

506 Phenomenology of Mind

ways of judging as such ; to this end we have to
apply the criterion akeady brought forward. The
conscious relation where identity or agreement is
found, is, according to this standard, the good ; that
where want of agreement obtains, the bad. These two
types of relation must henceforth be regarded as modes
or forms of conscious existence. Conscious life, through
taking up a different kind of relation, thereby becomes
itself characterised as different, comes to be itself good
or bad. It is not simply distinct in virtue of the fact
that it took as its constitutive principle either existence
for itself, or mere being in itself ; for both are
equally essential moments of its life : that dual way
of judging, above discussed, presented those principles
as separated, and contained, therefore, merely abstract
ways of judging. Concrete actual conscious life has
31 fc within it both principles, and the distinction between
them falls solely within its own nature, viz. inside the
relation of itself to the real.

This relation takes opposite forms ; in the one there
is an active attitude towards state-power and wealth
as to something with which it is in accord, in the other it
is related to these realities as to something with which
it is at variance. A conscious Hfe which finds itself at
one with them has the attribute of Nobility. In the
case of the public authority of the state, it beholds
what is in accord with itself, and sees that it has there
its own nature pure and simple and the region for the
exercise of its own powers, and takes up the position
of open willing and obedient service in its interests,
as well as that of inner reverence towards it. In the
same way in the sphere of wealth, it sees that wealth
secures for it the consciousness of self-existence, of

Culture and its Sphere of Reality 507

realising the other essential aspect of its nature : hence
it looks upon wealth hkewise as something essential in
relation to itself, acknowledges him from whence the
enjoyment comes as a benefactor, and considers itself
under a debt of obligation.

The conscious life involved in the other relation, again,
that of disagreement, has the attribute of Baseness. It
remains at variance with both those essential elements.
It looks upon the authoritative power of the state as a
chain, as something suppressing its separate existence
for its own sake, and hence hates the ruler, obeys only
with secret malice, and stands ever ready to burst out
in rebelHon. It sees, too, in wealth, by which it attains
to the enjoyment of its own independent existence,
merely something discordant, or out of harmony with
its permanent nature ; since through wealth it only gets
a sense of its particular isolated existence and a con-
sciousness of passing enjoyment, this type of mind
loves wealth, but despises it, and, with the disappearance
of enjoyment, of what is inherently evanescent, regards
its relation to the man of wealth as having ceased too.

These relations now express, in the first instance, a
judgment, the determinate characterisation of what both
those facts [state-power and wealth] are as objects for
consciousness ; not as yet what they are in their
complete objective nature {an und für sich). The
reflection which is presented in this judgment is partly
at first for us [who are philosophising] an affirmation
of the one characteristic along with the other, and
hence is a simultaneous cancelling of both ; it is not
yet the reflection of them for consciousness itself.
Partly, again, they are at first immediate essential
entities ; they have not become this nor is there in

5ÖÖ Phenomenology of Mind

them consciousness of self : that for which they are is
not yet their animating principle : they are predicates
which are not yet themselves subject. On account
of this separation, the entirety of the spiritual
process of judgment also breaks asunder into two
existent modes of consciousness, each of which has
a one-sided character. Now, just as at the outset the
indifference of the two aspects in the process of self-
estrangement — one of which was the inherent essential
being of pure consciousness, viz. the determinate
ideas of good and bad, the other their actual ex-
istence in the form of state-power and wealth — passed
to the stage of being related the one to the other,
passed to the level of judgment ; in the same way this
external relation must be raised to the level of their
inner unity, must become a relation of thought to
actual reality. In this way the spirit animating both
the forms of judgment will make its appearance. This
takes place when judgment passes into inference,
becomes the mediating process in which the middle
term necessitating and connecting both sides of the
judgment is brought forward.

The noble type of consciousness, then, finds itself in
the judgment related to state-power, in the sense
that this power is indeed not a self as yet but at first
is universal substance, in which however this form of
mind feels its own essential nature to exist, is conscious of
its own purpose and absolute content. By taking up a
positive relation to this substance, it assumes a negative
attitude towards its own special purposes, its par-
ticular content and individual existence, and lets
them disappear. This type of mind is the heroism of
Service ; the virtue which sacrifices individual being

Culture and its Sfhere of Reality 509

to the universal, and thereby brings this into existence ;
the type of personaUty which renounces possession and
enjoyment, acts for the sake of the prevailing power,
and becomes a concrete reality in this way.

Through this process the universal becomes united
and bound up with existence in general, just as the
individual consciousness makes itself by this renuncia-
tion essentially universal. That from which this con-
sciousness alienates itself by submitting to serve is its
consciousness immersed in mere existence : but the being
alienated from itself is the inherent nature. By thus
shaping its life in accord with what is universal, it
acquires a Reverence for itself, and gets reverence 3 6i>
from others. The power of the state, however, which
to start with was merely universal in thought, the
inherent nature, becomes through this very process
universal in fact, becomes actual power. It is actually
so only in getting that actual obedience which it obtains
through self -consciousness judging it to be the essential
reality, and through the self being freely surrendered
to it. The result of this action, binding the essential
reahty and self indissolubly together, is to produce a
twofold actuality, — a self that is truly actuahsed, and a
state-power whose authority is accepted as true.

Owing to this alienation [implied in the idea of
sacrifice] state-power, however, is not yet a self-
consciousness that knows itself as state-power. It
is merely the law of the state, its inherent prin-
ciple, that is accepted ; the state-power has as yet
no particular will. For as yet the self-consciousness
rendering service has not ahenated its pure self-
hood, and made it an animating influence in the
exercise of state-power ; the serving attitude merely

610 Phenomenology of Mind

gives the state its bare being, sacrifices merely
^Ä./«'»,'^ its existence to the state, not its essential nature.
This type of self-consciousness passes thus for some-
thing that is in conformity with the essential nature,
and is acknowledged and accepted because of its in-
herent reality. The others find their essential nature
operative in it, but not their independent existence —
find their thinking, their pure consciousness fulfilled,
but not their specific individuality. It has a value,
therefore, in their thoughts, and is honoured accord-
ingly. Such a type is the haughty vassal ; he is active
in the interests of the state-power, so far as the latter
is not a personal will [a monarch] but merely an
essential will. His self-importance lies only in the
honour thus acquired, only in the general opinion think-
ing of his concern for the essential will, not in an indi-
viduality gratefully thinking of his services ; for he has
not helped this individuality [the monarch] to get inde-
pendence. The language he would use, were he to
occupy a direct relation to the personal will of the
state-power, which thus far has not arisen, would take
the form of " counsel " imparted in the interests of
what is the best for all.

State-power has, therefore, still at this stage no
will to meet the advice, and does not decide between
the different opinions as to what is universally the best.
It is not yet governmental control, and on that account
5 1 ^ is in truth not yet real state-power. Individual self-
existence, the possession of an individual will that
is not yet qua will surrendered, is the inner separa-
tist spiritual principle of the various classes and
stations, a spirit which keeps for its own behoof
what suits itself best, in spite of its words about

Culture and its SfJiere of Reality 511

the universal best, and this clap-trap about what
is universally the best tends to be made a substi-
tute for action bringing it about. The sacrifice of
existence, which takes place in the case of service,
is indeed complete when it goes so far as death. But
the constant danger of a death which the individual
survives, leaves a specific kind of existence, and hence
a particular self-reference still untouched ; and this
makes the counsel imparted in the interests of the
universally best ambiguous and open to suspicion ;
it really means, in point of fact, retaining the claim
to a private opinion of his own, and a separate individual
will as against the power of the state. Its relation to
the latter is, therefore, still one of discordance ; and
it possesses the characteristic found in the case of the
base type of consciousness — it is ever at the point of
breaking out into rebellion.

This contradiction, which has to be got rid of, in
this form of discordance and opposition between the
independence of the individual conscious hfe and
the universality belonging to state-authority, contains
at the same time another aspect. That renunciation
of existence, when it is complete, as it is in death,
is one that does not revert to the conscious hfe that
makes the sacrifice ; it simply is : this conscious hfe
does not survive the renunciation and exist by itself as
an objective fact {an und für sich), it merely passes away
in the unreconciled opposition. That alone is true
sacrifice of individuality, therefore, in which it gives itself
up as completely as in the case of death, but all the
while preserves itself in the renunciation. It comes
thereby to be actually what it is implicitly, — the identical
unity of self with its opposed self. In this way, by the

512 Phenomenology of Mind

inner withdrawn and separatist spiritual principle, the
self as such, coming forward and abrogating itself, the
state-power becomes if so facto raised into a proper self
of its own ; without this aHenation of self the deeds of
honour, the actions of the noble type of consciousness,
and the counsels which its insight reveals, would con-
tinue to maintain the ambiguous character which, as
2,yo we saw, kept that secret reserve of private intention
and self-will, in spite of its overt pretensions.

This estrangement, however, takes place in Language,
in words alone, and language assumes here its peculiar
role. Both in the sphere of the general social order
{Sittlichkeit), where language conveys laws and com-
mands, and in the sphere of actual life, where it ap-
pears as conveying advice, the content of what it
expresses is the essential reality, and language is the form
of that essential content. Here, however, it takes
the form in which qua language it exists to be its con-
tent, and possesses authority, qua spoken word ; it is
the power of utterance qua utterance which, just in
speaking, performs what has to be performed. For
it is the existence of a pure self qua self ; in speech
the particular self-existent self-consciousness comes as
such into existence, so that its particular individuality
is something for others. Ego qua this particular pure
ego is non-existent otherwise ; in every other mode of
expression it is absorbed in some concrete actuality,
and appears in a shape from which it can withdraw ;
it turns reflectively back into itself, away from its act, as
well as from its physiognomic expression, and leaves
such an incomplete existence, (in which there is always
at once too much as well as too little), lying soul-
less behind. Speech, however, contains this ego in its

Culture and its Sphere of Reality 513

purity ; it alone expresses I, qua self. Its existence in
this case is, qua existence, a form of objectivity which has
in it the true nature of existence. Ego is this particular
ego, but at the same time universal ; its appearing
is ipso facto and at once the alienation and disappear-
ance of this particular ego, and in consequence its
remaining all the while universal. The I, that ex-
presses itself, is apprehended as an ego ; it is a kind
of infection, in virtue of which it establishes at once a
unity with those who are aware of it, a spark that
kindles a imiversal consciousness of self. That it is
perceived as a fact by others means eo ipso that
its existence is itself dying away : this its otherness
is taken back into itself ; and its existence hes just in
this, that, qua self-conscious Now, as it exists, it has
no subsistence and that it subsists just through its
disappearance. This disappearance is, therefore, itself
ipso facto its continuance ; it is its own cognition of
itself, and its knowing itself as something that has
passed into another self that has been perceived and 37/
apprehended and is universal.

Spirit maintains this form of reality here, because
the extremes, too, whose unity spirit is, have directly
the character of being reahties each on its own
account. Their unity is disintegrated into rigid as-
pects, each of which is an actual object for the
other, and each is excluded from the other. The
unity, therefore, appears in the role of a mediating
term, which is excluded and distinguished from the
separated reahty of the two sides ; it has, therefore,
itself the actual character of something objective,
apart, and distinguished from its aspects, and objective
for them, i.e. the unity is an existent objective fact. J~-ciJz.'^ie^

VOL. II.— H

514 Phenomenology of Mind

The spiritual substance comes as such into existence only
when it has been able to take as its aspects those self-
consciousnesses, which know this pure self to be a reality
claiming immediate validity, and therein immediately
know, too, that they are such reahties merely through
the process of alienation. Through that pure self
the moments of substance get the transparency of a
self-knowing category, and become clarified so far as
to be moments of spirit ; through the mediating process
spirit comes to exist in spiritual form. Spirit in this way
is the mediating term, presupposing those extremes
and produced through their existence ; but it is also
the spiritual whole breaking out between them,
which sunders its self into them, and creates each
solely in virtue of that contact with the whole which
belongs to its very principle. The fact that both
extremes are from the start and in their very nature
transcended and disintegrated brings out their unity;
and this is the process which fuses both together, inter-
changes their characteristic features, and binds them
together, and does so in each extreme. This mediating
process consequently actuahses the principle of each
of the two extremes, or makes what each is inherently
in itself its controlling and moving spirit.

Both extremes, the state-authority and the noble
type of consciousness, are disintegrated by this latter.
In state-power, the two sides are the abstract universal
which is obeyed, and the individual will existing on its
own account, which, however, does not yet belong to
the universal itself. In nobility, the two sides are
the obedience in giving up existence, or the inherent
maintenance of self-respect and honour, and, on the
other hand, a self which exists purely for its own sake

Culture and its S'phere of Reality 515

and whose self-existence is not yet done away with,
the self-will that remains always in reserve. These
two moments into which the extremes are refined,
and which, therefore, find expression in language,
are the abstract universal, which is called the "universal
best," and the pure self which by rendering service
abrogated the life of absorption in the manifold variety
of existence. Both in principle are the same ; for
pure self is just the abstract universal, and hence their
unity acts as their mediating term. But the self is, to
begin with, actual only in consciousness as one extreme,
while the inherent nature {Ansich) is actuahsed in
state-authority as the other extreme. That state-power
not merely in the form of honour but in reality should
be transferred to it, is lacking in the case of conscious-
ness; while in the case of state-authority there is
lacking the fact that it was obeyed not merely as a
so-called universal best, but as will, in other words,
as state-power which is the self regulating and de-
ciding. The unity of the principle in which state-
power still remains, and into which consciousness
has been refined, becomes real in this mediating pro-
cess, and this exists qua mediating term in the simple
form of speech. All the same, the aspects of this
unity are not yet present in the form of two selves
as selves ; for state-power comes first to be inspired with
active self-hood. This language is, therefore, not yet
spiritual existence in the sense in which spirit com-
pletely knows and expresses itself.

Nobihty of consciousness, because the extreme form
of self, assumes the role of creating the language by
which the separate factors related are formed into
active spiritual wholes. The heroism of dumb service

516 Phenomenology of Mind

passes into the heroism of flattery. This reflection
of service in express language constitutes the self-
conscious self-disintegrating mediating term, and re-
flects back into itself not only its own special extreme,
but reflects the extreme of universal power back into
this self too, and makes that power, which is at first
implicit, into an independent self-existence, and gives
it the individualistic form of self-consciousness. Through
this process the indwelling spirit of this state-power
3y3 comes into existence — that of an unlimited monarch.
It is unlimited ; the language, of flattery raises
power into transparent, clearly-acknowledged univer-
sality; this moment being the product of language,
of transparent spiritualised existence, is a purified
form of self-identity. It is a monarch; for flattering
language likewise puts individualistic self-consciousness
on its pinnacle; what conscious nobility abandons
as regards this aspect of pure spiritual unity is
the pure essential natiu-e of its thought, its ego
itself. The naked particularity of its ego, which
otherwise is only imagined, flattery brings out more
definitely into relief as an actual existence, by giving
the monarch a proper name. For it is in the name
alone that the distinction of the individual from every
one else is not imagined but is actually made by all.
By having a name the individual passes for a pure
individual not merely in his own consciousness of him-
self, but in the consciousness of all. By its name,
then, the monarch becomes absolutely detached from
every one, exclusive and solitary, and in virtue of it is
unique as an atom that cannot commute any part of its
essential nature, and has nothing like itself. This name
is thus its reflection into itself, or is the actual reality

Culture and its Sphere of Reality 517

which universal power has inherently within itself :
through the name the power is the monarch.* Con-
versely he, this particular individual, thereby knows
himself, this individual self, to be universal power,
knows that the nobles not only are ready and pre-
pared for the service of the state-authority, but are
grouped as an ornamental setting round the throne,
and that they are for ever telHng him who sits thereon
what he is.

The language of their professed praise is in this way
the spirit that unites together the two extremes in
the case of state-power itself. This language reflects
in itself the abstract power and gives to it the
moment peculiar to the other extreme, an isolated
self of its own, willing and deciding on its own
account, and consequently gives it self-conscious exist-
ence. Or again, by that means this self-conscious
particular being comes to be aware of itself for certain
as the supreme authority. This power is the central
focal self into which, through relinquishing their own
inner certainty of self, the many separate centres of self- j7/^
hood are fused together into one.

Since, however, this proper spirit of state-power
subsists by getting its realisation and its noiu'ishment
from the homage of action and thought rendered by
the nobility, it is a form of independence in internal
self-estrangement. The noble, the extreme form of
self-existence, keeps back the other extreme of actual
universahty, and keeps it back for the universahty
of thought which was relinquished. The power of
the state has passed over to and fallen upon the noble.
It falls to the noble primarily to make the state-

* Cp. " L'etat c'est moi. "

518 Phenomenology of Mind

authority truly effective : in his existence as a self on
his own account, that authority ceases to be the inert
being it appeared to be qua extreme of abstract and
merely implicit reality.

Looked at "per se, state-power reflected back into
itself, or becoming spiritual, means nothing else than
that it has come to be a moment of self-conscious Hfe,
i.e. is only by being sublated. Consequently it is now
the real in the sense of something whose spiritual mean-
ing lies in being sacrificed and squandered ; it exists
in the sense of wealth. It continues, no doubt, to
subsist at the same time as a form of reaHty over
against wealth, into which in principle it is forever
passing ; but it is a reality, whose inherent principle
is this very process of passing over — owing to the
service and the reverence rendered to it, and by
which it arises — into its opposite, into the condi-
tion of relinquishing its power. Thus from its point
of view {Fürsich) the special and pecuhar self, which
constitutes its will, becomes, by the self-abasement of
the nobility, a universal that renounces itself, becomes
completely an isolated particular, a mere accident,
which is the prey of every stronger will. What remains
to it of the universally acknowledged and incommunic-
able independence is the empty name.

While, then, the nobility may adopt the attitude of
something that can in a similar way stand related to the
universal power, its true nature lies rather in retaining
its own separateness of being when rendering its service,
but, in what is properly the abnegation of its person-
Z'l^ aUty, its true being Hes in actually cancelling and rending
in pieces the universal substance. Its spirit is the
attitude of thoroughgoing discordance (inequahty) :

Culture and its Sphere of Reality 519

on one side it retains its own will in the honour it
receives, on the other hand it gives up its will : in part
it alienates its inner nature from itself, and arrives
at the extreme of discordance with itself, in part it
subdues the universal substance to itself, and puts this
entirely at variance with itself. It is obvious that, as a
result, its own specific nature, which kept it distinct
from the so-called base type of mind, disappears, and
with that this latter type of mind too. The base type
has gained its end, that of subordinating universal
power to self-centred isolation of self.

Endowed in this way with universal power, self-
consciousness exists in the form of universal beneficence :
or, from another point of view, universal power is wealth
that again is itself an object for consciousness. For
wealth is here taken to be the universal put in subjec-
tion, which, however, through this first transcendence,
is not yet absolutely returned into the self. Self has
not as yet its self as such for object, but the universal
essential reahty in a state of sublation. Since this
object has first come into being, the relation of con-
sciousness towards it is immediate, and consciousness
has thus not yet set forth its want of congruity with
this object : we have here the nobility preserving its
own self-centred existence in the universal that has
become non-essential, and hence acknowledging the
object and feehng grateful to its benefactor.

Wealth has within it from the first the aspect of self-
existence {Fürsichsein). It is not the self-less universal
of state-power, or the unconstrained simphcity of the
natural life of spirit ; it is state-power as holding its
own by effort of will in opposition to a will that wants
to get the mastery over it and get enjoyment out of it.

520 Phenomenology of Mind

But since wealth has merely the form of being essen-
Äa* Vfo^»*^, tial, this one-sided self-existent Hfe, — which has no
being in itself, which is rather the sublation of inherent
being, — is the retm:n of the individual into himself to
find no essential reaHty in his enjoyment. It thus itself
3rV> needs to be given animation ; and its reflective process
of bringing this about consists in its becoming some-
thing real in itself as well as for itself, instead of
being merely for itself ; wealth, which is the sublated
essential reality, has to become the essentially real.
In this way it preserves its own spiritual principle in
itself.

It will be sufficient here to describe the content of
this process since we have already explained at length
its form. Nobility, then, stands here in relation not
to the object in the general sense of something essen-
tial ; what is alien to it is self-existence itself. It finds
itself face to face with its own self as such in a state of
alienation, as an objective solid actuality which it has
to take from the hands of another self-centred being,
another equally fixed and solid entity. Its object is
self-existence, i.e. its own being : but by being an object
this is at the same time if so facto an alien reality,
which is a self-centred being on its own account, has a
will of its own ; i.e. it sees its self under the power of
an alien will on which it depends for the concession of
its self.

From each particular aspect self-consciousness can
abstract, and for that reason, even when under
an obligation to one of these aspects, retains the
recognition and inherent validity of self-consciousness
as an independent reality. Here, however, it finds
that, as regards its own ego, its own proper and

Culture and its S'phere of Reality 521

peculiar actuality, it is outside itself and belongs to
an other, finds its personality as such dependent on
the chance personahty of another, on the accident of a
moment, of an arbitrary caprice, or some other sort of
irrelevant circumstance.

In the sphere of legal right, what lies in the power
of the objective being appears as an incidental content,
from which it is possible to make abstraction ; and the
governing power possessed does not affect the self as
such; rather this self is recognised. But here the self sees
its self-certainty as such to be the most unreal thing of
all, finds its pure personality to be absolutely without
the character of personahty. The sense of its grati-
tude is, therefore, a state in which it feels profoundly
this condition of being utterly outcast, and feels also
the deepest revolt as well. Since the pure ego sees itself
outside self, and torn in sunder, everything that gives
continuity and universahty, everything that bears the
name of law, good, and right, is thereby torn to pieces
at the same time, and goes to wreck and ruin : all
identity and concord break up, for what holds sway is
the purest discord and disunion, what was absolutely
essential is absolutely unessential, what has a being on
its own account has its being outside itself : the pure
ego itself is absolutely disintegrated.

Thus since this consciousness receives back from
the sphere of wealth the objective form of being a
separate self-existence, and cancels that objective
character, it is in principle not only, like the preced-
ing reflexion, not completed, but is consciously un-
satisfied : the reflexion, since the self receives itself as an
objective fact, is the immediate contradiction that has
taken root in the pure ego as such. Qua self, however.

522 Phenomenology of Mind

it at the same time ipso facto rises above this contradic-
tion ; it is absolutely elastic, and again cancels this
sublation of itself, repudiates this repudiation of itself,
wherein its self-existence is made to be something alien
to it, revolts against this acceptance of itself and in the
very reception of itself is self-existent.

Since, then, the attitude of this type of consciousness
is bound up with this condition of utter disintegration,
the distinction constituting its spiritual nature — that
of being nobility and opposed to baseness — falls away
and both aspects are the same.

The spirit of well-doing that characterises the action
of wealth may, fmther, be distinguished from that of
the conscious life accepting the benefit it confers, and
deserves special consideration.

The spirit animating wealth had an unreal insubstan-
tial independence; wealth was something to be given
up. By communicating what it has, however, it passes
into something essential and inherent ; since it fulfils its
nature in sacrificing itself, it cancels the aspect of par-
ticularity, of merely seeking enjoyment for one's own
particular self, and, being thus sublated qua particular,
the type of spirit here is universahty or essentially real.

What it imparts, what it gives to others, is self-
existence. It does not hand itself over, however, as a
natural self- less object, as the frankly and freely offered
condition of unconscious Ufe, but as self-conscious, as
a reality keeping hold of itself : it is not Hke the power
3-7 g of an inorganic element which is felt by the conscious-
ness receiving its force to be inherently transitory ; it
is the power over self, a power aware that it is indepen-
dent and voluntary, and knowing at the same time that
what it dispenses becomes the self of some one else.

Culture and its Sphere of Reality 523

Wealth thus shares reprobation with its chentele ;
but in place of revolt appears arrogance. For in
one aspect it knows, as well as the self it benefits,
that its self-existence is a matter of accident ; but
itself is this accident in whose power personaHty is
placed. In this mood of arrogance — which thinks it
has secured through a dole an ahen ego -nature,
and thereby brought its inmost being into submis-
sion— it overlooks the secret rebellion of the other
self : it overlooks the fact of all bonds being com-
pletely cast aside, overlooks this pure disintegra-
tion, in which, the self-identity of what exists for
its own sake having become sheer internal discordance,
all oneness and concord, all subsistence is rent asunder,
and in which in consequence the thoughts and inten-
tions of the benefactor are the first to be shattered.
It stands directly in front of this abyss, cleaving
it to the innermost, this bottomless pit, where every
soHd base and stay have vanished : and in the depths
it sees nothing but a common thing, a display of whims
on its part, a chance result of its own caprice. Its
spirit consists in quite unreal imagining, in being super-
ficiality forsaken of all true spiritual import.

Just as self-consciousness had its own manner of
speech in deahng with state-power, in other words, just
as spirit took the form of expressly and actually mediat-
ing between these two extremes, self-consciousness has
also a mode of speech in dealing with wealth ; but
still more when in revolt does it adopt a language of
its own. The form of utterance which supphes wealth
with the sense of its own essential significance, and
thereby makes it master of itself, is likewise the language
of flattery, but of ignoble flattery ; for what it gives

524 Phenomenology of Mind

out to be the essential reality, it knows to be a reality
without an inherent nature of its own, to be something
at the mercy of another. The language of flattery,
however, as already remarked, is that of a one-sided
spirit. To be sure its constituent elements are, on the
one hand, a self moulded by service into a shape where
3//^ it is reduced to bare existence, and, on the other, the
inherent reahty of the power dominating the self.
Yet the bare principle, the pure conception, in which
the mere self and the inherent reality (Ansich), that
pure ego and this pure reality or thought, are one
and the same thing — this conceptual unity of the
two aspects between which the reciprocity takes effect,
is not consciously felt when this language is used.
The object is consciously still the inherent reality
in opposition to the self; in other words, the object is
not for consciousness at the same time its own proper
self as such.

The language expressing the condition of disintegra-
tion, wherein spiritual life is rent asunder, is, however,
the perfect form of utterance for this entire stage of
spiritual culture and development, the formative process
of moulding self-consciousness (Bildung), and expresses
the spirit in which it most truly exists. This self-con-
sciousness, which finds befitting the rebelhon that
repudiates its own repudiation, is eo ipso absolute self-
identity in absolute disintegration, the pure activity
of mediating pure self-consciousness with itself. It
is the oneness expressed in the identical judgment,
where one and the same personality is subject as well
as predicate. But this identical judgment is at the
same time the infinite judgment ; for this personality
is absolutely split in two, and subject and predicate

Culture and its Sphere of Reality 525

are entities utterly indifferent one to the other, which
have nothing to do with each other, with no necessary
unity, so much so that each has the power of an in-
dependent personahty of its own. What exists as
a self on its own account has for its object its
own self- existence, which is object in the sense of an
absolute other, and yet at the same time directly in
the form of itself — itself in the sense of an other, not
as if this had an other content, for the content is the
same self in the form of an absolute opposite, with
an existence completely all its own and indifferent.

We have, then, here the spirit of this real world
of formative culture, conscious of its own nature as
it truly is, and conscious of its ultimate and essential
principle [Begriff').

This type of spiritual life is the absolute and universal
inversion of reality and thought, their entire estrange-
ment the one from the other ; it is pure cultm'e. What
is found out in this sphere is that neither the concrete
reahties, state-power and wealth, nor their determin-
ate conceptions, good and bad, nor the consciousness
of good and bad (the consciousness that is noble and
the consciousness that is base) possess real truth ; it -So
is found that all these moments are inverted and trans-
muted the one into the other, and each is the opposite
of itself.

The universal power, which is the substance,
since it gains a spiritual nature pecuHarly its own
through the principle of individuality, accepts the
possession of a self of its own merely as a name by
which it is described, and, even in being actual power,
is really so powerless as to have to sacrifice itself.
But this self-less reahty given over to another, this

526 Phenomenology of Mind

self that is turned into a thing, is in fact the return
of the reahty into itself ; it is a self- existence that is
there for its own sake, the existential form of spirit.

The principles belonging to these reahties, the thoughts
of good and bad, are similarly transmuted and reversed
in this process; what is characterised as good is bad,
and vice versa. The consciousness of each of these
moments by itself, the conscious types judged as noble
and base — these are rather in their real truth simi-
larly the reverse of what these specific forms should be ;
nobility is base and repudiated, just as what is repudiated
as base turns round into the nobleness that characterises
the most highly developed form of free self-conscious-
ness.

Looked at formally, everji^hing is Hkewise in its
external aspects the reverse of what it is internally
for itself ; and again it is not really and in truth what
it is for itself, but something else than it wants to be;
self-existence on its own account is, strictly speaking,
the loss of self, and ahenation of self is really self-
preservation.

The state of things brought about here, then, is
that all moments execute justice on one another all
round, each is just as much in a condition of inherent
alienation as it fancies itself in its opposite, and in this
way reverses its nature.

Spirit truly objective, however, is just this unity
of absolutely separate moments, and in fact comes
into existence as the common ground, the mediating
agency, just through the independent reality of these
self-less extremes. Its very existence hes in universal
talk and depreciatory judgment rending and tearing
everything, before which all those moments are broken

Culture and its Sphere of Reality 527

up that are meant to signify something real and to
stand for actual members of the whole, and which at
the same time plays with itself this game of self-dis-
solution. This judging and talking is, therefore, the .3,5 ;
real truth, which cannot be got over, while it over-
powers everything — it is that which in this real world
is alone truly of importance. Each part of this world
comes to find there its spirit expressed, or gets to be
spoken of with spirit and finds said of it what it is.

The honest * soul takes each moment as a permanent
and essential fact, and is an uncultivated unreflective
condition, which does not think and does not know that
it is just doing the very inverse. The distraught and
disintegrated soul is, however, aware of inversion; it
is, in fact, a condition of absolute inversion : the con-
ceptual principle predominates there, brings together
into a single unity the thoughts that lie far apart in
the case of the honest soul, and the language clothing
its meaning is, therefore, full of esfrit and wit
{geistreich).

The content uttered by spirit and uttered about
itself is, then, the inversion and perversion of all con-
ceptions and realities, a universal deception of itself
and of others. The shamelessness manifested in stating
this deceit is just on that account the greatest truth.
This style of speech is the madness of the musician " who
piled and mixed up together some thirty airs, Itahan,
French, tragic, comic, of all sorts and kinds ; now, in a
deep undertone, he descended to the depths of hell, then,
contracting his throat to a high, piping falsetto, he rent
the vault of the skies, raving and soothing, haughtily

* V. p. 402 ff.

528 Phenomenology of Mind

imperious and mockingly j eering by turns. " * The placid
soult that in simple honesty of heart takes the music
of the good and true to consist in harmony of
sound and uniformity of tone, i.e. in a melodious
chord, regards this style of expression as a " fickle
fantasy of wisdom and folly, a melee of so much skill
and low cunning, composed of ideas as likely to be right
as wrong, with as complete a perversion of sentiment,
with as much consummate shamefulness in it, as abso-
lute frankness, candour, and truth. It is not able
to refrain from bringing out the sound of every note,
and running up and down the whole gamut of feeling,
from the depths of contempt and repudiation to the
highest pitch of admiration and stirring emotion.
'isi. A vein of the ridiculous will be diffused through the
latter, which takes away from their nature " ; the
former will find in their very candour a strain of
atoning reconcilement, will find in their shuddering
depths the all-powerful qualities which give spirit a
self.

If we consider, by way of contrast to the mode of
utterance indulged in by this self-transparent distracted
type of mind, the language adopted by that simple,
placid consciousness of the good and the true, we find
that it can only speak in monosyllables when face to
face with the frank and self-conscious eloquence of the
mind developed under the influence of culture ; for
it can say nothing to the latter that the latter does
not know and say. If it gets beyond speaking in
monosyllables, then it says the same thing that the
cultivated mind expresses, but in doing so commits,

* Diderot, Rameau's Neffc.

f The " philosopher " in Diderot's Dialogue.

Culture and its Sphere of Reality 529

in addition, the folly of imagining that it is saying
something new, something different. Its very syllables,
"disgraceful, " "base," are this folly already, for the other
says them of itself. This latter type of mind perverts
in its mode of utterance everything that sounds the
same, because this self -sameness is merely an abstraction,
but in its actual reality is intrinsically and inherently
perversion. On the other hand, again, the unsophisti-
cated mind takes under its protection the good and
the noble (i.e. what retains its identity of meaning in
being objectively expressed), and takes care of it in the
only way here possible — that is to say, the good must
not lose its value because it may be linked with what is
bad or mingled with it, for to be thus associated with
badness is its condition and necessity, and the wisdom
of nature lies in this fact. Yet this unsophisticated
mind, while it intended to contradict, has merely,
in doing so, gathered into a trifling form the mean-
ing of what spirit said, and put it in a manner which,
by turning the opposite of noble and good into the
necessary condition of noble and good, means, in an
unthinking way, to state something else than that
the so-called noble and good is by its very nature the
reverse of itself, or that what is bad is, conversely,
something excellent.

If the naive consciousness makes up for this barren,
soulless idea by the concrete reahty of what is excellent,
when it produces an example of what is excellent,
whether in the form of a fictitious case or a true story,
and thus shows it to be not an empty name, but an^^g 3
actual fact, then the universal reality of perverted
action stands in sharp contrast to the entire real world,
where that example constitutes merely something

VOL. U.— I

530 Phenomenology of Mind

quite isolated and particular, merely an esfece, a sort
of thing. And to represent the existence of the good
and the noble as an isolated particular anecdote,
whether fictitious or true, is the bitterest thing that
can be said about it.

Finally, should the naive mind require this entire
sphere of perversion to be dissolved and broken up, it
cannot ask the individual to withdraw out of it, for even
Diogenes in his tub [with his pretence of withdrawal]
is under the sway of that perversion ; and to ask this
of the particular individual is to ask him to do pre-
cisely what is taken to be bad, viz. to care for the self as
particular. But if the demand to withdraw is directed
at the universal individual, it cannot mean that reason
must again give up the culture and development of
spiritual conscious life which has been reached, that
reason should let the extensive riches of its moments
sink back into the naivete of natural emotion, and
revert and approximate to the wild condition of the
animal consciousness, which is also called the natural
state of innocence. On the contrary, the demand for
this dissolution when addressed to the spirit reahsed in
culture can only mean that it must qua spirit return
out of its confusion into itself, and win for itself a
still higher level of conscious life.

In point of fact, however, spirit has already accom-
plished this result. To be conscious of its own distraught
and torn condition and to express itself accordingly,
— this is to pour scornful laughter on its existence, on
the confusion pervading the whole and on itself as well :
it is at the same time this whole confusion dying away
and yet apprehending itself to be doing so. This
self-apprehending vanity of all reality and of every

Culture and its Sphere of Reality 531

definite principle reflects the real world into itself in a
twofold form : — in the particular self of consciousness
qua particular, and in the pure imiversahty of con-
sciousness, in thought. According to the one aspect,
mind thus come to itself has directed its gaze into the
world of actual reahty, and makes that reality its own .'i^i^
purpose and its immediate content : from the other
side, its gaze is in part turned solely on itself and
against that world of reality, in part turned away from
it towards heaven, and its object is the region beyond
the world.

In respect of that return into self the vanity of all
things is its own peculiar vanity, it is itself vain. It is
self existing for its own sake, a self that knows not only
how to sum up and chatter about everything, but with
esprit and wit to hit off the contradiction that Hes
in the heart of the all so solid seeming reality, and the
fixed determinations which judgment sets up ; and that
contradiction is their real truth. Looked at formally it
finds everything estranged from itself, self-existence
is cut off from essential being {Ansich), what is
intended and the purpose are separated from real
truth, and from both again existence for another, what
is ostensibly put forward is cut ofi from the proper
meaning, the real fact, the true intention.

It thus knows exactly how to put each moment in
antithesis to every other, knows in short how to express
correctly the perversion that dominates all of them :
it knows better than each what each is, no matter
how it is constituted. Since it apprehends what
is substantial from the side of that disunion and
contradiction of elements combined within its nature,
but not from the side of this union itself, it under-

532 Phenomenology of Mind

stands very well how to pass judgment on this
substantial reality, but has lost the capacity of truly
grasping it.

This vanity needs at the same time the vanity of all
things, in order to get from them consciousness of itself ;
it therefore itself creates this vanity, and is the soul
that supports it. State-power and wealth are the
supreme purposes of its strenuous exertion, it is aware
that through renunciation and sacrifice it is moulded
into universal shape, that it attains universality, and
in possessing universality finds general recognition and
acceptance : state-power and wealth are the real and
actually acknowledged sources of power. But its gain-
ing acceptance thus is itself vain, and just by the fact
that it gets the mastery over them it knows them to be
not real by themselves, knows rather itself to be the
power within them, and them to be vain and empty.
That in possessing them it thus itself is able to stand
apart from and outside them, — this is what it expresses
in spirited languages ; and to express this is, therefore,
3 S b its supreme interest, and the true meaning of the whole
process. In such utterance this self, — in the form of
a pure self not associated with or bound by determina-
tions derived either from reality or thought, — comes
consciously to be a spiritual entity having a truly
universal significance and value. It is the condition in
which the nature of all relationships is rent asunder, and
it is the conscious rending of them all. But only by self-
consciousness being roused to revolt does it know its own
peculiar torn and shattered condition ; and in its know-
ing this it has if so facto risen above that condition. In
that state of self-conscious vanity all substantial content
comes to have a negative significance, which can no

Öulture and^its Sffiere of Reality 53ä

longer be taken in a positive sense. The positive object
is merely the pure ego itself ; and the consciousness
that is rent in sunder is inherently and essentially this
pure self-identity of self-consciousness returned to
itself.

Belief and Pure Insight*

The spiritual condition of self-alienation exists in the
sphere of culture as a fact. But since this whole has
become estranged from itself, there lies beyond this
sphere the nonactual region of pure consciousness, of
thought. Its content consists of what has been reduced
piu:ely to thought, its absolute element is thinking.
Since, however, thinking is in the first instance the
element of this sphere, consciousness has merely these
thoughts, but it does not as yet thinh them or does not
know that they are thoughts : to consciousness they
appear in the form of presentations, they are objects
in the form of ideas. For it comes out of the sphere
of actuality into that of pure consciousness, but is
itself still to all intents and purposes in the sphere
of actuahty with the determinateness that implies.
The conscious state of being rent and torn to pieces is
still essentially and inherently the self-identity of
pure consciousness not as a fact that itself is aware
of but only as presented to us who are considering its
condition. It has thus not as yet completed within
itself the process of rising above this condition, it is
simply there ; and it still has within itself the opposite

* The contrast between these two elements is found both in the pre-
Reformation period and in the eighteenth century period ; — in the latter
the contrast assumes perhaps its acutest form.

534

Belief and Pure Insight 535

principle by which it is conditioned, without as yet
having become master of that principle through a
mediating process. Hence the essential content of its
thought is not taken to be an essential object merely
in the form of abstract immanence (Ansich), but in the
form of a common object, an object that has merely
been elevated into another element, without having
lost the character of an object that is not constituted 3.3^?
by thought.

It is essentially distinct from the immanent nature
which constitutes the essential being of the stoic type
of consciousness. The significant factor for Stoicism
was merely the form of thought as such, which has
any content foreign to it that is drawn from reahty.
In the case of the consciousness just described,
however, the form of thought is not the significant
element. Similarly it is essentially distinct from the
inherent principle of the virtuous type of conscious life ;
here the essential fact stands, no doubt, in a relation
to reahty ; it is the essence of reahty itself : but it
is no more than an unreahsed essence of it. In
the above type of consciousness the essence, although
no doubt beyond reahty, stands all the same for an
actual real essence. In the same way, the inherently
right and good which reason as lawgiver estabhshes,
and the universal operating when consciousness tests
and examines laws — neither of these has the character
of actual reahty.

Hence while pure thought fell within the sphere of
spiritual culture as an aspect of the estrangement
characteristic of this sphere, as the standard in fact
for judging abstract good and abstract bad, it has
become enriched, by having gone through the process

536 Phenomenology of Mind

of the whole, with the element of reahty and thereby
with content. This reahty of its essential being, how-
ever, is at the same time merely a reality of pure
consciousness, not of concrete actual consciousness :
it is no doubt lifted into the element of thought, but
this concrete consciousness does not yet take it for a
thought ; it is beyond the reality peculiar to this con-
sciousness, for it means flight from the latter.

In the form in which Religion here appears —
for it is religion obviously that we are speaking
about — as the belief which belongs to the realm
of culture, rehgion does not yet appear as it is truly
and completely {an und für sich). It has already
come before us in other phases, viz. as the un-
happy consciousness, as a form of conscious process
with no substantial content in it. So, too, in the
case of the ethical substance, it appeared as a belief
in the nether-world. But a consciousness of departed
spirits is, strictly speaking, not belief, not the inner
essence subsisting in the element of pure consciousness
away beyond the actual : there the belief has itself an
' immediate existence in the present ; its element, its
substance is the family.

But at the stage we are now considering, religion is
in part the outcome of the substance, and is the pure
consciousness of that substance ; in part this pure
consciousness is alienated from its concrete actual
consciousness, the essence from its existence. It is thus
doubtless no longer the insubstantial process of con-
sciousness ; but it has still the characteristic of opposi-
tion to reality qua the given reality in general, and of
opposition to the reality of self-consciousness in par-
ticular. It is essentially therefore merely a belief.

Belief and Pure Insight 537

This pure consciousness of Absolute Being is a con-
sciousness in alienation. Let us see more closely what is
the characteristic of that whose other it is ; we can only
consider it in connection with this other. In the first
instance this pure consciousness seems to have over
against it merely the world of actuality. But since
its nature is to flee from this actuality, and thereby is
characterised by opposition, it has this actuality inherent
within its own being ; pure consciousness is, therefore,
essentially in its very being self-alienated, and belief
constitutes merely one side of it. The other side has
already arisen too. For pure consciousness is reflexion
out of the world of culture in such a way that the
substantial content of this sphere, as also the separate
fragments into which it falls, are shown to be what they
inherently are, — essential modes of spiritual life, abso-
lutely restless processes or determinate moments which
are at once cancelled in their opposite. Their essential
nature, bare consciousness, is thus the bare simplicity
of absolute distinction, distinction which as it stands
is no distinction. Consequently it is pure self-existence
not of a particular self, but essentially universal self,
whose being consists in a restless process invading and
pervading the stable existence of actual fact. In it is
found the certainty that knows itself at once to be the
truth ; there we have pure thought in the sense of
absolute notion with all its power of negativity, which
annihilates every objective existence that would claim
to stand over against consciousness, and turns it into
a form of conscious existence.

This pure consciousness is at the same time simple
and undifferentiated as well, just because its distinction
is no distinction. Being this form of bare and simple

538 Phenomenology of Mind

reflexion into self, however, it is the element of beHef,
in which spirit has the special feature of positive
universality, of what is inherent and essential in contrast
with that self-existence on the part of self-consciousness.

Forced back upon itself away from this unsubstan-
tial world whose being is mere dissolution, spirit in
its undivided unity is, when we consider its true
meaning, at once the absolute movement, the ceaseless
process of negating its appearance, as well as the essen-
tial substance thereof satisfied within itself, and the
positive stability of that appearance. But, bearing as
they inherently do the characteristic of alienation, both
these moments fall apart in the shape of a twofold
consciousness. The former is pure Insight, the spiritual
process concentrated and focussed in self- consciousness,
a process which has over against it the consciousness
of something positive, the form of objectivity or pre-
sentation, and which directs itself upon this presented
object. The proper and peculiar object of this insight
is, however, merely pure ego.* The bare consciousness
of the positive element, of unbroken self-identity, finds
its object, on the other hand, in the inner reality as
such.

Pure insight has, therefore, in the first instance, no
content within it, because it exists for itself by
negating everything in it ; to belief, on the other hand,
belongs the content, but without insight. While the
former does not get away from self-consciousness, the
latter to be sure has its content as well in the element
of pure self-consciousness, but only in presentation, not
in conceptions — in pure consciousness, not in pure self-
consciousness. Behef is, as a fact, in this way pure

* Kaut : " Pure ego is the absolute unity of apperception."

Belief and Pure Insight 539

consciousness of the essential reality, i.e. of tlie bare
and simple inner nature, and is thus thought — the
primary factor in the nature of beUef , which is generally
overlooked.* The immediateness which characterises
the presence of the essential reaHty within it is due
to the fact that its object is essence, inner nature,
i.e. pure thought, f This immediateness, however, so
far as thinking enters consciousness, or pure conscious-
ness enters into self-consciousness, maintains the signifi-
cance of an objective being that lies beyond consciousness
of self. It is because of the significance which imme-
diacy and simplicity of pure thought thus retain in
consciousness that the essential reality in the case of
behef drops into being an objectively presented idea
(Vorstellung), instead of being the content of thought,
and comes to be looked at as a supersensible world,
which is essentially an " other " for self-consciousness.

In the case of pure insight, on the other hand, the
entrance of pure thought into consciousness has the
opposite character : objectivity has the significance
of a content that is merely negative, that cancels
itself and returns into the self ; that is to say, only the
self is properly object to self, or, to put it otherwise,
the object only has truth so far as it has the form of
self.

As behef and pure insight fall in common within
pure consciousness, they also in common involve the
mind's return out of the concrete sphere of spiritual
culture. There are three aspects, therefore, from
which they show what they are. In one aspect each

* " Belief is a kind of knowledge." — Encycl. : § 554.
+ Kant : " I am the essential realitj' when conscious of myself in pure
thought.'

540 Phenomenology oj Mmd

is outside every relation, and has a being all its own ;
in another each takes up an attitude towards the
concrete actual world standing in antithesis to pure
consciousness ; while in the third form each is related
to the other inside pure consciousness.

In the case of belief the aspect of complete being, of
being in-and-for-itself, is its absolute object, whose
content and character we have already come to know.
For it lies in the very notion of belief that this object
is nothing else than the real world lifted into the uni-
versality of pure consciousness. The articulation of
this world, therefore, constitutes the organisation be-
longing to pure universality also, except that the
parts in the latter case do not alienate one another
when spiritualised, but are complete realities all by
themselves, are spirits* returned into themselves and
self-contained.

The process of their transition from one into the
other is, therefore, only for us [who are analysing
the process] an ahenation of the characteristic nature
in which their distinction lies, and only for us, the
i<}» observers, does it constitute a necessary series; for
belief, however, their distinction is a static diversity,
and their movement simply a historical fact.

To deal shortly with the external character of their
form : as in the world of culture state-power or the
good was primary, so here the first and foremost
moment is Absolute Being, spirit absolutely self-con-
tained, so far as it is simple eternal substance.! But
in the process of realising its constitutive notion, which
consists in being spirit, that substance passes over into

* The ''persons" of the "Trinity.''
t God transcendent, God as Suhstance.

Belief and Pure Insight 541

a form where it exists for an other ; its self-identity
becomes actual Absolute Being, actualised in self-sacri-
fice ; it becomes a self, but a self that is transitory and
passes away.* Hence the third stage is the return of
self thus alienated, the substance thus abased into its
first primal simplicity of nature. Only when this is
done is spirit presented and manifested as spirit, f

These distinct ultimate Realities, when brought back
by thought into self out of the flux of the actual world,
are changeless, eternal spirits, whose being lies in think-
ing the unity which they constitute. While thus
torn away from self-consciousness, these Realities all
the same lay hold on it; for if the Ultimate Reality
were to be fixed and unmoved in the form of the first
bare and simple substance, it would remain alien to
self-consciousness. But the laying aside, the " empty-
ing,"' of this substance, and afterwards its spirit, in-
volves the element of concrete actuality, and thereby
participates in the believing self-consciousness, or the
believing attitude of consciousness belongs to the real
world.

According to this second condition, the believing type
of consciousness partly finds its actuality in the real
world of culture, and constitutes its spirit and its
existence, which have been described ; partly, how-
ever, behef takes up an attitude of opposition to this
its own actuality, looks on this as something vain,
and is the process of cancelling and abohshing it.
This process does not consist in the believing conscious-
ness having ingenious views about the perverted
condition of that reahty ; for it is bare and simple

* The God-man, Christ.

t God as Absolute Spirit and Subject.

542 Phenomenology of Mind

consciousness, which reckons esprit and wit as some-
thing vain and empty, because this still has the real
world for its purpose. On the contrary, in opposition
to its placid realm of thought stands concrete actuahty
as a soulless form of existence, which on that account

3 <] I has to be overcome in external fashion. This obedience
through service and rewards, by cancelHng sense-know-
ledge and action, brings out the consciousness of unity
with the self-complete and self-existing Being, though
not in the sense of an actual perceived unity. This
service is merely the incessant process of producing the
sense of unity, a process that never completely reaches
its goal in the actual present. The religious communion
no doubt does so, for it is universal self-consciousness.
But for the individual self-consciousness the realm of
pure thought necessarily remains something away
beyond its sphere of reality ; or, again, since this
remote region by the emptying, the *'kenosis," of the
eternal Being, has entered the sphere of actuality, its

,<yu f^ ' actuality is sensuous, non-conceptual. But one sensuous
actuahty is ever indifferent and external to another, and
what hes beyond has thus only received the further
character of remoteness in space and time. The essen-
tial notion, however, — the concrete actuality of spirit
directly present to itself — remains for belief an inner
principle, which is all and effects all, but never itself
comes to the light.

In the case of pure insight, however, the principle,
the essential notion {Begriff), is alone the real ; and this
third aspect of belief — that of being an object for pure
insight — is the specific relation in which the notion here
appears. Pure insight itself has similarly to be con-
sidered partly by itself {an und für sich), partly in re-

Belief and Pure Insight 543

lation to the real world — so far as the real world is still
present in positive shape, viz. in the form of a sense of
vanity — and lastly in that relation to belief already
mentioned.

We have already seen what pure insight by itself
is. Belief is unperturbed pure consciousness of spirit
as the ultimate Reality ; pure insight is the self-con-
sciousness of spirit as the ultimately real ; it knows
the essentially real, therefore, not qua essence but qua
Absolute Self. Its aim thus is to cancel every other
kind of independence which falls without self-conscious-
ness, whether that be the independence of the actually
objective or of the inherently real, and to mould it into
conceptual form. It is not merely the certainty of self-
conscious reason assured of being all truth ; it knows
that it is so.

In the form, however, in which the notion of pure 2q%
insight meets us first, it is not yet realised. As a
phase of consciousness it appears in consequence as
something contingent, as something isolated and par-
ticular, and its inmost constitutive nature appears as
some purpose that it has to carry out and reaHse.
It has to begin with the intention of making pure
insight universal, i.e. of making everything that is
actual into a notion, and a notion for every self-
consciousness.* The intention is pure, for its content
is pure insight ; and this insight is similarly pure,
for its content is merely the absolute notion, which
finds no opposition in an object, and is not restricted
in itself. In the unrestricted notion there are found at
once both the aspects — that everything objective is

* " Kant's philosophy is the enlightenment adapted so as to become a
philosophical method." — Hegel, W.W. 15, p. 502.

544 Phenomenology of Mind

to signify the self-existent, self-consciousness, and that
this is to signify something universal, that pure insight
is to be the property of all self-consciousnesses. This
second feature of the intention is so far a result of
culture, in that in culture the distinctions of objective
spirit, the parts and express determinations of its world,
have come to naught, as well as the distinctions, which
appeared as originally determinate natures. Genius,
talent, special capacities in general, belong to the world
of actuality, in so far as this world contains still the
aspect of being a herd of self-conscious individuals,
where, in confusion and mutual violence, individuals
cheat and struggle with one another over the contents
of the real world.

The above distinctions doubtless have no place in it
as genuine especes. Individuality neither is contented
with unreal " fact," nor has special content and purposes
of its own. It signifies merely something universally
acknowledged and accepted, viz. cultivated and de-
veloped ; and the question of distinction is reduced to
a matter of less or more energy, a distinction of quantity,
i.e. a non-essential distinction. This last difference,
however, has come to nothing, by the fact that the
distinction in the state where consciousness was com-
pletely torn asunder, turned round into an absolutely
qualitative distinction. What is there the other for the
3,0 J ego is merely the ego itself. In this infinite judgment
all the one-sidedness and peculiarity of the original
self-existing self is extinguished; the self knows itself
qua pure self to be its own object ; and this absolute
identity of both sides is the element of pure insight.

Pure insight, therefore, is the simple ultimate being
undifferentiated within itself, and at the same time the

Belief and Pure Insight 545

universal achievement and production and a universal
possession of all. In this simple spiritual substance
self-consciousness gives itself and maintains for itself in
every object the sense of this its own particularity or
of action, just as conversely the individuality of self-
consciousness is there identical with itself and universal.
This pure insight is, then, the spirit that calls to
every consciousness : be for yourself what you are
essentially in yourself — rational.

VOL. II.— K

II

Enlightenment *

The peculiar object on which pure insight directs
the active force of the notion is behef, this being a form
of pure consciousness Hke itself and yet opposed to it in
that element. But at the same time pure insight has a
relation to the actual world, for, like belief, it is a return
from the actual world into pure consciousness. We
have first of all to see how its activity is constituted,
as contrasted with the impure intentions and the per-
verted forms of insight found in the actual world, t

We have touched already on the placid type of con-
scious life, which stands in contrast to this turmoil of
alternate self-dissolution and self-evolution ; it con-
stitutes the aspect of pure insight and intention.
This unperturbed consciousness, however, as we saw,
has no special insight regarding the sphere of culture.
The latter has itself rather the most painful feehng,
and the truest insight about itself — the feeling that
everything made secure crumbles to pieces, that every
element of its existence is shattered to atoms, and every
bone broken : moreover, it consciously expresses this feel-
ing in words, pronounces judgment and gives luminous
utterance concerning all aspects of its condition. Pure

* Enlightenment (Aufklärung) is the universalisation of the principle
of " pure insight/' and hence is logically the outcome of the preceding
analysis.

t Cf. pp. 5?5-33.

Enlightenment 547

insight, therefore, can have here no activity and content 3^i^
of its own, and thus can only take up the formal
attitude of truly apprehending this ingenious insight
proper to the world and the language it adopts. Since
this language is a scattered and broken utterance and
the pronouncement a fickle mood of the moment, which
is again quickly forgotten, and is only known to be a
whole by a third consciousness, this latter can be
distinguished as pure insight only if it gathers those
several scattered traces into a universal picture, and
then makes them the insight of all.

By this simple means pure insight will resolve the
confusion of this world. For we have found that the
fragments and determinate conceptions and individu-
ahties are not the essential nature of this actuality,
but that it finds its substance and support alone in the
spirit which exists qua judging and discussing, and that
the interest of having a content for this ratiocination
and parleying to deal with alone preserves the whole
and the fragments into which it falls. In this language
which insight adopts, its self-consciousness is still par-
ticular, a self existing for its own sake ; but the empti-
ness of its content is at the same time emptiness of the
self knowing that content to be vain and empty. Now,
since the consciousness placidly apprehending all these
sparkling utterances of vanity makes a collection of
the most striking and penetrating phrases, the soul
that still preserves the whole, the vanity of witty
criticism, goes to ruin with the other form of vanity,
the previous vanity of existence. The collection shows
most people a better wit, or at least shows every
one a more varied wit than their own, and shows
that better knowledge and judging in general are|some-

548 Phenomenology of Mind

thing universal and are now universally familiar.
Thereby the single and only interest which was still found
is done away with ; and individual light is resolved
into universal insight.

Still, however, knowledge of essential reality stands
secure above vain and empty knowledge; and pure
insight, to begin with, appears in genuinely active form
in so far as it enters into conflict with behef.

a

The Struggle of Enlightenment with
Superstition*

The various negative forms which consciousness
adopts, the attitude of scepticism, and that of theoretical
and practical idealism, are inferior attitudes compared
with that of pure insight and the expansion of pure
insight — enlightenment ; for pure insight is born of the
substance of spirit, it knows the pure self of conscious-
ness to be absolute, and enters into conflict with the
pure consciousness of the Absolute Being of all reality.

Since belief and insight are the same pure conscious-
ness, but in form are opposed, — the reality in the case
of behef being a thought, not a notion, and hence some-
thing absolutely opposed to self-consciousness, while the
reality in the case of pure insight is the self — they are
such that inter se the one is the absolute negative of the
other.

As appearing the one against the other, all content
falls to belief ; for in its unperturbed element of
thought each moment obtains definite subsistence.
Pure insight, however, is in the first instance without
any content ; it involves rather the complete dis-
appearance of content ; but by its negative attitude
towards what it excludes it will make itself real and
give itself a content.

* "We live in an age of enlightenment " (Kant). Cp. Hegel ^V W 15
introduction to " French Philosophy."

549

550 Phenomenology of Mind

It knows belief to be opposed to insight, opposed
to reason and truth. Just as, for it, behef is in general
a tissue of superstitious prejudices and errors; so it
further sees the consciousness embracing all this content
organised into a realm of error, in which false insight
is the general sphere of consciousness, immediate,
naively unperturbed, and inherently unreflective. Yet
all the while this false insight does have within it
the moment of self-reflection, the moment of self-con-
sciousness, separated from its simple naivete, and keeps
this reflection in the background as an insight remain-
ing by itself, and as an evil intention by which that
that former conscious state is befooled. That mental
sphere is the victim of the deception of a Priesthood,
which carries out its envious vanity, jealous of being
S«^^ alone in possession of insight, and carries out its
other selfish ends as well. At the same time this
priesthood conspires with Despotism, which takes up
the attitude of being the synthetic crude {begrifflos)
unity of the real and this ideal kingdom — a singularly
amorphous and inconsistent type of being, — and stands
above the bad insight of the multitude, and the bad
intention of the priests, and even combines both of
these within itself. As the result of the stupidity and
confusion produced amongst the people by the agency
of priestly deception, despotism despises both and
draws for itself the advantage of undisturbed control
and the fulfilment of its desires, its humours, and its
whims. Yet at the same time it is itself in this same
state of murky insight, is equally superstition and error.

Enhghtenment does not attack these three forms of
the enemy without distinction. For since its essential
nature is pure insight, which is per se universal, its

The Struggle of EnligJitenment with Superstition 551

true relation to the other extreme is that in which it
is concerned with the common and identical element in
both. The aspect of individual existence isolating itself
from the universal naive consciousness is the antithesis
of it, and cannot be directly affected by it. The will
of a deceiving priesthood and an oppressive despot is,
therefore, not primarily the object on which it directs
its activity ; its object is the insight that is without
will and without individualised isolated self-existence,
the notion (Begriff) of rational self-consciousness,
which has its existence in the total mental sphere,
but is not yet there in the fullness of its true
meaning (Begriff). Since, however, pure insight rescues
this genuinely honest form of insight, with its naive
simphcity of nature, from prejudices and errors, it
wrests from the hands of bad intention the effective
reahsation of its powers of deception, for the exercise
of which the incoherent and undeveloped (begrifßos)
consciousness of the general sphere provides the basis
and raw material, while isolated self-existence finds its
substance in the simple consciousness as a whole.

The relation of pure insight to the naive conscious-
ness of absolute Reahty has now a double aspect. On
one side pure insight is inherently one and the same
with it. On the other side, however, this naive conscious-
ness lets absolute Reahty as well as its parts dispose " .? Y
themselves at will in the simple element of its thought,
and subsist there, and lets them hold only as its inherent
nature and hence hold good in objective form. In this
immanent being it disowns, however, independent exist-
ence for its own sake. In so far as, according to the
first aspect, this behef is for pure insight inherently
and essentially pure self-consciousness, and has to

Bh2 Phenomenotogy of Mind

become so expressly^ merely for itself, pure insight
finds in this constitutive notion of behef the element
in which, instead of false insight, it realises itself.

Since, from this point of view, both are essentially
the same, and the relation of pure insight takes effect
through and in the same element, the communication
between them is direct and immediate, and their give
and take an unbroken interfusion. Whatever pins and
bolts may be otherwise driven into consciousness, it is in
itself this simplicity of nature in which everything is
resolved, forgotten and unconstrained, and which,
therefore, is absolutely amenable to the activity of the
notion. The communication of pure insight is on that
account comparable to a silent extension or the expan-
sion, say, of vapour in the unresisting atmosphere. It is
a penetrating infection, which did not previously make
itself noticeable as something distinct from and opposed
to the indifferent medium into which it insinuates its
way, and hence cannot be averted. Only when the infec-
tion has become widespread is that consciousness alive
to it, which unconcernedly yielded to its influence. For
what this consciousness received into itself was doubtless
something simple, homogeneous, and uniform through-
out it, but was at the same time the simplicity of self-
reflected negativity, which later on also develops by its
nature into something opposed, and thereby reminds
consciousness of its previous state. This simple uni-
formity is the notion, which is simple knowledge that
knows both itself and its opposite, this opposite being,
however, cancelled as opposite within the self-know-
ledge of the notion. In the condition, therefore, in
which consciousness becomes aware of pure insight,
this insight is already widespread. The struggle with

The Struggle of Enlightenment with Superstition 553

it betrays the fact that the infection has done its work.
The struggle is too late ; and every means taken
merely makes the disease worse ; for the disease has
seized the very marrow of spiritual life, viz. con- .?3
sciousness in its ultimate principle (Begriff), or its
pure inmost nature itself. There is therefore no
power left in conscious hfe to surmount the disease.
Because it affects the very inmost being, whatever in-
dividual expressions remain, are repressed and allowed
to subside and the superficial symptoms are smothered.
This is immensely to its advantage ; for it does not
now squander its power in useless fashion, nor does
it show itself unworthy of its true nature — which is
the case when it breaks out into symptoms and par-
ticular eruptions antithetic to the content of belief
and the connexion of its external reahty. Rather,
being now an invisible and unperceived spirit, it
insinuates its way through and through the noble
parts, and soon has got complete hold over all the
vitals and members of the unconscious idol ; and then
" some fine morning it gives its comrade a shove with
the elbow, when, bash ! crash ! — and the idol is lying
on the floor." * On some " fine morning," whose noon
is not red with blood, if the infection has penetrated
to every organ of spiritual life. It is then the memory
alone that still preserves the dead form of the spirit's
previous state, as a vanished history, vanished men
know not how. And the new serpent of wisdom, raised
on high before bending worshippers, has in this manner
painlessly stripped off merely a shrivelled skin.

But this silent steady working of the loom of spirit
in the inner region of its substance, f its own action

* Rameau's Neffe. t In the life of "feeling" and "emotion."

554 Phenomenology of Mind

hidden from itself, is merely one side of the realising
of pure insight. Its expansion does not only consist
in like going along with like ; and its realisation is not
merely an unresisted expansion. The action of the
principle of negation is at the same time essentially a
developed process of self-distinction, which, being a
conscious action, must set forth its moments in a
definitely manifested expression, and must make its
appearance in the form of sheer noise, and a violent
struggle with an opposite as such.

We have, therefore, to see how pure insight and pure
2 J a, intention maintains its negative attitude towards that
other which it finds standing opposed to it.

Pure insight and intention, operating negatively,
can only be, — since its very principle is all essentiality
and there is nothing outside it — the negative of itself.
As insight, therefore, it passes into the negative of pure
insight, it becomes untruth and unreason ; and as inten-
tion it passes into the negative of pure intention, becomes
a lie and sordid impurity of purpose.

It involves itself in this contradiction by the fact
that it engages in a strife and thinks to do battle with
some alien external other. It merely imagines this, for
its nature as absolute negativity lies in having that
otherness within its own self. The absolute notion is
the category ; it is the principle that knowledge and
the object of knowledge are the same. In consequence,
what pure insight expresses as its other, what it pro-
nounces to be an error or a lie, can be nothing else than
its own self ; it can only condemn what itself is. What
is not rational has no truth, or what is not comprehended
through a notion, conceptually determined, is not.
When reason thus speaks of some other than itself is, it

The Struggle of Enlightenment with Superstition 555

in fact speaks merely of itself ; it does not therein go
beyond itself.

This struggle with the opposite, therefore, combines
in its meaning the significance of being its own actualisa-
tion. This consists just in the process of unfolding its
moments and taking them back into itself. One part
of this process is the making of the distinction in which
the insight of reason opposes itself as object to itself ;
so long as it remains in this condition, it is at variance
with itself. Qua pure insight it is without any content ;
the process of its realisation consists in itself becoming
content to itself ; for no other can be made its content,
because it is the category become self-conscious. But
since this insight in the first instance thinks of the
content as in its opposite, and knows the content
merely as a content, and does not as yet think of it as
its own self, pure insight misconceives itself in it. The
complete attainment of insight, therefore, has the
sense of a process of coming to know that content as
its own, which was to begin with opposed to itself.
Its result, however, will be thereby neither the re-
estabhshment of the errors it has fought, nor merely
its original notion, but an insight which knows the
absolute negation of itself to be its own proper reality,
to be its self, or an insight which is its self-understanding
notion.

This feature of the struggle of enlightenment with
errors, — that of fighting itself in them, and of condemn-
ing that in them which it asserts, — this is something
for us who observe the process, or is what enlightenment
and its struggle are in themselves impHcitly. The first
aspect of this struggle, however, — the contamination
and defilement of enlightenment through its pure self-

556 Phenomenology of Mind

identity accepting the attitude and function of destruc-
tive negation — this is how behef looks upon it; belief
finds it simply lying unreason and malicious intent,
just as enlightenment in the same way regards belief as
error and prejudice.

As regards its content, it is in the first instance
empty insight, whose content appears an external
other to it. It meets this content, consequently,
in the shape of something not yet its own, as some-
thing that exists quite independent of it, and is
found in belief.

Enlightenment, then, conceives its object in the
first instance and generally in such a way as to take
it as pure insight, and failing to recognise itself there,
interprets it as error. In insight as such consciousness
apprehends an object in such a manner that it becomes
the inner being of conscious life, or becomes an object
which consciousness permeates, in which consciousness
maintains itself, keeps within itself, and is present to
itself, and, by its thus being the process of that
object, brings the object into being. It is precisely
this which enlightenment rightly declares belief to be,
when enlightenment says that the Absolute Reality
professed by belief is a being that comes from belief's
own consciousness, is its own thought, something
produced from and by consciousness.* Enlightenment,
consequently, interprets and declares it to be error, to
be a made-up invention about the very same thing as
enhghtenment itself is.

Enlightenment that seeks to teach behef this new
wisdom does not, in doing so, tell it anything new.

* Cp. the view of God held by Fichte : also Feuerbach : — Wesen
der Religion.

The Struggle of Enlightenment with Superstition 557

For the object of belief itself is just this too, viz. a pure
essential reality of its own peculiar consciousness ; so
that this consciousness does not put itself down for lost
and negated in that object, but rather puts trust in it ;
and this just means that it finds itself there as this par- ua j
ticular consciousness, finds itself therein to be self-con-
sciousness. If I put my trust in any one, his certitude
of himself is for me the certitude of myself; I know
my self-existence in him, I know that he acknow-
ledges it, and that it is for him both his purpose
and his real nature. Trust, however, is belief, because
its consciousness has a direct relation to its object,
and thus sees at once that it is one with the object,
and in the object.

Further, since what is object for me is something
in which I know myself, I am at the same time in that
object really in the form of another self-consciousness,
i.e. one which has become in that object alienated
from its own particular individuation, from its natural
and contingent existence, but which partly continues
therein to be self-consciousness, and partly is there an
essential consciousness just like pure insight.

In the notion of insight there lies not merely this,
that consciousness knows itself in the object it looks
at, and finds itself directly there, without first quitting
the thought element and then returning into itself ; the
notion implies as well that consciousness is aware of
itself as being also the mediating process, aware of itself
as active, as the agency of production. Through this
it gets the thought of this unity of self as self and
object.

This very consciousness is also behef. Obedience and
action make a necessary moment, through which the

558 Phenomenology of Mind

certainty of existence in Absolute Keality comes about.
This action of belief does not indeed make it appear as if
Absolute ReaKty is itself produced thereby. But the
Absolute Reality for belief is essentially not the abstract
reaUty that lies beyond the believing consciousness ; it
is the spirit of the religious communion, it is the unity
of that abstract reahty and self-consciousness. The
action of the communion is an essential moment in
bringing about that it is this spirit of the communion.
That spirit is what it is by the productive activity
of consciousness, or rather it does not exist without
being produced by consciousness. For essential as this
process of production is, it is as truly not the only
basis of Absolute Reahty; it is merely a moment.
The Absolute Reality is at the same time self-complete
and self-contained {an und für sich selbst).

From the other side the notion of pure insight is
seen to be something else than its own object ; for
just this negative character constitutes the object.
Thus from the other side it also expresses the
ultimate Reality of belief as something foreign
to self-consciousness, something that is not bone of
its bone, but is surreptitiously foisted on it like a
changeling child. But here enlightenment is entirely
foolish ; belief discovers it to be a way of speaking
which does not know what it is saying, and does not
understand the facts of the case when it talks about
priestly deception, and deluding the people. It speaks
about this as if by means of some hocus-pocus of con-
juring priestcraft there were foisted on consciousness
as true Reahty something that is absolutely foreign,
and absolutely alien to it ; and yet says all the while
that this is an essential reality for consciousness, that

The Struggle of EnligJitefurtwnt vnth Superstition 559

consciousness believes in it, trusts in it, and seeks
to make it favourably disposed towards itself ; i.e. that
consciousness therein sees its pure ultimate Being just
as much as its own particular and universal individuahty,
and creates by its own action this unity of itself with
its essential reality. In other words, it directly de-
clares that to be the very inmost nature of conscious-
ness which it declares to be something alien to con-
sciousness.

How, then, can it possibly speak about deception
and delusion ? By the fact that it directly expresses
about belief the very opposite of what it asserts of
beHef, it ipso facto really reveals itself to be the
transparent lie. How are deception and delusion
to take place, where consciousness in its very truth
has directly and immediately the certitude of itself,
where it possesses itself in its object, since it just as
much finds as produces itself there ? The distinction
no longer exists, even in words.

When the general question has been raised, whether
it is permissible to delude a people, the answer, as a
fact, had to be that the question is pointless, be-
cause it is impossible to deceive a people in this matter.
Brass in place of gold, counterfeit instead of genuine
coin may doubtless have been disposed of in many an
instance ; many a one has stuck to it that a battle lost
was a battle won; and lies of all sorts about things
of sense and particular events have been credited for
a time ; but in the knowledge of that inmost reaUty
where consciousness finds the direct certainty of its
own self, the idea of delusion is entirely baseless.

Let us see further how belief finds enlightenment
in the case of the different moments of its own con-

560 Phenomenology oj Mind

scious experience, to which the view just noted referred
in the first instance only in a general way. These
moments are pm'e thought, or, qua object, absolute
Being fer se {an und für sich) ; then its relation,
as a form of knowledge, to absolute Being, the ulti-
mate basis of its belief ; and finally its relation to abso-
lute Being in its acts, i.e. its and " worship " service.*
Just as pure insight has misconceived itself in belief as a
whole and denied its own nature, we shall find it taking
up in these moments, too, an attitude similarly perverted
and distorted.

Pure insight assumes towards the absolute Reality
of the believing mind a negative attitude. This
Being is pure thought, and pure thought is established
within itself as object or as the true Being; in the
believing consciousness this immanent and essential
reality of thought preserves at the same time for the
self-existent consciousness the form of objectivity, but
merely the empty form ; it exists in the character of
something consciously "presented.'' To pure insight,
however, since it is pure consciousness in its aspect of
self existing for itself, this other appears as something
negative of self-consciousness. This might, again, be
taken either as the pure essential reality of thought,
or even as the being found in sense-experience, the
object of sense-certainty. But since it is at the same
time for the self, and this self, qua self which has an
object, is an actual consciousness, for insight the peculiar
l^ih object as such is an ordinary existing thing of sense.
This its object appears before it when it examines
the ideas found in belief. It condemns these ideas

* Enlightenment attacks the object and the Urns of belief, and the
mode of worship.

The Struggle of EnligUenment with Superstition 561

and in doing so condemns its own proper object. It
really commits a wrong, however, against belief in
so apprehending the object of belief as if it were its
own object. According to this account it states regarding
belief that its absolute Being is a piece of stone, a block
of wood, having eyes and seeing not, or again some
bread-paste, which is obtained from grain grown on
the field and transformed by men and set aside for that
purpose; or in whatever other ways belief anthro-
morphoses absolute Being, making it objective and
representable.

Enlightenment, proclaiming itself as the pure and
true, here turns what is held to be eternal hfe and holy
spirit into a concrete passing thing of sense, and contami-
nates it with the inherent nothingness of sense- experi-
ence— with an aspect and point of view which is not to
be found at all in the worshipping attitude of belief,
so that enhghtenment simply calumniates it by speak-
ing of such an aspect. What behef reveres is for behef
assuredly neither stone nor wood, nor bread-dough, nor
any other sort of thing of time and sense. If enlighten-
ment thinks it worth while to say its object all the same
is this as well, or even that belief is this in its inherent
nature and in truth, then behef also knows that some-
thing which it is " as well," but for it this, something
lies outside its worship ; on the other hand, however,
belief does not in general look on such things as stones,
etc., as having an inherent and essential being at all,
the Absolute Reality of pure thought is for it alone
something inherent.

The second moment is the relation of belief as a
form of knowing consciousness to this ultimate Reality.
As pure thinking consciousness belief has this Reality

VOL. II.— L.

562 Phenomenology of Mind

immediately within itself. But pm*e consciousness is
just as much a mediate relation of conscious certainty to
truth, a relation constituting the basis of belief. For
enlightenment this ground comes at the same time to
be regarded as a chance knowledge of chance occur-
rences. The ground of knowledge, however, is the con-
scious universal, and in its ultimate meaning is absolute
spirit, which in abstract pure consciousness, or thought
Lfti' as such, is merely absolute Being, but qua self -conscious-
ness is the knowledge of itself. Pure insight sets up this
conscious universal, self-knowing spirit pure and simple,
likewise as a negative element for self-consciousness.
Doubtless this insight is itself pure mediate thought, i.e.
thought mediating itself with itself, it is pure know-
ledge; but since it is pure insight, or pure knowledge,
which does not yet know itself, i.e. for which as yet there
is no awareness that it is this pure process of mediation,
this process seems to insight, like everything else consti-
tuting it, to be something external, an other. When
realising its inherent principle, then, it develops this
moment essential to it ; but that moment seems to it to
belong to belief, and to be, in its character of an
external other, a fortuitous knowledge of just such
common historical actualities. It thus here charges
religious belief with basing its certainty on some par-
ticular historical evidence, which, considered as his-
torical evidence, would assuredly not even warrant that
degree of certainty about the matter which we get
regarding any event mentioned in the newspapers. It
further makes the imputation that the certainty in the
case of religious belief rests on the accidental fact of the
preservation of all this evidence : on the preservation of
this evidence partly by means of paper, and partly

The Struggle of Enlightenment ivith Superstition 563

through the skill and honesty in transferring what is
written from one paper to another, and lastly rests upon
the accurate interpretation of the sense of dead words
and letters. As a matter of fact, however, it never
occurs to belief to make its certainty depend on such
evidence and such fortuitous circumstances. Belief in
its conscious assurance occupies a naive unsophisticated
attitude towards its absolute object, knows it with a
purity, which never mixes up letters, paper, or copyists
with its consciousness of the Absolute Being, and does
not make use of things of that sort to effect its union
with the Absolute. On the contrary, this consciousness
is the self-mediating, self-relating ground of its know-
ledge ; it is spirit itself which bears witness of itself
both in the inner heart of the individual consciousness,
as well as through the presence everywhere and in all
men of belief in it. If belief wants to appeal to historical
evidences in order to get also that kind of foundation,
or at least confirmation, for its content which enlighten-
ment speaks of, and is really serious in thinking and
acting as if that were an important matter, then it
has eo if so allowed itself to be corrupted and led astray
by the insinuations of enlightenment ; the efforts it
makes to secure a basis or support in this way are
merely indications that show how it has been affected
and contaminated by enlightenment.

There still remains the third aspect, the active re-
lation of consciousness to Absolute Being, its forms of
service.* This action consists in cancelling the particu-
larity of the individual, or the natural form of its self-
existence, whence arises its certainty of being pure
self - consciousness, of being, as the result of its

* The cult.

V*)

564 Phenomenology of Mind

action, i.e. as a self-existing conscious individual,
one with ultimate Reality.

Since in this action purposiveness and end get dis-
tinguished, and pm*e insight likewise takes up a nega-
tive attitude towards this action, and denies itself just
as it did in the other moments, it must as regards
purposiveness present the appearance of being stupid
and unintelligent, since insight united with intention,
accordance of end with means, appears to it as an
other, as really the opposite of what insight is. As
regards the end, however, it has to make badness,
enjoyment, and possession, its purpose, and prove itself
in consequence to be the impurest kind of intention,
since pure intention, qua external, an other, is equally
impure intention.

Accordingly we find that, so far as concerns pur-
posiveness, enhghtenment thinks it foolish when the
believing individual seeks to obtain the higher con-
sciousness,— ^where there is no entanglement with natural
enjoyment and pleasure, — by positively denying itself
natural enjoyment and pleasure, and proving through
its acts that it makes no denial of its contempt for
them, but rather that the contempt is quite genuine.

In the same way enlightenment finds it foolish for
consciousness to absolve itself of its characteristic
of being absolutely individual, excluding all others,
and possessing property of its own, by itself demitting
its own property, for thereby it shows in reality that
this isolation is not really serious. It shows rather
that itself is something that can rise above the natural
necessity of isolating itself and of denying, in this
absolute isolation of its own individual existence, that
the others are one and the same with itself.

The Struggle of Enlightetiment with Superstition 565

Pure insight finds both purposeless as well as wrong.
It is purposeless to renounce a pleasure and give away a
possession, in order to show oneself independent of
pleasure and possession; hence, in the opposite case,
insight will be obliged to proclaim the man a fool, who,
in order to eat, employs the expedient of actually
eating. Insight again thinks it wrong to deny one-
self a meal, and give away butter and eggs not for
money, nor money for butter and eggs, but just to give
them away and get no return at all ; it understands a
meal, or the possession of things of that sort, to be a
self's proper object, an end of a self, and hence in fact
understands itself to be a very impure intention which
ascribes essential value to enjoyment and possessions
of this kind. As pure insight it further maintains the
necessity of rising above the condition of nature,
above covetousness and its ways ; it only finds it
foohsh and wrong that this supremacy should have
to be demonstrated by action. In other words this
pure intention is in reahty a deception, which pretends
to and demands an inner elevation, but declares that it is
superfluous, foohsh, and even wrong to be in earnest in
the matter, to put this upHfting into concrete expression,
into actual shape and form, and demonstrate its truth.

Pure insight thus denies itself both as pure insight, —
for it abrogates directly purposive action, and as
pure intention, — for it denies the intention of proving
its independence of the ends of particular existence.

Thus, then, enhghtenment makes behef learn what
it means. It takes on this appearance of being bad,
because just by the fact of relation to an external other
it gives itself a negative reahty, it presents itself as the
opposite of itself. Pure insight and intention have to /^Dd

566 Phenomenology of Mind

adopt this relational attitude, however, for that is their
actualisation.

This reahsation appeared, in the first instance, as a
negative reality. Perhaps its positive reality is better
constituted. Let us see how this stands.

When all prejudice and superstition have been
banished, the question arises what next ? What is
the truth enlightenment has diffused in their stead ?
It has already given expression to this positive content
in its process of exterminating error, for that alienation
of itself is equally its positive reality.

In dealing with what for behef is Absolute Spirit,
it interprets whatever sort of determination it discovers
there as being wood, stone, etc., as particular concrete
things of sense. Since in this way it conceives in general
every characteristic, i.e. every content and filling, to
be a finite fact, to be a human entity and a mental
presentation, absolute Being on its view turns out
to be a mere vacuum, to which can be attributed
no characteristics, no predicates at all. In fact to
marry such a vacuity with universal predicates would
be essentially reprehensible; and it is just through
such a union that the monstrosities of superstition
have been produced. Reason, pure insight, is doubt-
less not empty itself, since the negative of itself is
present consciously to it, and is its content ; it is,
on the contrary, rich in substance, but only in particu-
larity and restrictions. The enlightened function of
reason, of pure insight, consists in allowing nothing of
that sort to appertain to Absolute Reality, nor attribut-
ing anything of thatlkind to it : this function well knows
how to put itself and the wealth of finitude in their
place, and deal with the Absolute in a worthy manner.

The Struggle of Enlightenment with Superstition 567

In contrast with this colourless empty ReaHty there
stands, as a second aspect of the positive truth of
enlightenment, the particularity in general of conscious
Hfe and of all that is : — a particularity excluded from
an absolute Being, and standing by itself as some-
thing entirely self-contained. Consciousness, which
in its very earliest expression is sense-certainty and
mere " opining,"' here comes back, after the whole course
of its experience, to this same point, and is once again
a knowledge of what is pure negative of itself, a know-
ledge of sense things, i.e. of existent entities which 4.,? 4,
stand in indifference over against its own self-existence.
But here it is not an immediate naive consciousness ;
it has become to itself immediate. While at first the prey
to every sort of entanglement, into which it is plunged
by its gradually unfolding, and now led back to its
first form by pure insight, it has arrived at this first state
as the result and outcome of the process. This sense-
certainty, resting as it does on an insight into the
nothingness of all other forms of consciousness, and
hence the nothingness of whatever is beyond sense-
experience, — this sense-certainty is no longer a mere
*' opining," it is rather absolute truth. This nothingness
of everything that transcends sense is doubtless merely
a negative proof of this truth. But no other is admis-
sible or possible, for the positive truth of sense-experi-
ence in itself is just the unmediated self-existence of
the notion itself qua object and an object in the form of
otherness — the positive truth is that it is absolutely
certain to every consciousness that it is and that
there are other real things outside it, and that in its
naive existence it, as well as these things too, are in and
for themselves or absolute.

568 Phenomenology of Mind

Lastly, the third moment of the truth of enhghten-
ment is the relation of the particular entities to Abso-
lute Being, is the relation of the first two moments
to one another. Insight, qua pure insight of what is
identical or unrestricted, also transcends the unhke or
diverse, i.e. transcends finite reality, or transcends itself
qua mere otherness. The " beyond " of this otherness it
takes to be the void, to which it thus relates the facts
of sense. In determining this relation both the terms
do not enter the relation as its content ; for the one is
the void, and thus a content is only to be had through
the other, through sense reality. The form the relation
assumes, however, to the determination of which the
aspect of immanent and ultimate being {Ansich) contri-
butes, can be shaped just as we please ; for the form
is something inherently and essentially negative, and
therefore something self-opposed, being as well as
nothing, inherent and ultimate {Ansich) as well as
^ I If the opposite ; or, what is the same thing, the relation of
actuahty to an inherent essential being qua something
beyond, is as much a negating as a positing of that
actuahty. Finite actualities can, therefore, properly
speaking, be taken just in the way people have need of
them. Sense facts are thus related now positively to
the Absolute qua something ultimate {Ansich), and sense
reahty is itself ultimate fer se ; the Absolute makes
them, fosters and cherishes them. Then, again, they
are related to it as an opposite, that is to their own
non-being ; in this case they are not something ulti-
mate, they have being only for an other. Whereas
in the preceding mode of consciousness the conceptions
involved in the opposition took shape as good and bad,
in the case of pure insight they pass into the more

The Struggle of Enlightenment with Superstition 569

abstract forms of what is fer se (Ansich) and what is
for an other being.

Both ways of deahng with the positive as well as the
negative relation of finitude to what is ultimate (Ansich)
are, however, equally necessary as a matter of fact,
and everything is thus as much something per se
(an sich) as it is something for an other : in other words
everyt'hing is " useful."

Everything is now at the mercy of other things, lets
itself now be used by others, and exists for them ;
and then again it, so to say, gets up on its hind legs,
fights shy of the other, exists for itself on its own account,
and on its side uses the other too.

From this, as a result, man, being the thing conscious
of this relation, derives his true nature and place. As
he is immediately, man is good, qua natural conscious-
ness per se, absolute qua individual, and all else exists
for him : and further, — since the moments have the
significance of universality for him qua self-conscious
animal, — everything exists to pleasure and delight
him, and, as he first comes from the hand of God,
he walks the earth as in a garden planted for him.
He is bound also to pluck the fruit of the tree of
knowledge of good and evil ; he claims to have a use
for it which distinguishes him from every other being,
for, as it happens, his inherently good nature is so
constituted that the superfluity of delight does it
harm, or rather his particularity contains as a factor
in its constitution a principle that goes beyond it ;
his particularity can overreach itself and destroy itself.
To prevent this, he finds reason a useful means for duly
restraining this self-transcendence, or rather for pre-
serving himself when he does go beyond determinate

570 Phenomenology of Mind

limits : for such is the force of consciousness. The
enjoyment of this conscious and essentially universal
being must, in manifold variety and duration, be itself
universal and not something determinate. The prin-
ciple of measure or proportion has, therefore, the deter-
minate function of preventing pleasure in its variety
and duration from being quite broken off: i.e. the
"measure" is determined with respect to immodera-
tion.

As everything is useful for man, man is likewise
useful too, and his characteristic determination con-
sists in making himself a member of the human herd,
of use for the common good, and serviceable to all.
The extent to which he looks after his own interests is
the measure with which he must also serve the purpose
of others, and so far as he serves their turn, he is taking
care of himself : the one hand washes the other. But
wherever he finds himself there he is in his right: he
makes use of others and is himself made use of.

Different things are serviceable to one another in
different ways. All things, however, have this recipro-
city of utility by their very nature, by being related to
the Absolute in the twofold manner, the one positive,
whereby they have a being all their own, the other
negative, and thereby exist for others. The relation to
Absolute Reality, or Religion, is therefore of all forms
of profitableness the most supremely profitable;* for
it is profiting pure and simple ; it is that by which
all things stand — by which they have a being all their
own — and that by which all things fall — have an
existence for something else.

BeUef, of course, finds this positive outcome of

* Cp, 1 Timothy iv. 8 : "Godliness is profitable unto all things."

The Struggle of Enlightenment with Superstition 571

enlightenment as much an abomination as its negative
attitude towards behef. This enhghtened insight into
absolute Eeahty, that sees nothing in it but just
absolute Reality, the etre supreme, the great Void —
this intention to find that everything in its imme-
diate existence is inherently real {an sich) or good,
and finally to find the relation of the particular con- j^/2
scious entity to the Absolute Being, Rehgion, ex-
haustively summed up in the conception of profitableness
— all this is for belief utterly and simply revolting.
This special and peculiar wisdom of enlightenment
necessarily seems at the same time to the believing
mind to be sheer insipidity and the confession of
insipidity ; because it consists in knowing nothing of
absolute Being, or, what amounts to the same thing,
in knowing this entirely accurate platitude regard-
ing it, — that it is merely absolute Being, and, again,
in knowing nothing but finitude, taking this, more-
over, to be the truth, and thinking this knowledge
about finitude qua truth to be the highest knowledge
attainable.

Behef has a divine right as against enlightenment,
the right of absolute self-identity or of pure thought;
and it finds itself utterly wronged by enlighten-
ment ; for enlightenment distorts all its moments, and
makes them something quite different from what they
are in it. Enlightenment, on the other hand, has
merely a human right as against behef, and can only
put in a human claim for its own truth ; for the wrong
it commits is the right of disunion, of discordance,
and consists in perverting and altering, a right that
belongs to the nature of self -consciousness in opposi-
tion to the simple ultimate essence or thought. But

572 Phenomenology of Mind

since the right of enhghtenment is the right of self-
consciousness, it will not merely retain its own right,
too, in such a way that two equally valid rights of spirit
would be left standing in opposition to one another
without either satisfying the claims of the other ; it
will maintain the absolute right, because self-conscious-
ness is the negative function of the notion {Begriff),
a function which does not merely operate on its own
account, but also gets control over its opposite. And
because belief is a mode of consciousness, it will not be
able to balk enlightenment of that right.

For enlightenment does not operate against the
believing mind with special principles of its own, but
with those which belief itself implies and contains.
Enlightenment merely brings together and presents to
belief its own thoughts, the thoughts that lie scattered
and apart within belief, all unknown to it. Enlighten-
ment merely reminds behef, when one of its own forms
is present, of others it also has, but which it is always
L ) 3 forgetting when the one is there. Enlightenment shows
itself to belief to be pure insight, by the fact that it,
in a given determinate moment, sees the whole, brings
forward the opposite element standing in direct rela-
tion to that moment and, converting the one into the
other, brings out the principle operating negatively on
both thoughts — the notion. It appears, therefore, to
belief to be distortion and lies, because it shows up the
other side in the moments of belief. Enlightenment
seems, in consequence, directly to make something
else out of them than they are in their own particu-
larity ; but this other is equally essential, and in
reality is to be found in the believing mind itself, only
the latter does not think about it, but keeps it some-

The Struggle of Enlightenment with Superstition 573

where else. Hence neither is the result foreign to
behef nor can belief reject its truth.

Enlightenment itself, however, which reminds behef
of the opposite of its various separate moments, is just
as little enlightened regarding its own nature. It takes
up a purely negative attitude to belief, so far as it
excludes its own content from its own pure activity and
takes that content to be negative of itself. Consequently,
neither in this negative, in the content of belief, does it
recognise itself, nor, for this reason, does it bring to-
gether the two thoughts, the one which it contributes
and the one against which it brings the first. Since
it does not know that what it condemns in the case of
belief is directly its very own thought, it has its own
being in the opposition of both moments, only one of
which, — viz. in every case the one opposed to belief —
it acknowledges, but cuts off the other from the first,
just as belief does. Enlightenment, consequently, does
not bring out the unity of both as their unity, i.e. the
notion ; but the notion arises before it and comes to Hght
of its own accord, in other words, enhghtenment finds the
notion merely as something lying ready at hand. For
in itself the process of realising pure insight is just this,
that insight, whose essential nature is the notion, comes
before itself to begin with in the shape of an abso-
lute other, and repudiates itself (for the opposite of the
notion is an absolute opposite), and then out of this
otherness comes to itself or comes to its notion.

Enhghtenment, however, is merely this process, it i^/y
is the activity of the notion in still unconscious form,
an activity which no doubt comes to itself qua object,
but takes this object for an external other, and does not
even know the nature of the notion, i.e. does not know

574 Phenomenology of Mind

that it is the undifferentiated element which absolutely
divides itself.

As against behef, then, insight is the power of the
notion in so far as this is the active process of relating
the moments lying apart from one another in belief ; a
way of relating them in which the contradiction in them
comes to light. Herein lies the absolute right of the
power which insight exercises over behef ; but the
actuality which it gives this power lies just in the
fact that the beheving state of consciousness is itself
the notion and thus itself recognises and accepts the
opposite which insight produces and presents before it.
Insight, therefore, has and retains right against belief,
because it makes valid in belief what is necessary to
belief itself, and what belief contains within it.

At fii-st enlightenment asserts the moment of the
notion to be an act of consciousness ; it maintains in the
face of belief that the absolute Reality belief accepts is a
Reality of the believer's consciousness qua a self, or that
this absolute Reality is produced through consciousness.
To the beheving mind its absolute Being is just as it is in
itself for the believer, at the same time not as a foreign
thing, standing there no one knows how or whence
it came there. The trust and confidence of behef con-
sists just in finding itself in absolute Reality as a par-
ticular personal consciousness, and its obedience and
service consist in acting so as to bring out that Reality
as its own Absolute. Enlightenment, strictly speaking,
only reminds belief of this, if belief goes beyond the
action of consciousness and gives expression to the ulti-
mate natiire {Ansich) of absolute Being in abstracto.

But while enlightenment no doubt puts alongside the
one-sidedness of belief the opposite moment, viz. : — the

TJie Struggle of Enlighteimient with Superstition 575

action of belief in contrast to being — and being is all
belief thinks about here, — and yet does not itself in
doing so bring those opposite thoughts together, en-
lightenment isolates the pure moment of action, and
declares that what belief takes to be fer se ultimate
(Ansich) is merely a product of consciousness. The ://,s'
isolated separate act opposed to this ultimate Being
(Ansich) is, however, a contingent action, and, qua pre-
sentative activity, is a creating of fictions, — presented
figurative ideas that have no being in themselves. And
this is how enUghtenment regards the content of belief.

Conversely, however, pure insight equally says
the very opposite. Since insight lays stress on the
moment of otherness which the notion contains, it
declares the essential Reality for belief to be one
which is not in any way due to consciousness, is
away beyond consciousness, foreign to it, and un-
known. To belief, too, that Reahty has the same
character. On one side belief trusts in it, and gets,
in doing so, the assurance of its own self, on the other
side it is unsearchable in all its ways and unattainable
in its being.

Further, enhghtenment maintains against the be-
heving mind a right which the latter concedes, when
enhghtenment treats the object of the behever's
veneration as stone and wood, or, in short, some finite
anthropomorphic feature. For, since this conscious-
ness is divided within itself in having a 'beyond' remote
from actuality and an immediate present embodiment of
that remote beyond, there is also found in it, as a
matter of fact, the view that sense-things have a value
and significance in and for themselves {an und für sich).
But belief does not bring together these two ideas of

576 Phenomenology of Mind

what is " in and for itself," viz. that at one time what is
" in and for itself " is for beHef pure essential Reahty
and at another time is an ordinary thing of sense.
Even its own pure consciousness is affected by this last
view ; for the distinctions of its supersensuous world,
because dispensing with the notion, are a series of inde-
pendent shapes and forms, and their activity is a
happening, i.e. they exist merely in idea, merely as
presentations, and have the characteristic of sense-
existence.

Enlightenment on its side isolates actuality in the
same way, treating it as a reality abandoned by spirit ;
isolates specific determinateness as some fixed im-
movable finite element, as if it were not a moment
in the spiritual process of the real itself, were neither
i^ ( 4 nothing, nor something with a being all its own, but
something evanescent and transitory.

It is clear that the same is the case with regard
to the ground of knowledge. The beheving mind
recognises itself to be an accidental knowledge ; for in
belief the mind adopts an attitude towards contingen-
cies, and absolute Reality itself comes before belief
in the form of a presented idea of ordinary actual
fact. Consequently behef is also a kind of certainty
which does not carry the truth within it, and it con-
fesses itself to be an unsubstantial consciousness of
this kind, far short of being well assured of itself and
authentically secure. This moment, however, belief
forgets in its immediate spiritual knowledge of absolute
Reality.

Enhghtenment, however, which reminds beHef of
all this, thinks again merely of the contingency of
the knowledge and forgets the other — thinks only

The Struggle of Enlightenment with Superstition 577

of the mediating process which takes effect through
an ahen third term, and does not think on that pro-
cess wherein the immediate is itself the third term,
through which it mediates itself with the other, viz.
with itself.

Finally, on the view enlightenment takes of the
action of belief, the rejection of enjoyment and posses-
sions is looked upon as wrong and purposeless.

As to the wrong thus done, enlightenment preserves
the harmony of the beheving attitude in this that
behef acknowledges the actual reality of possessing
property, keeping hold of it, and enjoying it. In in-
sisting on its property, it behaves with all the more
stubborn independence and exclusiveness, and in its
enjoyment with all the more frank self-abandonment,
since its rehgious act of giving up pleasure and property
takes effect beyond the region of this actuahty, and
purchases for it freedom to do as it hkes so far as that
other sphere is concerned. This service, that consists
in sacrificing natural impulses and enjoyments, in
point of fact has no truth, owing to this opposition.
The retention and the sacrifice subsist together side by
side. The sacrifice is merely a "sign" which performs
real sacrifice only as regards a small part, and hence
in point of fact only representatively suggests sacri-
fice.

As for purposiveness, enhghtenment finds it point-
less and stupid to throw away a possession in order to
feel and to prove oneself to be free from all possession,
to renounce an enjoyment in order to think and de-
monstrate that one is rid of all enjoyment. The be-
lieving mind itself takes the absolute act for a universal
one. Not only does the action of its absolute Reality

VOL. II.— M

578 Phenomenology of Mind

as its object appear something universal, but the
individual consciousness, too, has to prove itself de-
tached entirely and altogether from its sensuous nature.
But throwing away a particular possession, giving up
and disclaiming a particular enjoyment, is not acting
universally in this way. And since in the action it
is essentially the purpose, which is a universal,
and the performance, which is a particular process,
that had to stand in all their incompatibility before
consciousness, that action shows itself to be of a kind
in which consciousness has no share, and consequently
this way of acting is seen to be too naive to be an action
at all. It is too naive to fast in order to prove one-
self quite indifferent to the pleasures of the table ;
too naive to rid oneself, Hke Origen, of other bodily
pleasure in order to show that pleasure is finished
and done with. The act itself proves to be an external
and a particular function. But desire is deeply rooted
within the inner Kfe, and is a universal element ; its
pleasure neither disappears with the instrument for
getting pleasure nor by abstention from particular
pleasures.

But enlightenment on its side here isolates the un-
reahsed inwardness as against the concrete actuality ;
just as in the case of the devotion and direct intuition
of belief, enlightenment holds fast to the externality
of things of sense as against the inward attitude of
beHef. Enlightenment finds the main point in the
intention, in the thought, and thereby finds no need
for actually bringing about the Hberation from natural
ends. On the contrary, this inner sphere is itself the
formal element that has its concrete fulfilment in
natm^al impulses, which are justified simply by the

The Struggle of Enlightenment with Superstition 579

fact that they fall within, that they belong to universal
being, to nature.

Enlightenment, then, holds irresistible sway over
beHef by the fact that the latter finds in its own
constitution the very moments to which enlightenment uf9
gives significance and validity. Looking more closely
at the action exerted by this force, its operation on
belief seems to rend asunder the unity and happy
harmony of trustfulness and immediate confidence,
to pollute its spiritual life with lower thoughts drawn
from the sphere of sense, to destroy the feeling of calm
security in its attitude of submission by introducing
the vanity of understanding, of self-will, and self-fulfil-
ment. But in point of fact, enlightenment really
brings to pass the abohtion of that state of unthinking,
or rather uncomprehended (begrifflos) cleavage, which
finds a place in the nature of belief. The believing
mood weighs and measures by a twofold standard,
it has two sorts of eyes and ears, uses two voices to
express its meaning, it duplicates all ideas, without
comparing and squaring the sense and meaning in
the two forms used. Or we may say belief fives its
Hfe amidst two sorts of perceptions, the one the percep-
tions of thought which is asleep, purely uncritical and
uncomprehending, the other those of waking conscious-
ness living solely and simply in the world of sense ;
and in each of them it manages to carry on a household
all its own.

Enlightenment illuminates that world of heaven
with ideas drawn from the world of sense, pointing
out there this element of finitude which behef cannot
deny or repudiate, because it is self-consciousness, and
in being so is the unity to which both kinds of ideas

ifl^

580 Phenomenology of Mind

belong, and in which they do not fall apart from one
another ; for they belong to the same indivisible simple
self into which belief has passed, and which constitutes
its life.

Belief has by this means lost the content which
furnished its fiUing, and collapses into an inarticulate
state where the spirit works and weaves within itself.*
Belief is banished from its own kingdom ; this kingdom
is sacked and plundered, since every distinction and
expansion of it has rent the waking consciousness in its
innermost nature, and claimed every one of its parts
for earth, and returned them to the earth that owns
them. Yet belief is not on that account satisfied,
for this illumination has everywhere brought to light
only what is individual, with the result that only
insubstantial realities and finitude forsaken of spirit
make any appeal to spirit.

Since belief is without content and cannot continue
in this barren condition, or since, in getting beyond
finitude, which is the sole content, it finds merely the
empty void, it is a sheer longing : its truth is an empty
beyond, for which there is no longer any appropriate
content to be found, for everything is appropriated and
connected in other ways.

BeHef in this manner has in fact become the same
as enhghtenment — the conscious attitude of relating
a finite that inherently exists to an unknown and un-
knowable Absolute without predicates ; the difference
is merely that the one is enhghtenment satisfied, while
belief is enlightenment unsatisfied.! It will yet be

* i.e. the life of feeling.

t i.e. the contrast between belief and enlightenment becomes a con-
trast inside enlightenment itself.

The Struggle of Enlightenment with Superstition 581

seen whether enlightenment can continue in its state
of satisfaction ; that longing of the troubled, be-
shadowed spirit, mourning over the loss of its spiritual
world, Hes in the background. Enhghtenment has
on it this stain of unsatisfied longing : — in its empty-
Absolute Being we find this in the form of the pure
object; in passing beyond its individual nature to an
unfulfilled beyond, the fleck appears as an act and a
process; in the selflessness of what is "useful" it is
seen in the form of an object fulfilled. Enhghtenment
will remove this stain : by considering more closely
the positive result which constitutes the truth in its
case, we shall find that the stain is implicitly removed
already.

The True Kesult of Enlightenment*

The spirit that sullenly works and weaves without
further distinctions within itself has thus passed into
itself away beyond consciousness, which, again, has
arrived at clearness as to itself. The first moment
of this clearness of mind is determined, in regard to
its necessity and constitution, by the fact that pure
insight, or insight that is imphcitly and fer se notion,
actuahses itself ; it does so when it gives otherness
or determinateness a place in its own nature. In this
manner it is negative pure insight, i.e. the negation of
the notion; this negation is equally pure; and here-
with has arisen the pure and simple " thing,"' the Abso-
lute Being, that has no further determination of any
sort. If we define this more precisely, insight in the
sense of absolute notion is a distinguishing of distinc-
tions that are not so any longer, of abstractions or pure
notions that no longer support themselves but find a
fixed hold and a distinction only by means of the whole
hfe of the process. This distinguishing of what is not
distinguished consists just in the fact that the absolute
notion makes itself its object, and as against that
process asserts itself to be the essence. The essence
hereby dispenses with the aspect wherein abstrac-

* The outcome is at once positive and negative — materialism and
agnosticism : on the secular side, it is pure utilitarianism .

5S2

Tlie Result of Enlightenment 583

tions or distinctions are kept apart, and hence be-
comes pure thought in the sense of a pure thing.

This, now, is just the dull, silent, unconscious working
and weaving of the spirit at the loom of its own being,
to which behef, as we saw, sank back when it lost all
distinction in its content. And this is at the same time
that movement of pure self-consciousness, in regard to
which the essence is intended to be the absolutely exter-
nal beyond. For, because this pure self-consciousness is a
movement working with pure notions, with distinctions
that are no distinctions, pure self- consciousness col-
lapses in fact into that unconscious working and
weaving of spirit, i.e. into pure feehng, or pm^e thing-
hood.

The self-aHenated notion — for the notion still stands
here at the level of such aHenation — does not, however,
know this identical nature constituting both sides, — the
movement of self-consciousness and its absolute Reahty,
— does not know the identity of their nature, which, in
point of fact gives them their very substance and sub-
sistence. Since the notion is not aware of this insight,
absolute Reahty has significance and value merely in
the form of an objective beyond, while the consciousness
making these distinctions, and in this w^ay keeping
the ultimate reality outside itself, is treated as a finite
consciousness.

Regarding that Absolute Being, enhghtenment itself
falls out with itself in the same way as it did formerly
with behef, and is divided between the views of two
parties. One party proves itself to be victorious by
the fact that it breaks up into two parties ; for in that
fact it shows it possesses within it the principle it
combats, and consequently shows it has abolished

584 Phenomenology of Mind

the one-sidedness with which it formerly made its
appearance. The interest which was divided between
it and the other, now falls entirely within it, and forgets
the other, because that interest finds lying in it alone
the opposition on which attention is directed. At
the same time, however, the opposition has been lifted
into the higher victorious element, where it is cleared
1^7» up and set forth. So that the schism that arises in
one party, and seems a misfortune, demonstrates rather
its good fortune.

The pure essence itself has in it no distinction ; con-
sequently distinction is reached by two such pure
essences being put forward for consciousness to be
aware of, or by a twofold consciousness of the pure
reality. The pure absolute essence is only in pure
thought, or rather it is pure thought itself, and thus
absolutely beyond the finite, beyond self-consciousness,
and is merely the ultimate essence in a negative sense.
But in this way it is just being, the negative of self-
consciousness. Being negative of self-consciousness, it
is also related to self-consciousness. It is external
being, which, placed in relation to self-consciousness
within which distinctions and determinations fall, pre-
serves within it the distinctions, of being tasted, seen,
and so on; and the relationship is that of sense-
experience and perception.

Taking the point of departm-e from this sense-
existence, into which that negative beyond necessarily
passes, but abstracting from those various ways in
which consciousness is related to sense-existence, there
is left pure matter as that in which consciousness weaves
and moves inarticulately within itself. In dealing with
this, the essential point to note is that pure matter is

The Result of Enlightenment 585

merely what remains over when we abstract from seeing,
feeling, tasting, etc., i.e. it is not what is seen, tasted,
felt, and so on ; it is not matter that is seen, felt, or
tasted, but colom-, a stone, salt, and so on. Matter is
really a pm-e abstraction ; and, being so, we have here
the pm'e essential natm'e of thought, or pure thought
itself, as the Absolute without predicates, undetermined,
having no distinctions within it.*

The one kind of enlightenment calls absolute Being
that predicateless Absolute, which exists in thought
beyond the actual consciousness from which this en-
lightenment started ; the other calls it matter. If they
were distinguished as Nature and Spirit or God, the
unconscious inner working and weaving would have
nothing of the wealth of developed Hfe required in
order to be nature, while Spirit or God would have
no self-distinguishing consciousness. Both, as we saw,
are entirely the same notion ; the distinction Ues not
in the objective fact, but purely in the diversity of
starting-point adopted by the two thought-construc-
tions, and in the fact that each keeps to a special point
of view in the thought-process. If they rose above
that, their thoughts would coincide, and they would
find what to the one is, as it holds, a horror, and to
the other a folly, is one and the same thing. For to
the one, absolute Being, in its pure thought — or
directly for pure consciousness — is outside finite con-
sciousness, is the negative beyond of finite mind. If
it would reflect that in part that simple immediacy
of thought is nothing else than pure being, that in part,
again, what is negative for consciousness is at the same

* Cp. Schopenhauer : " The absolute without predicates is just
matter."

586 Phenomenology of Mind

time related to consciousness — that in the negative
judgment the copula " is " also connects and holds
together the two separated factors — it would come to
see that this beyond, which the nature of an external
existence implies, stands in a relation to consciousness,
and that in so doing this means the same as what is
called pure matter. The missing moment of the
present would then be secured.

The other enlightenment starts from sense-existence ;
it then abstracts from the sensuous relation of tasting,
seeing, etc., and turns sense-existence into purely
inherent being (Ansich), absolute matter, something
neither felt nor tasted. This being has in this way
become the inner reality of pure consciousness, the
ultimately simple without predicates ; it is the pure
notion, qua notion whose being is in itself, or it is pure
thought within itself. This insight in its conscious
activity does not go through the process of passing
from being, which is purely being, to an opposite in
thought, which is the same as mere being, or does not
go from the pure positive to the opposite pure negative ;
since the positive is really pure simply and solely
through negation, while the negative qua pure is self-
identical and one within itself, and precisely on that
account positive.
^^2, C)r again, these two have not come to the notion
found in Descartes' metaphysics that in themselves being
and thought are the same; they have not arrived at
the thought that being, pure being, is not a concrete
actual reality, but pure abstraction, and conversely that
pure thought, self-identity or inner essence, is partly
the negative of self-consciousness, and consequently
is being, and partly, qua immediate simple entity, is

The Result of Enlightenment 587

likewise nothing else than being. Thought is thing-
hood, or thinghood is thought.

The real essence is here divided asunder in such a way
that, to begin with, it appertains to two specifically
distinct modes of thinking. In part, the real must hold
distinction in itself ; in part, just by so doing, both ways
of considering it merge into one ; for then the abstract
moments, of pure being and the negative, by which
their distinction is expressed, are united in the object
with which these modes of treatment deal.

The universal common to both is the abstraction
of pure self-thinking, of pure quivering within the
self. This simple motion of rotating on its own
axis is bound to resolve itself into separate moments,
because it is itself only motion by distinguishing its
own moments. This distinguishing of the moments
leaves the unmoved [unity] behind as the empty shell
of pure being, that is no longer actual thought, has
no more life within it ; for qua distinction this process
is all the content. The process, which thus puts itself
outside that unity thereby constitutes, however, the
shifting change — a change that does not return into
itself — of the moments of being-in-itself, of being-
for-another, and of being-for-self — actual reality in the
way this is object for the concrete consciousness of pure
insight — constitutes Utility.

Bad as utiHty may look to beHef or sentimentality or
even to the abstraction that calls itself speculation, and
takes to do with the ultimate, the inherent nature ; ^a^ J>w«i
yet it is that in which pure insight finds its reahsation,
and itself is the object for insight, an object which
insight now no longer repudiates, and which, too, it t+Zlt
does not put down as the void or the pm'e beyond. For

588 Phenomenology of Mind

pure insight, as we saw, is the Uving notion itself, the
self-same pure personality, distinguishing itself within
itself in such a way that each of the distinguished
elements is itself pure notion, i.e. is eo ipso not distinct ;
it is simple undifferentiated pure self-consciousness,
which is for itself as well as in itself within an immediate
unity. Its inherent being, its being in itself, is therefore
not fixed and permanent, but at once ceases, in its
distinction, to be something distinctive. A being of that
kind, however, which is immediately without support
and cannot stand of itself, has no being in itself, no
inherent existence, it is essentially for something else,
which is the power that consumes and absorbs it. But
this second moment, opposed to that first one, dis-
appears immediately too, like the first ; or, rather, qua
being merely for some other, it is the very process of
disappearing, and is definitely affirmed as being that
has turned back into itself, as being for itself. This
simple being-for-self, however, qua self-identity, is rather
an objective being, or is thereby for an other.

This nature of pure insight in thus unfolding and
making explicit its moments, in other words insight
qua object, finds expression in the useful, the profitable.
What is useful is a thing, something that subsists in
itself ; this being in itself is at the same time only a pure
moment : it is in consequence absolutely for something
else, but is equally for an other merely as it is in itself :
these opposite moments return into the indivisible
unity of being-for-self. While, however, the useful
doubtless expresses the notion of pure insight, it is all
the same not insight as such, but insight as conscious
presentation, or as object for insight. It is merely the
restless shifting change of those moments, of which

The Result of Enlightenment 589

one is indeed being returned into itself, but merely as
being for itself, i.e. as abstract moment, appearing on
one side over against the others. The useful itself does
not consist in the negative fact of having these moments
in their opposition at the same time undivided in
one and the same respect, of having them as a form of
thought yer se in the way they are qua pure insight.
The moment of being-for-self is doubtless a phase of i^s^f
usefulness, but not in the sense that it swamps the other
moments, heing-per-se and being-for-another ; if so, it
would be the whole self. In dealing with the useful,
pure insight thus takes as object its own pecuhar
notion in the pm^e moments constituting its nature;
it is the consciousness of this metaphysical principle,
but not yet its conceptual comprehension, it has not
yet itself got to the unity of being and notion. Because
the useful still appears before insight in the form of an
object, insight has a world, not indeed any longer a
world all by itself and self-contained, but still a world
all the same, which it distinguishes from itself. Only,
since the opposites have come forth on the summit of
the notion, the next step will be for them to collide
with one another and for enhghtenment to experience
the fruits of their deeds.

When we look at the object reached in relation to
this entire sphere of spiritual life, we found the actual
world of culture summed up in the vanity of self-
consciousness — in independent self-existence, whose
content is drawn from the confusion characteristic
of culture, and which is still the individual notion,
not yet the self-conscious {für sich) universal notion.
Keturned into itself, however, that (individual) notion
is pure insight — pure consciousness qua pure self or

590 Phenomenology of Mind

negativity, just as belief, too, is pure consciousness, qua
pure thought or positivity. Behef finds in that self the
moment that makes it complete; — but, perishing through
being thus completed, it is in pure insight that we now
see both moments as absolute Being, which is purely
thought-constituted or is a negative entity, and as
matter, which is the positive entity.

This completion still lacks that actual reality of
self- consciousness, which belongs to the vain and empty
type of consciousness — the world out of which thought
raised itself up to itself. What is thus wanting is
reached in the aspect of utility so far as pure
insight secures positive objectivity there; pure insight
is thereby a concrete actual consciousness satisfied
within itself. This objectivity now constitutes its
world, and is become the final and true outcome of the
entire previous world, ideal as well as real. The first
world of spirit is the expansive realm of spirit's
self-dispersed existence and of certainty of self in
separate individual shapes and forms : just as nature
disperses its life in an endless multiphcity of forms and
shapes, without the generic principle of all the forms being
present therein. The second world contains the generic
principle, and is the realm of the ultimate inherent
nature {Ansichseyns) or the essential truth, over against
that individual certainty. The third world, however,
that of the profitable or the useful, is the truth which is
certainty of self as well. The realm of the truth of behef
lacks the principle of concrete actuality, or of certainty
of self in the sense of this individual self. But, again,
concrete actuahty, or certainty of self qua this individual,
lacks the ultimate inherent nature {AnsicJi). In the object
of pure insight both worlds are united. The useful

The Result of Enlightenment 591

is the object so far as self-consciousness sees through it
and individual certainty of self finds its enjoyment
(its self-existence) in it; self-consciousness sees into it
in this manner, and this insight contains the true essence
of the object (which consists in being something perme-
able to sight, something seen through, in other words,
in being for an other). This insight is thus itself true
knowledge ; and self-consciousness directly finds in this
attitude universal certainty of itself as well, has its pure
consciousness in this attitude, in which truth as well as
immediateness and actuality are united. Both worlds
are reconciled and heaven is transplanted to the earth
below.

Ill

Absolute Freedom and Tereor*

Consciousness has found its notion in the principle
of utiHty. But that notion is partly an object still,
partly, for that very reason, still a purpose, of which
consciousness does not yet find itself to be immediately
possessed, utility or profitableness is still a predicate
of the object, not a subject, not its immediate and sole
i,i "• actuahty. It is the same thing that appeared before
when we found that self-existence (being-for-self) had
not yet shown itself to be the substance of the remaining
moments, a process by which the useful would be
primarily nothing else than the self of consciousness
and this latter thereby in its possession.

This resumption of the form of objectivity which
characterises the useful has, however, already taken
effect implicitly, and as the outcome of this immanent
internal revolution there comes to light the actual
revolution of concrete actuahty, the new mode of
conscious life — absolute freedom.

This is so because in point of fact there is here no more
than an empty semblance of objectivity separating
self-consciousness from actual possession. For, in part,
all the worth and permanence of the various specific
members of the organisation of the world of actuahty
and belief have as a whole returned into this simple

* Refers primarily to the regime under the French revolutionaries.

592

Absolute Freedom and Terror 593

determination, which is their ground and their indwell-
ing spirit : in part, however, this determinate element
has nothing pecuharly its own left for itself, it is instead
pure metaphysic, pure notion or knowledge of self-
consciousness. That is to say, from the inherent and
specific nature of the useful qua object consciousness
learns that its inherent nature, its being-in-itself, is
essentially a being for another ; mere being 'per se,
since it is self -less, is ultimately and in truth a passive
entity, or something that is for another self. The object,
however, is present to consciousness in this abstract
form of purely immanent being, of pure being-in-itself ;
for consciousness is the activity of pure insight, the
separate moments of which take the pure form of
notions.

Self- existence, being-for-self, however, into which being
for another returns, in other words the self, is not a self
of what is called object, a self all its own and different
from the ego : for consciousness qua pure insight is not
an individual self, over against which the object, in the
sense of having a self all its own, could stand, but the
pure notion, the gazing of the self into self, the hteral
and absolute seeing itself doubled. The certainty of
itself is the universal subject, and its notion knowing
itself is the essential being of all reahty. If the useful
was merely the shifting change of the moments, without Lf is
returning into its own proper unity, and was hence
still an object for knowledge to deal with, then it ceases
to be this now. For knowing is itself the process and
movement of those abstract moments ; it is the univer-
sal self, the self of itself as well as of the object, and,
being imiversal, is the unity of this process, a unity
that returns into itself.

VOL. II.— N

594 Phenomenology of Mind

This brings on the scene spirit in the form of absolute
freedom. It is the mode of self-consciousness which
clearly comprehends that in its certainty of self hes the
essence of all the component spiritual parts of the
concrete sensible as well as of the supersensible world,
or, conversely, that essential being and concrete actu-
ality consist in the knowledge consciousness has of
itself.

It is conscious of its pure personahty and with that
of all spiritual reahty ; and all reahty is solely spiritu-
ality ; the world is for it absolutely its own will, and
this will is universal will. And further, this will is not
the empty thought of will, which is constituted by
giving a silent assent, or an assent through a representa-
tive, a mere symbol of wilhng ; it is a concretely em-
bodied universal will, the will of all individuals as such.
For will is in itself the consciousness of personality, of
every single one ; and it has to be as this true concrete
actual will, as self-conscious essential being of each and
every personality, so that each single and undivided
does everything, and what appears as done by the whole
is at once and consciously the deed of every single
individual.

This undivided substance of absolute freedom puts
itself on the throne of the world, without any power
being able to offer effectual resistance. For since in
very truth consciousness is alone the element which
furnishes spiritual beings or powers with their sub-
stance, their entire system, which is organised and
maintained through division into separate spheres and
distinct wholes, has collapsed into a single whole, when
once the individual consciousness conceives the object
as having no other nature than that of self-conscious-

Absolute Freedom and Terror 595

ness itself, or conceives it to be absolutely the notion.
What made the notion an existential object was the
distinguishing it into separate and separately subsist-
ing areas or groups ; when, however, the object becomes
a notion there is nothing fixedly subsisting left in it;
negativity permeates and pervades all its moments.
It exists in such a way that each individual conscious-
ness rises out of the sphere assigned to it, finds no
longer its inmost natiu-e and function in this isolated
area, but grasps itself as the notion of will, grasps all
the various groupings as the essential expression of this
will, and is in consequence only able to realise itself
in a work which is a work of the whole. In this absolute
freedom all social ranks or classes, which are the
component spiritual factors into which the whole is
difierentiated, are effaced and annulled ; the individual
consciousness that belonged to any such group and
exercised its will and found its fulfilment there, has re-
moved the barriers confining it ; its purpose is the
universal purpose, its language universal law, its work
universal achievement.

The object and the element distinguished have here
lost the meaning of utility, of profitableness, which was
a predicate of all real being; consciousness does not
commence its process with the object as a sort of ahen
element after dealing with which it then and only then
returns into itself ; the object it is aware of is conscious-
ness itself. The opposition thus consists solely in the
distinction of individual and imiversal consciousness.
But the individual itself is directly on its own view
that which had merely the semblance of opposition ;
it is universal consciousness and will. The ulterior
beyond that lies remote from this its actual reaHty,

596 Phenomenology of Mind

hovers over the corpse of the vanished and departed
independence of what is real or beheved to be, and
hovers there merely as an exhalation of stale gas, of the
empty etre supreme.

By doing away with the various distinct spiritual
groups, and the restricted and confined fife of individuals,
as well as both its worlds, there thus remains merely the
process of the universal self-consciousness within itself
as an interaction of its content, a reciprocal interaction
between its universal form and personal consciousness.
43./^ The universal will goes into itself, is subjecti vised, and
becomes individual will, to which the universal law and
universal work stand opposed. But this individual con-
sciousness is equally and immediately conscious of
itself as universal will; it is fully aware that its own
objective content is a law given by that will, a work
performed by that will ; in exercising and carrying out
its activity, in creating objectivity, it is thus doing
nothing individual, but executing laws and functions of
the state.

This process is consequently the interaction of con-
sciousness with itself, in which it lets nothing break
away and assume the shape of a detached object
standing over against it. It follows from this, that it
cannot arrive at a positive accomplishment of anything,
either in the way of universal operations in language
or in actual reahty, either in the shape of laws and
universal regulations of conscious freedom, or of deeds
and works of active freedom.

The accomplished result at which this freedom, that
gives itself consciousness, might manage to arrive,
would consist in the fact that such freedom qua universal
substance made itself into an object and an abiding

Absolute Freedom and Terror 59*7

existence. This objective otherness would there be the
differentiation which enabled it to divide itself into
stable spiritual groups and into separate fragments or
members. These wholes or spheres would partly be the
thought-constituted factors of a power that is differ-
entiated into legislative, judicial and executive ; but
partly they would be the substantial elements we found
in the real world of spiritual culture; and, since the
content of universal action would be more closely taken
note of, they would be the particular areas or spheres of
labour, which are further distinguished as specific social
ranks or classes. Universal freedom, which would have
differentiated itself in this manner into its various parts,
and by the very fact of doing so would have made itself
an existing substance, would thereby be free from par-
ticular individualities, and could apportion the plurality
of individuals to its several parts.

The activity and being of personahty would, however,
find itself by this process confined to a branch of the
whole, to one kind of action and existence ; when placed
in the element of existence, personality would bear the j^9>/
meaning of a determinate personality ; it would cease
to be in reality universal self-consciousness. Neither
by the idea of submission to self-imposed laws, addressed
in part to universal self-consciousness, nor by its being
represented when legislation and universal action take
place, does self-consciousness here let itself be mistaken
about the actual truth, that itself lays down the law
and itself accomplishes a universal and not a particular
task. For in the case where the self is merely repre-
sented and ideally presented (vorgestellt), there it is not
actual : where it is by proxy, it is not. *

* The essential principle of anarchy.

598 Phenomenology of Mind

Just as tlie individual self-consciousness does not find
itself in this universal work of absolute freedom qua
existing substance, as little does it find itself in the deeds
proper and specific individual acts of will performed by
this substance. For the universal to pass into a deed, it
must gather itself into the single unity of individuahty,
and put an individual consciousness in the forefront ; for
universal will is an actual concrete will only in a self
that is single and one. Thereby, however, all other in-
dividuals are excluded from the entirety of this deed, and
have only a restricted share in it, so that the deed would
not be a deed of real universal self-consciousness.

Universal freedom can thus produce neither a positive
achievement nor a deed ; there is left for it only nega-
tive action ; it is merely the rage and fury of dis-
appearance and destruction.

But the highest reality of all and the reality most of
all opposed to absolute freedom, or rather the sole
object it is yet to become aware of, is the freedom and
singleness of actual self-consciousness itself. For that
universaHty which does not let itself attain the reahty of
organic differentiation, and whose purpose is to maintain
itself in unbroken continuity, distinguishes itself within
itself all the while, because it is process or consciousness
in general. Moreover on account of its own peculiar
abstraction, it divides itself into extremes equally
2.7^^ abstract, into the cold unbending bare universality,
and the hard discrete absolute rigidity and stubborn
atomic singleness of actual self-consciousness. Now
that it is done with exterminating and destroying
express organisation, and subsists on its own behalf,
this is its sole object, an object that has no other content
left, no other possession, existence and external exten-

Absolute Freedom and Terror 599

sion, but is merely this knowledge of itself as absolutely-
pure and detached individual self. The point at which
the object can be laid hold of and understood is solely
its abstract existence in general.

The relation, then, of these two, since they exist for
themselves indivisibly and absolutely and thus cannot
arrange for a common part to act as a means for con-
necting them, is pure negation entirely devoid of media-
tion, the negation, moreover, of the individual as a factor
existing within the universal. The sole and only work
and deed accomplished by universal freedom is therefore
death — a death that achieves nothing, embraces nothing
within its grasp ; for what is negated is the unachieved,
unfulfilled punctual entity of the absolutely free self.
It is thus the most cold-blooded mean and meaningless
death of all, with no more significance than cleaving
a head of cabbage or swallowing a draught of water.

In this single expressionless syllable consists the
wisdom of the government, the intelhgence of the
general will, when carrying out and executing its plans.
The government is itself nothing but the self-established
focus, the individual embodiment of the general will.
Government, a power to will and perform proceeding
from a single centre, wills and performs at the same time a
determinate order and action. In doing so it, on the
one hand, excludes other individuals from a share in
its deed, and, on the other, thereby constitutes itself
a form of government which is a specifically determinate
will and eo ipso opposed to the universal will. By
no manner of means, therefore, can it put itself forward
as anything but a faction. The victorious faction
only is called the government ; and just in that it
is a faction lies the direct necessity of its overthrow ;

600 Phenomenology of Mind

and its being government makes it, conversely, into a
faction and hence guilty. When the universal will holds
to this concrete action of the government and holds this to
be a crime which the government has committed against
the universal will, then the government on its side has
nothing tangible and external left whereby to estabhsh
and show the guilt of the will opposing itself to it ; for
what thus stands opposed to it as concrete actual uni-
versal will is merely unreal abstract will, bare intention.
Being suspected, therefore, takes the place, or has the
significance and effect, of being guilty ; and the external
reaction against this reality that lies in bare inward
intention, consists in the fatuous barren destruction
of this particular existent self, in whose case there is
nothing else to take away but its mere existence.

In this its characteristically peculiar performance,
absolute freedom becomes objective to itself, and
self-consciousness finds out what this freedom is.
In itself it is just this abstract self -consciousness,
which destroys all distinction and all fixedness of
distinction within itself. It is object to itself in this
shape ; the terror of death is the direct apprehension
(Anschauung) of this its negative nature. This its
reahty, however, finds absolute free self-conscious-
ness quite different from what its own notion of itself
was, viz. that the universal will is merely the positive
substance of personality, and that this latter knows
itself in it only positively, knows itself preserved there.
Eather for this self -consciousness, which qua pure
insight completely separates its positive and negative
nature — separates the unpredicated Absolute qua pure
thought and qua pure matter — the absolute transition
from the one to the other is found here present within

Absolute Freedom and Terror 601

its reality. The universal will, qua absolutely positive
concrete self-consciousness — because it is this self-con-
scious actuality raised to the level of pure thought or
abstract matter — turns round into the negative entity,
and shows itself at the same time to be what cancels
and does away with self- thinking or self - conscious-
ness.

Absolute freedom qua pure self-identity of universal
will thus carries with it negation; but in doing so
contains distinction in general, and develops this again
as concrete actual difference. For pure negativity finds Z^3 ^
in the self-identical universal will the element of sub-
sistence, or the substance in which its moments get
their reahsation ; it has the matter which it can turn into
the specific nature of the substance ; and in so far as this
substance has manifested itself to be the negative element
for the individual consciousness, the organisation of the
spiritual groups or " masses" of the substance, to which
the plurality of conscious individuals is assigned, thus
takes shape and form once more. These individuals,
who felt the fear of death, their absolute lord and master,
submit to negation and distinction once more, arrange
themselves into groups, and return to a restricted and
apportioned task, but thereby to their substantial
reality.

Out of this tumult spirit would be thrown back
upon its starting-point, the ethical world and the real
world of spiritual culture, which would thus have been
merely refreshed and rejuvenated by the fear of the
lord, that has again entered their hearts. Spirit
would have anew to traverse and continually repeat
this cycle of necessity, if only complete interpenetra-
tion of self-consciousness and the substance were

602 Phenomenology of Mind

the final result. In such an interpenetration self-con-
sciousness might seek to experience the force of its
universal nature operating negatively upon it, would
try to know and find itself not as this particular self-
consciousness but only as universal, and hence, too,
would be able to endure the objective reahty of uni-
versal spirit, a reality, excluding self-consciousness qua
particular.

But this is not the form the final result assumes. For
in absolute freedom there was no reciprocal interaction
either between an external world and consciousness,
which is absorbed in manifold existence or sets itself
determinate purposes and ideas, or between consciousness
and an external objective world, be it a world of reality
or of thought. What that freedom contained was the
world absolutely in the form of consciousness, as a
universal will, and, along with that, self-consciousness
gathered out of all the dispersion and manifoldness of
existence or all the manifold ends and judgments of
mind, and concentrated into the bare and simple self.
The form of culture, which it attains in interaction with
that essential nature, is, therefore, the grandest and
the last, is that of seeing its pure and simple reality
immediately disappear and pass away into empty
nothingness.* In the sphere of culture itself it does
not get the length of viewing its negation or ahenation
in this form of pure abstraction ; its negation is nega-
tion with a filling and a content — either honour and
wealth, which it gains in the place of the self that it
has alienated from itself ; or the language of esfrit and
insight, which the distraught consciousness acquires ; or,
again, the negation is the heaven of belief or the element

* Kant's "thing in itself" t

Absolute Freedom and Terror 603

of utility belonging to the stage of enlightenment. All
these determinate elements disappear with the disaster
and ruin that overtake the self in the state of absolute
freedom ; * its negation is meaningless death, sheer
horror of the negative which has nothing positive in
it, nothing that gives a filling.

At the same time, however, this negation in its actual
manifestation is not something ahen and external.
It is neither that universal background of necessity in
which the moral world is swamped, nor the particular
accident of private possession, the whims and humours
of the owner, on which the distraught consciousness
finds itself dependent ; it is universal will, which in
this its last abstraction has nothing positive, and
hence can give nothing in return for the sacrifice.
But just on that account this will is in unmediated
oneness with self-consciousness, it is the pure positive
because it is the pure negative ; and that meaningless
death, the insubstantial, vacuous negativity of self, in
its inner constitutive principle, turns round into abso-
lute positivity. For consciousness, the immediate unity
of itself with universal will, its demand to see and find
itself as a determinate particular focus in the universal
will, is changed and converted into the absolutely oppo-
site experience. What it loses there, is abstract being,
the immediate existence of that insubstantial focus ; and
this vanished immediacy is the universal will as such
which it now, knows itself to be, so far as it is superseded
and cancelled immediacy, so far as it is pure knowledge
or pure will. By this means it knows that will to be
itself, and knows itself to be essential reality ; but not
as the immediate essence, not will as revolutionary

* In the sense of abstract autonomy.

604 Phenomenology of Mind

government or anarchy struggling to establish an anar-
chical constitution, nor itself as a centre of this faction or
the opposite : the universal will is its pure knowing and
willing, and it is universal will qua this pure knowledge
and volition. It does not lose itself there, for pure
knowledge and volition is it qua atomic point of con-
sciousness. It is thus the interaction of pure knowledge
with itself ; pure knowledge qua essential reahty is
universal will, while this essence is simply and solely
pure knowledge. Self-consciousness is thus pure know-
ledge of essential reality in the sense of piu:e knowledge.
Fiu:thermore, qua particular self it is merely the form
of the subject or concrete real action, a form which by
it is known as form. In the same way objective reality,
" being," is for it absolutely self-less form ; for that
objective reality would be what is not known : this
knowledge, however, knows knowledge to be the essen-
tial fact.

Absolute freedom has thus squared and balanced
the opposition of universal and particular will with
its own nature. The self-alienated type of mind,
driven to the acme of its opposition, where pure volition
and the purely vohtional agent are still kept distinct,
reduces that opposition to a transparent form, and
therein finds itself.

Just as the realm of the real and actual world
passes over into that of belief and insight, absolute
freedom leaves its self-destructive sphere of reality,
and passes over into another land of self-conscious spirit,
where in this unreality freedom is taken to be and is
accepted as the truth. In the thought of this truth
spirit refreshes and revives itself (so far as spirit is thought
and remains so), and knows this being which self-

Absolute Freedom and Terror 605

consciousness involves [viz. thought] to be the complete
and entire essence of everything. The new form and
mode of experience that now arises is that of the Moral
Life of Spirit.

G

Spirit in the Condition of being Certain of Itself :

Morality

[The following section deals with the final and highest stage in the life
of finite spiritual experience as realised in the concrete form of a historical
society. Here the substance of the social order is the real content of the
self-conscious individual : that substance has become subjectified ; we
have therefore a -self-contained spiritual subject. The discordance in-
volved in the sphere of culture and enlightenment is overcome by the
self knowing and realising itself as a completely universal self-determin-
ing free will, its world within itself, and its self its own world. Each
reflects the whole (the totality of social life) in itself so perfectly that
what it does is transparently the doing of the whole as much as its own
doing. Such a sphere of spiritual existence is Morality, the all-sufficient
spiritual order of the finite spirit as an individual. The meaning assigned
to " morality " here is that expressed by Kant when he says that morality
is "the relation of actions to the autonomy of the will, i.e. to possible
universal legislation through maxims of the will." In other words, all the
universality constituting the interrelations of finite spirits in a society
are epitomised in the soul of the acting individual, who can thus quite
legitimately, look upon itself as the self-regulating source of all universal
conditions of action.

It is inevitable that such a concrete mode of experience should have
various aspects and should pass through various stages in the process of
fully realising its nature. The individual may lay exclusive stress on the
self-completeness which he possesses through being the source and origin
of his own laws. His self -legislative function, just because it carries with
it the sense of universality, may appear so supremely important that all
the actual detail of his life comes to be treated as external, indifferent, and
contingent. This detail no doubt is essential to give body and substance
to his spiritual individuality, but the universality of his will so far tran-
scends each and every detail of content as to seem by itself the sole and
all-sufficient reality of his being. The content of his life only enters into
consideration as an element to be regulated and made to conform to the
universal : the relation so constituted between content and universal is

606

Morality 607

found in the consciousness of Duty. Since the content is thus subor-
dinate, though absolutely essential to give even meaning to the idea and
the " fulfilment " of duty, and since the universal is the supremely im-
portant fact, not merely is duty to be fulfilled for duty's sake, but the
duty in question is pure duty. The " good will " is the purely universal
will, and is the only will in the world from this point of view.

In the first section (a) Hegel analyses this phase of the moral life.

The historical material the writer has in mind is a moral attitude
which came into prominence at the time of the Romantic movement
towards the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth
century. It found its philosophical expression in the moral theories of
Kant and Fichte ; and Lessing may be taken as a typical representative in
literature of the same attitude.]

Spirit in the Condition of being Certain of Itself :

Morality

The ethical order of the community found its con-
summation and its truth in the type of spirit existing
in mere sohtude and separation within it — the individual
self. This legal person, however, has its substance and
its fulfilment outside that ethical order. The process
of the world of culture and belief does away with this
abstraction of a mere person ; and by the completion
of the process of estrangement, by reaching the ex-
tremity of abstraction, the self of spirit finds the sub-
stance become first the universal will, and finally its
own possession. Here, then, knowledge seems at last
to have become entirely at one with the truth at which
it aims ; for its truth is this knowledge itself. All
opposition between the two sides has vanished, and
that, too, not for us (who are tracing the process), not
merely implicitly, but actually for self-consciousness
itself. That is to say, knowledge has itself got the
mastery over the opposition which consciousness had
to face. This rests on the opposition between certainty
of self and the object. Now, however, the object for it
is the certainty of self, knowledge : just as the cer-
tainty of itself as such has no longer ends of its own,
is no longer conditioned and determinate, but is pure
knowledge.

Self-consciousness thus now takes the knowledge of
itself to be the substance itself. This substance is, for
it, at once immediate and absolutely mediated in one

608

Morality 609

indivisible unity. It is immediate — just in the way
the " ethical " consciousness knows and itself does its
duties, and is bound to the substance as to its own
nature : but it is not character, just as that ethical
consciousness, w^hich in virtue of its immediacy is
a determinate type of spirit, belongs merely to one
of the essential features of ethical life, and has
the peculiarity of not being conscious explicit know-
ledge. It is, again, absolute mediation, as involving the
conscious processes of culture and behef ; for it is essen-
tially the movement of the hfe of self to transcend the
abstract form of immediate existence, and become con-
sciously universal — and yet to do so neither by simply
estranging and rending itself as well as reality, nor by i^ 'hS
fleeing from it. Rather, it is directly and immediately
present in its very substance ; for this substance is its
knowledge, it is the pure certainty of self become trans-
parently visible. And just this very immediacy, which
constitutes its actual reality, is the entire actuality;
for the immediate is being, and qua pure immediacy,
immediacy made transparent by thoroughgoing nega-
tion, this immediacy is pure being, is being in general,
is all being.

Absolute essential Being is, therefore, not exhausted
by the characteristic of being the simple essence of
thought; it is all actuality, and this actuahty exists
merely as knowledge. What consciousness did not know
would have no sense and can be no power in its life.
Into its self-conscious knowing will, all objectivity, the
whole world, has withdrawn. It is absolutely free in
that it knows its freedom ; and just this very knowledge
of its freedom is its substance, its puroose, its sole and
only content.

VOL. II.— O

a

The Moral View of the World

Self-consciousness knows and accepts duty as the
Absolute. It is bound by that alone, and this sub-
stance is its own conscious life pure and simple ; duty
cannot, for it, take on the form of something alien
and external. When thus shut up and confined within
itself, however, moral self-consciousness is not yet
affirmed and looked at as consciousness* The object
is immediate knowledge, and, being thus permeated
purely by the self, is not object. But, this knowledge
being essentially mediation and negativity, there is im-
plied in its very conception relation to some otherness ;
and thus it is consciousness. This other, because duty
constitutes its sole essential purpose and objective con-
tent, is a reality completely devoid of significance for
consciousness. But again because this consciousness is
so entirely confined within itself, it takes up towards
this otherness a perfectly free and detached attitude ;
and the existence of this other is, therefore, an exis-
tence completely set free from self-consciousness, and in
like manner relating itself merely to itself. The
freer self-consciousness becomes, the freer also is the
negative object of its consciousness. The object is thus
a complete world within itself, with an individuality of

* i.e. there is not the opposition of an object to subject which con-
sciousness requires.

6io

The Moral View of the World 611

its own, an independent whole of laws peculiar to it-
self, as well as an independent procedure and an un-
fettered active realisation of those laws. It is alto-
gether a nature, a nature whose laws and also whose
action belong to itself as a being which is not dis-
turbed about the moral self-consciousness, just as the
latter is not troubled about it.

Starting with a specific character of this sort, there
is formed and established a moral outlook or point of
view which consists in a process of relating the im-
plicit aspect of morality {moralisches Ansichseyn) and the
explicit aspect {moralisches Fürsichseyn). This relation
presupposes both thorough reciprocal indifference and
specific independence as between nature and moral
purposes and activity ; and also, on the other side,
a conscious sense of duty as the sole essential fact,
and of nature as entirely devoid of independence and
essential significance of its own. The point of view or
attitude of the moral life consists in the development
of these moments, which are involved in this relation of
such entirely antithetic and contradictory presuppo-
sitions.

To begin with, then, the moral consciousness in
general is presupposed. It takes duty to be the essen-
tial reality : itself is actual and active, and in its
actuality and action fulfils duty. But this moral con-
sciousness, at the same time, finds before it the assumed
freedom of nature : it learns by experience that nature
is not concerned about giving consciousness a sense of
the unity of its reality with that of nature, and hence
discovers that nature may let it become happy, but
perhaps also may not. The non-moral consciousness
on the other hand finds, by chance perhaps, its realisa-

612 Phenomenology of Mind

tion where the moral consciousness sees merely an occa-
sion for acting, but does not see itself enjoying through
its action the success of performance and the satisfaction
of achievement. It therefore finds reason for bewaihng
a situation where there is no correspondence between
itself and existence, and lamenting the injustice which
confines it to having its object merely in the form of
pure duty but refuses to let it see this object and itself
actually realised.
^i,,c. The moral consciousness cannot renounce happiness
and drop this element out of its absolute purpose.
The purpose, which is expressed as duty pure and
simple, essentially implies retention of individual self-
consciousness and maintenance of its claims. Individual
conviction and knowledge thereof constituted a funda-
mental element in morality. This element in the objecti-
fied purpose, in duty fulfilled, is the particular conscious-
ness seeing itself as actually realised. In other words,
this moment is that of enjoyment, which thus lies in the
very principle of morahty, not indeed of morality in
the sense of immediate feeling and sentiment, but in
the principle of the actualisation of morality. Owing
to this, however, enjoyment is also involved in moral
sentiment, for morality seeks, not to remain sentiment
as opposed to action, but to act or realise itself. Thus
the purpose, expressed as a whole along with the con-
sciousness of its elements or moments, is that duty
fulfilled shall be both a purely moral act and a real-
ised individuality, and that nature, the aspect of par-
ticularity in contrast with abstract purpose, shall be
one with this purpose.

While experience must necessarily bring to light the
disharmony between the two aspects, seeing that nature

The Moral View of the World 613

is detached and apart, nevertheless duty is alone the es-
sential fact and nature by contrast is devoid of self-
hood. That purpose in its entirety, which the harmony
of the two constitutes, contains within it actuality itself.
It is, at the same time, the thought of actuality. The
harmony of morality and nature, or — seeing that nature
is taken account of merely so far as consciousness finds
out natm'e's imity with it — the harmony of morality and
happiness, is thought of as necessarily existing ; it is
'postulated. For to postulate or demand means that
something is thought to he which is not yet actual, —
a necessity affecting, not the conception qua conception,
but existence. But the requirement or necessity is at the
same time essentially a relation through the conception.
The existence demanded thus belongs, not to something
present in the mind of some chance individual con-
sciousness, but is implied in the very notion of moraUty ^^^ /
itself, whose true content is the unity of pure with
individual consciousness. It falls to the individual
consciousness to see that this unity is, for it, an actu-
ality : — ^happiness as regards the content of the purpose,
and existence in general as regards its form. The ex-
istence thus demanded — the unity of both — is there-
fore not a wish, nor, looked at qua purpose, is it of
such a kind as to be still uncertain of attainment ;
the purpose is rather a demand of reason, or an imme-
diate certainty and presupposition of reason.

The first experience above referred to and this postu-
late are not the only experience and postulate ; a whole
round of postulates comes to light. For nature is not
merely this completely detached external mode in
which, as a bare pure object, consciousness has to
reahse its purpose. Consciousness is per se essentially

614 Phenomenology of Mind

something for which this other detached reaUty exists,
i.e. it is itself something contingent and natural. This
nature, which is properly its own, is sensibility, which,
taking the form of volition, in the shape of Impulses and
IncHnations, has by itself a determinate essential being
of its own, i.e. has specific particular purposes, and
thus is opposed to abstract will with its pure purpose. In
contrast with this opposition, however, pure conscious-
ness rather takes the relation of sensibility to it, the
absolute unity of sensibility with it, to be the essential
fact. Both of these, pure thought and sensibility,
are essentially and inherently one consciousness, and
pure thought is just that for which and in which this
pure unity exists ; but for it qiui consciousness the
opposition between itself and its impulses holds. In
this conflict between reason and sensibility, the essen-
tial thing for reason is that the conflict should be re-
solved, and that the unity of both should come out as
a result : not the original unity which consisted in
both the opposites being in one individual, but a unity
which arises out of the known opposition of the two.
So attained, such a unity is then the actual morality ; for
in it is contained the opposition through which the self
is a consciousness, or first becomes concrete and in
actual fact self, and at the same time universal. In
other words, we find there expressed that process of
mediation which, as we see, is essential to morality.

Since, of the two factors in opposition, sensibility is
otherness out and out, is the negative, while, on the
other hand, pure thought of duty is the ultimate
essence which cannot possibly be surrendered in any
respect, it seems as if the unity produced can be brought
about only by doing away with sensibility. But since

Tlie Moral View of the World 615

sensibility is itself a moment of this process of pro-
ducing the unity, is the aspect of actuality, we have,
in the first instance, to be content to express the unity
in this form — sensibihty should be in conformity with
morahty.

This unity is hkewise a postulated existence ; it is not
there as a fact ; for what is there is consciousness, or
the opposition of sensibility and pure consciousness.
All the same, the unity is not a something per se
like the first postulate, in which free external nature
constitutes an aspect and the harmony of nature with
moral consciousness in consequence falls outside the
latter. Rather, nature is here that which lies within
consciousness ; and we have here to deal with morahty
(Moralität) as such, with a harmony which is the
active self's very own. Consciousness has, therefore,
of itself to bring about this harmonious unity, and
" to be always making progress in morality." The
completion of this result, however, is pushed away
into the remote infinite, because if it actually entered
the life of consciousness as an actual fact, the moral
consciousness would be done away with. For morahty
is only moral consciousness qua negative force; sen-
sibility has merely a negative significance for the con-
sciousness of pure duty, it is something merely " not in
conformity with "' duty. By attaining that harmonj^
however, morality qua consciousness, i.e. its actuality,
passes away, just as in the moral consciousness or
actuahty its harmony vanishes. The completion is,
therefore, not to be reached as an actual fact ; it is to
be thought of merely as an absolute task or problem,
i.e. one which remains a problem pure and simple.
Nevertheless, its content has to be thought as some-

616 Phenomenology of Mind

A 1,3 thing which unquestionably has to be, and must not
remain a problem : whether we imagine the moral
consciousness quite cancelled in the attainment of this
goal, or not. Which of these exactly is the case, can-
not very well be clearly distinguished in the dim dis-
tance of infinitude, to which the attainment of the end
has to be postponed, just because we cannot decide
the point. We shall be, strictly speaking, bomid to
say that a definite idea on the matter ought to be
of no interest and ought not to be sought for, because
this leads to contradictions — the contradiction in speak-
ing of an undertaking that at once ought to remain an
undertaking and yet ought to be carried out, and the
contradiction in speaking of a morality which is not
consciousness, i.e. which is no longer actual. By
adopting the view, however, that morality when com-
pleted would contain a contradiction, the sacredness
of moral truth would be seriously affected, and an
unconditional duty would appear something unreal.

The first postulate was the harmony of morality and
objective nature — the final piu-pose of the world : the
other was the harmony of morality and will in its sen-
suous form, in the form of impulse, etc. — the final
purpose of self-consciousness as such. The former is
the harmony in the form of implicit immanent exist-
ence ; the latter, the harmony in the form of explicit
self-existence. That, however, which connects these
two extreme final purposes which are thought, and
operates as their mediating ground, is the process of
concrete action itself. They are harmonies whose
moments in their abstract distinctiveness from each
other have not yet become definitely objective : this
takes placG in concrete actuality, in which the aspects

The Moral View of the World 617

appear in consciousness proper, each as the other of
the other. The postulates arising by this means con-
tain harmonies which are now completely realised and
objective, whereas formerly they were merely separated
into implicit and explicit, immanent and self-existent.

The moral consciousness, qyxi bare and simple know-
ledge and willing of pure duty, is brought, by the
process of acting upon an object opposed to that
abstract simplicity, into relation with the manifold
actuality which various cases present, and thereby
assumes a moral attitude varied and manifold in
character. Hence arise, on the side of content, the
plurality of laws generally, and, on the side of form,
the contradictory powers of intelHgent knowing con- z^ x^ ^
sciousness and of a being devoid of consciousness.

To begin with, as regards the plurahty of duties, it is
merely the aspect of pure or bare duty in them which
in general appeals to the moral consciousness as being
of significance : the many duties qua many are deter-
minate and, therefore, are not, as such, anything
sacred for the moral consciousness. At the same time,
however, being necessary, in virtue of the very nature
of action which implicates a manifold actuality, and
hence manifold types of moral attitude, those many
duties must be looked on as having a substantial
existence and value. Furthermore, since they can only
exist in a moral consciousness, they exist at the same
time in another consciousness than that for which only
pure duty qua bare duty is sacred and self-sufficient.

It is thus postulated that there is another conscious-
ness which renders them sacred, or which knows them
as duties and wills them so. The first maintains pure
duty indifferent towards all specific content, and duty

618 Phenomenology of Mind

consists merely in being thus indifferent towards it.
The other, however, contains the equally essential re-
lation to the process of action, and the necessity, there-
fore, of determinate content : since duties for this
other mean determinate duties, the content is thus, for
it, just as essential as the form in virtue of which
the content is a duty at all. This consciousness is,
consequently, such that in it the universal and the
particular are, through and through, one ; its essential
principle is thus the same as that of the harmony of
morality and happiness. For this opposition between
morality and happiness expresses in hke manner the
separation of the self-identical moral consciousness from
that actuality which, qua manifold existence, opposes and
conflicts with the simple nature of duty. While, how-
ever, the first postulate expresses merely the objective
existential harmony between morahty and nature,
because nature is therein the negative of self-conscious-
ness, is the aspect of existence, this inherent harmony,
on the other hand, is now affirmed essentially as a
mode of consciousness. For existence now appears as
the content of duty, as that in the determinate duty
i^i^y which gives it specific determinateness. The immanent
harmony is thus the unity of elements which, qua simple
ultimate elements, are essentially thought-created, and
hence cannot exist except in a consciousness. This
latter becomes now a master and ruler of the world,
who brings about the harmony of morahty and happi-
ness, and at the same time sanctifies duties in their
multiplicity. To sanctify these duties means this
much, that the consciousness of pure duty cannot
straightway and directly accept the determinate or
specific duty as sacred ; but because a specific duty.

The Moral View of the World 619

owing to the nature of concrete action which is some-
thing specific and definite, is all the same necessary,
its necessity falls outside that consciousness and holds
inside another consciousness, which thus mediates or
connects determinate and pure duty, and is the reason
why that specific duty also has validity.

In the concrete act, however, consciousness proceeds
to work as this particular self, as completely individual :
it directs its activity on actual reality as such, and takes
this as its pm^pose, for it wants to perform something
definite. " Duty in general " thus falls outside it and
within another being, which is the consciousness and
sacred lawgiver of pure duty. The consciousness which
acts, just because it acts, accepts the other conscious-
ness, that of bare duty, and admits its validity imme-
diately ; this pure duty is thus a content of another
consciousness, and is only indirectly or in a mediate
way sacred for the active consciousness, viz. in virtue
of this other consciousness.

Because it is established in this manner that the
validity, the bindingness, of duty as something wholly
and absolutely sacred, falls outside the actual conscious-
ness, this latter thereby stands altogether on one side
as the incomplete moral consciousness. Just as, in
regard to its knowledge, it is aware of itself as that
whose knowledge and conviction are incomplete and con-
tingent ; in the same way, as regards its willing, it feels
itself to be that whose purposes are affected with sensi-
bihty. On account of its " un worthiness," therefore, it
cannot look on happiness as something necessary, but
as a something contingent, and can only expect happi-
ness as the result of " grace."

But though its actuahty is incomplete, duty is still, so

620 Phenomenology of Mind

far as its pure will and knowledge are concerned, held
If-ii. k to be the essential truth. In principle, therefore, so far
as the notion is opposed to actual reality, in other
words, in thought, it is perfect. The absolute truth
[duty] is, however, just this object of thought, and is
something postulated beyond the actual. It is there-
fore the thought in which the morally imperfect know-
ledge and will are held to be perfect, and — since it
takes this imperfection to have full weight — in which,
consequently, happiness is meted out according to
"worthiness," i.e. according to the "merit" ascribed.

This completes the meaning of the moral attitude.
For in the conception of moral self-consciousness the
two aspects, pure duty and actual reahty, are affirmed
of a single unity, and thereby the one, like the other, is
put forward, not as something self-complete, but as a
moment, or as cancelled and transcended. This be-
comes consciously explicit in the last phase of the moral
attitude or point of view. Consciousness, we there saw,
places pure duty in another form of being than its own
consciousness, i.e. it regards pure duty partly as some-
thing ideally presented, partly as what does not by itself
hold good — indeed, the non-moral is rather what is
held to be perfect. In the same way it affirms itself to
be that whose actuality, not being in conformity with
duty, is transcended, and, qua transcended, or in the
presented idea of what is absolute [pure duty], no longer
contradicts morality.

For the moral consciousness itself, however, its moral
attitude does not mean that consciousness therein de-
velops its own proper notion and makes this its object.
It has no consciousness of this opposition either as
regards the form or the content thereof ; the elements

The Moral View of the World 621

composing this opposition it does not relate and compare
with one another, but goes forward on its own com'se
of development, without being the connecting principle
of those moments. For it is only aware of the essence
pure and simple, i.e. the object so far as this is
duty, so far as this is an abstract object of its pure
consciousness qua pure knowledge — in other words, it is
only aware of this object as itself. Its procedure is thus
merely that of thinking, not conceiving, is by way of
thoughts not notions. Consequently it does not yet find
the object of its actual consciousness transparently
clear to itself ; it is not the absolute notion, which
alone grasps otherness as such, its absolute opposite,
as its very self. Its own reality, as well as all objective
reality, no doubt is held to be something unessential ;
but its freedom is that of pure thought, in opposition
to which, therefore, nature has likewise arisen as some-
thing equally free. Because both are found in like manner
within it — both the freedom which belongs to [external]
being and the inclusion of this existence within con-
sciousness— its object conies to be an existing object,
which is at the same time merely a thought-product.
In the last phase of its attitude or point of view, the
content is essentially so constituted that its being has
the character of something presented, an idea, and this
union of being and thinking is expressed as what in fact
it is, viz. — Presentation.

When we look at the moral view of the world in such
a way that this objective result is nothing else than
the very principle or notion of moral self-conscious-
ness which it makes objective to itself, there arises
through this consciousness concerning the form of its
origin another mode of exhibiting this view of the world.

622 Phenomenology of Mind

The fijst stage, which forms the starting point, is the
actual moral self-consciousness, or is the fact that there is
such a self-consciousness at all. For the notion estab-
lishes moral self-consciousness in the form that, for it, all
reality in general has essential being only so far as such
reality is in conformity with duty; and that notion
estabhshes this essential element as knowledge, i.e. in
immediate unity with the actual self. This unity is thus
itself actual, is a moral actual consciousness. The latter,
now, qua consciousness, presents its content to itself as
an object, viz. as the final purpose of the world, as the
harmony of morality with all reality. Since, however, it
represents this unity as object and is not yet the com-
plete notion, which has the object as such in its grasp,
this unity is taken to be something negative of or
opposed to self -consciousness, i.e. the unity falls outside
l^ Iß it, as something beyond its actual reality, but at the
same time of such a nature as to be also existent,
though merely thought of.

This self-consciousness, which, qua self-consciousness,
is something other than the object, thus finds itself left
with the want of harmony between the consciousness of
duty and actual reality, a reality, too, which is its own.
The proposition consequently now runs thus: "there is
no morally complete actual self-consciousness"; and,
since what is moral only is in the long run so far as
it is complete, — for duty is the pure unadulterated
ultimate element [Ansicli), and morality consists merely
in conformity to this pure principle — the second pro-
position runs : " there is no morally actual existence
at all."

Since, however, in the third place, it is a self, it is
inherently the unity of duty and actual reality. This

The Moral View of the World 623

unity thus becomes its object, as completed m^orality
— but as something beyond its actual reality, and yet
a " beyond " which still ought to be real.

In this final stage and last expression of the sjnithetic
unity of the two first propositions, the self-conscious
reality, as well as duty, is only affirmed as a tran-
scended or superseded moment. For neither of them is
alone, neither is isolated ; on the contrary, these factors,
whose essential characteristic lies in being free from
one another, are thus each in that unity no longer free
from the other ; each is transcended. Hence, as re-
gards content, they become, as such, object, each of them
holds good for the other; and, as regards form, they
become such that this interchange on their part is, at the
same time, merely in idea, is merely ideally presented.
Or, again, the actually non-moral, because it is, at the
same time, pure thought and elevated above its own
actual reality, is in idea still moral, and is taken to be
entirely sufficing. In this way the first proposition, that
there is a moral self-consciousness, is reinstated, but
bound up with the second that there is none ; that is
to say, there is one, but merely in idea. In other
words, there is indeed none, but it is all the same
allowed by some other consciousness to pass for one.

h

Dissemblance

[The first stage fails as it stands to do complete justice to the full mean-
ing of morality. Both elements in the spiritually complete individual are
essential, and each has to be recognised. The universal must be objectified
in nature ("external nature" and "sensibility"), and nature must be
subjectivised in spirit. Another condition or stage of the moral con-
sciousness, therefore, is found where the equality of value of the'
elements of the moral consciousness is admitted, without these elements
being completely fused into a single and total attitude. The universal is
realised in many ways and forms, and each is accepted in turn as the true
moral reality. The mind passes from one to the other ; when one is
accejited the other is set aside. The moral consciousness tries, so to say, to
hide from itself the endless diversity of its appearances, simply because it
clings tenaciously to the idea that the inherent self-completeness of itself
is a unity 2^er se which can only admit diversity on sufferance. Formerly
it eliminated all diversity by eliminating the source of diversity — nature.
Here it is forced to admit diversity, and yet cannot give up the claim to
be an abstract single unity independent of dift'erence. Thus its condition
here is a mixture of self-realisation and self -sophistication — a condition
which Hegel characterises as "Dissemblance," and which borders upon
and may pass into " Hypocrisy." Hegel regards this attitude as the
inevitable outcome of the preceding.]

624

Dissemblance *

In the moral attitude of experience we see, on one
side, consciousness itself produce its object in a con-
scious way. We find that neither does it pick up the
object as something external, nor does the object come
before it in an unconscious manner. Rather, conscious-
ness throughout proceeds on a certain basis, and from
this establishes the objective reality. It thus knows this
objective element to be itself, for it is aware of itself as
the active agent producing this object. It seems, in
consequence, to attain here its peace and satisfaction,
for this can only be found where it does not need to go
any more beyond its object, because this object no
longer goes beyond it. On the other side, however, it
really puts the object away outside itself, as something
beyond itself. But this latter self-contained entity is
at the same time put there as something that is not
detached from self-consciousness, but really there on
behalf of and by means of it.

The moral attitude is, therefore, in fact nothing else
than the developed expression of this fundamental con-
tradiction in its various aspects. It is — ^to use a Kantian
phrase which is here most appropriate — a "perfect

* Verstellung : It is not possible to bring out exactly by an English word
the verbal play involved in Hegel's interpretation of the state of mind
here discussed. Hegel has, in the course of his analysis, used the mean-
ing implied in the general term "stellen" to explain by contrast the
specific nuance of the purely moral attitude conveyed by the term
verstellen.

VOL. II.— p 625

V^^7

626 Phenomenology of Mind

nest'' of inconsistencies and contradictions.* Conscious-
ness, in developing this situation, proceeds by fixing
definitely one moment, passing thence immediately
over to another and doing away with the first. But,
in the way it has now set up this second moment, it
also " shifts '' {verstellt) this again, and really makes
the opposite the essential element. At the same time,
it is conscious of its contradiction and of this displace-
ment, for it passes from one moment, immediately in
its relation to this very moment, right over to the oppo-
site. Because a moment has for it no reality at all, it
affirms that very moment as real : or, what comes
to the same thing, in order to assert one moment
as per se existent, it asserts the opposite as the per se
existent. It thereby confesses that, as a matter of fact,
^s Ö it is in earnest about neither of them. The various
moments of this fraudulent process we must look at
more closely.

Let us allow the assumption, that there is an actual
moral consciousness, to rest on its own basis in the first
instance, because the assumption is not directly made
with reference to something preceding ; and let us turn
to the harmony of morahty and nature — the first
postulate. It is to be immanent, not explicitly for
actual conscious life, not really present ; the present
is rather simply the contradiction between the two.
In the present, morality is taken to be something
at hand, and actual realitv to be so situated or
" placed '" that it is not in harmony with morality.
The concrete moral consciousness, however, is active,
consists in acting ; that is what constitutes the
actuality of its morahty. In the very process of acting,

* An expression used by Kant of the " cosmological proof."

Dissemblance 627

however, that " place " or semblance is immediately
" displaced/' is dissembled ; for action is nothing else
than the actualisation of the inner moral pm:pose,
nothing but the production of an actuality constituted
and determined by purpose ; in other words, the pro-
duction of the harmony of moral purpose and reality
itself. At the same time the performance of the
action is a conscious fact, it is the " presence " of
this unity of reality and purpose ; and because in the
completed act consciousness realises itself as a given
particular consciousness, or sees existence return into
itself qua particular — and in this consists the nature
of enjoyment — there is, eo ipso, also contained in the
realisation of moral purpose that form of its realisation
which is called enjoyment and happiness.

Action thus, as a fact, fulfils directly what it was
asserted could not take place at all, fulfils what was to
be merely a postulate, was to lie merely " beyond."
Consciousness, therefore, expresses through its deed that
it is not in earnest in making the postulate, since the
meaning of acting is really that it makes a present fact
of what was not to be in the present. And, since the
harmony is postulated for the sake of the action — for
what is to become actual through action must be im-
pUcit, otherwise the actuality would not be possible
— the connexion of action with the postulate is so con-
stituted that, for the sake of the action, i.e. for the sake
of the actual harmony of purpose and reality, this har-
mony is put forward as not actual, as far away, as
" beyond."

Since action does take place, the want of adaptation
between purpose and reality is thus in general not taken
seriously. Action itself, on the other hand, does seem

U iT /

628 Phenomenology of Mind

to be taken seriously. But, as a matter of fact, the
actual deed done is the action of a particular conscious-
ness, and so is itself merely something particular, and
the result contingent. The end of reason, however,
being the all-comprehensive universal end, is nothing
short of the entire world — a final purpose which goes
far beyond the content of this particular act, and
therefore is to be placed altogether above anything
actually done. Because the universal best ought to be
carried out, nothing good is done. In point of fact,
however, the nothingness of actual action and the
reality of the entire purpose alone, which are here up-
held— these are on all hands again " shifted " or dis-
sembled. The moral act is not something contingent
and restricted ; its essential nature hes in pure duty.
This pure duty constitutes the sole entire purpose ; and
the act, whatever may be the limitation of the content,
being the actualisation of that purpose, is the accom-
plishment of the entire absolute purpose. Or, if again
we take the reality in the sense of nature, which has
laws of its own and stands over against pure duty, and
take it in such a way that duty cannot realise its law
within nature, then, since duty as such is the essential
element, we are, when acting, not in fact concerned about
the accomplishment of pure duty which is the whole pur-
pose ; for the accompHshment would then rather have
as its end not pure duty, but the opposite, viz. reahty.
But there is again a " shifting " from the position that
it is not reality with which we have to do. For, by the
very notion of moral action, pure duty is essentially an
iy { active consciousness. Action thus ought certainly to take
place, absolute duty ought to be expressed in the whole
of nature, and " moral law " to become " natural law."

Dissemblance 629

If, then, we allow this highest good to stand for the
essentially real, consciousness is not altogether in earnest
with moraUty. For, in this highest good, nature has
not a different law from what morality has. Moral
action itself, in consequence, drops, for action takes
place only under the assumption of a negative or op-
posing element which is to be cancelled by means of
the act. But if nature conforms to the moral law, then
undoubtedly this moral law would be violated by
acting, by cancelling what already exists.

On that mode of interpretation, then, there has arisen
as the essential situation one which renders moral action
superfluous and in which moral action does not take
place at all. Hence the postulate of the harmony
between morahty and reality — a harmony involved in
the very notion of moral action, which means bringing
the two into agreement — finds on this view, too, an ex-
pression which takes the form : — " because moral action
is the absolute purpose, the absolute purpose is — that
moral action do not take place at all."

If we put these moments together, through which con-
sciousness has gone on presenting its ideas of its moral
life, we see that it cancels each one again in its opposite.
It starts from the position that, for it, morality and
reahty do not make a harmony ; but it is not in earnest
with that, for in the moral act it is conscious of the
presence of this harmony. But neither is it in earnest
with this action, since the action is something par-
ticular ; while it has such a high purpose, the highest
good. This, however, is once more merely a dissem-
blance of the actual fact, for thereby all action and all
morahty would fall to the ground. In other words, it
is not strictly in earnest with moral action ; on the con-

630 Phenomenology of Mind

trary, it really feels that, what is most to be wished
for, the absolutely desirable, is that the highest good
were carried out and moral action superfluous.

From this result consciousness must go on still fur-
IfS ther in its contradictory procedure, and must of neces-
sity again dissemble the aboKtion of moral action.
Morality is the inherently essential (Ansich) ; in order
that it may have place, the final end of the world
cannot be carried out ; rather, the moral conscious-
ness must exist for itself, and must find lying before
it a nature opposing it. But it miist per se be
completed. This leads to the second postulate of the
harmony of itself and sensibility, the " nature " imme-
diately within it. Moral self-consciousness sets up its
purpose as pure purpose, as independent of inclinations
and impulses, so that this bare purpose has abolished
within itself the ends of sensibility. But this cancel-
ling of the element of sense is no sooner set up
than it is again dissembled. The moral consciousness
acts, it brings its purpose into reality ; and self-
conscious sensibility, which should be done away with,
is precisely the mediating element between pure con-
sciousness and reality — is the instrument used by
the former for the realisation of itself, or is the organ
of what is called impulse, inclination. It is thus
not really in earnest in cancelling inclinations and
impulses, for these are just self-consciousness making
itself actual. Moreover, they ought not to be sup-
pressed, but merely to be in conformity with reason.
They, are, too, in conformity with it ; for moral action
is nothing else than self-realising consciousness — con-
sciousness taking on the form of an impulse, i.e. it
is immediately the realised, actually present harmony

Dis semblance 631

of impulse and morality. But, in point of fact, the
impulse is not only this empty conscious form, which
might possibly have within itself a spring of action
other than the impulse in question, and be driven on
by that. For sensibility is a kind of nature, which con-
tains within itself its own laws and springs of action :
consequently, morality cannot seriously mean to be
the inciting motive {Triebfeder) for impulses (Triebe),
the angle of inclination for incUnations. For, since these
latter have their own fixed character and pecuHar con-
tent, the consciousness, to which they were to conform,
would rather be in conformity with thein — a conformity
which moral self-consciousness dechnes to adopt. The i^fi^
harmony between the two is thus merely implicit and
postulated.

In moral action the reaHsed or present harmony of
morahty and sensibihty was set up at one moment, and
at the next is " displaced." The harmony is in a misty
distance beyond consciousness, where there is nothing
more to be accurately distinguished or grasped ; for, to
grasp this unity, which we have just tried to do, has
proved impossible.

In this merely immanent or implicit harmony, how-
ever, consciousness gives up itself altogether. This im-
manent state is its moral completion, where the struggle
of morality and sensibihty has ceased, and the latter is
in conformity to the former in a way which cannot be
made out. On that account, this completion is again
merely a dissemblance of the actual case ; for in
point of fact morality would be really giving up itself
in that completion, because it is only consciousness of
absolute purpose qua pure and simple purpose, i.e. in
opposition to all other purposes. Morahty is both the

632 Phenomenology of Mind

activity of this pure purpose, and at the same time
the consciousness of rising above sensibility, of being
mixed up with sensibihty and of opposing and strugghng
with it. That this moral completion is not taken seri-
ously is directly expressed by consciousness in the fact
that it shifts this completion away into infinity, i.e.
asserts that the completion is never completed.

Thus it is really only the middle state of being incom-
plete that is admitted to have any value : a state never-
theless which at least ought to be one of progress to-
wards completion. Yet it cannot be so ; for advancing
in morality would mean approaching its annihilation and
disappearance. For the goal would be the nothingness
above mentioned, the abolition of morality and con-
sciousness itself : but to come ever nearer and nearer
to nothing means to decrease. Besides, " advancing "
would, in general, in the same way as " decreasing,"
introduce distinctions of quantity into morahty: but
tliese are quite inadmissible in such a sphere. In
morality qua mode of consciousness which takes the
i/t ' ethical end to be pure duty, we cannot think at all of
difference, least of all of the superficial difference of
quantity : there is only one virtue, only one pure duty,
only one morality.

Since, then, it is not moral completion that is taken
seriously, but rather the middle state, i.e., as just ex-
plained, the condition of no morality, we thus come
by another way back to the content of the first postu-
late. For we cannot perceive how happiness is to be
demanded for this moral consciousness on the ground
of its worthiness to be happy. It is well aware of its
not being complete, and cannot, therefore, in point of
fact, demand happiness as a desert, as something of

Dissemblance 633

which it is worthy. It can ask happiness to be given
merely as an act of free grace, i.e. it can only ask for
happiness as such, and as a substantive element by it-
self ; it cannot expect it except as the result of chance
and caprice, not because there is any absolute reason
of the above sort. The condition of non-morahty
herein expresses just what it is — that it is concerned,
not about morality, but about happiness alone, with-
out reference to morality.

By this second aspect of the moral point of view, the
assertion of the first aspect, wherein disharmony be-
tween morality and happiness is presupposed, is also
cancelled. One may pretend to have found by experience
that in the actual present the man who is moral often
fares badly, while the man who is not, often comes off
happily. Yet the middle state of incomplete morality,
the condition which has proved to be the essential one,
shows clearly that this perception that morality fares
badly, this experience which ought to be but is not, is
merely a dissemblance of the real facts of the case.
For, since morality is not completed, i.e. since morality
in point of fact is not, what can there be in experience
that morality should fare badly ?

Since, at the same time, it has come out that the
point at issue concerns happiness alone, it is manifest
that, in making the judgment, '' the man who has no
morality comes oft" well," there was no intention to
convey thereby that there is something \vrong in such
a case. The designation of an individual as one devoid
of morality necessarily falls to the ground, when morality
in general is incomplete ; such a characterisation rests,
indeed, on pure caprice. Hence the sense and content
of that judgment of experience is simply this, that

634 Phenomenology of Mind

happiness as such should not have fallen to some who
got it, i.e. the judgment is an expression of envy, which
is assuming the covering cloak of morality. The reason,
however, why we think good luck, as we call it, should
fall to the lot of others is good friendship, which un-
grudgingly grants and wishes them, and wishes itself
too, this favour, this accident of good fortune.

Morality, then, in the moral consciousness, is not
completed. This is what is now established. But its
essence consists in being merely what is complete, and
so pure morality : incomplete morality is, therefore,
impure, in other words, is Immorality. Morality it-
self thus exists in another being than the actual con-
crete consciousness. This other is a holy moral legis-
lator.

Morality which is not completed in consciousness,
the morality which is the reason for making those
postulates, means, in the first instance, that morality,
when it is set up as actual in consciousness, stands in
relation to something else, to an existence, and thus
itself preserves and implies otherness or distinction,
whence arises a manifold plurality of moral commands.
The moral self-consciousness at the same time, however,
looks on these many duties as unessential ; for it is
concerned with merely the one pure duty, and this
plurality of duties, so far as they are determinate duties,
have no true reahty for self-consciousness. They can
thus have their real truth accepted only in another
consciousness, and are (what they are not for the actual
moral self-consciousness) sacred through a holy law-
giver.

But this, too, is again merely a dissembling of the
actual fact. For moral self -consciousness is to itself

Dissemblance 635

the absolute, and duty is simply and solely what if
knows to be duty. It, however, recognises only pure
duty as duty : what is not sacred in its view is not in
itself sacred at all, and what is not per se sacred cannot
be rendered so by some being that is sacred. Moral
consciousness, further, is not really serious in allowing
something to be made sacred by another consciousness
than its own. For, only that is without qualification
sacred in its eyes which is made sacred through its own
action, and is sacred within it. It is thus just as little
in earnest in treating this other being as a holy being ;
for this would mean that, within it, something was to
attain an essential significance, which, for the moral
consciousness, i.e. in itself, has none.

If the sacred being was postulated, in order that duty
might have binding validity within the moral con-
sciousness, not qua pure duty, but as a plurality of
specific duties, then this must again be dissembled and
the other being must be solely sacred in so far as
only pure duty has binding validity within the moral
consciousness. Pure duty has also, in point of fact,
validity and bindingness only in another being, not in
the moral consciousness. Although, within the latter,
pure morahty seems alone to hold good, still this must
be put right in another form, for it is, at the same
time, a natural consciousness. Morality is, in it,
affected and conditioned by sensibihty, and thus is not
by itself self-contained, but a contingent result of free
will; in it, however, qua pure will, morality is a con-
tingency of knowledge. Taken by itself, therefore,
morality is in another being, is self- complete only in
another reality than the actual moral consciousness.

This other being, then, is here absolutely complete

636 Phenomenology of Mind

morality, because in its case morality does not stand in
relation to nature and sensibility. Yet the reality of pure
duty lies in its actualisation in nature and sensibility.
The moral consciousness accounts for its incompleteness
by the fact that morality, in its case, has a positive rela-
tion to nature and sensibility, since it holds an essential
moment of morality to be that morality should have
simply and solely a negative relation towards nature
and sensibility. The pure moral being, on the other
hand, because far above the struggle with nature and
sense, does not stand in a negative relation to them.
Thus, in point of fact, the positive relation to them
alone remains in its case, i.e. there remains just what
a moment ago passed for the incomplete, for what was
not moral. Pure morahty, however, entirely cut oft"
from actual reality so as likewise to be even without
positive relation to reality, would be a blank unreal
abstraction, where the very notion of morality, which
consists in thinking of pure duty and in willing and
doing, would be absolutely done away with. This other
being, so purely and entirely moral, is again, therefore,
a mere dissemblance of the actual fact, and has to be
given up.

In this purely moral being, however, the moments of
the contradiction, in which this synthetic ideational
process is carried on, come closer together. So, like-
wise, do the opposites taken up alternately, now this
and also that, and also the other, opposites which are
allowed to follow one after the other, with one opposite
constantly set aside by another, yet without these
ideas ever being brought together. So close do they
come, that consciousness here has to give up its moral
view of the world and retreat within itself.

Dissemblance 637

It knows its morality as incomplete because it is
affected by an opposing sensibility and nature, which
partly perturb morahty as such, and partly give rise
to a plurality of duties, by which, in concrete cases
of real action, consciousness finds itself embarrassed.
For each case is the concrete focus of many moral
relations, just as an object of perception in general
is a thing with many qualities. And since a determinate
duty is a purpose, it has a content ; its content is a
part of the purpose, and so morality is not pure
morahty. This latter, then, has its real existence in
some other being. But such reality means nothing
else than that morality is here self-complete, in itself
and for itself — for itself, i.e. is morahty of a con-
sciousness : in itself, i.e. has existence and actuality.

In that first incomplete consciousness, morality is
not realised and carried out. It is there something
immanent and implicit, in the sense of a mere thought-
element ; for it is associated with nature and sensi-
bility, with the actuality of [external] existence and
conscious life, which constitutes its content ; and nature
and sensibility are morally nothing. In the second,
morality is present as completed, and not in the form
of an unreahsed thought-element. But this completion
consists just in the fact that morality has reality in a
consciousness, in the sense of free reality, objective exist-
ence in general, is not something empty, but filled out,
full of content. That is to say, the completion of morality
is placed in this, that what a moment ago was character-
ised as morally nothing is found present in morahty and
inherent in it. It is at one time to have validity simply
and solely as the imrealised thought- element, a product
of pure abstraction ; but, on the other hand, is just as

638 Phenomenology of Mind

certainly to have in this form no vahdity at all : its
true nature is to consist in being opposed to reality,
detached altogether therefrom, and empty, and then
again to consist in being actual reality.

The syncretism, or fusion, of these contradictions,
which is expressed in extenso in the moral attitude of
experience, collapses internally, since the distinction on
which it rests — its distinction from something which
must be thought and stated as a necessity, and is yet at
the same time not essential — passes into one which does
not any longer exist even in words. What, at the end,
is affirmed to be something with different aspects, both
to be nothing and also real, is one and the very same —
existence and reahty. And what is to be absolute only
as something beyond actual existence and actual con-
sciousness, and at the same time to be only in conscious-
ness and so, qiwb beyond, nothing at all — this absolute is
pure duty and the knowledge that pure duty is the essen-
tially real. The consciousness, which makes this distinc-
tion that is no distinction, which announces actuality to
be at once what is nothing and what is real, pronounces
pure morality to be both the ultimate truth and also to be
devoid of all true realit}^, and expresses together in one
and the same breath ideas which it formerly separated —
such a consciousness itself proclaims that it is not in
earnest with this characterisation and separation of the
moments of self and inherent reality. It shows, on the
contrary, that, what it announces as absolute existence
apart from consciousness, it really keeps enclosed
wdthin the self of self-consciousness ; and that, what
it gives out as something entirely in thought or abso-
lutely inherent and implicit, it just for that reason
takes to be something which has no truth at all.

Dissemblance 639

It becomes clear to consciousness that placing these
moments apart from each other is mentally " dis-
placing'" them, is a dissemblance, and it would be
hypocrisy were it really to keep to this. But, being
pure moral self-consciousness, it flees from this discord-
ance between what it represents and what constitutes
its essential nature, flees from this untruth, which gives
out as true what it holds to be untrue, and, turning
away with abhorrence, it hastens back into itself. The
consciousness, which scorns such a moral idea of the
world, is pure Conscience [Gewissen) : it is, in its inmost
being, simply spirit consciously assured or " certain "
{gewiss) of itself, spirit which acts directly in the light
of this assurance, which acts conscientiously {gewissen-
haft), without the intervention of those ideas, and finds
its true nature in this direct immediacy.

While, however, this sphere of dissemblance is nothing
else than the development of moral self-consciousness in
its various moments and is consequently its reality,
so too this self-consciousness, by returning into itself,
will become, in its inmost nature, nothing else. This
returning into itself, indeed, simply means that it has
come to be conscious that its truth is a pretended
truth, a mere pretence. As returning into itself it had
to be always giving out this pretended truth as its real
truth, for it had to express and display itself as an
objective idea ; but it had to know all the same that
this is merely a dissemblance. It would consequently
be, in point of fact, hypocrisy all the while, and its
abhorrence of such dissemblance would be itself the first
expression of hypocrisy.

Conscience: the "Beautiful Soul": Evil and
THE Forgiveness of it

[The oiie-sidedness of each of the preceding stages is removed when the
moral consciousness assumes the attitude of Conscience. Here the indi-
vidual is at once self-legislating and yet sure of the unity and self-
completeness of its own will in the midst of all diversity of moral content.
The immediacy involved in the idea of a "self-legislating" will appears in
the perceptual directness of the action of conscience : it " sees " what is
right and does the right without hesitation. But it is not an abstract
*' faculty " of willing independent of the varied content of the individual's
moral experience. The universality of the individual permeates and per-
vades all the content of his being, and makes him a concrete moral
individuality, at home with himself in the smallest detail as well as in the
larger issues of his self-complete sj^iritual existence. Conscience, as Butler
Bays, is a ' system ' or ' constitution,' analogous in the case of the indi-
vidual to the objectified system of the state and its institutions. The
self-deception of the second one-sided phase of moral experience seems also
to have no place in Conscience, for Conscience is the transparent and self-
revealing unity in all the content of moral individuality. Only on this
condition can it be absolutely confident and certain of itself in all its
functions, and this certainty of itself is the inalienable characteristic of
conscience. It thinks it cannot be deceived about itself, can neither
delude itself nor others, but freely realises all that it professes to be and
professes to be all that it realises. It is thus the supreme achievement of
finite spiritual existence ; but it has no meaning apart from the existence
of finite spirit in the form of society.

Its very conditions, however, give rise to delusion and deception
of another kind. For, so complete is its world and its life that it may
attempt to cut itself off from the concrete substance of actual society which
alone makes possible the existence of conscience. It then tries to cultivate
goodness in solitary isolation from the actual social whole. This is the
attitude of the " beautiful soul," a type of spiritual life cultivated by the
" Moravians," and familiar during the Romantic movement. Novalis is
the best-known example ; the classical interpretation of the mood was

640

Conscience 641

given in Goethe's Meisters Lehrjahre, Bk. 6. It has the self-confidence
and individual inspiration of Conscience, but frankly rejects the con-
crete objectivity which secures for Conscience liberation from mere sub-
jectivity. The very rejection of objectivity is the only achievement of
the " beautiful soul," and is held to be the greatest triumph of its self-
conscious freedom. It flees from concrete moral action, and luxuriates in
a state of self-hypnotised inactivity. Still it takes up this attitude in the
interests of " pure goodness," and hence in withdrawing from the lowly
deeds of the daily moral life it indulges all the more in the self- cloistered
cult of the beauty of holiness. It is moral individualism turned into
mystic self-absorption. Hegel's analysis brings out that this type of
spirit is in principle as it was in fact the direct ally of moral evil. For

(1) its refusal to act means indift'erence to all action, good and bad alike,
and the rejection of the demands of duty is precisely immorality :

(2) its self-closed isolation destroys the very principle of true morality,
universality of will, recognition and acknowledgment by others of the
claims of the individual will.

But this extremity of finite spiritual experience is the opportunity of
Absolute Spirit. The attitude of this mystical moral individuality is
indirectly an indication of the finitude of the moral point of view and
therefore of its failure to supply the absolute self-completeness which
spirit requires. The very consciousness by finite spirit of its inherent
incompleteness is implicitly a consciousness of the Absolute Spirit. The
consciousness of Absolute Spirit is the attitude of experience known as
Religion.]

VOL. II.

Conscience : the " Beautiful Soul '' : Evil and
THE Forgiveness of it

The antinomy in the moral view of the world — viz. that
there is a moral consciousness and that there is none,
or that the validity, the bindingness, of duty has its
ground beyond consciousness, and conversely only takes
effect in consciousness — these contradictory elements
had been combined in the idea, in which the non-moral
consciousness is to pass for moral, its contingent know-
ledge and will to be accepted as fully sufficing, and
happiness to be its lot as a matter of grace. Moral self-
consciousness took this self-contradictory idea not upon
itself, but transferred it to another being. But this
putting outside itself of what it must think as neces-
sary is as much a contradiction in form as the other
was in content. But that which appears as contra-
dictory, and that in the division and again dissolution
of which hes the round of activity peculiar to the
moral attitude, are inherently the same : for pure duty
qua pure knowledge is nothing else than the self of
consciousness, and the self of consciousness is existence
and actuahty ; and, in the same way, what is to be
beyond actual consciousness is nothing else than pure
thought, is, in fact, the self. Because this is so, self-
consciousness, for us or fer se, passes back into itself,
and becomes aware that that being is its self, in which
the actual is at once pure knowledge and pure duty.

642

Conscience 643

It takes itself to be absolutely valid in its contingency,
to be that which knows its immediate particular
existence as pure knowledge and action, as the true
objective reality and harmony.

This self of Conscience, the phase of spiritual Hfe
immediately certain of itself as absolute truth and
objective being, is the third type of spiritual self. It
is the outcome of the third sphere of the spiritual
world,* and may be shortly contrasted with the
two former types of self.

The totality or actuality which is revealed as the
final result of the ethical world, the world of the social
order, is the self of a Person, ethical personality : its
existence hes in its being recognised and acknowledged.
As the person is the self devoid of substance, its exist-
ence is abstract reahty too. The person has a definite
standing, and that directly and unconditionally :
its self is the point in the sphere of its existence which
is immediately at rest. That point is not torn away
from its universality ; the two [the particular focus
and its universaHty] are therefore not in a relational
process with regard to one another : the universal is
in it without distinction, and is neither the content of
the self, nor is the self filled by itself.

The second self is the final truth and outcome of a
world of culture, is spirit that has recovered itself after
and through disruption, is absolute freedom. In this
self, the former immediate unity of individual exist-
ence and universaHty finds its elements separated from
one another. The universal, which remains at the same
time a purely spiritual entity, the state of recognition or

* Viz. Morality, the first being the Ethical Order of .Society, the secoud
the sphere of Culture.

644 Phenomenology of Mind

universal will and universal knowledge — the universal is
object and content of the self, and its universal actual-
ity. But the universal has not there the form of exist-
ence detached from the self : in this mode of self it
therefore gets no filling, no positive content, no world.

Moral self-consciousness, indeed, lets its universal
aspect get detached, so that this aspect becomes a
nature of its own ; and at the same time it retains this
universality within itself in a superseded form. But it
is merely a game of dissembling ; it constantly inter-
changes these two characteristics. In the form of Con-
science, with its certainty of itself, it first finds the
content to fill the former emptiness of duty as well as
the emptiness of right and the empty universal will.
And because this certainty of self is at the same time
immediacy, it finds in conscience definite existence.

Having reached this level of its truth, moral self-
consciousness then leaves, or rather supersedes, this
state of internal division and self-separation, whence
arose dissimulation — the separation of its inherent being
from the self, of pure duty, qua pure purpose, from
reality qua a nature and a sensibility opposed to mere
purpose. It is, when thus returned into itself, con-
crete moral spirit, which does not make for itself a bare
abstract standard out of the consciousness of pure duty,
a standard to be set up against actual conscious life ; on
the contrary, pure duty, as also the sensuous nature
opposed to pure duty, are superseded moments. This
mode of spirit, in its immediate unity, is a moral being
making itself actual, and an act is immediately a con-
crete embodiment of morality.

Given a case of action ; it is an objective reality for
the knowing mind. The latter, qua conscience, knows

Conscience 645

it in a direct concrete manner ; and at the same time
it is merely as conscience knows it to be. When know-
ledge is something other than its object, it is contingent
in character. Spirit, however, which is sure of its self,
is not at all an accidental knowledge of that kind, is
not a way of producing inside its own being ideas from
which reahty is divorced. On the contrary ; since the
separation between what is essential or inherent and
self has been given up, a case of moral action falls,
just as it is fer se, directly within immediate conscious
certainty, the sensible [feeling] form of knowledge, and
it merely is per se as it is in this form of knowledge.

Action, then, qua realisation, is in this way the
pm'e form of will — the bare conversion of reahty, in
the sense of a given case, into a reahty that is performed
and done, the conversion of the bare state of objective
knowledge into one of knowledge about reahty as some-
thing produced and brought about by consciousness.
Just as sensuous certainty is directly taken up, or
rather converted, into the essential hfe and substance
of spirit, this other transformation is also simple and
unmediated, a transition made thi'ough pure conception
without changing the content, the content being con-
ditioned by some interest on the part of the conscious-
ness knowing it.

Further, conscience does not break up the circum-
stances of the case into a variety of duties. It does not
operate as the positive general medium, in which the
manifold duties, each for itself, would keep their substan-
tial existence imdisturbed. If it did so, either no action
could take place at all, because of each concrete case in
general containing opposition, and, in the specific case of
morality, opposition of duties, — and hence there would

646 Phenomenology of Mind

always be one side inj ured, one duty violated, when the
act took definite shape: or else, if action did take
place, the violation of one of the conflicting duties
would be the actual result brought about. Conscience
is rather the negative single unity, it is the absolute
self, which does away with this variety of substantial
moral constituents. It is simple action in accordance
with duty, action which does not fulfil this or that
duty, but knows and does what is concretely right. It
is, therefore, in general, and for the first time in moral
experience, moral action as action, and into this the
previous stage of mere consciousness of morality with-
out action has passed.

The concrete shape which the act takes may be
l^ii^ analysed by a conscious process of distinction into a
variety of properties, i.e. in this case into a variety of
moral relationships ; and these may either be each
expressly held to be absolute (as each must be if it
is to be duty) or, again, subjected to comparison and
criticism. In the simple moral action arising from
conscience, duties are shed so promiscuously that
the isolated independence of all these separate entities
is immediately destroyed, and the process of critically
considering and worrying about what our duty is finds
no place at all in the unshaken certainty of conscience.

Just as little, again, do we find in conscience that
fluctuating uncertainty of mind, which puts now so-
called " pure " morality away from itself, assigning it
to some other holy being, and takes itself to be unholy,
and then again, on the other hand, puts this moral
purity within itself, and places in that other the con-
nexion of the sensuous with the moral element.

It renounces all these semblances and dissem-

Conscience 647

blances {Stellungen und Verstellungen) characteristic
of the moral point of view, when it gives up think-
ing that there is a contradiction between duty and
actual reality. According to this latter state of mind,
I act morally when I am conscious of performing
merely pure duty and nothing else but that : i.e. in fact,
when I do not act. When, however, I really act, I am
conscious of an "other," of a reality which is there
before me, and one which I want to bring about ; I have
a definite end and fulfil a definite duty. There is some-
thing else therein than the pure duty, which alone
was supposed to be kept in view.

Conscience, on the other hand, is the sense that, when
the moral consciousness declares pure duty to be the
essence of its action, this bare purpose is a dissemblance
of the actual fact. For the real fact is that bare duty
consists in the empty abstraction of pure thought, and
finds its reality and content solely in some definite
actual existence, an actuality which is actuality of
consciousness itself — not of consciousness in the sense
of a thought-entity, but as an individual. Conscience, i.;bf
for its own part, finds its truth to He in the direct cer-
tainty regarding itself. This immediate concrete cer-
tainty of itself is true reality. Looking at this certainty
from the point of view of the opposition which con-
sciousness involves, its own immediate particularity
constitutes the content of moral action ; and the form
of moral action is just this very self as a pure process,
viz. as the process of knowing, in other words, is private
individual conviction.

Looking more closely at the unity and the significance
of the moments of this stage, we find that moral
consciousness conceived itself merely in the form of

648 Phenomenology of Mind

the inherent principle, or as ultimate essence ; qua
conscience, however, it lays hold of its expUcit indi-
vidual self-existence (Filrsichseyn), or its self. The
contradiction involved in the moral point of view
is resolved, i.e. the distinction, which lay at the basis
of its pecuhar attitude, proves to be no distinction, and
melts into the process of pure negativity. This process
of negativity is, however, just the self : a single simple
self which is at once pure knowledge and knowledge
of itself as this individual conscious hfe. This self
constitutes, therefore, the content of what formerly
was the empty essence ; for it is something actual and
concrete, which no longer has the significance of being
a nature alien to the ultimate essence, a nature inde-
pendent and with laws of its own. As the negative
element, it introduces distinction into the pure essence,
a definite content, and one, too, which has a value
in its own right as it stands.

Further, this self is, qua pure self-identical knowledge,
the universal without quahfication, so that just this
knowledge, being its very own knowledge, being con-
viction, constitutes duty. Duty is no longer the uni-
versal appearing over against and opposed to the self ;
duty is known to have in this condition of separation
and opposition no validity. It is now the law, which
exists for the sake of the self, and not the self for the
sake of the law. The law and duty, however, have
for that reason not only the significance of existing
on their own account, but also of being inherent
and essential ; for this knowledge is, in virtue of
its identity with itself, just what is inherently essen-
tial. This inherent being gets also separated in con-
sciousness from that direct and immediate unity with

Conscience 649

self-existence : so contrasted and opposed, it is objective
being, it is being for something else.

Duty itself now, qua duty deserted by the self, is
known and thought to be merely a moment ; it has
ceased to mean absolute being, it has become de-
graded to something which is not a self, does not exist
on its own account, and is thus what exists for some-
thing else. But this existing-for-something-else remains
just for that reason an essential moment, because self,
qrm consciousness, constitutes and establishes the
opposition between existence-for-self and existence-
for-another ; and now duty essentially means some-
thing immediately actual, and is no longer a mere
abstract consciousness of duty.

This existence for something else is, then, the in-
herently essential substance distinguished from the
self. Conscience has not given up pure duty, the
abstract imphcit essence : pure duty is the essential
moment of relating itself, qua universahty, to others.
Conscience is the common element of distinct self-con-
sciousnesses ; and this is the substance in which the act
secures subsistence and reality, the moment enabling
recognition by others to take place. The moral self-
consciousness does not possess this moment of recog-
nition, of pure consciousness which has definite exist-
ence; and on that account really does not "act" at
all, does not effectually actualise anything. Its inher-
ent nature is for it either the abstract unreal essence,
or else existence in the form of a reaUty which has no
spiritual character. The actual reality of conscience,
however, is one which is a self, i.e. an existence conscious
of itself, the spiritual element of being recognised.
Doing something is, therefore, merely the translation

650 Phenomenology of Mind

of its particular content into that objective element
where it is universal and is recognised, and this very
fact, that the content is recognised, makes the deed an
actuality. The action is recognised and thereby real,
because the actual reality is immediately bound up
with conviction or knowledge ; or, in other words,
knowledge of its purpose is immediately and at once
^ i '} the element of existence, universal recognition. For
the essence of the act, duty, consists in the conviction
conscience has about it. This conviction is just the
inherent principle itself ; it is inherently universal self-
consciousness — in other words, is recognition and hence
reality. The result achieved under conviction of duty
is therefore directly one which has substantial solid ex-
istence. Thus, we hear nothing more there about good
intention not coming to anything definite, or about the
good man faring badly. What is known as duty is
carried out completely and becomes an actual fact, just
because what is dutiful is the universal for all self-
consciousnesses, that which is recognised, acknow-
ledged, and thus objectively is. Taken separately and
alone, however, without the content of self, this duty
is existence-for-another, the transparent element, which
has merely the significance of an unsubstantial ultimate
factor in general.

If we look back on the sphere where in general
spiritual reality made its appearance, we find that
the principle involved was that the utterance of
individuality is the absolutely real, the ultimately
self-sufficing. But the shape which, in the first in-
stance, gave expression to this notion, was the
" honest consciousness " * which was occupied and

* v.p. 402 ff.

Conscience 651

concerned with abstract " fact itself." This " fact
itself " was there a predicate. In conscience, however,
it is for the first time a Subject, which has put all
aspects of consciousness in it, and for which all these
moments, substantiality in general, external existence,
and essence of thought, are contained in this cer-
tainty of itself. The " fact itself " has substantiality
in general in the ethical order {Sittlichkeit), external
existence in culture, self-knowing essence of thought
in morality ; and in conscience it is the Subject,
which knows these moments within itself. While the
" honest consciousness " is for ever grasping merely the
bare and empty " fact itself," conscience, on the other
hand, secures the " fact itself " in its fullness, a fullness
which conscience of itself supplies. Conscience has
this power through its knowing the moments of con- i^g
sciousness as moments, and controlling them because
it is their negative essential principle.

When conscience is considered in relation to the
particular features of the opposition which appears in
action, and when we consider its consciousness regard-
ing the nature of those features, its attitude towards
the reality of the particular case where action takes
efiect is, in the first instance, that of knowledge. So
far as the aspect of universality is present in such
knowledge, it is the business of conscientious action,
qua knowledge, to compass the reality before it in
an unrestricted exhaustive manner, and thus get to
know exactly the circumstances of the case, and give
them due consideration. This knowledge, however,
since it is aware of rmiversahty as a moment, is in
consequence a kind of knowledge of these circum-
stances which is conscious all the while of not embracing

652 Phenomenology/ of Mind

them, is conscious of not being conscientious in its pro-
cedure. The genuinely universal and pure relation of
knowledge would be one towards something not op-
posed, a relation to itself. But action through the oppo-
sition essentially implied in action is related to what
negates consciousness, to a reality existing per se. Con-
trasted with the simple nature of pure consciousness,
the absolute other, externality, multiplicity per se, is
a sheer plurality of circumstances which breaks up in-
definitely and spreads in all directions — backwards in
their conditions, sidewards in their associations, for-
wards in their consequences.

The conscientious mind is aware of this state of affairs
and of its relation thereto, and knows it is not acquainted
to the full and complete extent required with the case
in which its action takes effect, and knows that its
pretence of conscientiously weighing and considering
all the circumstances is futile. This acquaintance with
and consideration of all the circumstances, however,
are not entirely absent : but they are merely present
as a moment, as something which is only for others :
and the conscientious mind holds its incomplete know-
ledge to be sufficient and complete, merely because it
is its own knowledge.

In a similar way is constituted the process in
connection with the universality of the essential
principle, the universality by which the content is
characterised when determined through pure cou-
i^ta sciousness. Conscience, when it goes on to act, takes
up a relation to the various sides of the case. The
case breaks up into separate elements, and the relation
of pure consciousness towards it does the same :
whereby the multiplicity characteristic of the case

Conscience 653

becomes a multiplicity of duties. Conscience knows
that it has to select and decide amongst them ;
for none of them specifically, in its content, is an
absolute duty ; only duty pure and simple is so. But
this abstract entity has, in its realisation, come to denote
self-conscious ego. Spirit certain of itself is at rest
within itself in the form of conscience, and its real
universaUty, its duty, Hes in its bare conviction con-
cerning duty. This bare conviction as such is as empty
as pure duty, pure in the sense that nothing within it,
no definite content, is duty. Action, however, has to
take place, the individual must determine to do some-
thing or other ; and spirit which is certain of itself,
in which the inherent principle has attained the sig-
nificance of self-conscious ego, knows it has this deter-
mination, this specific content, within the immediate
certainty of its own self. This certainty, being a
determination and a content, is " natural '' conscious-
ness, i.e. the various impulses and inchnations.

Conscience admits no content as absolute for it, be-
cause it is absolute negativity of all that is definite.
It determines from itself alone. The circle of the self,
however, within which determinateness as such falls, is
so-called " sensibility " : in order to get a content out
of the immediate certainty of self, there is no other
means to be found except sensibility.

Everything that in previous modes of experience was
presented as good or bad, law and right, is something
other than immediate certainty of self ; it is a uni-
versal, which is now a relative entity, an existence-for-
another. Or, looked at otherwise, it is an object which,
while connecting and relating consciousness with itself,
comes between consciousness and its own proper truth,

654 Phenomenology of Mind

and instead of that object being the immediacy of con-
sciousness, it rather cuts consciousness off from itself.

For conscience, however, certainty of self is the
pure, direct, and immediate truth : and this truth is
i^ y^ thus its immediate certainty of self presented as
content ; i.e. its truth is altogether the caprice of the
individual, and the accidental content of his uncon-
scious natural existence [his sensibility].

This content at the same time passes for essential
moral reality, for duty. For pure duty, as was found
when testing and examining laws,* is utterly indifferent
to every content, and gets along with any. Here it has
at the same time the essential form of self-existence, of
existing on its own account : and this form of individual
conviction is nothing else than the sense of the empti-
ness of pure duty, and the consciousness that this is
merely a moment, that its substantial independence is
a predicate v/hich finds its subject in the individual,
whose caprice gives pure duty content, can connect
every content with this form, and attach its feeling of
conscientiousness to any content.

An individual increases his property in a certain way.
It is a duty that each should see to the maintenance
of himself and family, and no less ensure the possibility
of his being serviceable to his neighbours and of doing
good to those standing in need. The individual is aware
that this is a duty, for this content is directly contained
in the certainty he has of himself. He perceives,
further, that he fulfils this particular duty in this par-
ticular case. Other people possibly consider the specific
way he adopts as fraud : they hold by other sides
of the concrete case presented, while he holds firmly to

* v.p. 418 if.

Conscience 655

this particular side of it by the fact of his being
conscious that the increase of property is a pure and
absolute duty.

In the same way there is fulfilled by the individual,
as a duty, what other people call violence and wrong-
doing— the duty of asserting one's independence
against others : and, again, the duty of preserving
one's hfe, and maintaining the possibility of being
useful to one's neighbours. Others call this cowardice,
but what they call courage really violates both
these duties. But cowardice cannot be so stupid and
thoughtless as not to know that the maintenance
of life and the possibility of being useful to others
are duties — so inept as not to be convinced of the
dutifulness of its action, and not to know that
dutifulness consists in knowledge. Otherwise it would
commit the absurdity of being without morality. Since
morahty hes in the consciousness of having fulfilled
one's duty, this will not be lacking when the action is
what is called cowardice any more than when it is what
is called courage. As the abstraction called " duty "
is capable of every content, it is quite equal to this
latter content. The agent acting knows what he does
to be duty, and since he knows this, and conviction as
to duty is just dutifulness, he is thus recognised and
acknowledged by others. The act thereby becomes
accepted as vahd and has actual existence.

It is of no avail to object to this freedom — which puts
one kind of content as well as any other into this uni-
versal inert receptacle of pure duty and pure know-
ledge— by asserting that another content ought to have
been put there. For whatever the content be, each
content has upon it the stain of determinateness from

656 Phenomenology of Mind

which pure knowledge is free, which pure knowledge
can disregard just as readily as it can take up every
determinateness in turn. Every content, through its
being determinate, stands on the same footing with
every other, even though it seems to have precisely the
character that the particularity in the content is
cancelled. It may well seem — since in concrete cases
duty breaks regularly into opposition, and, by doing
so, sunders the opposites particularity and univer-
sality— that the duty, whose content is the universal
as such, contains on that account, i'pso facto, the nature
of pure duty, and that thus form and content are here
entirely in accord. On this view, it might seem that,
e.g., acting for the universal good, for what is the best
for all, is to be preferred to acting for what is the best
for the individual. But this universal duty is in its
entirety what is present as self-contained actual sub-
stance, in the form of [established] law and right,
and holds good independently of the individual's
knowledge and conviction and immediate interest. It
is thus precisely that against the form of which morality
as a whole is directed. As regards its content, however,
even this is determinate in character, in so far as the
" universally best " is opposed to the " individual best."
Consequently, its law is one from which conscience
knows itself to be absolutely free, and it gives itself the
absolute privilege to add and pare, to neglect as well
as fulfil it.

Then, again, the above distinction of duty towards
the individual and duty towards the universal is not
something fixed and final, when we look at the nature of
the opposition in question. On the contrary, what the
individual does for himself is to the advantage of the

Conscience 657

universal as well. The more he looks after his own
good, not only is there the greater possibility of his use-
fulness to others : his very reality consists merely in
his Uving and existing in connection with others. His
individual enjoyment means ultimately and essentially
putting what is his own at the disposal of others,
and helping them to secure their enjoyment. In ful-
filling duty to individuals, and hence duty to self, duty
to the general thus also gets fulfilled. Weighing, con-
sidering, comparing duties, should this appear here,
would take the line of calculating the advantage which
the general would get from any given action. But there
can be no such process ; partly because morality would
thereby be handed over to the inevitable contingency
characteristic of mere " insight " ; partly because it is
precisely the nature of conscience to have done with
all this calculating and weighing of duties, and to
decide directly from itself without reasons of any
kind.

In this way, then, conscience acts and maintains
itself in the unity of its essential being and its
objective existence for itself, in the unity of pure
thought and individuality : it is spirit certain of itself,
which inherently possesses its own truth, within itself,
in its knowledge, a knowledge in the sense of know-
ledge of its duty. It maintains its being therein by
the fact that the positive element in the act, the
content as well as form of duty and the knowledge of
duty, belong to the self, to the certainty of itself.
What, however, seeks to come before the self with an
inherent being of its own is held to be not truly
real, merely a transcended element, only a moment.
Consequently, it is not universal knowledge in general

VOL. II.— R

658 Phenomenology of Mind

that has a vakie, but what is known of the circum-
stances. It puts into duty, which is the universal im-
manent essence, the content which it derives from its
natural individuality ; for the content is one that is
present in its own being. This content, in virtue of
the universal medium wherein it exists, becomes the
duty which it carries out, and empty bare duty is,
through this very fact, affirmed to be something tran-
scended, a moment. This content is its emptiness,
transcended and cancelled, i.e. is the fulfilhng of pure
duty.

But at the same time conscience is detached from
every possible content. It absolves itself from every
specific duty, which would try to pass for a law. In
the strength of its certainty of itself, it has the majesty
of absolute self-sufficiency, of absolute avrdpKeia, to
bind or to loose. This self-determination is at once,
therefore, absolute conformity to duty. Duty is the
knowledge itself ; this pure and simple selfhood, how-
ever, is the immanent principle and essence ; for this
inherent principle is pure self-identity, and self-identity
lies in this consciousness.

This pure knowledge is immediately objective, is
existence-for-another ; for, qua pure self-identity, it is
immediacy, it is objective being. This being, however,
is at the same time pure universality, the selfhood of
all : in other words, action is acknowledged, and hence
actual. This being forms the element by which con-
science directly stands on a footing of equality with
every self-consciousness ; and this relation means not
an abstract impersonal law, but the self of conscience.

In that this right which conscience does is at the
same time, however, a fact for others, a disparity seems

Conscience 659

to affect conscience. The duty which it fulfils is
a determinate content; that content is, no doubt,
the self of consciousness, and so its knowledge of itself,
its identity with its self. But when fulfilled, when
planted in the general element of existence, this identity
is no longer knowledge, no longer this process of dis-
tinction which directly and at the same time does away
with its distinctions. Rather, in the sphere of exist-
ence, distinction is set up as subsistent, and the act is a i^y/^
determinate specific one, not identical with the element
of everybody's self-consciousness, and hence not neces-
sarily acknowledged and recognised. Both aspects,
conscience qua acting, and the general consciousness
acknowledging this act to be duty, stand equally loose
from the specific character belonging to this deed. On
account of this freedom and detachment, the relation
of the two within the common medium of their connec-
tion is rather a relationship of complete disparity — as a
result of which, the consciousness doing and owning
the act finds itself in complete uncertainty regarding
the spirit which does the act and is " certain of itself."
This spirit acts and places in existence a particular
determinate characteristic ; others hold to this existence,
as its truth, and are therein certain of this spirit ; it has
therein expressed what it takes to be its duty. But it
is detached and free from any specific duty ; it has,
therefore, left the point where other people think it
actually to be ; and this very medium of existence
and duty as inherently existing are held by it to be
merely transitory moments. What it thus places
before them, it also " displaces " again, or rather has,
eo ipso, immediately " displaced." For its reahty is,
for it, not the duty and determinate content thus

660 Phenomenology of Mind

put forward, but rather is the reahty which it has
in its absolute certainty of itself.

The other self-consciousnesses do not know, then,
whether this particular conscience is morally good or is
wicked ; or, rather, not merely can they not know this
conscience, but they must take it to be also wicked.
For just as it stands loose to the determinate content
of duty, and detached from duty as inherently existing,
so do they likewise. What is placed before them, they
themselves know how to " displace "' or dissemble : it
is something expressing merely the self of another
individual, not their own : they do not merely know
themselves to be detached and free from it, but have
to resolve and dissipate it within their own conscious-
ness, reduce it to nothingness by judgments and
explanations in order to preserve their own self.

But the act of conscience is not merely this deter-
mination of existence, a determinate content forsaken
by the pure self. What ought to be binding as duty and
KMi get recognised as such, only is so through knowledge
and conviction as to its being duty, by knowledge of
self in the deed done. WTien the deed ceases to have
in it this element of self, it ceases to be what is alone
its essential nature. Its existence, if deserted by this
consciousness of self, would be an ordinary reality, and
the act would appear to us a way of fulfilling one's plea-
sure and desire. What ought to exist has here essen-
tiality only by its being known to be individuality
giving itself expression. And its being thus known is
the fact acknowledged and recognised by others, and
is that which as such ought to have existence.

The self enters existence as self. The spirit which is
certain of itself exists as such for others ; its immediate

Conscience 661

act is not what is accepted and real ; what is acknow-
ledged by others is, not the determinate element, not
the inherent being, but solely and simply the self know-
ing itself as such. The element which gives perma-
nence and stability is universal self-consciousness.
What enters this element cannot be the effect of
the act : the latter does not last there, and maintains
no permanence : only self-consciousness is what is
recognised and gains concrete reality.

Here again,* then, we see Language to be the form
in which spirit finds existence. Language is the way
self-consciousness exists for others ; it is self-conscious-
ness which is there irmnediately present as such, and
in the form of this actual universal self-consciousness.
Language is self separating itself from itself, which
comes objectively before itself as the pure ego identical
with ego, which at once maintains itself in this objective
form as this actual self, and at the same time fuses
directly with others and is their self-consciousness. The
self perceives itself at the same time that it is perceived
by others : and this perceiving is just existence which
has become a self.

The content, which language has here obtained, is
no longer the self we found in the world of culture,
perv^erted, perverting, and distraught. It is spirit which,
having returned to itself, is certain of itself, certain in
itself of its truth, of its own act of recognition, and of
being recognised as this knowledge. The language of U-Jk:
the ethical spirit of society is law, and simple command
and complaint, which is but a tear shed over necessity.
Moral consciousness, on the other hand, remains dumb,
shut up within its inner Ufe ; for self has no existence

* v.p. 512 ff.

66Ö Phenomenology of Mind

as yet in its case : rather existence and self there stand,
in the first instance, in external relation to each other.
Language, however, comes forward merely as the
mediating element between independent self- conscious-
nesses recognised and acknowledged ; and the existent
self means immediately universal recognition, means
recognition in manifold ways and in this very mani-
foldness simple recognition. What the language of
conscience contains is the self knowing itself as
essential reality. This alone is what that language
expresses, and this expression is the true realisation
of " doing " anything, and renders the act valid
and acceptable. Consciousness expresses its convic-
tion : in this conviction alone is the action duty : it
holds good as duty, too, solely by the conviction being
expressed. For universal self-consciousness stands
detached from the specific act which merely exists :
the act qua existence means nothing to it : what
it holds of importance is the conviction that the act is
a duty ; and this appears concretely in language.

To realise the act means here not translating its
content from the form of purpose, or subjectivity, into
the form of abstract reality : it means translating it
from the form of immediate certainty of self, which
takes its knowledge, its self-existence, to be the essential
fact, into the form of the assurance that consciousness
is convinced of its duty, and, being conscience, knows
of itself what duty is. This assurance thus guarantees
that it is convinced of its conviction being the essential
fact.

Whether the assurance, that it acts from conviction
of duty, is true, whether that really is duty which is
done — these questions or doubts have no meaning if

Conscience 663

directed against conscience. In the case of the ques-
tion, whether the assurance is true, it would be assumed
that the inner intention is different from the one put
forward, i.e. that the wilhng of a particular self can if^/
be separated from duty, from the will of the universal
and pure consciousness : the latter will would in that
case be a matter of words, while the former would be
strictly the real moving principle of the act. But such
a distinction between the universal consciousness and
the particular self is precisely what has been cancelled,
and the superseding of it constitutes conscience. Im-
mediate knowledge on the part of self which is certain
of itself is law and duty. Its intention, by being its own
intention, is what is right. All that is required is that
it should know this, and state its conviction that its
knowledge and will are the right. The expression of
this assurance ipso facto cancels the form of its par-
ticularity. It recognises thereby the necessary univer-
sality of the self. In that it calls itself conscience, it
calls itself pure self-knowledge and pure abstract will,
i.e. it calls itself a universal knowledge and will which
acknowledges and recognises others, is hke them — for
they are just this pure self-knowledge and will — and
which is on that account also recognised by them. In
the willing of the self which is certain of itself, in this
knowledge of the self as the essential reahty, Hes the
essence of the right.

When any one says, therefore, he is acting from
conscience, he is saying what is true, for his conscience
is the self which knows and wills. He must, however,
necessarily say so, for this self has to be at the same
time universal self. It is not universal in the content
o f the act : for this content is per se indifferent on

664 Plienomenologij of Mind

account of its being specific and determinate. The
universality lies in the form of the act. It is this form
which is to be affirmed as real : the form is the self,
which as such is actual in language, pronounces itself to
be the truth, and just by so doing acknowledges all
other selves, and is recognised by them.

Conscience, then, in its majestic sublimity above any
specific law and every content of duty, puts whatever
content there is into its knowledge and willing. It
i^yg becomes moral genius and originality, which takes the
inner voice of its immediate knowledge to be a voice
divine ; and since in such knowledge it directly knows
existence as well, it is divine creative power, which
contains living force in its very conception. It is in
itself, too, divine worship), " service of God," for its
action consists in beholding this its own proper
divinity.

This solitary worship, this " service of God " in soli-
tude of soul, is at the same time essentially " service of
God " in public, on the part of a religious community ;
and pure inward self-knowledge and perception of self
pass to being a moment of consciousness.* To behold
itself is to exist objectively, and this objective element
is the utterance of its knowledge and will in a universal
way. Through such expression the self becomes estab-
lished and accepted, and the act becomes an effective
deed, a deed carrying out a definite result. What gives
reality and subsistence to its deed is universal self-
consciousness. When, however, conscience finds expres-
sion, this puts the certainty of itself in the form of pure
self and thereby as universal self. Others let the act

* i.e. into a state which implies distinction and opposition of subject
and object.

The "Beautiful Soul" 665

hold as valid, owing to the explicit terms in which the
self is thus expressed and acknowledged to be the
essential reality. The spirit and the substance of their
community are, thus, the mutual assurance of their
conscientiousness, of their good intentions, the rejoicing
over this reciprocal purity of purpose, the quickening
and refreshment received from the glorious privilege of
knowing and of getting expression, of fostering and
cherishing a state so altogether excellent and desirable.

So far as this sphere of conscience still distinguishes
its abstract consciousness from its self-consciousness,
its hfe is merely hid in God. God is indeed imme-
diately present to its mind and heart, to its self. But
what is revealed, its actual consciousness and the
mediating process of this consciousness, is, to it, some-
thing other than that hidden inner life and the imme-
diacy of God's presence. But, with the completion of
conscience, the distinction between its abstract con-
sciousness and its self- consciousness is done away. It
knows that the abstract consciousness is just this self,
this individual self-existence which is certain of itself :
that the very difference between the terms is abolished
in the immediateness of the relation of the self to the
ultimate Being, which, when placed outside the self, is
the abstract essence, and a Being concealed from it.
For a relation is mediate when the terms related are
not one and the same, but each is a different term for
the other, and is one only with the other in some third
term: an immediate relation, however, means, in fact,
nothing else than the unity of the terms. Having
risen above the meaningless position of holding these
distinctions, which are not distinctions at all, to be
still such, consciousness knows the immediateness of

666 Phenomenology of Mind

the presence of ultimate Being within it to be the unity
of that Being and its self : it thus knows itself to be
the living inherent reality, and takes its knowledge to
be Religion, which, qua knowedge viewed as an object
or knowledge with an objective existence, is the utter-
ance of the religious communion regarding its own
spirit.

We see then, here, self-consciousness withdrawn into
the inmost retreats of its being, with all externality, as
such, gone and vanished from it — returned into the
intuition of ego as altogether identical with ego, an
intuition where this ego is all that is essential, and all
that exists. It is absorbed in this conception of
itself ; for it is driven to the extreme limit of its
extreme positions, and in such a way that the moments
distinguished, moments through which it is real or still
consciousness, are not merely for us these bare ex-
tremes ; rather what it is for itself, and what, to it,
is inherent, and what is, for it, existence — all these
moments evaporate into abstractions. They have no
longer stability, no substantial existence for this phase
of consciousness. Everything, that was hitherto for
consciousness essential, has reverted into these abstrac-
tions. When clarified to this degree of transparency,
consciousness exists in its poorest form, and the
poverty, constituting its sole and only possession, is
itself a process of disappearance. This absolute cer-
tainty into which the substance has been resolved is
absolute untruth, which collapses within itself ; it is
absolute self -consciousness, in which consciousness [with
its relation of self and object] is submerged and goes
under.

Looking at this absorption and disappearance from

The "Beautiful Soul" 667

within, the inherent and essential substance is, for
consciousness, knowledge in the sense of its knowledge.
Being consciousness, it is split up into the opposition
between itself and the object, which is, for it, the
essentially real. But this very object is what is perfectly
transparent, is its self ; and its consciousness is merely
knowledge concerning itself. All life and all spiritual
truth have returned into this self, and have lost their
difference from the ego. The moments of conscious-
ness are therefore these extreme abstractions, of which
none holds its ground, but each loses itself in the
other and produces it. We have here the process of
the " unhappy soul," * in restless change with self ;
in the present case, however, this is a conscious ex-
perience going on inside itself, fully conscious of being
the notion of reason, while the " unhappy soul " above
spoken of was only reason implicitly. The absolute
certainty of self thus finds itself qua consciousness,
converted directly into a dying sound, a mere objectifi-
cation of its subjectivity or self -existence. But this
world so created is the utterance of its own voice, which
in hke manner it has directly heard, and the echo of
which only returns to it. This return does not therefore
mean that the self is there in its true reahty {an und
für sich) : for the real is, for it, not an inherent being, is
no per se, but its very self. Just as httle has consciousness
itself existence, for the objective aspect does not succeed
in becoming something negative of the actual self, in the
same way as this self does not reach complete actuality.
It lacks force to externahse itself, the power to make
itself a thing, and endure existence. It hves in dread of
staining the radiance of its inner being by action and

* v.p. 200 ff.

668 Phenomenology of Mind

existence. And to preserve the purity of its heart, it
flees from contact with actuaUty, and steadfastly per-
severes in a state of self-willed impotence to renounce a
self which is pared away to the last point of abstraction,
and to give itself substantial existence, or, in other
words, to transform its thought into being, and commit
itself to absolute distinction [that between thought and
being]. The hollow object, which it produces, now
fills it, therefore, with the feehng of emptiness. Its
activity consists in yearning ; it merely loses itself in
becoming an unsubstantial shadowy object, and, rising
;+?/ above this loss and falling back on itself, finds itself
merely as lost. In this transparent purity of its moments
it becomes a sorrow-laden " beautiful soul,'' as it is
called ; its light dims and dies within it, and it vanishes
as a shapeless vapour dissolving into thin air.*

This silent fusion of the pithless unsubstantial ele-
ments of evaporated life has, however, still to be taken
in the other sense of the reality of conscience, and in
the way its process actually appears. Conscience has
to be considered as acting. The objective moment in
this phase of consciousness took above the determinate
form of universal consciousness. The knowing of self
is, qua this particular self, different from another self.
Language in which all reciprocally recognise and
acknowledge each other as acting conscientiously —
this general equality breaks up into the inequahty of
each individual existing for himself ; each conscious-
ness turns from its universahty back into itself, each is
just as much reflected absolutely into itself as it is
universal. By this means there necessarily comes about

* Cf. Hegel's remarks on Jacolii's conception of the " beautiful soul " :
WWX., 1, p. .303.

Evil and Forgiveness 669

the opposition of individuality to other individuals
and to the universal. And this relation and its proce-
dure we have to consider.

Or, again, this universahty and duty have the abso-
lutely opposite significance ; they signify determinate
individuality, exempting itself from what is universal,
individuality which looks on pure duty as universality
that has appeared merely on the surface and is turned
on its outside : " duty is merely a matter of words,"
and passes for that whose being is for something
else. Conscience, which in the first instance takes up
merely a negative attitude towards duty, qua a given
determinate duty, feels itself detached from it. But
since conscience fills empty duty with a determinate con-
tent drawn from its own self, it is positively aware of
the fact that it, qua this particular self, makes its own
content. Its pure self, as it is empty knowledge, is
without content and without definiteness. The content
which it supphes to that knowledge is drawn from
its own self, quu this determinate self, is drawn from
itself as a natural individuality. In speaking of
the conscientiousness of its action, it is doubtless
aware of its pure self, but in the purpose of its action —
a purpose which brings in a concrete content — it is
conscious of itself as this particular individual, and is
conscious of the opposition between what it is for itself
and what it is for others, of the opposition of univer-
sality or duty and its state of being reflected into self
away from the universal.

While in this way the opposition, into which con-
science passes when it acts, finds expression in its inner
Hfe, the opposition is at the same time disparity on
its outer side, in the sphere of existence — the disparity

670 Phenomenology of Mind

or discordance of its particular individuality with,
reference to another individual. Its special peculiarity
consists in the fact that the two elements constituting
its consciousness — viz. the self and the inherent nature
(Ansich) — are unequal in value and significance within
it ; in being accepted as valid, they are so determined
that certainty of self is the essential fact as against the
inherent nature, or the universal, which is taken to be
merely a moment. Over against this internal determina-
tion there thus stands the element of existence, the
universal consciousness ; and for this latter it is rather
universality, duty, which is the essential fact, while
individuality, which exists for itself and is opposed to
the universal, has merely the value of a superseded
moment. The first consciousness is held to be Evil by
the consciousness which thus stands by the fact of duty,
because of the lack of congruity or identity of its internal
subjective life with the universal ; and since at the same
time the first consciousness declares its act to be identity
with itself, to be duty and conscientiousness, it is held
by that universal consciousness to be Hypocrisy.

The course taken by this opposition is, in the first
instance, the formal reinstatement of the identity be-
tween what the evil consciousness is in its own nature
and what it declares itself to be. It has to be made
manifest that it is evil, and its objective existence thus
made congruent with its real nature ; the hypocrisy
must be unmasked. This return of the disparity,
present in hypocrisy, into the state of congruency or
identity is not at once brought to pass by the mere
fact that, as people usually say, hypocrisy just
proves its reverence for duty and virtue through
assuming the appearance of them, and using this as

Evil and Forgiveness 671

a mask to liide itself from its own consciousness
no less than from another — as if, in this acknow-
ledgment and recognition in itself of its opposite,
60 ipso congruency and agreement were implied and
contained. Yet even then it is just as truly done with .'- s s
this recognition in words and is reflected into self ;
and in the very fact of its using the inherent and
essential reality merely as something which has a
significance for another consciousness, there is really
imphed its own contempt for that inherent principle,
and the demonstration of the worthlessness of that
reality for all. For what lets itself be used as an
external instrument shows itself to be a thing, which
has within it no proper weight and worth of its own.

Moreover, this congruency or identity, is not
brought about either by the evil consciousness per-
sisting onesidedly in its own state, or by the judgment
of the universal consciousness. If the former disclaims
the consciousness of duty, and maintains that what
the latter pronounces to be baseness, to be absolute
discordance with universality, is an action according
to inner law and conscience, then, in this onesided
assurance of identity and concord, there still remains
its want of agreement with the other, since this other
universal consciousness certainly does not believe the
assurance and does not acknowledge it. In other
words, since onesided insistence on one extreme
destroys itself, evil would indeed thereby confess
to being evil, but in so doing would at once cancel
itself and cease to be hypocrisy, and so would not
qua hypocrisy be unmasked. It confesses itself, in fact,
to be evil by asserting that, while opposing what is
recognised as universal, it is acting according to inner

672 Phenomenology of Mind

law and conscience. For were this law and conscience
not the law of its particularity and caprice, it would
not be something inward, something private, but what
is universally accepted and acknowledged. When,
therefore, any one says he acts towards others from a
law and conscience of his own, he is saying, in point of
fact, that he is abusing and wronging them. But actual
conscience is not this insistence on a knowledge and a
will which are opposed to what is universal ; the univer-
sal is the element of its existence, and its very language
pronounces its action to be recognised duty.

Just as little, when the universal consciousness
emphasises and persists in its own judgment, does this
unmask and dissipate hypocrisy. When that universal
consciousness stigmatises hypocrisy as bad, base, and
so on, it appeals, in passing such a judgment, to
its own law, just as the evil consciousness, on its side,
does too. For the former law makes its appearance in
opposition to the latter, and thereby is a particular law.
It has, therefore, no antecedent claim over the other
law; rather it legitimises this other law. Hence the
universal consciousness, by thus emulating the other,
does precisely the opposite of what it means to do :
for it shows that its so-called " true duty," which
ought to be universally acknowledged, is something
not acknowledged and recognised, and consequently it
grants the other an equal right of independently exist-
ing on its own account.

This judgment [of universal consciousness], however,
has, at the same time, another side to it, from which it
leads the way to the dissolution of the opposition in
question. Consciousness of the universal does not
proceed, qua real and qua acting, to deal with the evil

Evil and Forgiveness 673

consciousness ; for this latter, rather, is the real.
In opposing the latter, it is a consciousness which is not
entangled in the opposition of particular and universal
involved in action. It stays within the universahty of
thought, takes up the attitude of an apprehending
intelligence, and its first act is merely that of judgment.
Through this judgment it now places itself, as was just
observed, alongside the first consciousness, and the
latter, through this identity, this hkeness, between them,
comes to see itself in this other consciousness. For
in the attitude of apprehension consciousness of duty
is passive. Thereby it is in contradiction with itself as
the absolute will of duty, as the self that determines
absolutely from itself. It may well preserve itself in its
purity, for it does not act ; it is hypocrisy, which wants
to see the fact of judging taken for the actual deed,
and instead of proving its uprightness and honesty
by acts does so by expressing fine sentiments. It is
thus constituted entirely in the same way as that
against which the reproach is made of putting its
phrases in place of duty. In both cases alike the
aspect of reality is distinct from the express statements
— in the one case owing to the selfish purpose of the
action, in the other through failure to act at all, a
result which is inevitable when there is mere talk about
duty, for duty without deeds is altogether meaningless.
The act of judging, however, has also to be looked
at as a positive act of thought and has a positive con-
tent : this aspect makes the contradiction present in
the apprehending consciousness and its identity with
the first consciousness still more complete. The active
consciousness declares its specific deed to be its duty,
and the consciousness that passes judgment cannot deny

VOL. II.— S

i^ -r i-

674 Phenomenology of Mind

this ; for duty as such is form void of all content and
capable of any. In other words, concrete action, ii^her-
ently implying diversity in its manysidedness, involves
the universal aspect, which is that which is taken as
duty, just as much as the particular, which constitutes
the share and interest the individual has in the act.
The consciousness expressing its judgment does not
now stop at the former aspect of duty and rest content
with the knowledge which the active agent has of this,
viz. that this is its duty, the condition and the status
of its reahty. It holds on to the other aspect, diverts
the act into the inner realm, and explains the act from
selfish motives and from its inner intention, an inten-
tion different from the act itself. As every act is
capable of treatment in respect of its dutifulness, so,
too, each can be considered from this other point of
view of particularity ; for as an act it is the actuality
of an individual.

This process of judging, then, takes the act out of
the sphere of its objective existence, and turns it back
into that of the inner realm, into the form of specific
and individual particularity. If the act carries glory
with it, then the inner aspect is judged as love of fame.
If it altogether fits in with the position and status of
the individual, without going beyond this position, and
is so constituted that the individuality in question does
not have the position hanging on to it as an external
appendage, but through itself supplies the content to
this universality, and by that very process shows itself to
be capable of a higher status — then the inner nature
of the act is judged as ambition ; and so on. Since, in
the act in general, the individual who acts comes to
see himself in objective form, or gets the feeling of his

Evil and Forgiveness 675

own being in his objective existence and thus attains
enjoyment, the judgment on the act finds the inner
nature of it to be an impulse towards personal and
private happiness, even though this happiness were to
consist merely in inner moral vanity, the enjoyment of
a sense of personal excellence, and in the foretaste and
hope of a happiness to come.

No act can escape being judged in such a way ;
for " duty for duty's sake," this bare purpose, is some-
thing unreal. What reality it has hes in the deed of
some individuality, and the action thereby has in it the
aspect of particularity. No hero is a hero to his valet,
not, however, because the hero is not a hero, but because
the valet is — the valet, with whom the hero has to do,
not as a hero, but as a man who eats, drinks, and dresses,
who, in short, appears as a particular individual with
certain personal wants and idiosyncrasies. In the same
way, there is no act in which that process of judgment
cannot oppose the particular aspect of the individuality
to the universal aspect of the act, and set the valet of
morahty against the hero who does the act.*

The consciousness, that so passes judgment, is in con-
sequence itself base and mean, because it divides the
act up, and brings out and holds on to its inherent in-
consistency and self-discordance. It is, furthermore,
hypocrisy, because it gives out this way of judging, not
as another fashion of being wicked, but as the correct
consciousness of the act ; sets itself up, in its unreality,
in this vanity of knowing well and better, far above
the deeds it decries ; and wants to find its mere words
without deeds taken for an admirable kind of reahty.

On this account, then, putting itself on a level with

* Cp. with above Philosophy of History, Intro. (Eng. trans., p. 32 ff.)

676 Phenomenology of Mind

the agent on whom it passes judgment, it is recognised
by the latter as the same as himself. This latter does not
merely find himself apprehended as something alien or
external to, and unlike or discordant with that other :
but rather finds the other in its peculiar constitutive
}^^', character identical with himself. Seeing this similarity
and giving this expression, he openly declares himself to
the other, and expects in like manner that the other,
having in point of fact put itself on the same level, will
respond in the same terms on its side, will give voice to
the likeness found within it, and that thus the state of
mutual recognition will be brought about. His confes-
sion is not an attitude of abasement or humiliation
before the other, is not flinging himself away. For to
give the matter expression in this way has not the
one-sided character which would fix and establish his
disparity with the other : on the contrary, it is solely
because of seeing the likeness of the other to him that
he gives himself utterance. In making his confession
he announces, from his side, their common likeness, and
does so for the reason that language is the existence of
spirit as an immediate self. He thus expects that the
other will make its own contribution to this manner of
existence.

But the admission on the part of the one who is
wicked, " I am so,'' is not followed by a reply making
a similar confession. This was not what that way
of judging meant at all: far from it! It repels
this community of nature, and is the " hardhearted-
ness," which keeps to itself and rejects all continuity
with the other. By so doing the scene is changed. The
one who made the confession sees himself thrust off, and
takes the other to be in the wrong when he refuses to

Evil and Forgiveness 677

let his own inner nature go forth in the objective shape
of an express utterance, opposes and contrasts the
beauty of his own soul with the wicked individual, and
opposes to the confession of the penitent the stiff-
necked attitude of the self-consistent equable character,
and the rigid silence of one who keeps himself to
himself and refuses to throw himself away for some one
else. Here we find asserted the highest pitch of revolt
to which a spirit certain of itself can reach. For it
beholds itself, qua this bare self-knowledge, in another
conscious being, and in such a way that the external
form of this other is not an unessential " thing," as
in the case of an object of wealth, but thought ;
knowledge itself is what is opposed to it. It is this
absolutely unbroken continuity of pure knowledge
which refuses to estabUsh communication with an
other, which had, ipso facto, by making its confession, ^/S^P
renounced separate isolated self-existence, had affirmed
its particularity to be cancelled, and thereby estab-
lished itself as continuous with the other, i.e. estab-
lished itself as universal. The other, however, retains
in its own case and reserves to itself its uncom-
mimicative, isolated independence : in the case of the
individual making the confession it retains just the
very thing which that individual has already cast
away. It thereby proves itself to be a form of
consciousness which has forsaken and denies the very
nature of spirit ; for it does not understand that spirit,
in the absolute certainty of itself, is master and lord
over every deed, and over all reality, and can reject and
cast them off and make them as if they had never been.
At the same time, it does not see the contradiction it is
committing in not allowing a rejection, which has been

678 Phenomenology of Mind

made in express language, to pass for genuine rejection,
while itself has the certainty of its own spiritual life, not
in a concrete real act, but in its inner nature, and
finds the objective existence of this inner being in the
mere utterance of its own judgment. It is thus its own
self which checks that other's return from the act to the
spiritual objectivity of spoken utterance, and to spiritual
identity and agreement, and by its stiffness produces the
discordance and dissimilarity which still remain.

Now, so far as the spirit which is certain of itself, in the
form of a " beautiful soul," does not possess the faculty of
relinquishing the self-absorbed uncommunicative know-
ledge of itself, it cannot attain to any identity with
the consciousness that is repulsed, and so cannot suc-
ceed in seeing the unity of its self in another Hfe, cannot
reach objective existence. The equality comes about,
therefore, merely in a negative way, as a state of being
devoid of spiritual character. The "beautiful soul,"
then, has no concrete reality ; it subsists in the contra-
diction between its pure self and the necessity felt by
this self to externalise itself and turn into something
actual; it exists in the immediacy of this rooted and
fixed opposition, an immediacy which alone is the middle
term mediating and reconciling an opposition which
has arisen to its pure abstraction, and is pure being or
empty nothingness. Thus the " beautiful soul," being
conscious of this contradiction in its unreconciled
immediacy, is unhinged, disordered, and runs to mad-
ness, passes away in yearning, and is consumed in
pining inanition.* Thereby it gives up, as a fact, its

* This was the actual fate of Novalis, the " 8t. John of Romanticism "
(d. 1801, jBt. 29). Cp. Hegel's remarks on Novalis WW X., 1, p. 201 :
XVI., p. 500.

Evil and Forgiveness 679

stubborn insistence on its own isolated self-existence,
but only to bring forth the soulless, spiritless unity of
abstract being.

The true, that is to say the self-conscious and actual,
balance or adjustment of the two sides is necessitated
by, and already contained in the foregoing. Break-
ing the hard heart and raising it to the level of uni-
versality is the same process which appeared in the
case of the consciousness that expressly made its
confession. The wounds of the spirit heal and leave
no scars behind. The deed is not something imperish-
able ; the spirit takes it back into itself ; and the
aspect of particularity present in it, whether in the
form of an intention or of an existential negativity and
limitation, immediately passes away. The process of
actually reahsing self, the form of its act, is merely a
moment of the whole ; and the same is true of the
knowledge fimctioning through judgment, and estab-
hshing and maintaining the distinction between the
particular and universal aspects of action. The evil con-
sciousness, spoken of, definitely yields up and rehn-
quishes itself, or sets itself down as a moment, being
drawn into the way of express confession by seeing
itself in another. This other, however, must have its
onesided, unaccepted, and unacknowledged judgment
broken down, just as the former has to abandon its
onesided unacknowledged existence in a state of par-
ticularity and isolation. And as the former displays
the power of spirit over its reality, so this other must
manifest the power of spirit over its constitutive and
determinate notion.

The latter, however, renounces thought that divides
and separates, and the rigid imperviousness of uncom-

680 Phenomenology of Mind

municative self-existence, for the reason that, in point
of fact, it sees itself in the first. That which, in this
way, abandons its reality and makes itself into a
superseded particular "this" {Diesen), shows itself
thereby to be, in fact, universal. It turns away from
its external reality back into itself as inner essence ;
and there the universal consciousness thus knows and
finds itself.

The forgiveness it extends to the first is the renuncia-
tion of self, of its unreal being, since it identifies this
j^qcj unreal nature and that other element of real action,
and recognises what was called bad — a determination
assigned to action by thought — to be good ; or rather it
lets go and gives up this distinction of determinate
thought with its self -determining isolated judgment, just
as the other foregoes determining the act in isolation and
for its own private behoof. The word of reconciliation is
the objectively existent spirit, which sees and imme-
diately apprehends the pure knowledge of itself qua
universal being in its opposite, in the pure knowledge
of itself qua absolutely self-confined single individual —
a reciprocal recognition which is Absolute Spirit.

Absolute Spirit enters existence merely at the cul-
minating point at which its pure knowledge about itself
is the opposition and interchange" with itself. Know-
ing that its pure knowledge is the abstract essential
reality, Absolute Spirit is this knowing duty in absolute
opposition to the knowledge which knows itself, qua
absolute singleness of self, to be the essentially real.
The former is the pure continuity of the universal,
which knows the individuality, that thinks itself the
real, to be inherently null and naught, to be evil. The
latter, again, is absolute discreteness, which thinks

Evil and Forgiveness 681

itself absolute in its pure oneness, and thinks the
universal is the unreal which exists only for others.
Both aspects are refined and clarified to this degree of
purity, where there is no self-less existence left, no nega-
tive of consciousness in either of them, where, instead,
the one element of " duty " is the self -identical character
of its self-knowledge, and the other element of "evil"
equally has its purpose in its own inner being and its
reality in its own mode of utterance. The content of
this utterance is the substance that gives it subsistence ;
the utterance is the assurance and asseveration of the
certainty of spirit within its own self.

These spirits, both certain of themselves, have each
no other purpose than its own pure self, and no other
reality and existence than just this pure self. But they
are still different, and the difference is absolute, because
holding within this element of the pure notion. The
difference is absolute, too, not merely for us [tracing the
experience], but for the notions themselves which stand
in this opposition. For while these notions are indeed 1/
determinate and specific relatively to one another,
they are at the same time in themselves universal, so
that they compass the whole range of the self ; and this
self can have no other content than this its own deter-
minate constitution* which neither transcends the self
nor is more restricted than it. For the one aspect, the
absolutely universal, is pure self-knowledge as well as the
other, the absolute discreteness of single individuality,
and both are merely this pure self-knowledge. Both
determinate aspects, then, are cognitive pure notions
which know qua notions, whose very constitution con-
sists in immediately knowing, or, in other words, whose
relationship and opposition is the Ego. Because of this

682 Phenomenology of Mind

they are for one another these absolutely opposed
elements ; it is what is completely inner that has in this
way come into opposition to itself and entered objective
existence ; they constitute pure knowledge, which, owing
to this opposition, takes the form of consciousness. But
as yet it is not self -consciousness. It obtains this actuali-
sation in the course of the process through which this
opposition passes. For this opposition is really itself the
indiscrete continuity and identity of ego = ego ; and each
by itself inherently cancels itself just through the
contradiction in its pure universality, which, while
implying continuity and identity, at the same time still
resists its identity with the other, and separates itself
from it. Through this rehnquishment of separate self-
hood, the knowledge, which in its existence is in a state
of diremption, returns into the unity of the self ; it is the
concrete actual Ego, universal knowledge of self in its
absolute opposite, in the knowledge which is internal
to and within the self, and which, because of the very
purity of its separate subjective existence, is itself
completely universal. The reconcihng affirmation, the
" yes,'' with which both egos desist from their existence
in opposition, is the existence of the ego expanded into
a duality, an ego which remains therein one and iden-
tical with itself, and possesses the certainty of itself
in its complete relinquishment and its opposite : it is
God appearing in the midst of those who know them-
selves in the form of pure knowledge.

(CC)
RELIGION

[The appearance of Absolute Spirit as a principle constituting on its
own account a distinctive stage of experience is at once a demand of
the preceding development and a condition of making experience self-
complete. Finite or socialised spiritual existence is at its best incapable
of establishing the truth that " Spirit is the only reality " ; for the more
finite spirit approximates to the state of claiming to be self-contained the
more is it dependent on universal self-consciousness. A trans-finite or
Absolute Spiritual Being as such is thus necessary to realise and sustain
the fullness of meaning which finite spirit possesses. Moreover, if " the
truth is the whole," and only so is truth self-complete and self-explaining,
and, if reality is essentially spiritual — then experience only finds its
complete meaning realised in the principle of Absolute Spirit. Hence
the final stage of the Phenomenology of experience is the appearance
therein of Absolute Spirit. Moreover, Absolute Spirit, in its own
distinctive existence, could only appear at the end of the process of
experience, for the whole of that process is required to reveal and to
constitute the substance of which the Absolute consists. But the pecu-
liarity of the stage now reached is that here the Absolute operates in its
undivided totality to form a definite type of experience ; or, in the
language of the text, we have the Absolute here " conscious of its self." No
doubt, in all the previous stages, "consciousness," "self-consciousness,"
" reason," " spirit," the Absolute has been implied as a limiting principle,
at once substantiating and determining the boundaries of each stage :
hence each stage had an Absolute of its own, the character of which was
derived in each case from the peculiarity of the stage in question. Now,
however, we have the Absolute by itself, in its single self-completeness, as
the sole formative factor of a certain type of experience.

The Absolute, then, in its own self-complete reality appears as the
constitutive principle of experience. The experience here is the self-
consciousness of Absolute Spirit ; it appears to itself in all its objects.
Since all the modes of finitude hitherto considered (consciousness, self-
consciousness, etc.) are embraced in its single totality, it may use each and
all of these various modes as the media through and in which to appear,

683

684 Phenomenology of Mind

When it appears in and through these modes of fiuitude we have the
attitude of Religion. Since these modes, as we saw, differ, the religious
attitude differs ; and accordingly we have various types or forms of
religion.

Each of these forms, in and through which the Absolute appears, is
circumscribed in its nature and process ; each is fer se inadequate to the
revelation of complete absolute self-consciousness : hence the variety of
religions is necessitated by and is indirectly due to the failure of any one
type and the inadequacy of every single type to reveal the Absolute com-
pletely. A form of appearance or self-manifestation of the Absolute is
therefore demanded which will reveal Absolute Spirit adequately to itself
as it essentially is in itself. Here it will know itself, so to say, face to
face, and with perfect completeness. This form is Ahsohde Knowledge-
Hence Religion and Absolute Knowledge are the final stages in the
argument of the Phenomenology. The former is dealt with in the im-
mediately succeeding section (VII) and its various subsections ; the latter
forms the subject of the concluding section (VIII) of the work.]

VII

Religion in General ^02

IN the forms of experience hitherto dealt with —
which are distinguished broadly as Consciousness,
Self-consciousness, Reason, and Spirit — Religion also,
the consciousness of Absolute Being in general, has no
doubt made its appearance. But that was from the
point of view of consciousness, when it has the Absolute
Being for its object. Absolute Being, however, in its
own distinctive nature, the Self-consciousness of Spirit,
has not appeared in those forms.

Even at the plane of Consciousness, viz. when this
takes the shape of " Understanding," there is a con-
sciousness of the supersensuous, of the inner being
of objective existence. But the supersensible, the
eternal, or whatever we care to call it, is devoid of
selfhood. It is merely, to begin with, something uni-
versal, which is a long way still from being spirit knowing
itself as spirit.

Then there was Self-consciousness, which came to
its final shape in the " bereft soul," the " unhappy
consciousness " ; that was merely the pain and sorrow
of spirit wresthng to get itself out into objectivity
once more, but not succeeding. The unity of individual
self-consciousness with its unchangeable Being, which
is what this stage arrives at, remains, in consequence,
a " beyond," something afar off.

685

686 Phenomenology of Mind

The immediate existence of Reason (which we found
arising out of that state of sorrow), and the special
shapes which reason assumes, have no form of rehgion,
because self-consciousness in the case of reason knows
itself or looks for itself in the direct and immediate
present.

On the other hand, in the world of the Ethical Order,
we met with a type of rehgion, the religion of the
nether world. This is belief in the fearful and un-
known darkness of Fate, and in the Eumenides of
the spirit of the departed : the former being pure
negation taking the form of universahty, the latter
the same negation but in the form of particularity.
Absolute Being is, then, in the latter shape no doubt
the self and is present, as there is no other way for
the self to he except present. But the particular
self is this particular ghostly shade, which keeps the
universal element, Fate, separated from itself. It is
indeed a shade, a ghost, a cancelled and superseded
particular, and so a universal self. But that negative
meaning has not yet turned round into this latter
positive significance, and hence the self, so cancelled
and transcended, still directly means at the same time
this particular being, this insubstantial reahty. Fate,
however, without self remains the darkness of night
devoid of consciousness, which never comes to draw
distinctions within itself, and never attains the clear-
ness of self-knowledge.

This behef in a necessity that produces nothing-
ness, this belief in the nether world, becomes behef
in Heaven, because the self which has departed must
be united with its universal nature, must unfold what
it contains in terms of this universahty, and thus

Religion 687

become clear to itself. This kingdom of belief, how-
ever, we saw unfold its content merely in the element
of reflective thought {Denken), without bringing out
the true notion (Begriff) ; and we saw it, on that ac-
count, perish in its final fate, viz. in the religion of
enlightenment. Here in this type of rehgion, the super-
sensible beyond, which we found in " understanding,''
is reinstated again, but in such a way that self-conscious-
ness rests and feels satisfied in the mundane present,
not in the " beyond," and thinks of the supersensible
beyond, void and empty, unknowable, and devoid of
all terrors, neither as a self nor as power and
might.

In the religion of Morahty it is at last reinstated
that Absolute Reahty is a positive content ; but that
content is bound up with the negativity characteristic
of the enlightenment. The content is an objective
being, which is at the same time taken back into the
self, and remains there enclosed, and is a content with
internal distinctions, while its parts are just as imme-
diately negated as they are posited. The final destiny,
however, which absorbs this contradictory process, is
the self conscious of itself as the controlhng necessity
{Schicksal) of what is essential and actual.

Spirit knowing its self is in religion primarily and im-
mediately its own pure self-consciousness. Those modes
of it above considered — " objective spirit," " spirit
estranged from itself " and " spirit certain of its self "
— together constitute what it is in its condition of
consciousness, the state in which, being objectively
opposed to its own world, it does not therein apprehend
and consciously possess itself. But in Conscience it
brings itself as well as its objective world as a whole

688 Phenomenology of Mind

into subjection, as also its idea * and its various specific
conceptions ; t and is now self-consciousness at home
with itself. Here spirit, represented as an object,
has the significance for itself of being Universal Spirit,
which contains within itself all that is ultimate and
essential and all that is concrete and actual ; yet is
not in the form of freely subsisting actuality, or of the
detached independence of external nature. It has a
shape, no doubt, the form of objective being, in that
it is object of its own consciousness ; but because
this being is put forward in rehgion with the essential
character of being self-consciousness, the form or shape
assumed is one perfectly transparent to itself ; and
the reahty spirit contains is enclosed in it, or transcended
in it, just in the same way as when we speak of " all
reality " ; its reality is universal reahty in the sense
of a product of thought.

Since, then, in rehgion, the pecuhar characteristic
of what is properly consciousness of spirit does not
have the form of detached and external otherness,
the existence of spirit is distinct from its self-conscious-
ness, and its actual reahty proper falls outside rehgion.
There is no doubt one spirit in both, but its conscious-
ness does not embrace both together ; and rehgion
appears as a part of existence, of acting, and of striving,
whose other part is the hfe hved within its own actual
world. As we now know that spirit in its own world
and spirit conscious of itself as spirit, i.e. spirit in the
I cfi, sphere of rehgion, are the same, the completion of
rehgion consists in the two forms becoming identical
with one another : not merely in its reahty being grasped
and embraced by rehgion, but conversely — it, as spirit

* Vorstellung. t Begriff.

Religion 689

conscious of itself, becomes actual to itself, and real
object of its own consciousness.

So far as spirit in religion presents itself to itself,
it is indeed consciousness, and the reality enclosed
within it is the shape and garment in which it clothes
its idea of itself. The reahty, however, does not in
this presentation get proper justice done to it, that
is to say, it does not get to be an independent and free
objective existence and not merely a garment. And
conversely, because that reality lacks within itself its
completion, it is a determinate shape or form, which
does not attain to what it ought to reveal, viz. spirit
conscious of itself. That its form might express spirit
itself, the form would have to be nothing else than spirit,
and spirit would have to appear to itself, or to be actual,
as it is in its own essential being. Only thereby, too,
would be attained — what may seem to demand the
opposite — that the object of its consciousness has, at
the same time, the form of free and independent reality.
But only spirit which is object to itself in the shape
of Absolute Spirit, is as much aware of being a free and
independent reality as it remains therein conscious of
itself.

Since in the first instance self-consciousness and con-
sciousness simply, rehgion, and spirit as it is externally in
its world, or the objective existence of spirit, are distinct,
the latter consists in the totahty of spirit, so far as its
moments are separated from each other and each is
set forth by itself. These moments, however, are
consciousness, self -consciousness, reason, and spirit —
spirit, that is, qua immediate spirit, which is not yet
consciousness of spirit. Its totality, taken all together,
constitutes the mundane existence of spirit as a whole ;

VOL. II.— T

690 Phenomenology of Mind

spirit as such contains the previous separate embodi-
ments in the form of universal determinations of its
own being, in those moments just named. Rehgion
Lc,0> presupposes that these have completely run their
course, and is their simple totahty, their absolute Self
and soul.

* The course which these traverse is, moreover, in
relation to rehgion, not to be pictured as a temporal
sequence. It is only spirit in its entirety that is in
time, and the shapes assumed, which are specific
embodiments of the whole of spirit as such, present
themselves in a sequence one after the other. For
it is only the whole which properly has reality, and
hence the form of pure freedom relatively to any-
thing else, the form which takes expression as
time. But the moments of the whole, consciousness,
self-consciousness, reason, and spirit, have, because they
are moments, no existence separate from one another.

Just as spirit was distinct from its moments,
we have further, in the third place, to distinguish
from these moments their specific individuated char-
acter. Each of those moments, in itself, we saw
broke up again in a process of development all
its own, and took various shapes and forms : as
e.g. in the case of consciousness, sensuous certainty
and perception were distinct phases. These latter
aspects fall apart in time from one another, and belong
to a specific particular whole. For spirit descends
from its universality to assume an individual form
through specification, by determination. This deter-
mination, or mediate element, is consciousness, self-

* The two following paragraphs form a break in the analysis, and
may be regarded as an explanatory note.

Feligion 691

consciousness, and so on. Now the forms assumed by
these moments constitute individuahty. Hence these
exhibit and reveal spirit in its individuahty or con-
crete reahty, and are distinguished in time from one
another, though in such a way that the succeeding re-
tains within it the preceding.

While, therefore, rehgion is the completion of the
life of spirit, its final and complete expression, into
which, as being their ground, its individual moments,
consciousness, self-consciousness, reason, and spirit,
return and have returned, they, at the same time,
together constitute the objectively existing reahsation
of spirit in its totality ; as such spirit is real only as the
moving process of these aspects which it possesses, a
process of distinguishing them and returning back into
itself. In the process of these universal moments is con-
tained the development of religion generally. Since,
however, each of these attributes was set forth and
presented, not only in the way it in general determines
itself, but as it is in and for itself, i.e. as, within its
own being, running its course as a distinct whole — there
has thus arisen not merely the development of rehgion
generally ; those independently complete processes pur-
sued by the individual phases and stages of spirit
contain at the same time the determinate forms of
rehgion itself. Spirit in its entirety, spirit in rehgion,
is once more the process from its immediacy to the
attainment of a knowledge of what it imphcitly or
immediately is ; and is the process of attaining the state
where the shape and form, in which it appears as an
object for its own consciousness, will be perfectly
identical with and adequate to its essential nature,
and where it will behold itself as it is.

692 Phenomenology of Mind

In this development of religion, then, spirit itself as-
sumes definite forms, which constitute the distinctions
involved in this process : and at the same time a deter-
minate or specific form of rehgion has hkewise an actual
spirit of a specific character. Thus, if consciousness,
self-consciousness, reason, and spirit belong to self-
knowing spirit in general, in a similar way the specific
shapes, which self-knowing spirit assumes, appropriate
and adopt the distinctive forms which were specially
developed in the case of each of the stages — con-
sciousness, self-consciousness, reason, and spirit. The
determinate shape, assumed in a given case by re-
ligion, appropriates, from among the forms belonging
to each of its moments, the one adapted to it, and makes
this its actual spirit. This one determinate attitude
of* rehgion pervades and permeates all aspects of its
actual existence, and stamps them with this common
feature.

In this way the arrangement now assumed by the
forms and shapes which have thus far appeared, is
different from the way they appeared in their own
order. On this point we may note shortly at the out-
set what is of chief importance. In the series we con-
sidered, each moment, exhaustively elaborating its
entire content, evolved and formed itself into a single
whole within its own peculiar principle. And knowledge
was the inner depth, or the spirit, wherein the elements,
having no subsistence of their own, possessed their
substance. This substance, however, has now at
length made its appearance ; it is the deep hfe of spirit
certain of itself ; it does not allow the principle be-
longing to each individual form to get isolated, and
become a whole within itself : rather it collects all

Religion 693

these moments into its own content, keeps them to-
gether, and advances within this total wealth of
its concrete actual spirit ; while all its particular
moments take into themselves and receive together
in common the hke determinate character of the whole.
This spirit certain of itself and the process it goes
through — this is their true reahty, the independent
self -subsistence, which belongs to each individually.

Thus while the previous linear series in its advance
marked the retrogressive steps in it by knots, but
thence went forward again in one hnear stretch,
it is now, as it were, broken at these knots, these
universal moments, and radiates into many hnes,
which, being bound together into a single bimdle,
combine at the same time symmetrically, so that the
similar distmctions, in which each separately took
shape within its own sphere, meet together.

For the rest, it is self-evident from the whole argu-
ment, how this co-ordination of universal directions,
just mentioned, is to be understood; so that it be-
comes superfluous to remark that these distinctions
are to be taken to mean essentially and only moments
of the process of development, not parts. In the case
of actual concrete spirit they are attributes of its
substance ; in rehgion, on the other hand, they are
only predicates of the subject. In the same way,
indeed, all forms in general are, in themselves or for
us, contained in spirit and contained in every spirit.
But the main point of importance, in deahng with its
reahty, is solely what determinate character it has in
its consciousness, in which specific character it has
expressed its self, or in what shape it knows its essential
nature.

'/■-• 7

694 Phenomenology of Mind

The distinction made between actual spirit and that
same spirit which knows itself as spirit, or between
itself qua consciousness and qua self-consciousness, is
transcended and done away with in the case where spirit
knows itself in its real truth. Its consciousness and
its self-consciousness have come to terms. But, as
rehgion is here to begin with and immediately, this
distinction has not yet reverted to spirit. It is merely
the conception, the principle, of rehgion that is es-
tablished at first. In this the essential element is
self-consciousness, which is conscious of being all
truth, and which contains all reality within that truth.
This self-consciousness, being consciousness [and so
aware of an object], has itself for its object. Spirit,
which knows itself in the first instance immediately,
is thus to itself spirit in the form of immediacy ; and
the specific character of the shape in which it appears
to itself is that of pure simple being. This being, this
bare existence, has indeed a filhng drawn neither
from sensation or manifold matter, nor from any other
one-sided elements, purposes, and determinations ; its
filling is solely spirit, and is known by itself to be all
truth and reality. Such filling is in this first form not
in agreement or identity with its own shape ; spirit qua
ultimate Reality is not in accord with its consciousness.
It is actual only as Absolute Spirit, when it is also
to itself in its truth as it is in its certainty of itself,
or, when the extremes, into which spirit quu conscious-
ness falls, exist for one another in spiritual shape.
The embodiment adopted by spirit quxi object of its
own consciousness, remains filled by the certainty of
spirit, and this self-certainty constitutes its substance.
Through this content, the degrading of the object to

Religion 695

bare objectivity, to the form of something that negates
self-consciousness, disappears. The immediate unity of
spirit with itself is the fundamental basis, or pure
consciousness, inside which consciousness breaks up
into its constituent elements [viz. an object with subject
over against it]. In this way, shut up within its pure
self-consciousness, spirit does not exist in religion as
the creator of a nature in general; rather what it
produces in the course of this process are its forms and
shapes qita spirits, which together constitute all that it
can reveal when it is completely manifested. And this
process itself is the development of its perfect and com-
plete actuality through the individual aspects thereof,
i.e. through its imperfect modes of realisation.

The first reaHsation of spirit is just the principle
and notion of rehgion itself — rehgion as immediate
and thus Natural Rehgion. Here spirit knows itself
as its object in a " natural '' or immediate shape. The
second reahsation, is, however, necessarily that of r^o»
knowing itself in the shape of transcended and super-
seded natural existence, i.e. in the form of self. This
is the Rehgion of Art or productive activity. For the
shape it adopts is raised to the form of self through
the productive activity of consciousness, by which
this consciousness beholds in its object its own action,
i.e. sees the self. The third reahsation, finally, cancels
the one-sidedness of the first two : the self is as much an
immediate self as the immediacy is a self. If spirit
in the first is in the form of consciousness, and in
the second in that of self-consciousness, it is in the
third in the form of the unity of both ; it has then the
shape of what is completely self-contained {An-und
Fürsichseyns) ; and since it is thus presented as it

696 Pheno?nenology of Mind

is in and for itself, this is the sphere of Revealed Re-
ligion. Although spirit, however, here reaches its
true shape, the very shape assumed and the conscious
presentation are an aspect and phase still unsurmounted ;
and from this spirit has to pass over into the hfe of the
Notion, in order therein completely to resolve the form
of objectivity, in the notion, which embraces within
itself this its own opposite.

It is then that spirit has grasped its own principle,
the notion of itself, as so far only we [who analyse
spirit] have grasped it ; and its form, the element of
its existence, since this form is the notion, is then
spirit itself.

Natural Religion

[The arrangement of the analysis of Religion and the divisions into
the various subsections are, as indicated in the jDreceding note (p. 683),
determined by the general development of experience. That development
is from the immediate through mediation to the fusion of immediacy and
mediation. The stages of the development of experience are Consciousness,
Self-consciousness, Reason, the latter leading to its highest level — finite
Spiritual existence. The development of Religion follows these various
ways in which objects are given in experience, and the three chief divisions
of Religion are determined accordingly : Natural Religion is religion at
the level of Consciousness; Art, Religion at the level of Self-conscious-
ness ; Revealed Religion is Religion at the level of Reason and Spirit.
Each of these is again subdivided, and the subdivision follows more or
less closely the various subdivisions of these three ultimate levels of ex-
perience— Consciousness, Thus, in Natural Religion, we have Religion
at the level of Sense-certainty — " Light " : Religion at the level of Percep-
tion— " Life " : and Religion at the level of Understanding— the reciprocal
relation constituted by the " play of forces " appears as the relation of the
" Artificer " to his own product.

The general principle is not worked out in detail, with the same
obviousness, in the case of the other two primary types of Religion — Art
and Revealed Religion. But the same general method of development is
pursued in these cases.

The historical material befoi'e the mind of the writer is, as might be
expected, the various religions which have historically appeared amongst
mankind. These religions are treated, however, as illustrations of prin-
ciples dominating the religious consciousness in general, rather than
as merely historical phenomena.

With the succeeding argument should be read Hegel's Philosophy of
Religion, Part II, Sections I and II, and Part III.]

697

Natural Keligion*

Spirit knowing spirit is consciousness of itself ;
and is to itself in the form of objectivity. It is ;
and is at the same time self -existence {Fürsichsein).
It is for self ; it is the aspect of self-consciousness,
and is so in contrast to the aspect of its consciousness,
the aspect by which it relates itself to itself as object.
In its consciousness there is the opposition and in
consequence the specificity of the form in which it
appears to itself and knows itself. It is with this
specificity that we have alone to do in considering
rehgion ; for its essential unspecified principle, its
abstract notion, has akeady come to light. The
distinction of consciousness and self-consciousness,
however, falls at the same time within this notion.
The form or shape of rehgion does not contain the
existence of spirit in the sense of its being nature
detached and free from thought, nor in the sense
of its being thought detached from existence. The
shape assumed by rehgion is existence contained and
preserved in thought, as well as a thought-content
which is consciously existent.

It is by the determinate character of this form,
in which spirit knows itself, that one rehgion is dis-
tinguished from another. But we have at the same
time to note that the systematic exposition of this
knowledge about itself, in terms of this particular
specific character, does not as a fact exhaust the whole

* Primarily Oriental religion.

69S

Natural Religion 699

meaning of a given actual religion. The series of
different religions, which will come before us, just as
much sets forth again merely the different aspects of a
single rehgion, and indeed of every particular rehgion,
and the ideas, the conscious processes, which seem to
mark off one concrete religion from another, make their
appearance in each. All the same the diversity must
also be looked at as a diversity of rehgion. For while
spirit hves in the distinction of its consciousness and
its self-consciousness, the process it goes through
finds its goal in the transcendence of this fundamental
distinction and in giving the form of self-consciousness
to the given shape which is object of consciousness.
This distinction, however, is not eo ipso transcended
by the fact that the shapes, which that consciousness
contains, have also the element of self in them, and that
God is represented as self -consciousness. The consciously
presented self is not the actual concrete self. In order
that this, hke every other more specific determination
of the form, may in truth belong to this form, it has
partly to be put into this form by the action of self-
consciousness, and partly the lower determination must
show itself to be cancelled and transcended and com-
prehended by the higher. For what is consciously
presented (Vorgstellt) only ceases to be something
" presented " and ahen, external, to its knowledge, by
the self having produced it, and so viewing the deter-
mination of the object as its own determination, and
hence seeing itself in that object. By this operation,
the lower determination [that of being something " pre-
sented "] has at once vanished ; for doing anything is a oo^
negative process which is carried through at the expense
of something else. So far as that lower determination

700 Phenomenology of Mind

still continues to appear, it has withdrawn into what is
without any essential significance : just as, on the other
hand, where the lower still predominates, while the
higher is also present, the one co-exists in a self-less
way alongside of the other. While, therefore, the
various ideas falling within a particular rehgion no
doubt exhibit the whole course its forms take, the
character of each is determined by the particular unity
of consciousness and self-consciousness ; that is to
say, by the fact that self-consciousness has taken
into itself the determination belonging to the object
of consciousness, has, by its own action, made that
determination altogether its own, and Imows it to be
the essential one as compared with the others.

The truth of behef in a given determination of the
rehgious spirit shows itself in this, that the actual spirit
is constituted after the same manner as the form in
which spirit beholds itself in rehgion ; thus e.g. the in-
carnation of God, which is found in Eastern rehgion,
has no truth, because the concrete actual spirit of this re-
ligion is without the reconcihation this principle imphes.

It is not in place here to return from the totahty
of specific determinations back to the particular deter-
mination, and show in what shape the plenitude of all
the others is contained within it and within its par-
ticular form of religion. The higher form, when put
back under a lower, is deprived of its significance for
self-conscious spirit, belongs to spirit merely in a super-
ficial way, and is for it at the level of a presentation.
The higher form has to be considered in its own peculiar
significance, and dealt with where it is the principle of
a particular religion, and is certified and approved by
its actual spirit.

a

God as Light*

Spirit, as the absolute Being, which is self-conscious-
ness— or the self-conscious absolute Being, which
is all truth and knows all reality as itself — is, to begin
with, merely its notion and principle in contrast to
the reahty which it acquires in the process of its con-
scious activity. And this conception is, as contrasted
with the clear dayhght of that explicit development,
the darkness and night of its inner hfe ; in contrast to
the existence of its various moments as independent
forms and shapes, this notion is the creative secret of
its birth. This secret has its revelation within itself ;
for existence has its necessary place in this notion,
because this notion is spirit knowing itself, and thus
possesses in its own nature the moment of being con-
sciousness and of presenting itself objectively. We have
here the pure ego, which, in externalising itself, in
seeing itself qua universal object, has the certainty of
self ; in other words, this object is, for the ego, the
fusion of all thought and all reahty.

When the first and immediate cleavage is made within
self-knowing Absolute Spirit, its form assumes that
character which belongs to immediate consciousness
or to sense-certainty. It beholds itself in the form of
being ; but not being in the sense of what is without

* Parsee religion.
701

702 Phenomenology of Mind

spirit, containing only the contingent qualities of sensa-
tion— the kind of being that belongs solely to sense-
certainty. Its being is filled with the content of spirit.
It also includes within it the form which we found in
the case of immediate self-consciousness, the form of
lord and master,* with reference to the self-consciousness
of spirit which retreats from its object.

This being, having as its content the notion of
spirit, is, then, the mode of spirit in relation simply
to itself — the form of having no special form at all.
In virtue of this characteristic, this mode is the pure
all-containing, all-suffusing Light of the East, which
preserves itself in its formless indeterminate substanti-
ality. Its counterpart, its otherness, is the equally
simple negative — Darkness. The processes of its own
self-abandonment, its creations in the unresisting
element of its counterpart, are bursts of Light. At the
same time in their ultimate simpHcity they are its
way of becoming something for itself, its return from
its objective existence, streams of fire consuming its
embodiment. The distinction, which it gives itself, no
doubt thrives abundantly on the substance of existence,
and grows into and assumes the diverse forms of nature.
But the essential simplicity of its thought rambles
and roves about inconstant and inconsistent, enlarges
5^ i^ its boimds to measureless extent, and its beauty
heightened to splendour is lost in its subhmity.f

The content, which this state of mere being involves,
its perceptive activity, is, therefore, an unreal by-
play on this substance which merely rises, without
descending into itself to become subject and secure

* Term applied iu e.g. Judaism and Mohammedanism,
t Cp. Philos. ofRelig., W.W., XI, 403, 404, 411.

God as Light 703

firmly its distinctions through the self. Its deter-
minations are merely attributes, which do not succeed
in attaining independence ; they remain merely names
of the One, called by many names. This One is clothed
with the manifold powers of existence and with the
shapes of reahty, as with a soulless, selfless ornament ;
they are merely messengers of its mighty power,*
claiming no will of their own, visions of its glory, voices
in its praise.

This revel of heaving lifef must, however, assume
the character of distinctive self-existence, and give
enduring subsistence to its fleeting forms. Immediate
being, in which it places itself over against its own
consciousness, is itself the negative destructive agency
which dissolves its distinctions. It is thus in truth
the Self ; and spirit therefore passes on to Imow itself
in the form of self. Pure Light scatters its simphcity
as an infinity of separate forms, and presents itself as
an offering to self-existence, that the individual may
have sustainment in its substance.

* Angels. t Cp. Ency., § 389.

Plants and Animals as Objects of Religion*

Self-conscious spirit, passing away from abstract,
formless Essence and going into itself — or, in other
words, having raised its immediacy to the level of
Self — makes its simple unity assume the character
of a manifold of self-existing entities, and is the E-eligion
of spiritual Sense-Perception. Here spirit breaks up into
an innumerable plurahty of weaker and stronger, richer
and poorer spirits. This Pantheism, which, to begin
with, consists in the quiescent stability of these spiritual
atoms, passes into a process of active internal hostility.
The innocence, which characterises the flower and plant
religions, and which is merely the selfless idea of Self,
gives way to the seriousness of strugghng warring life,
to the guilt of animal religions ; the quiescence and
impotence of merely contemplative individuahty pass
into the destructive violence of separate self-existence.

It is of no avail to have removed the hfelessness
of abstraction from the things of perception, and to
have raised them to the level of reahties of spiritual
perception : the animation of this spiritual kingdom
has death in the heart of it, owing to the fact of deter-
minateness and the inherent negativity, which invades
and trenches upon their innocent and harmless indiffer-
ence to one another. Owing to this determinateness

* Primarily religions of India.

704

Plants and Animals as Objects of Religion 705

and negativity, the dispersion of passive plant-forms
into manifold entities becomes a hostile process, in
which the hatred stirred up by their independent self-
existence rages and consumes.

The actual self-consciousness at work in this dis-
persed and disintegrated spirit, takes the form of a
multitude of individuahsed mutually-antipathetic folk-
spirits, who fight and hate each other to the death, and
consciously accept certain specific forms of animals as
their essential reality, their god * : for they are nothing
else than spirits of animals, their animal hfe separate
and cut ofi from one another, and with no universahty
consciously present in them.

The characteristic of purely negative independent
self-existence, however, consumes itself in this active
hatred towards one another ; and through this pro-
cess, involved in its very principle, spirit enters
into another shape. Independent self-existence can-
celled and abohshed is the form of the object, a form
which is produced by the self, or rather is the self
produced, the self-consuming self, i.e. the self that
becomes a " thing." The agent at work, therefore,
retains the upper hand over these animal spirits
merely tearing each other to pieces ; and his action is
not merely negative, but composed and creative.
The consciousness of spirit is, thus, now the process
which is above and beyond the immediate inherent
[universal] nature, as well as transcends the abstract
self-existence in isolation. Since the imphcit inherent
nature is relegated, through opposition, to the level of
a specific character, it is no longer the proper form of
Absolute Spirit, but a reahty which its consciousness

* Sacred animals in Indian religion,
VOL. II.— U

706 Phenomenology of Mind

finds lying over against itself as an ordinary existing
fact and cancels; at the same time this consciousness
is not merely this negative cancelling self-existent being,
but produces its own objective idea of itself, — self-
existence put forth in the form of an object. This
c- ^ process of production is, all the same, not yet perfect
production ; it is a conditioned activity, the forming
of a given material.

The Artificer*

Spirit, then, here takes the form of the artificer,
and its action, when producing itself as object, but
without having as yet grasped the thought of itself,
is an instinctive kind of working, hke bees building
their cells.

The first form, because immediate, has the abstract
character of " understanding," and the work accom-
phshed is not yet in itself endued with spirit. The
crystals of Pyramids and Obehsks, simple combinations
of straight fines with even surfaces and equal relations
of parts in which incommensurability of curvature is
set aside — these are the works produced in strict geo-
metrical form by this artificer. Owing to the purely
abstract intelfigible nature of the form, it is not in itself
the true significance of the form ; it is not the spiritual
self. Thus, either the works produced only receive
spirit into them as an alien, departed spirit, one that
has forsaken its hving suffusion and permeation with
reahty, and, being itself dead, enters into these fifeless
crystals ; or they take up an external relation to spirit
as something which is itself external and not there as
spirit — they are related to it as to the orient Light,
which throws its significance on them.

The separation of elements from which spirit as

* Egyptian religions.
707

708 Phenomenology of Mind

artificer starts — the separation of the impHcit essential
nature, which becomes the material it works upon,
and independent self-existence, which is the aspect
of self-consciousness at work — this division has become
objective in the result achieved. Its further endeavour
has to be directed to cancelhng and doing away with
this separation of soul and body ; it must strive to
clothe and give embodied shape to soul per se, and
endow the body with soul. The two aspects, since
they are brought closer to one another, bear towards
each other, in this condition, the character of ideally
presented spirit and of enveloping shell. Spirit's
oneness with itself contains this opposition of indi-
viduahty and universality. Since the aspects of the
work produced become closer by performance of it, there
comes about thereby at the same time the other fact,
that the work gets nearer to the self-consciousness
performing it, and that the latter attains in the work
knowledge of itself as it truly is. In this way, however,
the work merely constitutes to begin with the abstract
side of the activity of spirit, which does not yet per-
ceive the content of this activity within itself but in its
work, which is a "thing.'' The artificer as such, spirit
in its entirety, has not yet appeared ; the artificer is
still the inner, hidden reahty, which qua entire is
present only as broken up into active self-consciousness
and the object it has produced.

The surrounding habitation, external reahty, which
to begin with is raised merely to the abstract form of
the understanding, is worked up by the artificer and
made into a more animated form. The artificer em-
ploys plant life for this purpose, which is no longer
sacred, as in the previous case of inactive impotent

The Artificer 709

pantheism ; rather, the artificer, who holds himself
to be the self-existent reahty, takes that plant Hfe
as something to be used and degrades it to an ex-
ternal aspect, to the level of an ornament. But it is
not turned to use without some alteration : for the
worker producing the self-conscious form destroys at the
same time the transitoriness, inherently characteristic
of the immediate existence of this hfe, and brings its
organic forms nearer to the more exact and more uni-
versal forms of thought. The organic form, which,
left to itself, grows and thrives in particularity, being
on its side subjugated by the form of thought, elevates
in turn these straight-lined and level shapes into more
animated roundedness — a blending which becomes the
root of free architecture.*

This dwelhng, (the aspect of the universal element
or inorganic nature of spirits), also includes within it
now a form of individuality, which brings nearer to
actuahty the spirit that was formerly separated from
existence and external or internal thereto, and thus
makes the work to accord more with active self-con-
sciousness. The worker lays hold, first of all, on the
form of self-existence in general, on the forms of animal
life. That he is no longer directly aware of himself in
animal hfe, he shows by the fact that in reference to sToa
this he constitutes himself the productive force, and
knows himself in it as being his own work, whereby the
productive force at the same time is one which is super-
seded and becomes the hieroglyphic symbol of another
meaning, the hieroglyph of a thought. Hence also
this force is no longer solely and entirely used by the
worker, but becomes blended with the shape embody-

* The Egyptian columns and architecture.

710 Phenomenology of Mind

ing thought, with the human form.* Still, the work
lacks the form and existence where self as self appears :
it also fails to express in its very nature that it includes
within itself an inner meaning ; it lacks language,
the element in which the sense and meaning contained
are actually present. The work done, therefore, even
when quite purified of the animal aspect, and bearing
the form and shape of self-consciousness alone, is
still the silent soundless form, which needs the rays
of the rising sun in order to have a sound which, when
produced by light, is even then merely noise and not
speech, shows merely an outer self, not the inner self.f

Contrasted with this outer self of the form and shape,
stands the other form, which indicates that it has in
it an inner being. Nature, turning back into its essen-
tial being, degrades its multiplicity of life, ever
individuahsing itself and confounding itself in its
own process, to the level of an external encasing shell,
which is the covering for the inner being. And still
this inner being is primarily mere darkness, the un-
moved, the black formless stone. 1:

Both representations contain inwardness and ex-
istence— the two moments of spirit : and both kinds
of manifestation contain both moments at once in a
relation of opposition, the self both as inward and as
outward. Both have to be imited. The soul of the
statue in human form does not yet come out of the
inner being, is not yet speech, objective existence of
self which is inherently internal,— and the inner being
of multiform existence is still without voice or sound,

* The representations of the gods with forms half animal, half hmnan.

t The statues of Memnon.

X The Black Stone of Mecca : a fetish still worshipped by the faithful.

The Artificer "711

still draws no distinctions within itself, and is still
separated from its outer being, to which all distinctions
belong. The artificer, therefore, combines both by
blending the forms of nature and self-consciousness ;
and these ambiguous beings, a riddle to themselves —
the conscious strugghng with what has no consciousness,
the simple inner with the multiform outer, the darkness
of thought mated with clearness of expression — these
break out into the language of a wisdom that is
darkly deep and difficult to understand.*

With the production of this work, the instinctive
method of working ceases, which, in contrast to self-
consciousness, produced a work devoid of consciousness,
For here the activity of the artificer, which constitutes
self-consciousness, comes face to face with an inner
being equally self-conscious and giving itself ex-
pression. He has therein raised himself by his work
up to the point where his conscious hfe breaks asunder,
where spirit greets spirit. In this unity of self-conscious
spirit with itself, so far as it is aware of being embodi-
ment and object of its own consciousness, its blending
and minghng with the unconscious condition of im-
mediate forms of nature become purified. These
monsters in form and shape, word and deed, are resolved
and dissolved into a shape which is spiritual — an outer
which has entered into itself, an inner which ex-
presses itself out of itself and in itself, — they pass into
thought, which brings forth itself, preserves the shape
and form suited to thought, and is transparent exist-
ence. Spirit is Artist.

* Sphinxes

B

Religion in the Form of Art*

Spirit has raised the shape in which it is object
for its own consciousness into the form of conscious-
ness itself ; and spirit sets such a form before itself.
The artificer has given up the external synthesising
activity, that blending of the heterogeneous forms of
thought and nature. When the shape has gained the
form of self-conscious activity, the artificer has
become a spiritual workman.

If we next ask, what the actual spirit is, which finds
in the religion of art the consciousness of its Absolute,
it turns out that this is the ethical or objective spirit.
£-10 This spirit is not merely the universal substance of
all individuals ; but when this substance is said to
have, as an objective fact for actual consciousness,
the form of consciousness, this amounts to saying that
the substance, which is individuahsed, is known by
the individuals within it as their proper essence and
their own achievement. It is for them neither the
Light of the World, in whose unity the self-existence
of self-consciousness is contained only negatively,
only transitorily, and beholds the lord and master
of its reahty ; nor is it the restless waste and destruction
of hostile nations ; nor their subjection to " casts,"
which together constitute the semblance of organisation

* Greek religion.
712

Religion in the Form of Art 713

of a completed whole, where, however, the universal
freedom of the individuals concerned is wanting.
Rather this spirit is a free nation, in which custom
and order constitute the common substance of all,
whose reahty and existence each and every one knows
to be his own will and his own deed.

The rehgion of the ethical spirit, however, raises
it above its actual reahsation, and is the return from
its objectivity into pure knowledge of itself. Since an
ethically constituted nation hves in direct unity with its
own substance, and does not contain the principle
of pure individuahsm of self-consciousness, the rehgion
characteristic of its sphere first appears in com-
plete form in severance from its stable security.
For the reahty of the ethical substance rests partly
on its quiet unchangeableness as contrasted with
the absolute process of self-consciousness ; and con-
sequently on the fact that this self-consciousness has
not yet left its serene hfe of customary convention
and its confident security therein, and gone into itself.
Partly, again, that reahty rests on its organisation into
a plurahty of rights and duties, as also on its organised
distribution into groups of stations and classes, each
with its particular way of acting which co-operates
to form the whole ; and hence rests on the fact that
the individual is contented with the hmitation of his
existence, and has not yet grasped the unrestricted
thought of his free self. But that serene immediate
confidence in the substance of this ethical Hfe returns
to trust in self and to certainty of self ; and the plurahty
of rights and duties, as well as the restricted particular Sji
action this involves, is the same dialectic process in
the sphere of the ethical hfe as the plurahty of " things "

714 Phenomenology of Mind

and their various " qualities " — a process which only
comes to rest and stabihty in the simphcity of spirit
certain of self.

The complete fulfilment of the ethical Hfe in free
self-consciousness, and the destined consummation
(Schicksal) of the ethical world, are therefore found when
individuality has entered into itself ; the condition is
one of absolute levity on the part of the ethical spirit ;
it has dissipated and resolved into itself all the firmly
estabhshed distinctions constituting its own stabihty,
and the separate components of its own articulated
organisation, and, being perfectly sure of itself, has
attained to boundless cheerfulness of heart and the
freest enjoyment of itself. This simple certainty of
spirit within itself has a double meaning ; it is quiet
stabihty and solid truth, as well as absolute unrest, and
the disappearance of the ethical order. It turns round,
however, into the latter ; for the truth of the ethical
spirit hes primarily just in this substantial objectivity
and trust, in which the self does not think of itself as
free individual, and where the self, therefore, in this
inner subjectivity, in becoming a free self, falls to the
ground. Since then its trust is broken, and the sub-
stance of the nation cracked, spirit, which was the
connecting medium of the unstable extremes, has now
come forward as an extreme — that of self-consciousness
taking itself to be essential and ultimate. This is spirit
certain within itself, which mourns over the loss of its
world, and now produces out of the abstraction of self
its own essential being, raised far above actual reaHty.

At such an epoch art in absolute form* comes on the
scene. At the earher stage it is instinctive in its

* The religion of pure beauty.

Religion in the Form of Art 715

operation ; being absorbed and steeped in existence, it
works out of and works into this element ; it does not
find its substance in the free Hfe of an ethical order,
and hence, too, the self operating does not consist of
free spiritual activity.

Later on, spirit goes beyond art in order to gain its
higher manifestation, viz. that of being not merely
the substance born and produced out of the self, but
of being in its manifestation object of this self ; it
seeks at that higher level not merely to bring forth
itself out of its own notion, but to have its very notion
as its form, so that the notion and the work of art pro- s'12.
duced may know each other reciprocally as one and
the same.*

Since, then, the ethical substance has withdrawn
from its objective existence into its bare self -conscious-
ness, this is the aspect of the notion, or the activity
with which spirit brings itself forward as object. It
is pure form, because the individual in ethical obedience
and service has so worked off every unconscious
existence and every fixed determination, as the sub-
stance has itseK become this fluid and undifferentiated
entity. This form is the night in which the substance
was betrayed, and made itself subject. It is out of
this night of pure certainty of self that the ethical
spirit rises again in a shape freed from nature and its
own immediate existence.

The existence of the pure notion into which spirit
has fled from its bodily shape, is an individual, which
spirit selects as the vessel for its sorrow. Spirit acts
in this individual as his universal and his power, from
which he suffers violence, as his element of " Pathos,"

* This paragraph may be regarded as an interpolated note.

716 Phenomenology of Mind

by having given himself over to which his self-
consciousness loses freedom. But that positive power
belonging to the universal is overcome by the pure
self of the individual, the negative power. This pure
activity, conscious of its inahenable force, wrestles
with the unembodied essential being. Becoming its
master, this negative activity has turned the element of
pathos into its own material, and given itself its content ;
and this unity comes out as a work, universal spirit
individualised and consciously presented.

a

The Abstract Work of Art

The first work of art is, because immediate, abstract
and particular. On its own side it has to move away
from this immediate and objective phase towards self-
consciousness, while, on the other side, the latter for
itself endeavours in the '' cult " to do away with the
distinction, which it at first gave itself in contrast to its
own spirit, and by so doing to produce a work of art
inherently endowed with Ufe.

The first way in which the artistic spirit keeps as far
as possible removed from each other its form and its
active consciousness, is immediate in character — the
form assumed is there as a " thing " in general. It
breaks up into the distinction of particularity, which
contains the form of the self, and universality, which
represents the inorganic elements in reference to the
form adopted, and is its environment and habitation.
This shape assumed obtains its pure form, the form
belonging to spirit, by the whole being raised into the
sphere of the pure notion. It is not the crystal, belong-
ing as we saw to the level of understanding, a form
which housed and covered a hfeless element, or is shone
upon externally by a soul. Nor, again, is it that com-
minghng of the forms of nature and thought, which first
arose in connection with plants, thought's activity here
being still an imitation. Rather the notion strips off

717

718 Phenomenology of Mind

the remnant of root, branches and leaves, still chnging
to the forms, purifies the forms and makes them into
figures in which the crystal's straight hues and surfaces
are raised into incommensurable relations, so that the
animation of the organic is taken up into the abstract
form of understanding, and, at the same time, its
essential nature — incommensurabiUty — is preserved for
understanding.

The indwelling god, however, is the black stone
extracted from the animal encasement,* and suffused
with the light of consciousness. The human form strips
off the animal character with which it was mixed up.
The animal form is for the god merely an accidental
vestment ; the animal appears alongside its true form,t
and has no longer a value on its own account, but has
sunk into being a significant sign of something else, has
become a mere symbol. By that very fact, the form
assumed by the god in itself casts off even the need for
the natural conditions of animal existence, and hints
at the internal arrangements of organic hfe melted down
into the surface of the form, and pertaining only to this
surface.

The essential being of the god, however, is the unity of
the universal existence of nature and of self-conscious
spirit which in its actuahty appears confronting the
former. At the same time, being in the first instance
a particular form, its existence is one of the elements
of nature, just as its self-conscious actuahty is a par-
ticular national spirit. 1: But the former is, in this
unity, that element reflected back into spirit, nature
made transparent by thoughts and united with self-

* V. anp., p. 710. t e.g. the eagle as tlie "bird of Zeus."

I e.g. Athene.

The Abstract Work of Art 719

conscious life. The form of the gods retains, therefore,
within it its nature-element as something transcended,
as a shadowy, obscure memory. The utter chaos and
confused struggle amongst the elements existing free
and detached from each other, the non-ethical dis-
ordered realm of Titans, is vanquished and banished
to the outskirts of self-transparent reahty, to the
cloudy boundaries of the world which finds itself in
the sphere of spirit and is at peace. These ancient
gods, first-born children of the union of Light with
Darkness, Heaven, Earth, Ocean, Sun, earth's aimless
typhonic Fire, and so on, are supplanted by forms and
shapes, which do but darkly recall those earlier titans,
and which are no longer things of nature, but spirits
clarified by the ethical hfe of self-conscious nations.

This simple form has thus destroyed within itself
restless endless individuation, the individuation both
in the hfe of nature, which operates with necessity
only qua universal essence, but is contingent in its
actual existence and process ; and also in the hfe of
a nation, which is scattered and broken into parti-
cular spheres of action and into individual centres
of self-consciousness, and has an existence mani-
fold in action and meaning. All this individuation
the simphcity of this form has abolished, and brought
together into an individuality at peace with itself.
Hence the condition of unrest stands contrasted with
this form ; confronting quiescent individuahty, the
essential reahty, stands self-consciousness, which, being
its source and origin, has nothing left over for itself
except to be pure activity. What belongs to the sub-
stance, the artist gave entirely along with his work ;
to himself, however, as a specific individuahty there

720 Phenomenology of Mind

belongs in his work no reality. He could only have
conferred completeness on it by reUnquishing his
particular nature, divesting himself of his own being,
and rising to the abstraction of pure action.

With the first and immediate act of production, the
separation of the work and his self-conscious activity
is not yet healed again. The work is, therefore,
not by itself really a spiritual entity ; it is a whole only
when its process of coming to be is taken along with it.
The obvious and common element in the case of a
work of art, that it is produced in consciousness and
is made by the hand of man, is the aspect of the
notion existing qua notion, and standing in contrast
to the work produced. And if this notion, qua the
artist or spectator, is unselfish enough to declare the
work of art to be fer se absolutely spiritual, and to
forget himself quxi agent or onlooker, then, as against
this, the notion of spirit has to be insisted on ; spirit
cannot dispense with the moment of being conscious of
itself. This moment, however, stands in contrast
to the work, because spirit, in this its primary dis-
ruption, gives the two sides their abstract and specific-
ally contrasted characteristics of " doing " something
and of being a " thing " ; and their return to the unity
they started from has not yet come about.

The artist finds out, then, in his work, that he did
not produce a reahty Hke himself. No doubt there
comes back to him from his work a consciousness in
the sense that a wondering multitude honours it as the
spirit, which is their own true nature. But this way
of animating or spirituahsing his work, since it renders
him his self-consciousness merely in the form of ad-
miration, is rather a confession that the work is not

The Abstract Work of Art 721

animated in the same manner as the artist. Since
the work comes back to him in the form of gladness
in general, he does not find in it the pain of his
self-disciphne and the pain of production, nor the
exertion and strain of his own toil. People may,
moreover, judge the work, or bring him offerings and
gifts, or endue it with their consciousness in whatever
way they Hke — if they with their knowledge set them-
selves over it, he knows how much more his act is than
what they understand and say ; if they put themselves
beneath it, and recognise in it their own dominating
essential reahty, he knows himself as the master of this.
The work of art hence requires another element
for its existence ; God requires another way of going
forth than this, in which, out of the depths of his
creative night, he drops into the opposite, into ex-
ternahty, to the character of a " thing " with no self-
consciousness. This higher element is that of Language
— a way of existing which is directly self-conscious
existence. When individual self-consciousness exists
in that way, it is at the same time directly a form of
universal contagion ; complete isolation of indepen-
dent self-existent selves is at once fluent continuity
and universally communicated unity of the many
selves ; it is the soul existing as soul. The god,
then, which takes language as its medium of em-
bodiment, is the work of art inherently spirituahsed,
endowed with a soul, a work which directly in
its existence contains the pure activity which was
apart from and in contrast to the god when existing
as a " thing." In other words, self-consciousness, when
its essential being becomes objective, remains in direct
relation with itself. It is, when thus at home with

VOL. II.— X

722 Phenomenology of Mind

itself in its essential nature, pure thought or devotion,
whose inwardness gets at the same time express ex-
istence in the Hymn. The hymn keeps within it
the individuality of self-consciousness, and this in-
dividual character is at the same time perceived to
be there universal. Devotion, kindled in every one,
is a spiritual stream which in all the manifold self-con-
scious units is conscious of itself as one and the same
function in all ahke and a simple state of being. Spirit,
being this universal self-consciousness of every one,
holds in a single unity its pure inwardness as well as
its objective existence for others and the independent
self-existence of the individual units.

This kind of language is distinct from another
way God speaks, which is not that of universal self-
consciousness. The Oracle, both in the case of the
god of the religions of art as well as of the pre-
ceding religions, is the necessary and the first form
of divine utterance. For its very principle imphes
that God is at once the essence of nature and of
spirit, and hence has not merely natural but spiritual
existence as well. In so far as this moment is imphed
primarily in its principle and is not yet reahsed in
rehgion, the language used is, for the religious self-
consciousness, the speech of an alien and external
self-consciousness. The self-consciousness which re-
^ '7 mains ahen and foreign to its religious communion,
is not yet there in the way its essential principle re-
quires it should be. The self is simple self-existence,
and thereby is altogether universal self-existence ;
that self, however, which is cut off from the self-con-
sciousness of the communion, is primarily a mere par-
ticular self.

The Abstract Work of Art 723

The content of this its own pecuUar and individual
form of speech is suppKed from the general determinate
character which the Absolute Spirit as such adopts
in its rehgion. Thus the universal spirit of the East,
which has not yet particularised its existence, utters
about the Absolute equally simple, abstract, and
universal statements, whose substantial content is
subhme in the simpHcity of its truth, but at the same
time appears, because of this universality, trivial to
the self-consciousness developing further.

The further developed self, which advances to being
distinctively for itself, rises above the pure " pathos "
of [unconscious] substance, gets the mastery over the
objectivity of the principle of Light in Eastern rehgion,
and knows that simplicity of abstract truth to be the
inherent reahty {das AnsicJiseyende) which does not
possess the form of contingent existence through an
utterance of an ahen self, but is the sure and unwritten
law of the gods, a law that " Hves for ever, and no man
knows what time it came."

As the universal truth, revealed by the " Light "
of the world, has here returned into what is within or
what is beneath, and has thus got rid of the form of
contingent appearance; so too, on the other hand, in
the rehgion of art, because God's form or shape has
taken on consciousness and hence particularity in
general, the pecuHar utterance of God, who is the
spirit of an ethically constituted nation, is the Oracle,
which knows its special circumstances and situation,
and announces what is serviceable to its interests.
Reflective thought, however, satisfies itself as to the
universal truths enunciated, because these are known
as the essential imphcit reahty of the nation's hfe ;

724 Phenomenology of Mind

and the utterance of them is thus for such reflection
no longer a strange and ahen speech, but is its very-
own. Just as that wise man of old * searched in
his own thought for what was worthy and good, but
left it to his " Daimon " to find out and decide the
petty contingent content of what he wanted to know —
whether it was good for him to keep company with
SiS this or that person, or good for one of his friends to
go on a journey, and such like unimportant things ;
in the same way the universal consciousness draws the
knowledge about the contingent from birds, or trees,
or fermenting earth, the steam from which deprives
the self-conscious mind of its powers of discrimination.
For what is accidental is something imdiscerned, un-
discriminated, and extraneous; and hence the ethical
consciousness lets itself, as if by a throw of the dice,
settle the matter in a manner that is similarly undis-
criminating and extraneous. If the individual, by his
understanding, determines on a certain course, and
selects, after consideration, what is useful for him, it
is the specific nature of his particular character which
is the ground of this self-determination. This basis is
just what is contingent ; and that knowledge which his
understanding supplies as to what is useful for the
individual, is hence just such a knowledge as that of
" oracles " or of the " lot " ; only that he who questions
the oracle or lot, thereby shows the ethical sentiment
of indifference to what is accidental, while the former,
on the contrary, treats the inherently contingent as an
essential concern of his thought and knowledge. Higher
than both, however, is to make careful reflection the
oracle for contingent action, but yet to recognise that

* Socrates.

The Abstract Work of Art 725

this very act reflected on is something contingent, be-
cause it refers to what is opportune and has a relation
to what is particular.

The true self-conscious existence, which spirit receives
in the form of speech, which is not the utterance of
extraneous and so accidental, i.e. not universal, self-
consciousness, is the work of art which we met with
before. It stands in contrast to the statue, which
has the character of a " thing." As the statue is ex-
istence in a state of rest, the other is existence in a state
of transience. In the case of the former, objectivity
is set free and dispenses \vith the iromediate presence
of the self proper ; in the latter, on the other hand,
objectivity is too much bound up with the self, attains
insufiiciently to definite embodiment, and is, Hke time,
no longer there just as soon as it is there.

The rehgious Cult constitutes the process of the two -
sides — a process in which the divine embodiment in '
motion within the pure feehng-element of self-con-
sciousness and its embodiment at rest in the element of
thinghood, reciprocally abandon the different character
each possesses, and the unity, which is the underlying
principle of their being, becomes an existing fact. Here
in the Cult, the self gives itself a consciousness of the
Divine Being descending from its remoteness into it,
and this Divine Being, which was formerly the unreal
and merely objective, thereby receives the proper
actuahty of self-consciousness.

This principle of the Cult is essentially contained
and present already in the flow of the melody of the
Hymn. These hymns of devotion are the way the
self obtains immediate pure satisfaction through and
within itself. It is the soul purified, which, in the

726 Phenomenology of Mind

purity it thus attains, is immediately and only absolute
Being, and is one with absolute Being. The soul,
because of its abstract character, is not consciousness
distinguishing its object from itself, and is thus merely
the night of its existence and the place prepared for its
form. The abstract Cult, therefore, raises the self into
being this pure divine element. The soul brings about
the attainment of this purity in a conscious way.
Still it is not yet the self, which has descended to the
depths of its being, and knows itself as evil. It is
something that merely is, a soul, which cleanses its
exterior with the washing of water, and robes it in
white, while its innermost traverses the path set before
itself of labour, punishment, and reward, the way of
spiritual discipline, of altogether rehnquishing its par-
ticularity—the road by which it reaches the mansions
and the fellowship of the blest.

This ceremonial cult is, in its first form, merely in
secret, i.e. is merely a performance accomplished sub-
jectively in idea, and unrealised. It has to become a
real act, for an unreal act is a contradiction in terms.
Consciousness proper, thereby, rises to the level of its
pure self-consciousness. The essential Being has in it
the significance of a free object ; through the actual
cult this object turns back to the self; and in so far as,
in pure consciousness, it has the significance of absolute
isii} Being dwelling in its purity beyond actual reality,
this Being descends, through this mediating process
of the cult, from its universahty into individual form,
and thus combines and unites with actual reahty.

The way the two sides make their appearance in the
act is of such a character that the self-conscious aspect,
so far as it is actual consciousness, finds the absolute

The Abstract Work of Art 727

Being manifesting itself as actual nature. On the one
hand, nature belongs to self - consciousness as its
possession and property, and stands for what has no
existence fer se. On the other hand, nature is its
proper immediate reahty and particularity, which
is equally regarded as not truly real and essential,
and is abrogated. At the same time, that external
nature has the opposite significance for its pure
consciousness — viz. the significance of being the in-
herently real, for which the self sacrifices its own
[relative] unreahty, just as, conversely, the self sacrifices
the imessential aspect of nature to itself. The act is
thereby a spiritual movement, because it is this double-
sided process of cancelling the abstraction of absolute
Being (in the way devotion determines the object), and
making it something concrete and actual, and, on the
other hand, of cancelhng the actual (in the way the
agent determines the object and the self acting), and
raising it into universahty.

The practice of the rehgious Cult begins, therefore,
with the pure and simple " offering up " or " sur-
render " of a possession, which the owner apparently
considers quite useless for himself and spills on the
ground or lets rise up in smoke. By so doing he re-
nounces before the ultimate Being of his pure conscious-
ness all possession and right of property and enjoyment
thereof ; renounces personahty and the reversion of
his action to his self ; and instead, reflects the act
into the universal, into the absolute Being rather
than into himself. Conversely, however, the objective
ultimate Being too is annihilated in that very pro-
cess. The animal offered up is the sjanbol of a god ;
the fruits consumed are the actual hving Ceres and

728 Phenomenology of Mind

Bacchus. In the former die the powers of the upper
law [the Olympians] which has blood and actual Hfe,
in the latter the powers of the lower law [the Furies]
which possesses in bloodless form secret and crafty-
power.
£1) The sacrifice of the divine substance, so far as it is

active, belongs to the side of self-consciousness. That
this concrete act may be possible, the absolute Being
must have from the start implicitly sacrificed itself. This
it has done in the fact that it has given itself definite
existence, and made itself an individual animal and fruit
of the earth. The self actively sacrificing demonstrates
in actual existence, and sets before its own conscious-
ness, this already implicitly completed self-renunciation
on the part of absolute Being ; and replaces that im-
mediate reahty, which absolute Being has, by the
higher, viz. that of the self making the sacrifice. For
the unity which has arisen, and which is the outcome
of transcending the particularity and separation of the
two sides, is not merely negative destructive fate, but
has a positive significance. It is merely for the abstract
Being of the netherworld that the sacrifice offered to it is
wholly surrendered and devoted ; and, in consequence,
it is only for that Being that the reflection of personal
possession and individual self-existence back into the
Universal is marked distinct from the self as such. At
the same time, however, this is only a trifling part ;
and the other act of sacrifice is merely the destruction
of what cannot be used, and is really the preparation
of the offered substance for a meal, the feast that
cheats the act out of its negative significance. The
person making the offering at that first sacrifice re-
serves the greatest share for his own enjoyment ;

The Abstract Work of Art 729

and reserves from the latter sacrifice what is useful
for the same purpose. This enjoyment is the negative
power which supersedes the absolute Being as well as
the unity ; and this enjoyment is, at the same time, the
positive actual reahty in which the objective existence
of absolute Being is transmuted into self-conscious
existence, and the self has consciousness of its unity
with its Absolute.

This cult, for the rest, is indeed an actual act, although
its meaning hes for the most part only in devotion.
What pertains to devotion is not objectively produced,
just as the result when confined to the feeling of enjoy-
ment* is robbed of its external existence. The Cult,
therefore, goes further, and replaces this defect, in the
first instance by giving its devotion an objective subsist-
ence, since the cult is the common task — or the indi-
vidual task for each and all to do — which produces
for the honour and glory of God a House for Him i'ii
to dwell in and adornment for His presence. By
so doing the external objectivity of statuary is
partly cancelled ; for by thus dedicating his gifts and
his labours the worker makes God well disposed to-
wards him and looks on his self as attached and apper-
taining to God. Furthermore, this course of action is
not the individual labour of the artist ; this particu-
larity is dissolved in universahty. But it is not only
the honour of God which is brought about, and the
blessing of His countenance and favour is not only
shed in idea and imagination on the worker ; the
work has also a meaning the reverse of the first which
was that of self-renunciation and of honour done to
what is alien and external. The Halls and Dwellings

* i.e. at the feast.

730 Phenomenology of Mind

of God are for the use of man, the treasures preserved
there are in time of need his own ; the honour which
God enjoys in his decorative adornment, is the honour
and glory of a refined artistic and high-spirited nation.
At the festival season, the people adorn their own
dwellings, their own garments, and their establish-
ments too with the furnishings of elegance and grace.
In this manner they receive a return for their gifts
from a responsive and grateful God ; and receive the
proofs of His favour — wherewith the nation became
bound to the God because of the work done for Him
— not as a hope and a deferred realisation, but rather,
in testifying to His honour and in presenting gifts, the
nation finds directly and at once the enjoyment of its
own wealth and adornment.

The Living Work of Art

That nation which approaches its god in the cult of
the rehgion of art is an ethically constituted nation,
knowing its State and the acts of the State to be the
will and the achievement of its own activity. This
universal spirit, confronting the self-conscious nation,
is consequently not the " Light " of the world, which,
being selfless, does not contain the certainty of the
individual selves, but is only their universal ultimate
Being and the dominating imperious power, wherein
they disappear. The rehgious cult of this simple un-
embodied ultimate Being gives back, therefore, to its
votaries in the main merely this: that they are the ^2.3
nation of their god. It secures for them merely their
stable subsistence, and their bare substance as a whole ;
it does not secure for them their actual self ; this is
indeed rejected. For they revere their god as the
empty profound, not as spirit. The cult, however, of
the rehgion of art, on the other hand, dispenses with
that abstract simphcity of the absolute Being, and
therefore with its " profundity." But that Bemg,
which is directly at one with the self, is inherently
spirit and comprehending truth, although not yet
known exphcitly, in other words it does not know the
" depths " of its nature. Because this Absolute, then,
imphes self, consciousness finds itself at home with it

731

732 Phenomenology of Mind

when it appears ; and, in the cult, this consciousness
receives not merely the general title to its own sub-
sistence, but also its self-conscious existence within it :
just as, conversely, in a despised and outcast nation
whose mere substance is acknowledged, the absolute
Being has not a selfless reality, but in the nation whose
self is acknowledged as living in its substance.

From the ceremonial cult, then, self-consciousness
that is at peace and satisfied in its ultimate Being
turns away, as also does the god that has entered into
self-consciousness as into its place of habitation. This
place is, by itself, the night of mere " substance," or
its pure individuality ; but no longer the strained and
striving individuality of the artist, which has not yet
reconciled itself with its essential Being that gradually
becomes objective ; it is substance satisfied, having
its "pathos'' within it and in want of nothing, because
it comes back from mere intuition, from objectivity
which is overcome and superseded.

This " pathos " is, by itself, the Being of the
Orient,* a Being, however, which has now "set" and
disappeared within itself, and has its own "setting,''
self-consciousness, within it, and so contains existence
and reahty.

It has here traversed the process of its actuahsation.
Descending from its pure essentiality and becoming
an objective force of nature and the expressions of this
force, it is an existence relative to an other, an objective
existence for the self by which it is consumed. The
silent inner being of selfless nature attains in its fruits
the stage where nature, duly prepared and digested,
jjiu.f is offered as material for the life which has a self. In

* Tlie " Light " of the world.

The Living Work of Art 733

its being useful for food and drink it reaches its highest
perfection. For therein it is the possibihty of a higher
existence, and comes in touch with spiritual existence.
In its metamorphosis the spirit of the earth has de-
veloped and become partly a silently energising sub-
stance, partly spiritual ferment ; in the first case it is
the feminine principle, the nursing mother, in the other
the mascuhne principle, the self-driving force of self-
conscious existence.

In this enjoyment, then, that orient "Light" of the
world is discovered for what it really is : Enjojnnent
is the Mystery of its being. For mysticism is not
concealment of a secret, or ignorance ; it consists
in the self knowing itself to be one with absolute Being,
and in this latter, therefore, becoming revealed. Only
the self is revealed to itself ; or what is manifest is
so merely in the immediate certainty of itself. But
it is just in such certainty that simple absolute Being
has been placed by the cult. As a thing that can be
used, it has not only existence which is seen, felt, smelt,
tasted ; it is also object of desire, and, by actually
being enjoyed, it becomes one with the self, and
thereby disclosed completely to this self, and made
manifest.

When we say of anything, " it is manifest to reason, to
the heart," it is in point of fact still secret, for it still
lacks the actual certainty of immediate existence, both
the certainty regarding what is objective, and the
certainty of enjoyment, a certainty which in rehgion,
however, is not only immediate and unreflecting, but
at the same time fully cognitive certainty of self.

What has thus been, through the cult, revealed to
self-conscious spirit within itself, is simple absolute

734 Phenomenology of Mind

Being ; and this lias been revealed partly as the process
of passing out of its dark night of concealment up to the
level of consciousness, to be there its silently nurturing
substance ; partly, however, as the process of losing
itself again in nether darkness, in the self, and of
waiting above merely with the silent yearning of mother-
hood. The more conspicuous moving impulse, however,
is the variously named " Light '' of the East and its
tumult of heaving hfe, which, having hkewise desisted
r-, ^ from its abstract state of being, has first embodied
itself in objective existence in the fruits of the earth,*
and then, surrendering itself to self-consciousness,|
attained there to its proper reahsation ; and now it
curvets and careers about in the guise of a crowd of
excited, fervid women, the unrestrained revel of nature
in self-conscious form.J

Still, however, it is only Absolute Spirit in the sense
of this simple abstract Being, not as spirit fer se, that
is discovered to consciousness : i.e. it is merely im-
mediate spirit, the spirit of nature. Its self-conscious
life is therefore merely the mystery of the Bread and
the Wine, of Ceres and Bacchus, not of the other, the
strictly higher, gods [of Olympus], whose individuahty
includes, as an essential moment, self-consciousness as
such. Spirit has not yet qua self-conscious spirit offered
itself up to it, and the mystery of bread and wine is
not yet the mystery of flesh and blood.

This unstable divine revel must come to rest as
an object, and the enthusiasm, which did not reach
consciousness, must produce a work which confronts

* As found in the mysteries of Demeter.

t As found in the mysteries of Bacchus and Dionysus.

I Tlie Maenads ; cp. Euripides, Bacchae.

The Living Work of Art 735

it as the statue stands over against the enthusiasm of
the artist in the previous case, — a work too that is
equally complete and finished, yet not as an inherently
lifeless but as a hving self. Such a cult is the Festival
which man makes in his own honour, though not im-
parting to a cult of that kind the significance of
the Absolute Being; for it is the ultimate Being that
is first revealed to him, not yet Spirit — not such a
Being as essentially takes on human form. But this
cult provides the basis for this revelation, and lays
out its moments individually and separately. Thus
we here get the abstract moment of the living em-
bodiment of ultimate Being, just as formerly we had
the unity of both in the state of unconstrained emo-
tional fervency. In the place of the statue man thus
puts himself as the form elaborated and moulded
for perfectly free movement, just as the statue is the
perfectly free state of quiescence. If every individual
knows how to play the part at least of a torchbearer,
one of them comes prominently forward who is the
very embodiment of the movement, the smooth elabora-
tion, the fluent energy and force of all the members.
He is a Hvely and hving work of art, which matches
strength with its beauty ; and to him is given, as a
reward for his force and energy, the adornment, with
which the statue was decorated [in the former type of
religion], and the honour of being, amongst his own
nation, instead of a god in stone, the highest bodily
representation of what the essential Being of the
nation is.

In both the representations, which have just come
before us, there is present the unity of self-consciousness
and spiritual Being ; but they still lack their due balance

736 Phenomenology of Mind

and equilibrium. In the case of the bacchic * revelhng
enthusiasm the self is beside itself ; in bodily beauty of
form it is spiritual Being that is outside itself. The
gloominess of consciousness in the one case and its
Avild stammering utterance, must be taken up into the
transparent existence of the latter ; and the clear but
spiritless form of the latter, into the emotional inward-
ness of the former. The perfect element in which the
inwardness is as external as the externality is inward, is
once again Language. But it is neither the language of
the oracle, entirely contingent in its content and alto-
gether individual in character ; nor is it the 'emotional
hymn sung in praise of a merely individual god ; nor
is it the meaningless stammer of delirious bacchantic
revelry. It has attained to its clear and universal
content and meaning. Its content is clear, for the
artificer has passed out of the previous state of entirely
insubstantial enthusiasm, and worked himself into a
definite shape, which is his own proper existence, per-
meated through all its movements by self-conscious
soul, and is that of his contemporaries. Its content is
universal, for in this festival, which is to the honour
of man, there vanishes the onesidedness pecuhar to
figures represented in statues, which merely contain a
national spirit, a determinate character of the godhead.
The finely built warrior is indeed the honour and glory
of his particular nation; but he is a physical or cor-
poreal individuality in which are sunk out of sight the
expanse and depth of meaning, the seriousness of sig-
nificance, and the inner character of the spirit which
underhes the particular mode of fife, the cravings,
the needs and the customs of his nation. In re-

* As distinct from the worship of Apollo.

The Living Worh of Art 737

linquishing all this for complete corporeal embodi-
ment, spirit has laid aside the particular impressions,
the special tones and chords of that nature which it,
as the actual spirit of the nation, includes. Its nation,
therefore, is no longer conscious in this spirit of its
special particular character, but rather of having laid
this aside, and of the universahty of its human
existence.

VOL. II.

The Spiritual Work of Art

The national spirits, which find their being in the
form of some particular animal, coalesce into one single
spirit.* Thus it is that the separate artistically beau-
tiful national spirits combine to form a Pantheon,
the element and habitation of which is Language.
Pure intuition of self in the sense of universal human
nature takes, when the national or tribal spirit is
actuahsed, this form : the national spirit combines with
the others (which together with it constitute, through
nature and natural conditions, one people), in a common
undertaking, and for this task builds up a collective
nation, and, with that, a collective heaven. This
universahty, to which spirit attains in its existence,
is, nevertheless, merely this first imiversaUty, which,
to begin with, starts from the individuahty of ethical
life, has not yet overcome its immediacy, has not yet
built up a single state out of these separate national
elements. The ethical life of an actual national spirit
rests partly on the simple confiding trust of individuals
in the whole of their nation, partly in the direct share
which all, in spite of differences of position, take in the
decisions and acts of its government. In the union, not
in the first instance to secure a permanent order but
merely for a common act, that freedom of participation

* V. sup., A., b.
738

The Spiritual Work of Art 739

on the part of each and all is for the nonce set aside.
This first community of hfe is, therefore, an assemblage
of individuahties rather than the dominion and control of
abstract thought, which would rob the individuals of
their self-conscious share in the will and act of the
whole.

The assembly of national spirits constitutes a circle
of forms and shapes, which now embraces the whole of
natm'e, as well as the whole ethical world. They are too
under the supreme command rather than the supreme Szs
dominion of one. By themselves, they are the universal
substances embodying what the self-conscious essential
reahty inherently is and does. This, however, con-
stitutes the moving force, and, in the first instance,
at least the centre, with which those universal entities
are concerned, and which, to begin with, seems to unite
in a merely accidental way all that they variously
accomphsh. But it is the return of the divine Being to
self-consciousness which already contains the reason
that self-consciousness forms the centre for those divine
forces, and conceals their essential unity in the first
instance under the guise of a friendly external relation
between both worlds.

The same universahty, which belongs to this content,
has necessarily also that form of consciousness in which
the content appears. It is no longer the concrete acts
and deeds of the cult; it is an action which is not
indeed raised as yet to the level of the notion, but
only to that of ideas, the synthetic connection of self-
conscious and external existence. The element in
which these presented ideas exist, language, is the
earHest language, the Epic as such, which contains
the universal content, at any rate universal in the sense

740 Phenomenology of Mind

of completeness of the world presented, though not
in the sense of universahty of thought. The Minstrel
is the individual and actual spirit from whom,
as a subject of this world, it is produced, and by whom
it is borne. His " pathos " is not the deafening powers
of nature, but Mnemosyne, Recollection, a gradually
evolved inwardness, the memory of an essential
mode of being once directly present. He is the organ
and instrument whose content is passing away ;
it is not his own self which is of any account,
but his muse, his universal song. What, however, is
present in fact, has the form of an inferential process,
where the one extreme of universality, the world of
gods, is connected with individuahty, the minstrel,
through the middle term of particularity. The middle
term is the nation in its heroes, who are individual
men like the minstrel, but only ideally presented, and
thereby at the same time universal hke the free extreme
of universahty, the gods.

In this Epic, then, what is inherently established in
the cult, the relation of the divine to the human, is
set forth and displayed as a whole to consciousness.
The content is an ''act"* of the essential Being con-
scious of itself. Acting disturbs the peace of the sub-
stance, and awakens the essential Being ; and by
so doing its simple unity is divided into parts,
and opened up into the manifold world of natural
powers and ethical forces. The act is the violation
of the peaceful earth; it is the trench which, vivified
by the blood of the hving, calls forth the spirits of the
departed, who are thirsting for Hfe, and who receive
it in the action of self-consciousness.t There are two

* A " drama.'' t The Epic exorcises the dead past ; v. Odyssey, XI.

The Sfiritual Work oj Art 741

sides to the business the universal activity is concerned
to accompHsh : the side of the self — in virtue of which
it is brought about by a collection of actual nations
with the prominent individuahties at the head of them ;
and the side of the universal — in virtue of which it is
brought about by their substantial forces. The re-
lation of the two, however, took formerly the character
of being the synthetic connection of universal and
individual, i.e. of being the process of ideal presentation.
On this specific character depends the judgment re-
garding this world.

The relation of the two is, by this means, a com-
minghng of both, which illogically divides the unity of
the action, and in a needless fashion throws the act
from one side over to the other. The universal powers
assume the form of individual beings, and thus have in
them the principle from which action comes ; when
they effect anything, therefore, this seems to pro-
ceed as entirely from them and to be as free as in
the case of men. Hence both gods and men have
done one and the same thing. The seriousness with
which those divine powers go to work is ridiculously
unnecessary, since they are in point of fact the moving
force of the individuahties engaged in the acts; while
the strain and toil of the latter again is an equally use-
less effort, since the former direct and manage every-
thing. Over-zealous mortal creatures, who are as
nothing, are at the same time the mighty self that
brings into subjection universal beings, violates the
gods, and procures for them actual reahty and an in-
terest in acting. Just as, conversely, these powerless
gods, these impotent universal beings, which procure
their sustenance from the gifts of men and, through 5S^

742 Phenomenology of Mind

men, first get something to do, are the natural inner
principle and the substance of all events, as also the
ethical material, and the " pathos " of action. If their
cosmic natures first get reahty and a sphere of effectual
operation through the free self of individuahty, it is also
the case that they are the imiversal, which withdraws
from and avoids this connection, remains unrestricted
and unconstrained in its own character, and, by the
inexhaustible elasticity of its unity, extinguishes the
atomic singleness of the individual acting and his
various aspects, preserves itself in its purity, and dis-
solves all that is individual in the current of its own
continuity.

Just as the gods fall into this contradictory relation
with the antithetic nature having the form of self, in
the same way their miiversality comes into conflict
with their own specific character and the relation in
which it stands to others. They are the eternal and
resplendent individuals, who exist in their own calm,
and are removed from the changes of time and the
influence of alien forces. But they are at the same
time determinate elements, particular gods, and thus
stand in relation to others. But that relation to others,
which, in virtue of the opposition it involves, is one of
strife, is a comic self-forgetfulness of their eternal
nature. The determinateness they possess is rooted
in the divine subsistence, and, in its specific hmitation,
has the independence of the whole individuahty ; owing
to this, their characters at once lose the sharpness of
their distinctive peculiarity, and in their ambiguity
blend together.

One purpose of their activity and their activity
itself, being directed against an " other " and so against

The Spiritual Work of Art 743

an Invincible divine force, are a contingent and futile
piece of bravado, which passes away at once, and trans-
forms the pretence of seriousness in the act into a
harmless, self-confident piece of sport with no result
and no issue. If, however, in the nature of their divinity,
the negative element, the specific determinateness of
that nature, appears merely as the arbitrariness of
their activity, and as the contradiction between the
purpose and result, and if that independent self-confi-
dence outweighs and overbalances the element of deter-
minateness, then, by that very fact, the pure force of
negativity confronts and opposes their nature, and more-
over with a power to which it must finally submit, and
over which it can in no way prevail. They are the uni- irj /
versal, and the positive, as against the individual self of
mortals, which cannot hold out against their power and
might. But the universal self, for that reason, hovers
over these mortal selves, and over this whole world of
ideal presentation to which the entire content belongs ;
and is for them the empty form of bare Necessity, not
determined conceptually — a mere event to which they
stand related selfless and sorrowing, for these deter-
minate natures do not find themselves in this purely
formal necessity.

This necessity, however, is the unity of the notion,
a unity dominating and controlhng the contradic-
tory independent subsistence of the individual moments,
a unity in which the inconsistency and fortuitousness
of their action is coherently regulated, and the spor-
tive character of their acts receives its serious value
in those moments themselves. The content of the
world of ideal presentation carries on its process in the
midst unrestrained and detached by itself, gathering

744 Phenomenology of Minä

round tlie individuality of some hero, who, however,
feels the strength and splendour of his life broken,
and mourns the early death he sees ahead of him. For
the actual individuality, firmly fixed in itself, is isolated
and excluded to the utmost point, and severed into its
elements, which have not yet found each other and
united. The one individual element, the abstract unreal
moment, is necessity which takes no share in the hfe
of the mediating term just as httle as does the other,
the concrete real individual element, the minstrel,
who keeps himself outside it, and disappears in what
he ideally presents. Both extremes must get nearer
the content ; the one, necessity, has to get filled with
it, the other, the language of the minstrel, must have
a share in it. And the content formerly left to itself
must preserve in it the certainty and the fixed character
of the negative.

This higher language, that of Tragedy, gathers and
keeps more closely together the dispersed and disin-
tegrated moments of the inner essential world and the
world of action. The substance of the divine falls
apart, in accordance with the nature of the notion, into
its shapes and forms, and their movement is hkewise in
conformity with that notion. In regard to form, the lan-
guage here ceases to be narrative, in virtue of the fact
that it enters into the content, just as the content
ceases to be merely one that is ideally presented. The
hero is himself the spokesman, and the representation
given brings before the audience — who are also spec-
tators— self-conscious human beings, who know their
own rights and purposes, the power and the will be-
longing to their specific nature, and who know how to
state them. They are artists who do not express with

The Spiritual Work of Art 745

unconscious naivete and naturalness the merely ex-
ternal aspect of what they begin and what they decide
upon, as is the case in the language accompanying
ordinary action in actual hfe ; they make the very
inner being external, they prove the righteousness of
their action, and the "pathos" controlling them is
soberly asserted and definitely expressed in its universal
individuahty, free from all accident of circumstance
and the particular pecuHarities of personahties. Lastly,
it is in actual human beings that these characters get
existence, human beings who impersonate heroes,
and represent them in actual speech, not in the form
of a narrative, but speaking in their own person. Just
as it is essential for a statue to be made by human
hands, so is the actor essential to his mask — not as an
external condition, from which, artistically considered,
we have to abstract ; or so far as abstraction must
certainly be made, we thereby state just that art does
not yet contain in it the true and proper self.

The general ground, on which the movement of these
shapes produced from the notion takes place, is the con-
sciousness of the first form of language, where the
content is ideally presented, and its detail spread
out without reference to self. It is the commonalty
in general, whose wisdom finds utterance in the Chorus
of the Elders ; in the powerlessness of this chorus the
generahty finds its representative, because the common
people itself compose merely the positive and passive
material for the individuahty of the government
confronting it. Lacking the power to negate and
oppose, it is unable to hold together and keep within
boimds the riches and varied fullness of divine life;
it allows each individual moment to go ofi its own v/ay.

*746 Phenomenology of Mind

and in its hymns of honour and reverence praises each
individual moment as an independent god, now this
god and now again another. Where, however, it
detects the seriousness of the notion, and perceives
how the notion proceeds to deal with these forms,
shattering them as it goes along; and where it comes
to see how badly its praised and honoured gods come
off when they venture on the ground where the notion
holds sway; — there it is not itself the negative power
actively setting to work, but keeps itself within
the abstract selfless thought of such power, confines
itself to the consciousness of alien and external destiny,
and produces the empty wish to tranquillize, and feeble
ineffective talk intended to appease. In its terror
before the higher powers, which are the immediate
arms of the substance ; in its terror before their struggle
with one another, and before the simple and uniform
action of that necessity, which crushes them as
well as the living beings bound up with them ; in its
compassion for these living beings, whom it knows at
once to be the same with itself — it is conscious of
nothing but ineffective horror of this whole process,
conscious of equally helpless pity, and, in fine, the mere
empty peace of surrender to necessity, whose work is
apprehended neither as the necessary act of character,
nor as the action of the absolute Being within itself.

Spirit does not appear in its dissociated multiplicity
on the plane of this spectacular consciousness, the in-
different ground, as it were, of presentation; it comes
on the scene in the simple diremption of the notion. Its
substance manifests itself, therefore, merely torn asunder
into its two extreme powers. These elementary universal
beings are, at the same time, self-conscious individu-

The Spiritual Work of Art 747

alities — heroes who put their conscious hfe into one
of these powers, find therein determinateness of cha-
racter, and procure their effective activity and reahty.
This universal individuahsation descends again, as
will be remembered, to the immediate reahty of existence
proper, and is presented before a crowd of spectators,
who find in the chorus their image and counterpart,
or rather their own thought giving itself expression.

The content and movement of spirit, which is object CSj:,
to itself here, have been already considered as the nature
and reahsation of the substance of ethical life. In its
form of rehgion spirit attains to consciousness about
itself, or reveals itself to its consciousness in its purer
form and its simpler mode of embodiment. If, then, the
ethical substance by its very principle broke up, as re-
gards its content, into two powers — which were defined
as divine and human law, law of the nether world and
law of the upper world, the one the family, the other
state sovereignty, the first bearing the impress and
character of woman, the other that of man — in the
same way, the previously multiform circle of gods,
with its wavering and unsteady characteristics, con-
fines itself to these powers, which owing to this feature
are brought closer to individuality proper. For the
previous dispersion of the whole into manifold abstract
forces, which appear hypostatised, is the dissolution
of the subject which comprehends them merely as
moments in its self ; and individuality is therefore only
the superficial form of those entities. Conversely,
a further distinction of characters than that just named
is to be imputed to contingent and inherently external
personahty.

At the same time, the essential nature [in the case of

748 Phenomenology of Mind

ethical substance] gets divided in its form, i.e. with re-
spect to knowledge. Spirit when acting, appears, qua
consciousness, over against the object on which its
activity is directed, and which, in consequence, is deter-
mined as the negative of the knowing agent. The agent
finds himself thereby in the opposition of knowing and not
knowing. He takes his purpose from his own character,
and knows it to be essential ethical fact ; but owing to
the determinateness of his character, he knows merely
the one power of substance ; the other remains for him
concealed and out of sight. The objectively present
reality, therefore, is one thing in itself, and another
for consciousness. The higher and lower right come to
signify in this connection the power that knows and
reveals itself to consciousness, and the power conceahng
itself and lurking in the background. The one is the
aspect of light, the god of the Oracle, who as regards
ir i S" its natural aspect [Light] has sprung from the all-
illuminating Sun, knows all and reveals all, Phoebus
and Zeus, who is his Father. But the commands of
this truth-speaking god, and his proclamations of what
is, are really deceptive and fallacious. For this know-
ledge is, in its very principle, directly not knowledge,
because consciousness in acting is inherently this
opposition. He,* who had the power to unlock the
riddle of the sphinx, and he too who trusted with
childlike confidence,! are, therefore, both sent to
destruction through what the god reveals to them.
The priestess, through whose mouth the gracious god
speaks, J is in nothing different from the equivocal
sisters of fate,§ who drive their victim to crime by

* Oedipus. t Oi'este.s.

X lu the Delphic Oracle. ^ The witches in '^ Macbeth."

The Spiritual Work of Art 749

their promises, and who, by the double-tongued,
equivocal character of what they give out as a certainty,
deceive the King when he rehes upon the manifest
and obvious meaning of what they say. There is a
type of consciousness that is purer than the latter* which
believes in witches, and more discriminating, more
thorough and more solid than the former which puts its
trust in the priestess and the gracious god. This
type of consciousness, t therefore, lets his revenge tarry
for the revelation which the spirit of his father makes
regarding the crime that did him to death, and institutes
other proofs in addition — for the reason that the spirit
giving the revelation might possibly be the devil.

This mistrust has good grounds, because the knowing
consciousness takes its stand on the opposition between
certainty of itself on the one hand, and the objective
essential reahty on the other. Ethical rightness,
which insists that actuaHty is nothing "per se in opposi-
tion to absolute law, finds out that its knowledge is
onesided, its law merely a law of its own character, and
that it has laid hold of merely one of the powers of
the substance. The act itself is this inversion of what
is subjectively known into its opposite, into objective
existence, turns round what is right from the point of
view of character and knowledge into the right of the
very opposite with which the former is bound up in
the essential nature of the substance — turns it into the
" Furies " who embody the right of the other power
and character awakened into hostility. The lower
right sits with Zeus enthroned, and enjoys equal respect
and homage with the god revealed and known.

To these three supernatural Beings the world of the

* Macbeth. t Hamlet.

750 Phenomenology of Mind

gods of the chorus is hmited and restricted by the act-
ing individuaUty. The one is the substance, the power
presiding over the hearth and home and the spirit
worshipped by the family, as well as the universal
power dominating state and government. Since this
distinction belongs to the substance as such, it is, when
ideally presented, not individualised as two distinct
forms [of the substance], but has in actual reaUty
the two persons of its characters. On the other hand,
the distinction between knowing and not knowing
falls within each of the actual self-consciousnesses ; and
only in abstraction, in the element of universahty, does
it get divided into two individual shapes. For the self
of the hero only exists as a whole consciousness, and
hence includes essentially the whole of the distinction be-
longing to the form; but its substance is determinate,
and only one side of the content distinguished belongs
to him. Hence both sides of consciousness, which have
in concrete reahty no separate individuality pecuharly
their own, receive, when ideally represented, each its
own particular form : the one that of the god revealed,
the other that of the Furies keeping themselves con-
cealed. In part both enjoy equal honour, while again,
the form assumed by the substance, Zeus, is the ne-
cessity of the relation of the two to one another. The
substance is the relation [1] that knowledge is for itself,
but finds its truth in what is simple; [2] that the
distinction, through and in which actual consciousness
exists, has its basis in that inner being which destroys
it; [3] that the clear conscious assurance of certainty
has its confirmation in forgetfulness.

Consciousness disclosed this opposition by action,
through doing something. Acting in accordance with

The Spiritual Work of Art 751

the knowledge revealed, it finds out the deceptiveness
of that knowledge, and being committed, in view of the
inner meaning, to one of the attributes of substance,
it did violence to the other and thereby gave the latter
right as against itself. When following that god who
knows and reveals himself, it really seized hold of what
is not revealed, and repents of having trusted the
knowledge, whose equivocal character (since this is its ^"sjy
very nature) had to come also before it, and admoni-
tion thereanent to be found. The frenzy of the priestess,
the inhuman shape of the witches, the voices of trees
and birds, dreams, and so on, are not ways in which
truth appears; they are admonitory signs of decep-
tion, of want of discernment, of the individual and
accidental character of knowledge. Or, what comes to the
same thing, the opposite power, which consciousness has
violated, is present as express law and authentic right,
whether law of the family or law of the state ; while
consciousness, on the other hand, pursued its own proper
knowledge, and hid from itself what was revealed.
The truth, however, of the opposing powers of content
and consciousness is the final result, that both are
equally right, and, hence, in their opposition (which
comes about through action) are equally wrong. The
process of action proves their imity in the mutual over-
throw of both powers and the self-conscious characters.
The reconcihation of the opposition with itself is the
Lethe of the netherworld in the form of Death — or
the Lethe of the upper world in the form of absolution,
not from guilt (for consciousness cannot deny its guilt,
because the act was done), but from the crime, and of the
atoning consolation and peace of soul which absolution
gives. Both are forgetfulness, the disappearance of the

752 Phenomenology of Mind

reality and action of the powers of the substance, its com-
ponent individuahties, and of the powers of the abstract
thought of good and evil. For none of them by itself
is the real essence ; this consists in the undisturbed
calm of the whole within itself, the immovable unity of
Fate, the quiescent existence and hence want of activity
and vitahty in the family and government, and the
equal honour and consequent indifferent unreality
of Apollo and the Furies, and the return of their spiritual
life and activity into Zeus solely and simply.

This destiny completes the depopulation of Heaven
— of that imthinking mixture of individuality and
ultimate Being — a blending whereby the action of
this absolute Being appears as something incoherent,
5' 3 , inconsistent, contingent, unworthy of itself ; for in-
dividuahty, when attaching in a merely superficial
way to absolute Being, is unessential. The expulsion
of such unreal insubstantial ideas, which was demanded
by the philosophers of antiquity, thus already has its
beginning in tragedy in general, through the fact that
the division of the substance is controlled by the notion,
and hence individuality is the essential individuahty,
and the specific determinations are absolute characters.
The self-consciousness represented in tragedy knows
and acknowledges on that account only one highest
power, Zeus. This Zeus is known and acknowledged
only as the power of the state or of the hearth and home,
and, in the opposition falhng inside knowledge, merely
as the Father of the particular knowledge assum-
ing a definite shape ; he is the Zeus acknowledged
in the taking of oaths, the Zeus of the Furies, the Zeus
of what is universal, of the inner being dwelhng in
concealment. The further moments taken from the

The Spiritual Work of Art 753

notion {Begriff) and dispersed in the form of ideal
presentation {Vorstellung), moments which the chorus
permits to hold good one after the other, are, on the
other hand, not the " pathos " of the hero ; they sink to
the level of passions in the hero — to the level of acci-
dental, insubstantial moments, which the impersonal
chorus no doubt praises, but which are not capable of
constituting the character of heroes, nor of being
expressed and regarded by them as their real nature.

But, further, the persons of the divine Being itself,
as well as the characters of its substance, coalesce into
the simphcity of what is devoid of consciousness. This
necessity has, in contrast to self-consciousness, the char-
acteristic of being the negative power of all the forms
that appear, a power in which they do not recognise
themselves, but perish therein. The self appears as
merely allotted amongst the different characters, and
not as the mediating factor of the process. But self -con-
sciousness, the simple certainty of self, is in point of fact
the negative power, the unity of Zeus, the unity of the
substantial essence and abstract necessity ; it is the
spiritual unity into which everything returns. Because
actual self-consciousness is still distinguished from the
substance and Fate, it is partly the chorus, or rather
the crowd looking on, whom this movement of the
divine Ufe fills with fear as being something ahen and
strange, or in whom this movement, as something
closely touching themselves, produces merely the emo-
tion of passive pity. Partly again, so far as conscious-
ness co-operates and belongs to the various characters,
this alhance is of an external kind, is a hypocrisy —
because the true union, that of self, fate, and substance,
is not yet present. The hero, who appears before the

VOL. IL— z

754 Phenomenology of Mind

onlookers, breaks up into his mask and the actor, into
the person of the play and the actual self.

The self-consciousness of the heroes must step forth
from its mask and be represented as knowing itself to
be the fate both of the gods of the chorus and of the
absolute powers themselves, and as being no longer
separated from the chorus, the universal consciousness.

Comedy has, then, first of all, the aspect that actual
self-consciousness represents itself as the Fate of the
gods. These elemental Beings are, qua universal
moments, no definite self, and are not actual. They
are, indeed, endowed with the form of individuahty,
but this is in their case merely put on, and does not
really and truly suit them. The actual self has no
such abstract moment as its substance and content.
The subject, therefore, is raised above such a moment,
as it would be above a particular property, and when
clothed with this mask gives utterance to the irony
of such a property trying to be something on its own
account. The pretentious claims of the universal
abstract nature are shown up and discovered in the
actual self ; it is seen to be caught and held in a con-
crete reahty, and lets the mask drop, just when it wants
to be something right. The self, appearing here in its
significance as something actual, plays with the mask
which it once puts on, in order to be its own person;
but it breaks away from this seeming and pretence
just as quickly again, and comes out in its own naked-
ness and usual character, which it shows not to be
distinct from the proper self, the actor, nor again from
the onlooker,
i" 1^ ^ This general dissolution, which the formally em-
bodied essential nature as a whole undergoes when it

The Spiritual Work of Art 755

assumes individuaKty, becomes in its content more
serious, and hence more petulant and bitter, in so far
as the content possesses its more serious and necessary-
meaning. The divine substance combines the meaning
of natural and ethical essentiahty.

As regards the natural element, actual self-conscious-
ness shows, in the very fact of applying elements of
nature for its adornment, for its abode and so on, and
again in feasting on its own offering, that itself is the
Fate to which the secret is disclosed, no matter what
its position with regard to the independent substanti-
aHty of nature. In the mystery of the bread and
wine it makes its very own this self-subsistence of
nature together with the significance of inner reaUty ;
and in Comedy it is conscious of the irony lurking in
this meaning.

So far, again, as this meaning contains the essence
of ethical reahty, it is partly the nation in its two
aspects of the state, or Demos proper, and individual
family hfe ; partly, however, it is self-conscious pure
knowledge, or rational thought of the universal. Demos,
the general mass, which knows itself as master and
governor, and is also aware of being the insight
and intelhgence which demand respect, exerts com-
pulsion and is befooled through the particularity of
its actual hfe, and exhibits the ludicrous contrast
between its own opinion of itself and its immediate
existence, between its necessity and contingency, its
universahty and its vulgarity. If the principle of its
individual existence, cut off from the universal, breaks
out in the proper form of actual reahty and openly
usurps and administers the commonwealth, to which it
is a secret harm and detriment, then immediately there

756 Phenomenology of Mind

is disclosed the contrast between the universal in the
sense of an abstract theory, and that with which
practice is concerned ; there stands exposed the entire
emancipation of the ends and aims of the mere in-
dividual from all universal order, and the scorn the
mere individual shows for such order.*

Rational thinking removes contingency of form and
shape from the divine Being ; and, in opposition to
the uncritical wisdom of the chorus — a wisdom,
giving utterance to all sorts of ethical maxims and
stamping with vahdity and authority a multitude of
laws and specific conceptions of duty and of right —
rational thought lifts these into the simple Ideas of
the Beautiful and the Good. The process of this
abstraction is the consciousness of the dialectic in-
volved in these maxims and laws themselves, and hence
the consciousness of the disappearance of that absolute
validity with which they previously appeared. Since
the contingent character and superficial individuahty
which mere presentation lent to the divine Beings,
vanish, they are left, as regards their natural aspect,
with merely the nakedness of their immediate existence ;
they are Clouds, t a passing vapour, like those presenta-
tions. Having passed in accordance with their essential
character, as determined by thought, into the simple
thoughts of the Beautiful and the Good, these latter
submit to being filled with every kind of content. The
force of dialectic knowledge % puts determinate laws
and maxims of action at the mercy of the pleasure and
levity of youth, led astray therewith, and gives weapons

* cp. Cleon in Aristophanes, Knights.
t cp. Aristophanes, Clouds.
X The age of the Sophists.

The Spiritual Work of Art 757

of deception into the hands of sohcitous and apprehen-
sive old age, restricted in its interests to the individual
details of Hfe. The pure thoughts of the Beautiful
and the Good thus display a comic spectacle : — through
their being set free from opinion, which contains both
their determinateness in the sense of content and also
their absolute determinateness, the firm hold of con-
sciousness upon them, they become empty, and, on that
very account, the sport of the private opinion and
caprice of any chance individuahty.

Here, then, the Fate, formerly without conscious-
ness, consisting in mere rest and forgetfulness, and
separated from self-consciousness, is united with self-
consciousness. The individual * self is the negative
force through which and in which the gods, as also
their moments, (nature as existent fact and the
thoughts of their determinate characters), pass away
and disappear. At the same time, the individual self
is not the mere vacuity of disappearance, but preserves
itself in this very nothingness, holds to itself and is
the sole and only reahty. The rehgion of art is ful-
filled and consummated in it, and is come fuH circle.
Through the fact that it is the individual conscious-
ness in its certainty of self which is shown to be SLf'L
this absolute power, this latter has lost the form of
something ideally presented {vorgestellt), separated from
and ahen to consciousness in general — as were the
statue and also the hving embodiment of beauty or
the content of the Epic and the powers and persons
of Tragedy. Nor again is the unity the uncon-
scious unity of the cult and the mysteries; rather
the self proper of the actor coincides with the part

* In comedy.

758 Phenomenology of Mind

he impersonates, just as the onlooker is perfectly
at home in what is represented before him, and sees
himself playing in the drama before him. What this
self-consciousness beholds is that that, which assumes
the form of essentiality as against self-consciousness, is
resolved and dissolved within its thought, its existence
and action, and is quite at its mercy. It is the return
of everything universal into certainty of self, a cer-
tainty which, in consequence, is this complete loss of
fear of everything strange and ahen, and complete
loss of substantial reahty on the part of what is ahen
and external. Such certainty is a state of spiritual
good health and of self-abandonment thereto, on the
part of consciousness, in a way that, outside this kind
of comedy, is not to be found anywhere.*

* Cp. Hegel's Aesthetik, W S\., X., 3, 560.

c

Revealed Religion *

Through the Rehgion of Art spirit has passed from
the form of Substance into that of Subject ; for art
brings out its shape and form, and imbues it with
the nature of action or estabhshes in it the self-
consciousness which merely disappears in the awe-
some substance and in the attitude of simple trust
does not itself comprehend itself. This incarnation in
human form of the Divine Being begins with the
statue, which has in it only the outward shape of
the self, while the inner Hfe thereof, its activity, falls
outside it. In the case of the cult, however, both
aspects have become one ; in the outcome of the re-
ligion of art this unity in being completely attained
has at the same time also passed over to the extreme
of self ; in the type of spirit, which becomes perfectly
certain of itself in the individual existence of con-
sciousness, all essential content is swallowed up and
submerged. The proposition, which gives this Hght-
hearted action expression, runs thus : " The Self is
Absolute Being." The Being which was substance, and
in which the self was the accidental element, has dropped
to the level of a predicate ; and in this self-consciousness,
over against which nothing appears in the form of objec-
tive Being, spirit has lost its aspect of consciousness.!

* Cliristianity. t Which implies such opposition.

759

760 Phenoinenology of Mind

This statement, " The Self is Absolute Being,"
belongs, as is evident on the face of it, to the non-
religious, the concrete actual spirit ; and we have to
recall what the form thereof is which gives expression
to it. This form will contain at once the movement of
that spirit and its conversion, which lowers the self
to the note of a predicate and raises substance into
subject. This we must understand to take place in
such a way that the converse statement does not
fer se, or for us, make substance into subject, or,
what is the same thing, does not reinstate substance
again so that the consciousness of spirit is carried back
to its commencement in natural rehgion ; but rather
in such a way that this conversion is brought about
for and through self-consciousness itself. Since this
latter consciously gives itself up, it is preserved and
maintained in thus rehnquishing itself, and remains
the subject of the substance; but as being likewise
se?/-rehnquished, it has at the same time the con-
sciousness of this substance. In other words, since
by thus offering itself up, it produces substance as
subject, this subject remains its own very self. If,
then, taking the two propositions, in the first the
subject merely disappears in substantiaHty, and in the
second the substance is merely a predicate, and both
sides are thus present in each with contrary inequality
of value — the result hereby effected is that the union
and transfusion of both natures [subject and sub-
stance] become apparent. In this union both, with
equal value and worth, are at once essential and also
merely moments. Hence it is that spirit is equally
consciousness of itself as its objective substance, as
well as simple self-contained self-consciousness.

Revealed Religion 761

The religion of art belongs to the spirit animating
the ethical sphere,* the spirit which we formerly saw
sink and disappear in the condition of right, i.e. in
the proposition : " The self as such, the abstract person,
is absolute Being." In ethical hfe the self is absorbed
in the spirit of its nation, it is universahty filled
to the full. Simple abstract individuality, however,
rises out of this content, and its hghtheartedness clarifies
and rarifies it till it becomes a " person " and attains
the abstract universality of right. Here the substantial
reality of the ethical spirit is lost, the abstract insub-
stantial spirits of national individuals are gathered
together into a pantheon; not into a pantheon repre-
sented in idea {Vorstellung), whose impotent form lets
each alone to do as it hkes, but into the pantheon of
abstract universahty, of pure thought, which disem-
bodies them, and bestows on the spiritless self, on the
individual person, complete existence on its own ac-
count.

But this self, through its being empty, has let the
content go; this consciousness is Being merely with-
in itself. Its own very existence, the legal recognition
of the person, is an unfulfilled empty abstraction.
It thus really possesses merely the thought of itself;
in other words, as it there exists and knows itself as
object, it is something imreal. Consequently, it is
merely stoic independence, the independence of thought ;
and this finds, by passing through the process of
scepticism, its ultimate truth in that form we called
the " imhappy self -consciousness " — the soul of despair.

This knows how the case stands with the actual
claims to vahdity which the abstract [legal] person puts

* The Roman State.

762 Phenomenology of Mind

forward, as also with the vahdity of these claims in
pure thought [in Stoicism]. It knows that a vindica-
tion of such claims means really being altogether lost ;
it is just this loss become conscious of itself, and is the
surrender and rehnquishment of its knowledge about
itself. We see that this " unhappy consciousness " con-
stitutes the counterpart and the complement of the per-
fectly happy consciousness, that of comedy. All divine
reahty goes back into this latter type of consciousness ;
it means, in other words, the complete rehnquishment
and emptying of substance. The former, on the con-
trary, is conversely the tragic fate that befalls certainty
of self which aims at being absolute, at being self-
sufficient. It is consciousness of the loss of everything
of significance in this certainty of itself, and of the loss
even of this knowledge or certainty of self — the loss of
tr^ [" its substance as well as of self ; it is the bitter pain
which finds expression in the cruel words, " God is
dead."*

In the condition of right or law, then, the ethical
world has vanished, and its type of rehgion has
passed away in the mood of Comedy. The " un-
happy consciousness " the soul of despair, is just the
knowledge of all this loss. It has lost both the worth
and dignity it attached to its immediate personahty
[as a legal person] as well as that attaching to its per-
sonality when reflected in the medium of thought [in
the case of Stoicism]. Trust in the eternal laws of the
Gods is silenced, just as the oracles are dumb, whose
work it was to know what was right in particular
cases. The statues set up are now corpses in stone
whence the animating soul has flown, while the hymns

* From a hymn of Luther.

Revealed Religion 763

of praise are words from which all beUef has gone.
The tables of the gods are bereft of spiritual food and
drink, and from his games and festivals man no
more receives the joyful sense of his unity with the
divine Being. The works of the muse lack the force
and energy of the spirit which derived the certainty and
assurance of itself just from the crushing ruin of gods and
men. They are themselves now just what they are for
us — beautiful fruit broken of! the tree ; a kindly fate
has passed on those works to us, as a maiden might offer
such fruit off a tree. It is not their actual hfe as they
exist, that is given us, not the tree that bore them,
not the earth, and the elements, which constituted
their substance, nor the climate that determined their
constitutive character, nor the change of seasons which
controlled the process of their growth. So too it is
not their living world that Fate preserves and gives
us with those works of ancient art, not the spring and
summer of that ethical hfe in which they bloomed and
ripened, but the veiled remembrance alone of all this
reahty. Our action, therefore, when we enjoy them
is not that of worship, through which our conscious
hfe might attain its complete truth and be satisfied to
the full : our action is external ; it consists in wiping
off some drop of rain or speck of dust from these fruits,
and in place of the inner elements composing the
reahty of the ethical hfe, a reahty that environed,
created and inspired these works, we erect in prohx
detail the scaffolding of the dead elements of their
outward existence, — language, historical circumstances,
etc. All this we do, not in order to enter into their Si^. 4
very life, but only to represent them ideally or pic-
torially {vorstellen) within om"selves. But just as the

7G4 Phenomenology of Mind

maiden who hands us the plucked fruits is more than
the nature which presented them in the first instance —
the nature which provided all their detailed conditions
and elements, tree, air, hght and so on — since in a higher
way she gathers all this together into the hght of her
self-conscious eye, and her gesture in offering the
gifts ; so too the spirit of the fate, which presents us
with those works of art, is more than the ethical life
reahsed in that nation. For it is the inwardising in
us, in the form of conscious memory {Er-innerung),
of the spirit which in them was manifested in an
outward external way ; — it is the spirit of the tragic
fate which collects all those individual gods and at-
tributes of the substance into the one Pantheon, into
the spirit which is itself conscious of itself as spirit.

All the conditions for its production are present,
and this totahty of its conditions constitutes the de-
velopment of it, its notion, or the inherent produc-
tion of it. The cycle of the creations of art embraces
in its scope all forms in which the absolute sub-
stance rehnqiiishes itself. The absolute substance is
in the form of individuahty as a thing ; as an object
existing for sense experience ; as mere language, or
the process of that form whose existence does not
get away from the self, and is a purely evanescent
object ; as immediate imity with universal self-con-
sciousness when inspired with enthusiasm ; as mediated
unity when performing the acts of the cult ; as
corporeal embodiment of the self in a form of
beauty ; and j&nally as existence lifted into ideal
representation {Vorstellung) and the expansion of this
existence into a world which at length gathers its
content together into universahty, a universal which

Revealed Religion 765

is at the same time pure certainty and assurance
of itself. These forms, and, on the other side, the
world of personaHty and legal right, the wild and
desert waste of content with its constituent elements
set free and detached, as also the thought- constituted
personality of Stoicism, and the unresting disquiet of
Scepticism — these compose the periphery of the circle
of shapes and forms, which attend, an expectant and
eager throng, round the birthplace of spirit as it
becomes self-consciousness. Their centre is the yearn-
ing agony of the mihappy despairing self-consciousness,
a pain which permeates all of them, and is the com-
mon birthpang at its production, — the simpHcity of
the pure notion, which contains those forms as its
moments.

Spirit, here, has in it two sides, which are above re-
presented as the two converse statements : one is this,
that substance empties itself of itself, and becomes self-
consciousness ; the other is the converse, that self-
consciousness empties itself of itself and makes itself
into the form of " thing," or makes itself universal
self. Both sides have in this way met each other,
and, in consequence, their true union has arisen. The
relinquishment or " kenosis " on the part of the
substance, its becoming self-consciousness, expresses
the transition into the opposite, the unconscious
transition of necessity, in other words, that it is
implicitly self-consciousness. Conversely, the emptying
of self-consciousness expresses this, that imphcitly it
is Universal Being, or — because the self is pure self-
existence, which is at home with itself in its opposite
— that the substance is self-consciousness exphcitly for
the self, and, just on that account, is spirit. Of this spirit,

766 Phenomenology of Mind

which has left the form of substance behind, and enters
existence in the shape of self-consciousness, we may
say, therefore — if we wish to use terms drawn from
the process of natural generation — that it has a real
mother but a potential or an imphcit father. For
actual reahty, or self-consciousness, and implicit being
in the sense of substance, are its two moments ; and
by the reciprocity of their kenosis, each rehnquishing
or " emptying " itself of itself and becoming the other,
spirit thus comes into existence as their unity.

In so far as self-consciousness in a one-sided way
grasps only its oivn rehnquishment, although its object
is thus for it at once both existence and self and it
knows all existence to be spiritual in nature, yet true
spirit has not become thereby objective for it. For,
so far, being in general or substance, would not
necessarily from its side be also emptied of itself, and
SL become self -consciousness. In that case, then, all exist-
ence is spiritual reality merely from the standpoint of
consciousness, not inherently in itself. Spirit in this
way has merely a fictitious or imaginary existence.*
This fanciful imagination is fantastic extravagance
of mind, which introduces into nature as well as
history, the world and the mythical ideas of early
reHgions, another inner esoteric meaning different
from what they, on the face of them, bear directly to
consciousness, and, in particular, in the case of reH-
gions, another meaning than the self-consciousness,
whose religions they were, could find and admit to
be there. But this meaning is one that is borrowed,
a garment, which does not cover the nakedness of the
outer appearance, and secures no belief and respect ;

* As in neo-Platonism.

Revealed Religion 767

it is no more than murky darkness and a peculiar
crazy twist of consciousness.

If then this meaning of the objective is not to be bare
fancy and imagination, it must be inherent and essential
{an sich), i.e. must at once arise in consciousness as
springing from the very notion, and must come forward
in its necessity. It is thus that self-knowing spirit has
arisen ; it has arisen by means of its necessary process
through the knowledge of immediate consciousness,
i.e. of consciousness of the immediately existing ob-
ject. This notion, which, being immediate, had also,
for consciousness, the form of immediacy, has, in
the second place, taken on the form of self-conscious-
ness essentially and inherently, i.e. by just the same
necessity of the notion by which being or immediacy, the
abstract object of sense-consciousness, renounces itself
and becomes, for consciousness. Ego. The immediate
entity (Ansich), or objectively existent necessity, is, how-
ever, different from the subjective thinking entity,
or the knowledge of necessity — a distinction which,
at the same time, does not he outside the notion, for the
simple unity of the notion is itself immediate being.
The notion is at once what empties or rehnquishes itself,
or the exphcit unfolding of directly apprehended [ange-
schaut) necessity, and is also at home with itself in that
necessity, knows it and comprehends it. The immediate ^"i^q
inherent nature of spirit, which takes on the form of
self-consciousness, means nothing else than that the
concrete actual ivorld-sfirit has reached this knowledge
of itself. It is then too that this knowledge first enters
its consciousness, and enters it as truth. How that
came about has already been explained.

That Absolute Spirit has taken on the form of self-

768 Phenomenology of Mind

consciousness inherently and necessarily, and has done
so too as a conscious fact — this position appears now
as the behef of the world, the behef that spirit exists
in fact as a definite self-consciousness, i.e. as an actual
human being, that spirit is an object for immediate
experience, that the beheving mind sees, feels, and hears
this divinity.* Taken thus it is not an imagination,
not a fancy ; it is actual in the behever. Consciousness
in that case does not set out from its own inner hfe,
does not start from thought, and enclose the thought of
God along with existence; rather it sets out from im-
mediate present existence, and finds God there.

The moment of immediate existence is present as an
element in the notion, and present in such a way that
the rehgious spirit, on the return of all ultimate reahty
into consciousness, has become simple positive self, just
as the actual spirit as such, in the case of the " unhappy
consciousness," was just this simple self-conscious nega-
tivity. The self of the definitely existent spirit has in
that way the form of complete immediacy. It is neither
set up as something thought, or imaginatively repre-
sented, nor as something produced, as is the case with
the immediate self both in natural rehgion, and in
rehgion as art. Rather, this concrete God is beheld
sensuously and immediately as a self, as a real indi-
vidual human being ; only so is it a self-consciousness.

This incarnation of the Divine Being, its having
essentially and directly the form of self-consciousness,
is the simple content of Absolute Rehgion. Here the
Divine Being is known as spirit ; this rehgion is the
Divine Being's consciousness concerning itself that
it is Spirit. For spirit is knowledge of itself in

* e.g. in Christianity.

Revealed Religion 769

its state of self-relinquishment, the absolute Reality,
which is the process of retaining its harmony and
identity with itself in its otherness. This, however,
is Substance, so far as in its accidents substance at the
same time turns back into itself ; and does so, not as
being indifferent towards something unessential and, con-
sequently, finding itself in some ahen element, but as
being there within itself, i.e. so far as it is subject or
self.

In this form of rehgion the Divine Being is, on that
account, revealed. Its being revealed obviously consists
in this, that what it is, is consciously known. It is,
however, known just in its being known as spirit, as a
Being which is essentially self-consciousness.

There is something in the object always concealed
from consciousness when the object is for consciousness
an " other," something alien and extraneous, and when
consciousness does not laiow the object as its self. This
concealment, this secrecy, ceases when the Absolute
Being qua spirit is object of consciousness. For here in
its relation to consciousness the object is in the form of
self ; i.e. consciousness at once and immediately knows
itself there, or is manifest, revealed, to itself in the
object. Itself is manifest to itself merely in its own
certainty of self; the object it has is the self; self, how-
ever, is nothing ahen and extraneous, but inseparable
unity with itself, the immediate universal. It is the pure
notion, pure thought, or self-existence, being-for-self,
which is immediately being, and, therewith, being-for-
another, and, qua this being-for-another, is immedi-
ately tm'ned back into itself and is at home with itself
{bei sich). It is thus the truly and solely revealed.
The Good, the Righteous, the Holy, Creator of Heaven

VOL. II.— 2 A

770 Phenomenology of Mind

and Earth, etc. — all these are predicates of a subject,
universal moments, which have their hold on this
central point, and only are when consciousness goes
back into thought.

As long as it is tJiey that are known, their ground and
essential being, the Subject itself is not yet revealed ;
and in the same way the specific determinations of the
universal are not this universal itself. The Subject itself,
and consequently this pure universal too, is, however,
revealed as self ; for this self is just this inner being
reflected into itself, the inner being which is immediately
given and is the proper certainty of that [other] self, for
511 which it is object. To be in its notion that which reveals
and is revealed — this is, then, the true form of spirit ; and
moreover, this form, its notion, is alone its very essence
and its substance. Spirit is known as self-consciousness,
and to this self-consciousness it is directly revealed, for
it is this self-consciousness itself. The divine nature
is the same as the human, and it is this unity which is
intuitively apprehended {angeschaut).

Here, then, we fiiid as a fact consciousness, or the
general form in which Being is aware of Being — the
shape which Being adopts — to be identical with its self-
consciousness. This shape is itself a self-consciousness ;
it is thus at the same time an existent object; and this
existence possesses equally directly the significance of
pure thought, of Absolute Being.

The absolute Being existing as a concrete actual self-
consciousness, seems to have descended from its eternal
pure simphcity ; but in fact it has, in so doing, attained
for the first time its highest nature, its supreme reach of
being. For when the notion of Being has reached its
simple purity of nature, it is then both the absolute

Revealed Beligion 771

abstraction, which is pure thought and hence the pure
singleness of self, and immediacy or objective being, on
account of its pure simphcity.

What is called sense-consciousness is also just this pure
abstraction ; it is this kind of thought for which being is
the immediate. The lowest is thus at the same time the
highest ; the revelation which has appeared entirely on
the surface is just therein the deepest that can be
made. That the Supreme Being is seen, heard, etc., as
an existent self-consciousness, — this is, in very truth,
the cuhnination and consummation of its notion. And
through this consummation, the Divine Being is given
to sense, exists immediately, in its character as Divine
Being.

This immediate existence is at the same time not
solely and simply immediate consciousness ; it is re-
ligious consciousness. This immediacy means not only
an existent self-consciousness, but also the purely
thought-constituted or Absolute Being; and these
meanings are inseparable. What we [the philosophers]
are conscious of in our conception, — that objective ^rsx,
being is ultimate essence, — is the same as what the
rehgious consciousness is aware of. This unity of being
and essence, of thought which is immediately exist-
ence, is immediate knowledge on the part of this re-
hgious consciousness just as it is the inner thought or
the mediated reflective knowledge of this consciousness.
For this unity of being and thought is self-consciousness
and actually exists; in other words, the thought-con-
stituted unity has at the same time this concrete shape
and form of what it is. God, then, is here revealed, as
He is ; He actually exists as He is in Himself ; He is real
as Spirit. God is attainable in pure speculative know-

772 Phenomenology of Mind

ledge alone, and only is in that knowledge, and is merely
that knowledge itself, for He is spirit ; and this specula-
tive knowledge is the knowledge furnished by revealed
religion. That knowledge knows God to be thought,
or pure Essence ; and knows this thought as actual
being and as real existence, and existence as the nega-
tivity, the reflexion, of itself, hence as Self, a particular
" this," and a universal self. It is just this that revealed
rehgion knows.

The hopes and expectations of preceding ages pressed
forward to, and were solely directed towards this revela-
tion, the vision of what Absolute Being is, and the dis-
covery of themselves therein. This joy, the joy of seeing
itself in Absolute Benig, becomes reahsed in self-con-
sciousness, and seizes the whole world. For the Absolute
is Spirit, it is the simple movement of those pure
abstract moments, which expresses just this — that
Ultimate Reahty is then eo ipso known as Spirit when it
is seen and beheld as immediate self-consciousness.

This conception of spirit knowing itself to be spirit,
is still the immediate notion ; it is not yet developed.
The ultimate Being is spirit ; in other words, it has
appeared, it is revealed. This first revelation is itself
immediate ; but the immediacy is likewise thought,
or pure mediation, and must therefore exhibit and set
forth this moment in the sphere of immediacy as such.

Looking at this more precisely, spirit, when self-
consciousness is immediate, is a particular '' this '' ; it is
an individual self-consciousness set up in contrast to the
universal self-consciousness. It is a one, a repelHng and
excluding unit, which appears to that consciousness, for
which it exists, in the impervious form of a sensuous
other, an unreduced opposite in the sphere of sense.

Revealed Religion 773

This other does not yet know spirit to be its own ; in
other words, spirit, in its form as an individual self,
does not yet exist as equally universal self, as all self.
Or again, the shape it assumes has not as yet the form
of the notion, i.e. of the universal self, of the self which
in its immediate actual reahty is at once transcended,
is thought, universahty, without losing its reahty in
this universahty.

The prehminary and similarly immediate form of this
universahty is, however, not at once the form of thought
itself, of the notion as notion ; it is the universahty of
actual reahty, it is the " allness," the collective totahty,
of the selves, and is the elevation of existence into the
sphere of presentative or figurative thought {Vorstel-
lung) ; just as in general, to take a concrete example,
the " this " of sense, when transcended, is first of all
the "thing" of "perception," and is not yet the
"universal" of ''miderstanding."

This individual human being, then, which Absolute
Being is revealed to be, goes through in its own case as
an individual the process found in sense existence. He
is the immediately present God ; in consequence His
being passes over into His having been. Consciousness,
for which God is thus sensuously present, ceases to see
Him, to hear Him : it has seen Him, it has heard Him.
And it is by the mere fact that it has seen and heard
Him, that it first becomes itself spiritual consciousness* ;
or, in other words. He has now arisen in the hfe of
Spirit, as He formerly rose before consciousness as an
object existing in the sphere of sense. For, a conscious-
ness which sees and hears Him by sense, is one which is

* cp. " He that has seen me has seen the Father " (John xiv.). " If I
go not away the Comforter will not come unto you " {ibid. xvi.).

774 Phenomenology of Mind

itself merely an immediate consciousness, which has not
cancelled and transcended the disparateness of objec-
tivity, has not withdrawn it into pure thought, but
accepts this objectively presented individual, and not
itself, as spirit. In the disappearance of the immediate
existence of what is known to be Absolute Being, im-
mediacy preserves its negative moment. Spirit remains
the immediate self of actual reahty, but in the form
of the universal self-consciousness of a rehgious com-
munion,* a self-consciousness which rests in its own
proper substance, just as in it this substance is uni-
versal subject : it is not the individual subject by
iTi, himself, but the individual along with the consciousness
of the communion, and what he is for this communion
is the complete whole of the individual spirit.

The terms " past " and " distance " are, however,
merely the imperfect form in which the immediateness
gets mediated or made universal ; this is merely dipped
superficially in the element of thought, is kept there
as a sensuous mode of immediacy, and not made one
with the nature of thought itself. It is hfted out of
sense merely into the region of ideation, of pictorial
presentation ; for this is the synthetic [external] con-
nexion of sensuous immediacy and its universahty or
thought.

Imaginative presentation constitutes the characteristic
form in which spirit is conscious of itself in this rehgious
communion. This form is not yet the self-consciousness
of spirit which has reached its notion as notion ; the
mediating process is still incomplete. In this connexion
of being and thought, then, there is a defect ; spiritual

* " Lo, I am with you alvvay even to the end of the world " (Matt,
xxviii. ; also xviii. 20).

Revealed Religion 175

life is still cumbered with an unreconciled diremption into
a '* hither " and a " yonder/' a " here " and a " beyond."
The content is the true content ; but all its moments,
when placed in the element of mere presentation, have
the character, not of being conceptually comprehended,
but of appearing as completely independent aspects,
externally related to one another.

*In order that the true content may also preserve its
true form when before consciousness, the latter must
necessarily pass to a higher plane of mental develop-
ment, where the Absolute Substance is not intuitively
apprehended but conceptually comprehended and where
consciousness is for itself brought to the level of its
self -consciousness ; — in the way this has already taken
place objectively or for us [who have analysed the pro-
cess of experience].

We have to consider this content as it exists in its
consciousness. Absolute Spirit is content ; that is how
it exists in the form of its truth. But its truth consists
not merely in being the substance or the inherent
reahty of the rehgious communion ; nor again in coming
out of this inwardness into the objectivity of per-
ceptual and presentational thought; but in becoming
concrete actual self, reflecting itself into self, and
being Subject. This, then, is the process which Spirit r5 5'
reahses in its communion ; this is its life. What this
self -revealing spirit is in and by itself, is therefore not
brought out by the rich and full content of its hfe being,
so to say, untwined and reduced to its original and
primitive strands, to the ideas, for instance, presented
before the minds of the first imperfect rehgious com-
munion, or even to what the actual human being

* This paragraph is explanatory.

776 Phenomenology of Mind

[incarnating the Divine Spirit] * has spoken. This
reversion to the primitive and elementary is based on
the instinct to get at the notion and ultimate principle ;
but it confuses the origin, in the sense of the immediate
existence of the first historical appearance, with the
pure simphcity of the notion. By thus impoverishing
the hfe of spirit, by clearing away the idea of the
communion and its action with regard to its idea,
there arises, therefore, not the notion, but bare exter-
nahty and particularity, merely the historical manner
in which spirit once upon a time appeared, the soulless
recollection of an ideally presented historical figure and
its past.j

Spirit is content of its consciousness to begin with in
the form of pure substance ; in other words, it is content
of its pure consciousness. This element of thought is
the process of descending into existence, the sphere of
particularity. The middle term between these two is
their synthetic connexion, the consciousness of passing
into otherness, the process of ideal presentation as such.
The third stage is the return from representation in idea
and from that otherness ; in other words, it is the ele-
ment of self-consciousness itself.

These three movements constitute the Hfe of spirit.
Its resolution into separate parts, when it enters the
form of presentation, consists in its taking on a deter-
minate mode of being ; this determinateness, however,
is nothing but one of its moments. Its detailed process
thus consists in spreading its nature over its various
moments, entering every one, each being an element in
its composition : and since each of these spheres is

* e.g. Christ.

t '1 lie lite and work of the historical Jesus.

Revealed Religion 777

self-complete, this reflexion into itself is at the same
time the transition into another sphere of its being.
Ideal presentation constitutes the middle term between
pure thought and self-consciousness as such, and is
merely one of the determinate forms. At the same time
however, as has been shown, the character belonging
to such presentation — that of being " synthetic con-
nexion " — is spread over all these elements and is their
common characteristic.

The content itself, which we have to consider, has
partly been met with already, as the idea or presenta-
tion of the " unhappy " and the " behevmg " types of
consciousness. In the case of the " unhappy " despairing
consciousness, however, the pecuKarity hes in the con-
tent being produced from consciousness and longingly
desired, wherein the spirit can never be satiated nor
find rest because the content is not yet its own content
inherently and essentially, or in the sense of being its
substance. In the case of the "beheving" conscious-
ness, again, this content has been regarded as the im-
personal Being of the World, as the essentially objective
content of presentative thought — a pictorial thinking
that seeks to escape the actual world altogether, and
consequently has not the certainty of self-consciousness,
a certainty which is cut of! from it, partly as being
conceit of knowledge, partly as being pure insight.
The consciousness of the rehgious communion, on the
other hand, possesses the content as its substance, just
as the content is the certainty the communion has of
its own spiritual hfe.

Spirit, represented at first as substance in the ele-
ment of pure thought, is, thus, primarily the eternal
Being, simple, self-identical, which does not, however,

i-CL

778 Phenomenology of Mind

have this abstract meaning of Being, but the meaning of
Absolute Spirit. Yet spirit consists, not in being a mean-
ing, not in being the inner, but in being the actual, the
real. " Simple eternal Being " would, therefore, be spirit
merely in empty phrase, if it stopped at ideational pic-
torial thought, and went no further than the expression
of " simple eternal Being." " Simple Being," however,
because it is abstraction, is in point of fact the inherently
negative, is indeed the negativity of reflective thought,
or negativity as found in Being per se ; i.e. it is absolute
distinction from itself, its pure process of becoming
its other. Qua essential Being, it is merely in itself,
purely imphcit, or for us : but since this purity of form
is just abstraction or negativity, it is for itself, it is the
self, the notion. It is thus objective; and since pre-
sentational thinking apprehends and expresses as an
event what has just been expressed as the necessity of
the notion, it will be said that the eternal Being pro-
duces for itself an other. But in this otherness it has
hkewise, if so facto, returned into itself again; for the
distinction is distinction in itself, i.e. the distinction is
directly distinguished merely from itself, and is thus the
unity returned into itself.

There are thus three moments to be distinguished :
immanent absolute Being ; exphcit Self-existence, which
is the antithesis, the express otherness, of Being, and
for which that Being is object ; and Self -existence
or Self-knowledge in that other, in that antithetic
expression. The absolute Being beholds only itself
in its Self -existence, in its objective otherness. In
thus emptying itself, in this kenosis, it is merely
within itself : the independent Self-existence which
excludes itself from absolute Being is the knowledge of

Revealed Religion 779

itself on the part of absolute Being. It is the " Word,"
the Logos, which when spoken empties the speaker of
himself, outwardises him, and leaves him behind emptied,
but is at the same time immediately heard and under-
stood, and only this act of hearing or perceiving himself
is the actual existence of the " Word/' Hence, then, the
distinctions which are set up are immediately resolved
just as they are made, and are directly made just as they
are resolved, and the truth and the reahty consist
precisely in this self-closed circular process.

This movement within itself is what the absolute Being
qita Spirit expresses. Absolute Being, when not grasped
as Spirit, is merely an empty abstraction, just as
spirit which is not grasped as a process in this way is
merely an empty word. Since its moments are taken
purely as moments, they are notions in restless activity,
which are merely in being inherently their own opposite,
and in finding their rest in the whole. But the pre-
sentative pictorial thought of the rehgious communion
is not this conceptual thinking ; it has the content
without its necessity ; and instead of the form of the
notion it brings into the realm of pure consciousness the
natural relations of Father and Son. Since it thus, even
when thinking, proceeds by way of figurative ideas, abso-
lute Being is indeed revealed to it, but the moments of
this Being, owing to this [externally] synthetic presenta-
tional thinking, fall of themselves apart from one another,
so that they are not related to each other through their
own very notion, while, again, this figurative thinking
retreats from the pure object it deals with, and takes up
a merely external relation towards it. The object is
externally revealed to it from an ahen source, and in
this thought of Spirit it does not find its own self, does

780 Phenomenology of Mind

not recognise the nature of pure self -consciousness. In
so far as the form of presentative thinking and that way
of thinking by means of relationships derived from nature
have to be transcended, and especially the method of
taking the moments of the process, in which the hfe of
Spirit consists, as isolated fixed immovable substances
or subjects, instead of transient moments — this trans-
cendence is to be looked at as a compulsion on the part
of the notion, in the way we formerly pointed out when
deahng with another aspect.* But since it is only an
instinct, it mistakes its own real character, rejects the
content along with the form, and, what comes to the
same thing, degrades the content into a historical
imaginative idea and an heirloom handed down by
tradition. In this way there is retained and preserved
only what is purely external to the sphere of behef, and
hence a Hfeless entity devoid of knowledge ; while the
inner element in belief has passed away, because this
would be the notion knowing itself as notion.

The Absolute Spirit, ideally presented in pure ultimate
Being, is indeed not the abstract pure Being ; rather,
just by the fact that this is merely a moment in
the Hfe of Spirit, it is lowered to the level of con-
stituent element. The representation of Spirit in this
element, however, has inherently the same defect, as
regards form, which ultimate Being as such has. Ulti-
mate Being is abstraction, and, therefore, the negative
of its simpHcity, is an other : in the same way,
Spirit in the element of ultimate Being is the form of
simple imity, which, on that account, is essentially and
at the same time a process of turning to otherness.
Or, what is the same thing, the relation of the eternal

* V. p. 775.

Revealed Religion 781

Being to its self -existence, its objective existence for
Itself, is that of pure thought, a directly simple relation.
In this simple beholding of itself in the Other, otherness
is not as such set up independently ; it is distinction
in the way distinction, in pure thought, is immediately
no distinction — a recognition of Love, where lover and
beloved are not in their very being opposed to each other
at all. Spirit, which is expressed in the element of pure
thought, is essentially just this : not to be merely in
that element, but to be concrete, actual ; for otherness, i.e.
cancelhng and superseding pure conception, thought-
constituted conception, hes in the very notion of Spirit.

The element of pure thought, because it is an abstract
element, is itself rather the other of its own simphcity,
and hence passes over into ideal presentation proper —
the element where the moments of the pure notion
at once preserve a substantial existence in opposition
to each other and are subjects as well, which do not
exist for a third thing in indifference towards each other,
but being reflected into themselves, break away from
one another, and stand confronting each other.

Merely eternal, or abstract Spirit, then, becomes
an other to itself : it enters existence, and, in the first
instance, enters immediate existence. It creates a World.
This "Creation"' is the word which pictorial presen-
tative thought uses to convey the absolute movement
which the notion itself goes through ; or to express
the fact that the absolutely simple or pure thought,
because it is abstract thought, is really the negative, and
hence opposed to itself, the other of itself ; or because,
to state the same in another way, what is put forward
as ultimate Being is simple immediacy, bare objective
existence, but qua immediacy or existence, is without

782 Phenomenology of Mind

Self, and, lacking thus inwardness, is passive, or has
a relative existence, exists for another. This relative
existence is at the same time a world. Spirit, in the
character of existing for another, is the midisturbed
separate subsistence of those moments formerly enclosed
within pure thought, is, therefore, the dissolution of
their simple universaHty, and their dispersion into their
own particularity.

The world, however, is not merely Spirit thus thrown
■^"** out and scattered in all its plenitude with an external
order imposed on it ; for since Spirit is essentially simple
Self, this self is Hkewise present therein. It is objectively
existent spirit which is individual self, that has con-
sciousness and distinguishes itself as other, as world,
from itself. In the way this individual self is thus
immediately estabhshed at first, it is not yet conscious
of being Spirit ; it thus does not exist as Spirit ; it may
be called " innocent," but not strictly " good." In
order that in fact it may be self and Spirit, it has
first to become objectively an other to itself, in the
same way that the Eternal being manifests itself as the
process of being self-identical in its otherness. Since
this spirit is determined as only immediately existing,
or dispersed in the diverse multiphcity of its conscious
life, its becoming "other" means that knowledge is
centred on itself, concentrates itself upon its subjective
content. Immediate existence turns into thought, or
merely sense-consciousness turns round into conscious-
ness of thought; and, moreover, because that thought
has come from immediacy or is conditioned thought, it is
not pure knowledge, but thought which contains other-
ness, and is, thus, the self-opposed thought of good
and evil. Man is pictorially represented by the rehgious

Revealed Religion 783

mind in this way : it happened once as an event, with
no necessity about it, that he lost the form of harmonious
unity with himself by plucking the fruits of the tree of
the knowledge of good and evil, and was driven from the
state of conscious innocence, from Paradise, from the
garden with all its creatures, and from nature offering
its bounties without man's toil.

Since this self-centredness on the part of the existent
consciousness directly gives rise to disharmony with
itself, Evil appears as the first actual expression of the
self-centred consciousness. And because the thoughts of
good and evil are utterly opposed, and this opposition is
not yet broken down, this consciousness is essentially and
merely evil. At the same time, however, owing to just
this very opposition, there is present also the good con-
sciousness opposing the one that is evil, and again their
relation to each other. In so far as immediate existence
turns round into thought, and self-absorption, self-
centredness, is just thought, while again the transi-
tion to otherness on the part of Being is thereby
more precisely determined, — the fact of becoming evil
can be removed .further backwards away out of the
actually existing world and transferred to the very
earhest realm of thought. It may thus be said that it
was the very first-born Son of Light [Lucifer] who, by
becoming self-centred, fell, but that in his place another
was at once created. Such a form of expression as
" fallen," belonging merely to figurative thought, and
not to the notion, just hke the term " Son," once more
transmutes and lowers the moments of the notion to
the level of imaginative thought, or, in other words,
drags pictures and presentations into the realm of
thought.

784 Phenomenology of Mind

In the same way, it is matter of indifference to co-
ordinate a multiplicity of other angehe shapes and forms
with the simple thought of otherness in the Being of the
Eternal, and transfer to them that condition of self-
centredness. This co-ordination must, all the same,
win approval, for the reason that, through it, this
moment of otherness does express diversity, as it
should do : not indeed as plurahty in general, but as
determinate diversity, so that one part is the Son,
that which is simple and knows itself to be ultimate
Being, while the other part involves the abandonment,
the emptying, of self-existence, and merely hves to praise
that Being. To this part may then also be assigned the
resumption once again of the self-existence relinquished,
and that " self-centredness " characteristic of evil. In
so far as this condition of otherness falls into two parts.
Spirit might, as regards its moments, be more exactly
expressed numerically as a Quaternity, a four in one, or
(because the multiphcity breaks up itself again into two
parts, viz. one part which has remained good, the
other which has become evil), might be expressed as
a Quinity.

Counting the moments, however, can be regarded as
altogether useless, since, for one thing, what is dis-
tinguished is itself just as truly one and single — viz.
the thought of distinction which is only one thought —
as the thought is this element distinguished, the second
over against the first. For another thing it is use-
less to count, because the thought which grasps the
many in one has to be dissolved out of its universahty
and must be distinguished into more than three or
four distinct components. This universahty appears, in
contrast to the absolute determinateness of the abstract

Revealed Religion 785

unit — the principle of number — as indeterminateness in
relation to number as such ; so that we can only speak in
this connexion of numbers in general, i.e. not of a
specific number of distinctions. Hence, in general, it is
here quite superfluous to think of number and counting,
just as, in other connexions, the bare difference of
magnitude and multitude says nothing at all and falls
outside conceptual thought.

Good and Evil were the specific distinctions of
thought which we found. Since their opposition is not
yet broken down, and they are represented as essential
reahties of thought, each of them independent by itself,
man is the self with no essential reahty of his own and
the mere ground which keeps them together, and on
which they exist and war with one another. But these
universal powers of good and evil belong all the same
to the self, or the self is their actuahsing principle. From
this point of view it thus comes about that, as evil is
nothing else than the natural existence of spirit be-
coming self-absorbed and self-centred, conversely, good
enters into actual reahty and appears as an objectively
existing self-consciousness. The idea of the transition
of the Divine Being into otherness is in general merely
indicated and hinted at when Spirit is interpreted in
terms of pure thought ; for figurative thinking this idea
here comes nearer its reahsation : the reahsation is
taken to consist in the Divine Being " humbhng '' It-
self, and renouncing its abstract nature and unreality.
The other aspect, that of evil, is taken by imagination
as an event extraneous and ahen to the Divine Being :
to grasp evil in the Divine Being as the wrath of God
— that is the supreme effort, the severest strain, of
which figurative thought, wresthng with its own Hmita-

VOL. II.— 2 B

786 Phenomenology of Mind

tions, is capable, an effort which, since it dispenses with
the notion, remains a fruitless struggle.

The ahenation of the Divine Nature is thus set up in
its double- sided form : the self of Spirit, and its simple
thought, are the two moments whose absolute unity is
V Q, '2 Spirit itself. Its ahenation with itself consists in the
two falhng apart from each other, and in the one having
an unequal value as against the other. This disparateness
is, therefore, twofold in character, and two connections
arise, which have in common the moments just given.
In the one, the Divine Being stands for what is essential,
while natural existence and the self are unessential
and are to be cancelled. In the other, on the contrary, it
is self-existence which passes for what is essential and the
Divine pure and simple for unessential. Their mediating,
though empty ground is existence in general, the bare
community of their two moments.

The dissolution of this opposition does not take
effect through the struggle between the two elements,
which are represented as separate and independent
Beings. Just in virtue of their independence each must
inherently, through its own notion, dissolve itself in
itself. The struggle takes place first in that quarter
where both cease to be this mixture of thought and
independent existence, and confront each other merely
as thoughts. For in that case, being determinate notions,
they essentially exist merely in the relation of opposi-
tion; qua independent, on the other hand, they have
their essential nature outside opposition; their move-
ment is thus free, self-determined, and pecuhar to
themselves. Just as the movement, then, of both is
inherently movement because it has to be regarded
in themselves, it is set going only by that element of

Revealed Religion 787

the two which has the character of being inherently-
essential as contrasted with the other. This is repre-
sented as a spontaneous action ; but the necessity for
its self-abandonment hes in the notion that what is
inherently essential, and gets this specific character
merely through opposition, has just on that account
no real independent subsistence. Therefore that ele-
ment which has for its essence, not independent self-
existence, but simple being, is what empties and abandons
itself, gives itself unto death, and so reconciles Absolute
Being with its own self. For in this process it manifests
itself as spirit: the abstract Being is estranged from
itself, it has natural existence and actual individual
reahty. This its otherness, or its being sensuously
present, is taken back again by the second process of
self-abandonment, of becoming "other," and is affirmed
as superseded, as universal. Thereby the Divine
Being has come to itself in the sphere of the sensu-
ous present; the immediate existence of actual reahty
has ceased to be something ahen or external to the
Divine, by being sublated, by its becoming universal :
this death of immediacy is therefore its rising anew
as Spirit. When the self-conscious Being cancels and
transcends its immediate present, it is universal self-
consciousness. This notion of the transcended in-
dividual self which is Absolute Being, immediately
expresses therefore the estabHshment of a commimion
which, while hitherto having its abode in the sphere of
pictorial presentation, now returns into itself as the Self :
and Spirit thus passes from the second element consti-
tuting it, — figurative presentation — and goes over to the
third — self -consciousness as such.

If we further consider the kind of procedure that pre-

788 Phenomenology of Mind

sentative thinking adopts as it goes along, we find in
the first place the expression that the Divine Being
"puts on'' human nature. Here it is eo ipso asserted
that imphcitly and inherently the two are not separate :
just as in the statement, that the Divine Being from
the beginning empties Itself of Itself, that its objective
existence is self-absorbed, centres in Itself and becomes
evil, it is not asserted but imphed that 'per se this evil
existence is not something alien to the Divine nature.
Absolute Being would be merely an empty name if in
very truth there were any other being external to it, if
there were an absolute " fall " from it. The aspect of
self-centredness, self-absorption, really constitutes the
essential moment of the self of Spirit.

That this self-centredness, whence primarily comes
its reahty, belongs to the Divine Being — while this is
for us a notion, and so as far as it is a notion, — appears
to presentative thinking as an inconceivable historical
fact. The inherent and essential nature assumes for
figurative thought the form of a bare objective fact
external and indifferent to God. The thought, however,
that those apparently mutually repugnant moments,
absolute Being and self-existent Self, are not inseparable,
comes also before this figurative way of thinking (since
it does possess the real content), but that thought appears
afterwards, in the form that the Divine Being empties
Itself of Itself and is made flesh. This figurative idea, which
in this way is still immediate and hence not spiritual, i.e.
it takes the human form assumed by the Divine to be
merely in the first instance a particular form, not yet a
universal form — becomes spiritual for this consciousness
in the process whereby God, who has assumed shape
and form, surrenders again His external, His immediate

ReDealed Religion 789

existence, and returns to His inner Being. The Divine
Being is then Spirit when it is reflected into itself.

The reconcihation of the Divine Being with its
antithesis as a whole, and, specifically, with the thought
of this other — evil — is thus presented here in a figurative
way. When this reconciliation is expressed conceptu-
ally, by saying it consists in the fact that evil is
inherently the same as what goodness is, or again
that the Divine Being is the same as natm^e in its entire
extent, just as nature separated from God is simply
nothingness, — then this must be looked at as an un-
spiritual mode of expression which is bound to give
rise to misunderstandings. When evil is the same as
goodness, then evil is just not evil nor goodness good ;
on the contrary, both are really done away with — evil
in general, self-centred self-existence, and goodness, self-
less simple abstraction. Since in this way they are both
expressed in terms of their notion, the unity of the two
is at once apparent ; for self-centred self-existence is
simple knowledge ; and what is self-less simple abstrac-
tion is as much pure self-existence centred within itself.
Hence, if it must be said that good and evil in their
conception, i.e., so far as they are 7iot good and evil, are
the same, just as certainly it must be said that they are
not the same, but absolutely different ; for simple self-
existence, or again pure knowledge, is equally pure
negativity or per se absolute distinction. It is only
these two propositions that make the whole com-
plete; and when the first is asserted and asseverated,
it must be met and opposed by insisting on the other
with immovable obstinacy. Since both are equally
right, they are both equally wrong, and their wrong
consists in taking such abstract forms as " the same "

790 Phenomenology of Mind

and " not the same," " identity " and " non-identity," to
be something true, fixed, real, and in resting on them.
Neither the one nor the other has truth ; their truth is
just their movement, the process in which simple
sameness is abstraction and thus absolute distinction,
while this again, being distinction per se, is distinguished
from itself and so is self-identity. Precisely this is
what we have in the case of the sameness of the Divine
Being and Nature in general and human nature in
particular : the former is Nature so far as it is not essen-
tially Being; Nature is divine in its essential Being.
But it is in Spirit that we find both abstract aspects
affirmed as they truly are, viz. as cancelled and pre-
served at once : and this way of affirming them cannot
be expressed by the judgment, by the soulless word
" is," the copula of the judgment. In the same way
Nature is nothing outside its essential Being [God] ; but
this nothing itself is all the same ; it is absolute abstrac-
tion, pure thought or self-centredness, and with its
moment of opposition to spiritual unity it is the principle
of Evil. The difficulty people find in these conceptions
is due solely to sticking to the term " is," and forgetting
the character of thought, where the moments as much
are as they are not, — are the process which is Spirit.
It is this spiritual unity, — unity where the distinctions are
merely in the form of moments, or are transcended and
maintained — which became known to presentative
thinking in that atoning reconcihation spoken of
above. And since this unity is the universahty of
self-consciousness, self-consciousness has ceased to be
figurative or pictorial in its thinking; the process has
turned back into it.

Spirit thus takes up its position in the third element,

Revealed Religion 791

in universal self-consciousness : Spirit is its own com-
munity. The movement of this community being that
of self-consciousness, which distinguishes itself from its
figurative idea, consists in explicitly bringing out what
has impHcitly become estabhshed. The dead Divine
Man, or Human God, is implicitly universal self-
consciousness ; he has to become explicitly so for this
self - consciousness. Or, since this self - consciousness
constitutes one side of the opposition involved in
ideal presentation, viz. the side of evil, which takes
natural existence and individual self-existence to be
the essential reality — this aspect, which is presented as
independent, and not yet as a moment, has, on account
of its independence, to raise itself in and for itself, to the
level of Spirit ; it has to reveal the process of Spirit in
this aspect.

This particular self-consciousness is Spirit in natural
form, natural spirit : self has to withdraw from this
natural existence and enter into itself, become self-
centred ; that means, it has to become evil. But this
aspect is already per se evil : entering into itself
consists, therefore, in persuading itself that natural
existence is what is evil. By presentational picture-
thinking the world is supposed actually to become
evil and be evil as an actual fact, and the atoning
reconcilement of the Absolute Being is viewed as an
actual existent phenomenon. By self-consciousness as
such, however, this figurative presentation of the
truth, as regards its form, is considered to be merely
a moment that is already superseded and transcended ;
for the self is the principle of negation, and hence
knowledge — a knowledge which is a pure act of con-
sciousness within itself. Tliis moment of the nega-

5-1

792 Phenomenology of Mind

tive must in like manner find expression as regards
the content. Since, that is to say, the Absolute Being
is inherently and from the start reconciled with itself
and is a spiritual unity, in which the parts constituting
the presentation are sublated, are moments, what we
find is that each element of the presentation receives
here the opposite significance to that which it had before.
By this means each meaning finds its completion in the
other, and the content is then and thereby a spiritual
content. Since the specific determinateness of each is
just as much its opposite, unity in otherness — spiritual
reahty — is achieved and completed : just as formerly we
saw opposite meanings combined and united objectively,
or in themselves, and even the abstract forms of " the
same " and " not- the- same," " identity " and " non-
identity " cancelled one another and were transcended.
If, then, from the point of view of figurative thought,
the natural self-consciousness rooted and fixed in itself
was the real evil, that process of becoming fixed in
itself is in the sphere of self-consciousness, the knowledge
of evil as something that per se belongs to existence.
This knowledge is certainly a process of becoming evil,
but merely of the thought of evil, and is therefore recog-
nised as the first moment of reconcihation. For, being a
return into self out of the immediacy of nature which is
specifically the principle of evil, it is a forsaking of that
immediacy, and a dying to sin. It is not natural exist-
ence as such that consciousness forsakes, but natural
existence that is at the same time known to be evil.
The immediate process of fixing itself within itself, of
becoming self-centred, is just as much a mediate
process : it presupposes itself, i.e. is its own ground
and principle : the reason for fixing itself in self is

Revealed Religion 793

because nature has fer se already done so. On
account of evil man must be turned back into himself,
but evil is itself the process of doing so, of "fixing
himself in self." This first movement is just on that
account itself merely immediate, is its bare and simple
notion, because it is the same as what its ground or
reason is. The movement, or the process of passing
into otherness, must therefore come out afterwards in
its own more pecuhar form.

Beside this immediacy, then, the mediation of ideal
presentation is necessary. Imphcitly and essentially,
the knowledge of nature as the untrue inadequate ex-
pression of spirit's existence, and this universahty of self
which has thereby arisen within the life of the self
— these constitute the reconciHation of spirit with itself.
This impHcit state is apprehended by the self-conscious-
ness that does not think conceptually, in the form of an
objective existence, and as something presented to it
figuratively. Conceptual comprehension {Begreifen),
therefore, does not mean for it a grasping {Ergreifen) of
this conception {Begriff) which knows natural existence
when cancelled and transcended to be universal and thus
reconciled with itself ; but rather a laying hold of that
ideal presentation, the imaginative idea ( Vorstellung) that
the Divine Being is reconciled with its existence through
an event, — the event of God's emptying Himself of Him-
self, relinquishing His Divine Being, through His factual
Incarnation and His Death. The laying hold of this
idea now expresses more specifically what was formerly
called in figurative thinking spiritual resurrection, or the ^t
process by which God's individual self- consciousness *
becomes the universal, becomes the rehgious communion.

* Tlie Christ.

794 Phenomenology of Mind

The death of the Divine Man, qua death, is abstract
negativity, the immediate result of the process which
terminates only in the universahty belonging to nature.
In spiritual self-consciousness death loses its natural
significance ; it passes into its true principle or con-
ception, the conception just mentioned. Death then
ceases to signify what it means directly — the non-
existence of this particular individual — and becomes
transformed and transfigured into the universahty
of spirit, which lives in its own communion, dies there
daily, and daily rises again.

That which belongs to the sphere of pictorial thought —
viz., that Absolute Spirit, qua individual or rather qua
particular, embodies and presents in its objective exist-
ence the nature of spirit — is thus here transferred to self-
consciousness itself, to the sphere where knowledge main-
tains itself in its otherness, in its opposite. This self-con-
sciousness does not therefore really die, as the particular
person * is represented to have really died ; its particu-
larity succumbs and expires in its universality, i.e. in its
knowledge, which is true Being reconcihng itself with
itself. That primary and prior element of presentative
thinking is thus here set forth as transcended, has, in
other words, returned into the self, into its notion.
What was in the former merely an existent entity has
come to assume the form of Subject. By that very fact
the first element too, pure thought and the spirit eternal
therein, are no longer away beyond and outside the
mind thinking pictorially nor beyond the self ; rather
the return of the whole into itself consists just in con-
taining all moments within itself. When the death
of the mediator is laid hold of by the self, brought

* Christ.

Revealed Religion 795

within its grasp, this means the sublation and trans-
cendence of his factuahty, of his particular independent
existence : this particular self-existence has become
universal self -consciousness.

On the other side, the universal, just because of this,
is self-consciousness, and the pure or abstract unreal
Spirit of bare thought has become concrete and actual.
Th,e death of the mediator is death not merely of his
natural aspect, of his particular self-existence : what dies
is not merely the outer encasement, which, being
stripped of true Being, is eo ipso dead, but also the
abstraction of the Divine Being. For the mediator, as
long as his death has not yet accomphshed the reconciha-
tion, is something one-sided, which takes as true Being
the simple abstract element of thought, not concrete
reality. This one-sided extreme of self has not yet
equal worth and value with ultimate Being ; the self first
gets this as Spirit. When the mediator as imaginatively
presented dies, his death imphes at the same time the
death of the mere abstraction of Divine Being, which is
not yet affirmed as a self. That death is the bitterness
and pain of the " unhappy consciousness," when it feels
that God himself is dead. This harsh utterance is the
expression of inmost self-knowledge which has self bare
and simple for its content ; it is the return of con-
sciousness into the depth of darkness where Ego is no-
thing but bare identity of Ego, a darkness distinguishing
and knowing nothing more outside it. This feehng thus
means, in point of fact, the loss of the Substance and of
its objective existence over against consciousness. But
at the same time it is the pure subjectivity of Substance,
the pure certainty and inner assurance of itself, which
it lacked when it was object or immediacy, pure ultimate

796 Phenomenology of Mind

Being. This knowledge is thus the process of spirituaHsa-
tion, whereby Substance becomes Subject, by which its
abstraction and hfelessness have expired, and Substance
therefore has become concrete and real, simple universal
self-consciousness.

In this way, then, Spirit is Spirit knowing its own self.
It knows itself ; that, which is for it object, exists, or,
in other words, its objectively presented idea is the true
absolute content. As we saw, the content expresses
just Spirit itself. It is at the same time not merely
content of self -consciousness, and not merely object for
self-consciousness ; it is also concrete actual Spirit.
It is this by the fact of its passing through and realising
the three elements of its nature : this movement
through the content of its whole self in this way con-
stitutes its actual reality. What moves itself, that is
Spirit; it is the subject of the movement, and it is
likewise the moving process itself, or the substance
through which the subject makes its way. We saw
how the notion of spirit arose when we entered the
^-,, sphere of religion : it was the process of self-assured
spirit, which forgives and pardons evil, and in so doing
puts aside its own simplicity of nature and rigid un-
changeableness : it was, to state it otherwise, the
process, in which what is absolutely in opposition
recognises itself as the same as its opposite, and this
knowledge breaks out into the "yea, yea" with which
one extreme meets the other. The religious conscious-
ness, to which the Absolute Being is revealed, sees this
notion, and does away with the distinction of its self
from what it beholds ; and as it is Subject, so it is also
Substance ; and is thus itself Spirit just because and in
so far as it is this process.

Revealed Religion 797

This religious communion, however, has not yet
achieved its complete self-consciousness. Its content,
in general, is put before it in the form of an objec-
tive pictorial idea; so that this disruption or opposi-
tion* still attaches even to the actual spiritual character
of the communion — to its return out of its presentative
way of thinking; just as the element of pure thought
itself was also hampered with that opposition. This
spiritual communion, too, is not aware what it is ; it is
spiritual self-consciousness, which is not object to itself
in this form, or does not develop into clear conscious-
ness of itself. Rather, so far as it is consciousness, it
has before it ideal presentations, those picture-thoughts
which were considered.

We see self-consciousness at its last turning-point
become inward to itself and attain to knowledge of its
inner being, of its self-centredness. We see it relinquish
and empty itself of its natural existence, and reach pure
negativity. But the positive significance — viz. that this
negativity, or pure inwardness of knowledge is just as
much the self -identical Absolute Being : put otherwise,
that Substance has here attained to being absolute
self-consciousness — this is, for the devotional con-
sciousness, an objective other, something external. It
grasps this aspect — that the knowledge which becomes
purely inward is inherently absolute simphcity, or
Substance — as the idea of something which is not
thus by its very conception, but as the act of satis-
faction obtained from an other. In other words, it
is not really aware as a fact that this depth of
pure self is the power by which the abstract Ulti-
mate Being is drawn down from its abstractness and

* i.e. between spiritual consciousness and objective idea.

r-i

798 Phenomenology of Mind

raised to the level of self by the strength and force
of this pure devotion. The action of the self hence
retains towards it this negative significance, because
the relinquishment of itself on the part of substance
is for the self an ultimate reality, something fer se ;
the self does not at once grasp and comprehend it,
or does not find it in its own action as such.

Since this unity of Ultimate Being and Self has been
essentially and inherently brought about, consciousness,
too, has this idea of its reconcihation, but in the form
of an imaginative idea. It obtains satisfaction by
attaching, in an external way, to its pure negativity the
positive significance of the unity of itself with absolute
Being. Its satisfaction thus itself remains hampered with
the opposition of an external beyond. Its own peculiar
reconcihation therefore enters its consciousness as
something remote, something far away in the future,
just as the reconcihation, which the other self achieved,
appears as away in the distance of the past. Just
as the individual god-man * has an imphcit, a potential
father and only an actual mother, in Hke manner
we may say the universal god-man, the spiritual com-
munion, has as its father its own proper action and
knowledge, while its mother is eternal Love, which it
merely feels, but does not behold as an actual immediate
object present in its consciousness. Its reconcihation,
therefore, is in its heart, but still with its conscious life
sundered in twain and its actual reahty shattered.
What falls within its consciousness as the inherent
and essential element, the aspect of pure mediation,
is the reconciliation that lies beyond : while what
appears as actually present in its consciousness, a.s the

* The historical Christ.

Revealed Religion 799

aspect of immediacy and of existence, is the world
which has yet to await transfiguration. The world is
no doubt implicitly reconciled with the Divine Being ;
and that Being no doubt knows that it no longer regards
the object as ahenated from itself, but as one with itself
in its Love. But for self-consciousness this immediate
presence has not yet the form and shape of spiritual
reahty. Thus the spirit of the communion is, in its
immediate consciousness, separated from its rehgious
consciousness, which declares indeed that these two
modes of consciousness imphcitly and inherently are
not separated, but this is an implicitness which is not
reahsed, or has not yet become an absolute explicit
self-existence as well.

(DD)

VIII

ABSOLUTE KNOWLEDGE*

THE Spirit manifested in revealed religion has not as
yet surmounted its attitude of consciousness as
such ; or, what is the same thing, its concrete self-con-
sciousness is not at this stage the object it is aware of.
Spirit as a whole and the moments distinguished in
it fall within the sphere of presentative thinking, are
presentations with the form of objectivity. The content
of this presentational thought is Absolute Spirit. All
that remains to be done now is to cancel and trans-
cend this bare form ; or better, because the form
appertains to consciousness as such its true meaning
must have come out in the shapes and modes conscious-
ness has already assumed.

The surmounting of the object of consciousness in this
way is not to be taken one-sidedly as meaning that the
object shows itself returning into the self. It has a more
definite and specific meaning: it means that the object
as such presents itself to the self as a vanishing factor ;
and, furthermore, that the emptying, the relinquish-
ment, of self-consciousness itself establishes thing-
hood, and that this laying aside of self-consciousness

* V. sup. p. 684. "Absolute Knowledge" is at once the consumma-
tion of experience and, on the historical side, constructive philosophy:
V. infra, p. 816 if.

800

Absolute Knowledge 801

has not merely negative, but positive significance, a
significance not merely for us or fer se, but for self-
consciousness itself. The negative of the object, its
cancelhng its own existence, gets, for self-consciousness,
a positive significance ; or, self-consciousness knows this
nothingness of the object because on the one hand
self-consciousness itself relinquishes itself ; for in doing
so it establishes itself as object, or, by reason of the
indivisible unity characterising its self-existence, sets up
the object as its self. On the other hand, there is also
this other moment in the process, that self-consciousness r/^"
has just as really cancelled and done away with this
self -relinquishment and objectification, and has resumed
them into itself, and is thus at home with itself in its
otherness. This is the movement of consciousness,
and in this process consciousness is the totahty of its
moments.

Consciousness, at the same time, had to take up a
relation to the object in all its aspects and phases, and
grasp its meaning from the point of view of each of
them. This totahty of its determinate characteristics
makes the object per se and inherently a spiritual
reahty; and it becomes so in truth for consciousness,
when the latter apprehends every individual one of
them as self, i.e. when it takes up towards them the
spiritual relationship just spoken of.

The object is, then, partly immediate existence, a
thing in general — corresponding to immediate con-
sciousness ; partly an alteration of itself, its relatedness,
(or existence-for-anotherand existence-for-self),c?e^ermm-
ateness — corresponding to perception ; partly essential
being or in the form of a universal — corresponding to
intelhgence or understanding. The object as a whole is

VOL. 11.— 2 c

802 Phenomenology of Mind

the mediated result [the conclusion] or the passing of
universality into individuality through specification,
as also the reverse process from individual to universal
through cancelled individuality or specific determination.
These three specific aspects, then, determine the ways
in which consciousness must get to know the object in
the form of self. This knowledge of which we are
speaking is, however, not knowledge in the sense of
pure conceptual comprehension of the object; here this
knowledge is to be taken as a developing process, has
to be taken in its various moments and set forth
in the manner appropriate to consciousness as such ;
and the moments of the notion proper, of pure and
absolute knowledge, are to assume the form of modes
or attitudes of consciousness. For that reason the
object does not yet, when present in consciousness as
such, appear as the inner essence of Spirit in the way
this has just been expressed. The procedure conscious-
ness adopts in regard to the object is not that of
considering it either in this totality as such or in the
pure conceptual form ; it is partly that of a mode or
attitude of consciousness in general, partly a multitude
of such modes which we [who analyse the process] gather
together, and in which the totality of the moments of
the object and of the procedure of consciousness can
be shown merely resolved into their separate elements.
To understand this method of grasping the object,
where apprehension is a form or mode of consciousness,
we have here only to recall the previous forms of con-
sciousness which came before us earlier in the argument.
As regards the object, then, so far as it is immediate,
an indifferent objective entity, we saw Reason, at the
stage of "Observation,"' seeking and finding itself in

Absolute Knowledge 803

this indifferent thing — i.e. we saw it conscious that its
activity is there of an external sort, and at the same
time conscious of the object merely as an immediate
ob j ect. We saw, too , its specific character take expression
at its highest stage in the infinite judgment : " the
being of the ego is a thing." And, further, the ego is an
immediate thing of sense. When ego is called a soul,
it is indeed represented also as a thing, but a thing in the
sense of something invisible, impalpable, etc., i.e. in fact
not as an immediate entity, and not as that which is
generally understood by a thing. That judgment, then,
*' ego is a thing " taken at first glance, has no spiritual
content, or rather, is just the absence of spirituahty.
In its conception, however, it is in fact the most
luminous and illuminating judgment ; and this, its inner
significance, which is not yet made evident, is what
the two other moments to be considered express.

The thing is ego. In point of fact, thing is transcended
in this infinite judgment. The thing is nothing in itself ;
it only has significance in a relation, only through the
ego and its reference to the ego. This moment came
before consciousness in pure insight and enhghtenment.
Things are simply and solely useful, profitable, and only
to be considered from the point of view of their utihty.
The trained and cultivated self-consciousness, which
has traversed the region of spirit in self-alienation,
has, by giving up itself, produced the thing as its self ;
it retains itself, therefore, still in the thing, and knows
the thing to have no independence, in other words
knows that the thing has essentially and solely a relative
existence. Or again — to give complete expression to the
relationship, i.e. to what here alone constitutes the
nature of the object — the thing stands lor something that

804 Phenomenology of Mind

is self-existent ; sense-certainty, sense-experience, is an-
nounced as absolute truth; but this self-existence is
itself declared to be a moment which merely disappears,
and passes into its opposite, into a being at the mercy
of an " other."

But knowledge of the thing is not yet finished at this
point. The thing must become known as self not merely
in regard to the immediateness of its being and as
regards specific determinateness, but also in the sense
of essence or inner reahty. This is found in the case
of Moral Self-consciousness. This mode of experience
^ thinks of its knowledge as the absolute essential element,
'knows no other objective being than pure will or pure
knowledge. It is nothing but merely this will and this
knowledge. Any other possesses merely non-essential
being, i.e. being that has no inherent nature fer se,
but only its empty husk. In so far as the moral
consciousness, in its view of the world, lets existence
drop out of the self, it just as truly reclaims and takes
this existence back again into the self. In the form of
conscience, finally, it is no longer this incessant alterna-
tion between the " placing " and the "displacing"' [dis-
sembling] of existence and self ; it knows that its
existence as such is this pure certainty of its own self ;
the objective element, into which qua acting it puts forth
itself, is nothing else than pure knowledge of itself by
itself.

These are the moments which compose the reconciha-
tion of spirit with its own consciousness proper. By
themselves they are particular and separate ; and it is
their spiritual unity alone which furnishes the power
for this reconciliation. The last of these moments is,
however, necessarily this unity itself, and, as we see,

AbsoliUe Knowledge 805

binds them all in fact into itself. Spirit certain of itself
in its objective existence takes as the element of its
existence nothing else than this knowledge of self.
The declaration that what it does it does in accordance
with the convictions of duty — this statement is the
warrant for its own action, and makes good its conduct. 5" y^p

Action is the first inherent division of the simple unity
of the notion, and the return out of this division.
This first movement turns round into the second, since
the element of recognition is put forward as simple
knowledge of duty in contrast to the distinction and
diremption that he in action as such and, in this way,
form a rigid reality confronting action. In pardon,
however, we saw how this rigid fixity gave way and
renounced its claims. Reahty has here, qua immediate
existence, no other significance for self-consciousness
than that of being pure knowledge ; similarly, qua
determinate existence, or qua relation, what is self-opposed
is a knowledge partly of this purely individual self, partly
of knowledge qua universal. Herein it is estabhshed,
at the same time, that the third moment, universality,
or the essence, means for each of the two opposite factors
merely knowledge. Finally they also cancel the empty
opposition that still remains, and are the knowledge of
ego as identical with ego : — ^this individual self which is
iromediately pure knowledge or universal.

This reconcihation of consciousness with self-con-
sciousness thus proves to be brought about in a double-
sided way ; in the one case, in the religious mind, in the
other case, in consciousness itself as such. They are
distinguished inter se by the fact that the one is
this reconcihation in the form of imphcit immanence,
the other in the form of exphcit self-existence. As

806 Phenomenology of Mind

we have considered them, they at the beginning fall
apart. In the order in which the modes or types of
consciousness came before us, consciousness has reached
the individual moments of that order, and also their
unification, long before ever religion gave its object
the shape and mould of actual self-consciousness. The
unification of both aspects is not yet brought to light ;
it is this that winds up this series of embodiments of
.-». spiritual life, for in it spirit gets to the point where it
knows itself not only as it is inherently in itself, or in
terms of its absolute content, nor only as it is objectively
for itself in terms of its bare form devoid of content, or
in terms of self-consciousness, but as it is in its self-com-
pleteness, as it is inherently and explicitly, in itself and
for itself.

This unification has, however, already taken place by
implication, and has done so in religion, in the return
of the objective presentation (Vorstellung) into self-con-
sciousness, but not according to the proper form, for the
religious aspect is the aspect of the esset it:' ally indepen-
dent [Ansich) and stands in contrast to the process of
\ self-consciousness. The unification therefore belongs to
this other aspect, which by contrast is the aspect of re-
flection into self, is that side which contains its self and
its opposite, and contains them not only implicitly [an
sich) or in a general way, but explicitly {für sich) or
expressly developed and distinguished. The content,
as well as the other aspect of self-conscious spirit, so far
as it is the other aspect, have been brought to light
and are here in their completeness : the unification
still a-wanting is the simple unity of the notion. This
notion is also already given with the aspect of self-
consciousness ; but as it previously came before us

Absolute Knowledge 807

above, it, like all the other moments, has the form of
being a particular mode or type of consciousness. It is
that part of the embodiment of self-assured spirit which
keeps within its essential principle and was called the
*' beautiful soul." That is to say, the " beautiful soul " is
its own knowledge of itself in its pure transparent unity
— self-consciousness, which knows this pure knowledge
of pure inwardness to be spirit, is not merely intuition
of the divine, but the self-intuition of God Himself.

Since this notion keeps itself fixedly opposed to its
reaHsation, it is the one-sided form which we saw before
disappear into thin air, but also take a positive ex-
ternal embodiment and advance further. Through the
process of realisation, this self-consciousness bereft of
objective content ceases to hold fast by itself, the
abstract determinateness of the notion over against its
fulfilment is cancelled and done away with. Its self-
consciousness attains the form of universahty ; and what
remains is its true notion, the notion that has attained
its reahsation — the notion in its truth, i.e. in unity with
its externalisation. It is knowledge of pure knowledge,
not in the sense of an abstract essence such as duty is,
but in the sense of an essential being which is this
particular knowledge, this individual pure self-con-
sciousness which is at the same time an object ; for the
object is the self -existing self.

This notion obtained its fulfilment partly from the
acts performed by the spirit that is sure of itself, partly
from rehgion. In the latter it obtained the absolute
content qua content, or in the form of an ideal pre-
sentation or of otherness for consciousness. On the
other hand, in the first the form is just the self, for
that mode contains the active practical spirit sure of

re

80S Phenomenology of Mind

itself ; the self accomplishes the life of Absolute Spirit.
This mode, as we see, is that simple notion, which
however gives up its eternal inner Being, takes upon
itself objective existence, or acts. The power of diremp-
tion or of coming forth out of its inwardness lies in the
purity of the notion, for this purity is absolute abstrac-
tion or negativity. In the same way the notion finds
its element of reality, or the objective being it contains,
in pure knowledge itself ; for this knowledge is simple
immediacy, which is being and existence as well as
essence, the former negative thought, the latter positive
thought. This existence, finally, is just as much that
state of reflection into self which comes out of pure
existence — both qua existence and qua duty — and this
is the state of evil. This process of " going into self '"
constitutes the opposition lying in the notion, and is
thus the appearance on the scene of pure knowledge of
the essence, a knowledge giving rise to no action and
no reahty. But to make its appearance in this oppo-
sition is to participate in it ; pure knowledge of essence
has inherently relinquished its simpHcity, for it is the
diremption or negativity which constitutes the notion.
So far as this process of diremption is the process of
becoming self-centred, it is the principle of evil : so far
as it is the inherently essential, it is the principle of
constant goodness.

Now what in the first instance takes place impUcitly
and inherently is at once objectively for consciousness,
and is duphcated as well — is both for consciousness
and is its self-existence or its own proper action. The
same thing that is already inherently estabhshed, thus
repeats itself now as knowledge thereof on the part
of consciousness and as conscious action. Each finds

Absolute Knowledge 809

the other lay aside the independence of character
with which each appears confronting the other. This
waiving of independence is the same renunciation of
the one-sidedness of the notion as constituted imphcitly
the beginning ; but it is now its own act of renuncia-
tion, just as the notion renounced is its own notion.
That imphcit nature of the beginning is in truth
as much mediated, because it is negativity; it now
estabhshes itself as it is in its truth ; and the negative
element exists as a determinate quahty which each has
for the other, and is inherently and essentially self-
cancelHng, self-transcending. The one of the two parts
I of the opposition is the disparity between existence
within itself in its individuahty and universahty ; the
other, disparity between its abstract universahty and
■the self. The former lets its self- existence perish, and
rehnquishes itself, makes confession ; the latter renounces
the rigidity of its abstract universality, and thereby puts
away its hfeless self and its inert universahty ; so
that the former is completed through the moment of
universahty, which is the essence, and the latter through
universahty, which is self. By this process of action
spirit has come to hght in the form of pure imiversahty
of knowledge, which is self-consciousness as self-con-
sciousness, which is simple unity of knowledge. It is
through action that spirit is spirit so as definitely to
exist ; it raises its existence into the sphere of thought
and hence into absolute opposition, and returns out of
it through and within this very opposition.

Thus, then, what was in the case of rehgion objective
content, or a way of ideally presenting an other, is here
the action proper of the self. The notion is the connect-
ing principle securing that the content is the action

810 Phenomenology of Mind

proper of the self. For this notion is, as we see, the
knowledge that the action of the self within itself is all
that is essential and all existence, the knowledge of this
S'S: Subject as Substance and of the Substance as this
knowledge of its action. What we have done here, in
addition, is simply to gather together the particular
moments, each of which in principle exhibits the life
of spirit in its entirety, and again to fix and secure
the notion in the form of the notion, whose content
was disclosed in those moments and had already pre-
sented itself in the form of a mode or type of con-
sciousness.

This last embodiment of spirit — spirit which at once
gives its complete and true content the form of self,
and thereby realises its notion, and in doing so
remains within its own notion — this is Absolute Know-
ledge. It is spirit knowing itself in the form of spirit,
it is conceptual comprehensive knowledge through
notions. Truth is here not merely in itself absolutely
identical with certainty ; it has also the typical form of
certainty of self, or in its existence — i.e. for spirit
knowing it — it is in the form of knowledge of itself.
Truth is the content, which in the case of religion is
not as yet at one with its certainty. This identifica-
tion, however, is secured when the content has received
the form and character of self. By this means, what
constitutes the very essence, viz. the notion, comes to
have the nature of existence, i.e. assumes the form of
what is objective to consciousness. Spirit, appearing
before consciousness in this element of existence, or,
what is here the same thing, produced by it in this
element, is systematic Science.

The nature, moments, and process of this type of

Absolute Knowledge 811

knowledge have then come about in such a way that this
knowledge is pure self-existence of self-consciousness.

It is ego, which is this concrete ego and no other,
and at the same time, from its very nature, is mediated,
or sublated universal ego. It has a content, which it
distinguishes from itself ; for it is pure negativity, or
self-diremption ; it is consciousness. This content in its
distinction is itself the ego, for it is the process of super- .fdPj
seding itself, or the same pure negativity which consti-
tutes ego. Ego is in it, qua distinguished, reflected into
itself; only then is the content conceptualy compre-
hended (begriffen) when ego in its otherness is still at
home with itself. More precisely stated, this content
is nothing else than the very process just spoken of;
for the content is the spirit which traverses the whole
range of its own being, and does this for itself qua
spirit, by the fact that it possesses the form of the
notion in its objectivity.

As to the actual existence of this notion, science
does not appear in time and in reahty till spirit has
arrived at this stage of being conscious regarding itself.
Qu^ spirit which knows what it is, it did not exist before,
and is not to be found at all till after the completion
of the task of mastering and overcoming the imperfection
of its form — the task of procuring for its consciousness
and making itself aware of the shape of its inmost
essence, and in this manner squaring its self-conscious-
ness with its consciousness. Spirit in and for itself,
spirit in its self-contained reahty, is, when distinguished
into its separate moments, self-existent knowledge,
conceptual comprehension in general, which as such has
not yet reached the substance, or is not in itself absolute
knowledge.

812 Phenomenology of Mind

Now in actual reality the knowing substance is
arrived at earlier than its form, earher than the form
of the notion. For the substance is the undeveloped
inherent nature, the fundamental notion in its inert
simphcity, the state of inwardness or the self of spirit
not yet objectivified. What is there, what does exist,
is in the shape of unexpressed simplicity, the un-
developed immediate, or the object of presentative
consciousness in general. Because knowledge {Erkennen)
is a spiritual state of consciousness, which is only aware
of what imphcitly and inherently is so far as this is a
being for the self and a being of the self or a notion —
knowledge has on this account merely a barren object
to begin with, in contrast to which the substance and the
consciousness of this substance are richer in content.
Revelation in such a case is, in fact, concealment ; for
5'*e the substance is here still self -less existence and nothing
but certainty of self is manifest or revealed to it. To
begin with, therefore, it is only the abstract moments
that fall to self-consciousness when dealing with the
substance. But since these moments are pure activities
and must move forward by their very nature, self-
consciousness enriches itself till it has torn from con-
sciousness the entire substance, and absorbed into itself
the entire structure of the substance with all its
constituent elements. Since this negative attitude
towards objectivity is positive as well, establishes and
fixes the content, it goes on till it has produced these
elements out of itself and thereby reinstated them once
more as objects of consciousness. In the notion,
knowing itself as notion, the moments thus make their
appearance prior to the whole in its complete fulfilment ;
the movement of these moments is the process by which

Absolute Knowledge 813

the whole comes into being. In consciousness, on the
other hand, the whole — but not as comprehended con-
ceptually— is prior to the moments.

Time is just the notion definitely existent, and pre-
sented to consciousness in the form of empty pure
intuition. Hence spirit necessarily appears in time,
and it appears in time so long as it does not grasp its
pure notion, i.e. so long as it does not annul time.
Time is the pure self in external form, apprehended in
intuition, and not grasped and understood by the
self, it is the notion directly apprehended through
intuition. When this notion grasps itself, it supersedes
the time character, conceptually comprehends intuition,
and is intuition comprehended and comprehending
through conceptions. Time therefore appears as spirit's
destiny and necessity, where spirit is not yet complete
within itself ; it is the necessity compelling spirit to
increase and enrich the share self-consciousness has in
consciousness, to put into motion the immediacy of
the inherent nature (which is the form in which the
substance is present in consciousness) ; or, conversely, to
reahse and make manifest what is inherent, regarded
as inward and immanent, to make manifest that which
is at first within — i.e. to vindicate and secure for it the
certainty of self.

For this reason it must be said that nothing is con-
sciously known which does not fall within experience,
or (as it is also expressed) which is not felt to be true,
which is not given as an inwardly revealed eternal
verity, as a sacred object of behef, or whatever other
expressions we care to employ. For experience just S'd'i"
consists in this, that the content — and the content is
spirit — in its inherent nature is substance and so object

814 Phenomenology of Mind

of consciousness. But this substance in which spirit
consists, is the development of itself exphcitly to what
it is inherently and imphcitly ; and only by this process
of reflecting itself into itself is it then essentially and
in truth spirit. It is inherently the movement which
constitutes the process of knowledge — the transforming
of that imphcit inherent nature into explicitness and
objectivity, of Substance into Subject, of the object of
consciousness into the object of self-consciousness, i.e.
into an object that is at the same time superseded and
transcended — in other words, into the notion. This
transforming process is a cycle that returns into itself,
a cycle that presupposes its beginning, and reaches its
beginning only at the end. So far as spirit, then, is of
necessity this process of self-distinction, it appears as a
single whole, intuitively apprehended, over against its
simple self-consciousness. And since that whole is
the aspect distinguished, it is distinguished into the
intuitively apprehended pure notion, Time, and the
content, the inherent imphcit nature. Substance, qua
subject, involves the necessity, at first an inner necessity,
to set forth in itself what it inherently is, to show itself
to be spirit. The completed systematic expression in
objective form becomes, then, at the same time the re-
flection of substance, the development of it into a
self or subject. Consequently, until and unless spirit
is inherently completed, completed as a world-spirit,
it cannot reach its completion as self-conscious spirit.
The content of rehgion therefore expresses earher in
time than speculative science what spirit is ; but science
alone is the perfer3t form in which spirit truly knows
itself.
The process of carrying forward this form of know-

Absolute Knowledge 815

ledge of itself constitutes the task which spirit accom-
plishes in the concrete actual shape of History. The
rehgious communion, in so far as it is at the outset the
substance of Absolute Spirit, is the crude form of con-
sciousness, which has an existence all the harsher and
more barbaric the deeper is its inner spirit ; and its
inarticulate stohd self has all the harder task in deahng
with its essence, the unconceived content ahen to its
consciousness. Not till it has surrendered the hope of s'^u
cancelHng that foreignness by an external, i.e. alien
^S method, does it turn to itself, to its own pecuhar world
in the actual present. It turns thither because to
supersede that alien method means returning into
self-consciousness. It thus discovers this world in the
Kving present to be its own property ; and so has
taken the first step to descend from the ideal in-
telHgible world, the world of the intellect, or rather
to endue the abstract element of the intellect with
concrete self -hood. Through " observation," on the
one hand, it finds existence in the shape of thought,
and comprehends existence ; and, conversely, it finds
in its thought existence.* When, in the first in-
stance, it has thus itself expressed in an abstract way
the immediate unity of thought and existence, of
abstract Being and Self ; and when it has expressed the
primal principle of "Light'' in a purer form, viz. as
unity of extension and existence — for " existence "is
an ultimate simple term more akin to thought than
" Light " — and in this way has revived again in
thought the Substance of the Orient,! the Absolute
Substance of Eastern Rehgions ; thereupon spirit at
once recoils in horror from this abstract unity, from this

* Descartes. t Spinoza.

816 Phenomenology of Mind

self-less substance, and maintains as against it the
principle of subjective Individuality.* But after spirit
has rehnquished this principle and brought it under
the ordeal of culture, has thereby made it an objective
existence and established it throughout the whole
of existence, has arrived at the idea of " Utility "t and
in the sphere of absolute freedom has found the key to
existence to be Individual Will, J— after these stages
spirit then brings to hght the thought that lies in its
inmost depths, and expresses ultimate Reahty in the
form Ego = Ego. §

This "Ego identical with Ego" is, however, an
inward, self-reflecting process ; for since this identity
qua absolute negativity is absolute distinction, the self-
identity of the Ego stands in contrast to this absolute
distinction, which — being pure distinction and at the
same time objective to the self that knows itself —
has to be expressed as Time. In this way, just as
formerly ultimate Reahty was expressed as unity of
thought and extension, it would here be interpreted as
unity of thought and time. But distinction left to itself,
unresting, unhalting time, really collapses upon itself ; it
!^S( is the objective quiescence, the stable continuity of
extension ; while this latter is pure identity with self —
is Ego.

Again, Ego is not merely self, it is identity of self
with itself. This identity, however, is complete and im-
mediate unity with self ; in other v^^ords this Subject is
just as much Substance. Substance by itself alone
would be void and empty Intuition {Anschauen), or
the intuition of a content which qua specific would

* Leibnitz. t Tlie principle of the "Aufklärung.''

I Kant. § Fichte.

Absolute Knowledge 817

have merely a contingent character and would be
devoid of necessity. Substance would only stand for
the Absolute in so far as Substance was thought of or
" intuited " as absolute unity ; and all content would,
as regards its diversity, have to fall outside the Sub-
stance and be due to reflection, a process which does
not belong to Substance, because Substance would not
be Subject, would not be conceived as Spirit, as re-
flecting about self and reflecting itself into self. If,
nevertheless, a content were to be spoken of, then on
the one hand, it would only exist in order to be
thrown into the empty abysm of the Absolute, while
on the other it would be picked up in external fashion
from sense perception. Knowledge would appear to
have come by things, by what is distinct from knowledge
itself, and to have got at the distinctions between the
endless variety of things, without any one understanding
how or where all this came from.*

Spirit, however, has shown itself to be neither the
mere withdrawal of self-consciousness into its pure
inwardness, nor the mere absorption of self- conscious-
ness into blank Substance devoid of all distinctions.
Spirit is the movement of the self which empties itself
of self and sinks itself within its own substance, and
qua subject, both goes out of that substance into itself,
making its substance an object and a content, and also
supersedes this distinction of objectivity and content.
That first reflection out of immediacy is the subject's
distinction of self from its substance, the notion in a
state of self-diremption, the subjectification of the self,
and the coming of the pure ego into being. Since this
distinction is the action pure and simple of Ego = Ego,

* Schelling.
VOL. 11.-2 D

818 Phenomenology of Mind

the notion is the necessity for and the uprising of
existence, which has the substance for its essential
nature and subsists on its own account. But this
5-5»^ subsisting of existence for itself is the notion estabhshed
and reahsed in determinate form, and is thereby the
notion's own inherent movement — that of descending
into the bare and simple substance, which is only sub-
ject by being this negativity and going through this
process.

Ego has not to take its stand on the form of self-
consciousness in opposition to the form of substantiahty
and objectivity, as if it were afraid of emptying itself
and becoming objective. The power of spirit Ues rather
in remaining one with itself when giving up itself,
and, because it is self-contained and self-subsistent, in
estabhshing as mere moments its explicit self-existence
as well as its imphcit inherent nature. Nor again is
Ego a tertium quid which casts distinctions back into the
abysm of the Absolute, and declares them all to mean
the same there. On the contrary, true knowledge
lies rather in the seeming inactivity which merely
watches and considers how the element distinguished
proceeds, how it is self-moved by its very nature and
returns again into its own unity.

With absolute knowledge, then. Spirit has wound up
the process of its various forms and modes, so far as in
assuming these various shapes and forms it is affected
with the insurmountable distinction which consciousness
implies [i.e. the distinction of consciousness from its
object or content]. Spirit has attained the pure element
of its existence, the notion. The content is, in view of the
freedom of its own existence, the self that empties and
gives up itself to objectivity ; in other words, that

Absolute Knowledge 819

content is the immediate unity of self-knowledge. The
pure process of thus rehnquishing itself to externahty
constitutes — when we consider this process in its bearing
on the content — the necessity of this content. The
diversity of content is, qua determinate and specific,
due to relation, and is not inherent ; it is its restless
activity of cancelhng and superseding itself, or its
negativity. Thus the necessity or diversity, hke its free
existence, is the self too ; and in this self-form, in
which existence is immediately thought, the content
is a notion. Seeing, then, that Spirit has attained
the notion, it unfolds its existence and develops its
processes in this ether of its hfe and is Systematic
Science. The moments of its process are set forth in
Science no longer as determinate modes or forms of
consciousness, but — since the distinction, which con-
sciousness imphes, has reverted to and has become a
distinction within the self — as determinate notions,
and as the organic self-explaining and self-constituted
process of these conceptions. While in the Phenomen-
ology of Mind each moment is the distinction of know-
ledge and truth, and the process in which that distinction
is cancelled and transcended, on the other hand System-
atic Science does not contain this distinction and
supersession of distinction. Kather, since each moment
has the form of the notion, it unites the objective form of
truth and the knowing self in an immediate unity. In
Science the individual moment does not appear as the
process of passing back and forward from consciousness
or presentation to self-consciousness and conversely :
there the pure form, hberated from the condition of being
an appearance in mere consciousness, — the pure notion
with its further development, depends solely and purely

820 PJienomenology of Mind

on its characteristic and specific nature. Conversely,
again, there corresponds to every abstract moment of
absolute Science a form or mode in which mind as a
whole makes it appearance. As the mind that actually
exists and historically appears is not richer than Science,
so, too, mind in its actual content is not poorer. To
know the pure notions of Science in the form in which
they are modes or types of consciousness — this consti-
tutes the aspect of their reality, in which its essential
element, the notion, appearing there in its simple
mediating activity as thinking, breaks up and separ-
ates the moments of this mediation, and exhibits its
content by reference to the internal and immanent
opposition of its elements.

Science contains within itself this necessity of re-
hnquishing and divesting itself of the form of the pure
notion, and necessarily involves the transition of the
notion into consciousness. For Spirit that knows itself
is, just for the reason that it grasps its own notion,
immediate identity with itself ; and this, in the distinc-
tion it implies, is the certainty of what is immediate or is
sense-consciousness — the beginning from which we
started. This process of releasing itself from the form of
its self is the highest freedom and security of its know-
ledge of itself.

All the same, this rehnquishment of self and aban-
donment to externahty are still incomplete. This
process expresses the relation of the certainty of
its self to the object, an object which, just by
being in relation, has not yet attained its full
freedom.. Systematic knowledge is aware not only
of itself, but also of the negative of itself, or
its hmit. Knowing its hmit means knowing how

Absolute Knowledge 821

to sacrifice itself. This sacrifice is the emptying of
self, the self-abandonment, in which Spirit sets forth, in
the form of free and miconstrained fortuitous con-
tingency, its process of becoming Spirit, intuitively
apprehending outside it its pure self as Time, and Hke-
wise its existence as Space.* This last form into which
Spirit passes, Nature, is its hving immediate process of
development. Natm^e — Spirit divested of self and given
over to externaUty — is, in its actual existence, nothing
but this eternal process of abandoning its own indepen-
dent subsistence, and the movement which reinstates
Subject.

The other aspect, however, in which Spirit comes into
being, History, is process in terms of knowledge, a con-
scious self-mediating process — Spirit given over to and
emptied into Time. But this form of abandonment is,
similarly, an emptying of itself by itself.; the negative
is negative of itself. This way of becoming presents a
tardy procession and succession of spiritual shapes and
forms, a gallery of pictures, each of which is endowed
with the entire wealth of Spirit, and moves so tardily
just for the reason that the self has to permeate and
assimilate all this wealth of its substance. Since its
accomphshment consists in Spirit knowing what it is,
in fully comprehending its substance, this knowledge
means its subjectification, a state in which Spirit leaves
its external existence behind and gives itself over to the
attitude of Recollection [Erinnerumj). In this subjectifi-
cation. Spirit is engulfed in the darkness and night of
its own self-consciousness ; its vanished existence is,
however, conserved therein; and this superseded ex-
istence— the previous state, but born anew from the

* Cp. Ency. §244 ; also Nuturphilos., lutrod.

822 Phenomenology of Mind

womb of knowledge — is the new stage of existence, a
new world, and a new type and mode of Spirit. Here it
has to begin all over again at its immediacy,* as freshly
as before, and thence rise once more to the measm:e of
its stature, as if, for it, all that preceded were lost,
and as if it had learned nothing from the experience
of the spirits that preceded. But re-collection {Er-
innerung) has conserved that experience, and is the inner
being, and, in fact, the higher form of the substance.
While, then, this phase of Spirit begins all over again
its formative development, apparently starting solely
from itself, yet at the same time it commences at a
higher level. The realm of spirits developed in this way,
and assuming definite shape in existence, constitutes a
succession, where one detaches and sets loose the other,
and each takes over from its predecessor the empire
of the spiritual world. The goal of the process is
the revelation of the depth of spiritual hfe, and this is
the Absolute Notion. This revelation consequently
means superseding its " depth," is its " extension '' or
spatial embodiment, the negation of this subjectivity
of the ego — a negativity which is its self-rehnquishment,
its externahsation, or its substance : and this revelation
is also its temporal embodiment, in that this external-
isation in its very nature relinquishes, externahses itself,
and so exists at once in its spatial " extension " as well
as in its " depth " or the self. The goal, vv^iich is Absolute
Knowledge or Spirit knowing itself as Spirit, finds its
pathway in the recollection of spiritual forms as they are
in themselves and as they accomphsh the organisation
of their spiritual kingdom. Their conservation, looked

* Cp. Aristotle, Mctap., KYtlh, " Movement can neither come into
being, nor cease to be ; nor can time come into being or cease to be."

Absolute Knowledge 823

at from the side of their free phenomenal existence in the
sphere of contingency, is History ; looked at from the
side of their conceptually comprehended organisation,
it is the Science of phenomenal knowledge, of the ways
in which knowledge appears.* Both together, or History
comprehended conceptually, form at once the recollection
and the golgotha of Absolute Spirit, the reahty, the
truth, the certainty of its throne, without which it were
hfeless, sohtary, and alone. Only

This" chalice of God's plenitude
Yields foaming His Infinitude, f

* "Phenomenology."

t Adaptation of Schiller's Die Freundschaft ad fin. ; cp. also Schiller's
Philos. Briefe, " 6^0«."

WILLIAM BRENDON AND SON, LTD,
PRINTERS, PLYMOUTH

F. - The Phenomenology of mind. v. 2

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